JUDGMENT 1. - These three writ petitions by M/s. Bhanwarlal Binjaram, Soorsagar, Jodhpur, a dissolved partnership firm, challenges the validity of the three notices dated 19.9.1975 issued by the Assistant Commercial Taxes Officer, War II, Circle 'A', Jodhpur, under section 12(1) of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954 upon the partners of the dissolved firm, in relation to the accounting periods 1959-60, 1960-61 and 1961-62. The contentions advanced in these petitions are common and, therefore, they are deal with by this common order. 2. The facts may be shortly stated. By three orders of re-assessment dated 18.8.1966, 12.10.66 & 25.4.67 the Assistant Commercial Taxes officer brought to tax the turnovers of M/s. Bhanwarlal Binjaram escaping assessment in the years in question. In appeals, the petitioner contended that the firm having been dissolved in 1965 Diwali, the Assessment Commercial Taxes Officer could not have passed the orders of re-assessment for the years in question without serving the partners with notice under section 12(1) of the Act and without affording them an opportunity of hearing. The Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) allowed the appeals on the ground that the Assistant Commercial Taxes Officer had failed to apply his mind to the requirements of section 12(1) of the Act. He, accordingly, set aside the orders of re-assessment and remitted the cases for taking further action, according to law. 3. In pursuance thereof, the Assistant Commercial Taxes Officer served the partners of the dissolved firm with individual notices dated 19.9.1975 under section 12(1) in form ST 12A. In response to the said notices, the partners filed their replies questioning the validity of the impugned notices, particularly on the ground of limitation. On 28.11.1975, the Assistant Commercial Taxes Officer served them with the usual notices in form ST 12, fixing the cases for hearing on 20.12.1975. Thereafter, he served them with notices dated 18.3.1976 under Rule 54 to show cause why penalty under section 16(1)(c) of the Act should not be imposed. The writ petitions have been filed by the dissolved firm. 4. Shri S.C. Bhandari, learned counsel for the Revenue, raises a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the writ petitions. He rightly urges that the writ petitions as filed in the name of the dissolved firm were not maintainable. The objection is clearly well founded. 5. The writ petitions have been filed by the dissolved firm. 4. Shri S.C. Bhandari, learned counsel for the Revenue, raises a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the writ petitions. He rightly urges that the writ petitions as filed in the name of the dissolved firm were not maintainable. The objection is clearly well founded. 5. The provisions of Order 30 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure on which reliance is placed, does not enable the filing of a suit in the firm name where, as here, the accrual of cause of action is after the dissolution: AIR 1945 PC; 71/84 Cal L.J. 33; 27 All L.J. 73; AIR 1945 Orissa 284; ILR(1910) Bom. 562; and the same principle ought to apply to a writ petition by a dissolved firm. 6. Under section 9(3)(b) of the Act, the partners of a dissolved firm are jointly and severally liable assessment and the amount of tax, penalty or other sum due. The writ petition should, therefore, have been filed by the partners individually and not in the name of the firm which stands dissolved. 7. On merits, the petitions must also fail. In support of the petitions, Shri S.K.M. Lodha, learned counsel for the petitioner advanced three contentions, namely (1) the Assistant Commercial Taxes officer had no jurisdiction to issue a fresh notice of re-assessment under section 12(1) of the Act to the partners of the dissolved firm, after the expiry of the period of 8 years provided under sub section (2) thereof; (2) the proceedings for re-assessment pursuant to the order of the remand in appeal, could not be started under section 12(1), upon the expiry of the period of 3 years next succeeding the date of the decision of the appeals; and (3) without completing the proceedings under section 12(1) of the Act, the Assistant Commercial Taxes Officer could not have issued the notice dated 18.3.1976 under section 16(1)(c) to the partners of the dissolved firm, to show cause why penalty should not be imposed under section 16(1)(c). There is, in our opinion, no substance in any of these contentions. 8. The contention that the Assistant Commercial Taxes officer acted without jurisdiction in issuing the notices under section 12(c) of the Act, beyond the period of 8 years prescribed therefor under section 12(2) cannot prevail. There is, in our opinion, no substance in any of these contentions. 8. The contention that the Assistant Commercial Taxes officer acted without jurisdiction in issuing the notices under section 12(c) of the Act, beyond the period of 8 years prescribed therefor under section 12(2) cannot prevail. No doubt, the notices to the partners individually, in compliance of the remand orders, were fresh notices but the bar of limitation under section 12(2) does not apply by reason of the proviso. The section reads:- 12(2). "No notice under sub-section (1) shall be issued in respect of any business, registration, fee or exemption fee for any year after the expiry of eight years from the end of the relevant assessment year; Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall apply to assessment or reassessment made in consequence of, or to give effect to, any finding or direction contained in an order under section 13, 14 or 15 or in an order of any competent court." The proviso furnishes a complete answer to the contention based on limitation. It is in the nature of an exception to main enacting part. The present case clearly falls within the proviso. 9. Next, the contention that no re-assessment proceedings could be initiated upon expiration of a period of three years next after the date of the decision of the appeals, cannot also be accepted. Undoubtedly, when the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) remitted the cases for re-assessment, section 12(1) contained the following clause which was inserted by Act 9 of 1958: "or, if such assessment has been a subject matter of proceedings in appeal or revision under this Act, within a period of three years next succeeding the date of termination of such proceedings." The clause was, however by Act 11 of 1969, w.e.f. 2.5.1969. 10. In the instant cases, the appeals were decided on 15.11.1967. There was, therefore, time to make the re-assessment till 14.11.1970. On 5.9.1969, section 12(2) was inserted by Act 13 of 1969 i.e. before the expiry of the period. 11. It is well settled that when the period is enlarged before the limitation expires the enlarged period is applicable to old cases. In dealing with the question, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held by a majority in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Janab Mohd. 11. It is well settled that when the period is enlarged before the limitation expires the enlarged period is applicable to old cases. In dealing with the question, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held by a majority in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Janab Mohd. Hussain, AIR (1963) 49 ITR 80 that even an assessment which has become final and in respect of which re-assessment proceedings had become time barred before the new section 34 was substituted in 1948, could be re-opened under the substituted section 34. The point in controversy is put beyond doubt by proviso to section 12(2) which limits the bar of limitation, in respect of proceedings for re-assessment initiated in compliance of, or to give effect to, any finding or direction contained in an order under section 13, 14 or 15 of the Act or in an order of any competent Court. The impugned notices are, therefore, not barred under section 12(2) of the Act. 12. The next and last contention is that the Assistant Commercial Taxes Officer could not serve a notice of penalty under section 16(1)(c) without first giving a positive finding that a part of the turnover in a particular year has escaped assessment or had been assessed at too low a rate. It was also pointed out that the notice dated 18.3.1976 was a combined notice for the three assessment years and, therefore, invalid. It was urged that the proceedings were still pending, there was yet no enquiry held and, consequently, there was no material on the basis of which the Assistant Commercial Taxes officer could have determined that turnover of Rs. 30,000/- in the account year 1959-60, Rs. 42,669/- in the account year 1960-61 and Rs.55,000/- in the accounting year 1961-62 had escaped assessment. Thus the proceedings, it is said, are vitiated due to the invalidity of this notice. We are afraid, the contention cannot be accepted. 13. While it is true that there could not be a combined notice under Rule 54, but the defect would not invalidate the proceedings. Under Rule 54, the Assistant Commercial Taxes Officer was required to afford a reasonable opportunity to the assessee to show cause why a penalty under section 16(1)(c) should not be imposed. That was the whole purpose of the notice dated 18.3.1976. This opportunity they were given. Thus the notice though defective, substantially meets the requirements of Rule 54. 14. Under Rule 54, the Assistant Commercial Taxes Officer was required to afford a reasonable opportunity to the assessee to show cause why a penalty under section 16(1)(c) should not be imposed. That was the whole purpose of the notice dated 18.3.1976. This opportunity they were given. Thus the notice though defective, substantially meets the requirements of Rule 54. 14. The submission that the Assistant Commercial Taxes officer should first have recorded a finding, does not take notice of the fact under the scheme of the Act, tax and penalty can be imposed in the order of assessment. Therefore, during the course of the re-assessment proceedings under section 12(1), the Assistant Commercial Taxes Officer could have issued a penalty notice. It is wrong to suggest that there was no material on which he could have acted. The account books of the dissolved firm have been seized. The figures appear in the original orders of re-assessment. They could be also ascertained by reference to the account books. The contention regarding the invalidity of the notice dated 18.3.1976 must, therefore, fail. 15. We have already observed that the giving of a combined notice under Rule 54 was defective. But this defect in form was not one of substance, and would not invalidate the proceedings. That apart, Shri Bhandari, learned counsel, withdrew the notice dated 18.3.1976 before us. 16. The writ petition cannot be entertained when the petitioner has an equally efficacious, alternative remedy by way of an appeal, revision and case stated. The Act has set up a complete machinery and a hierarchy of tribunals where these questions can be agitated. The petitioners has, indeed, raised these very objections before the Assistant Commercial Taxes Officer. There is no reason why the petitioner should be permitted to bye-pass the remedy provided by law. 17. Much stress was, however, laid on the decision of their Lordships in Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer, Calcutta, (1961) 41 ITR 191 . It was urged on the strength of the above decision that the existence of alternative remedies by way of appeals or references to the High Court should not, and cannot be a sufficient reason for refusing a writ or order in the nature of prohibition or certiorari, where the authority acts without jurisdiction. It was urged on the strength of the above decision that the existence of alternative remedies by way of appeals or references to the High Court should not, and cannot be a sufficient reason for refusing a writ or order in the nature of prohibition or certiorari, where the authority acts without jurisdiction. The decision of their Lordships in Calcutta Discount Co.Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer, Calcutta, (1961) 41 ITR 191 , is of no avail to the petitioner. The scheme under section 34 of the Income Tax Act, which is analogous to section 147 of the Income Tax Tact, 1961 is entirely different. 18. Under section 34 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, the Income Tax Officer should have 'reason to believe' that the income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for relevant year, or has been under assessed or assessed at too low a rate, etc. The words 'reason to believe' impose a condition to the exercise of the powers to make a re-assessment under section 34. Unlike section 34 of the Income tax Act, section 12(1) of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954 uses the words 'If for any reason, the whole or any part of any business of a dealer has escaped assignment to tax, or has been assessed at too low a rate in any year, etc." 19. The words 'for any reason' in section 12(1) of the Act are wide enough and the powers of the Commercial Taxes Officer under the section are not circumscribed by any condition. In Maharajadhiraj Sir Kameshwar Singh v. The State of Bihar, AIR 1959 SC 1303 their Lordships, while interpreting the Bihar Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1938, which used the same expression, observed:- "The use of the words 'any reason' which are of wide import dispenses with those conditions by which section 34 of the Indian Income Tax Act is circumscribed." 20. The writ petitions must, therefore, fail and are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. *******