JUDGMENT : 1. The Collector exercising powers u/s 286-A of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act has to objectively consider whether it is just and proper to appoint a receiver after giving an opportunity of hearing to the defaulter but he is not bound to exhaust the modes of realisation contained in Clauses (a) to (f) of Section 279 of the said Act before appointing a receiver u/s 286-A of the Act. 2. Let the writ petition be now listed before the learned Single Judge with the above answer. 3. Pronounced under Rule 1(2) of Chapter VII of the Rules of Court. K.B. Asthana, CJ. 4. I had the benefit of reading the opinions given by my brothers Misra and Varma and I generally agree with the conclusions reached by them. However, I would add a few words of my own. 5. The question before us substantially is: What is the duty of a Collector u/s 286-A of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (hereinafter called the Act) for realisation of the Government dues by appointment of a Receiver on any moveable or immovable property of the defaulter? 6. In Vimla Rani v. State of U.P. CMW No. 3264 of 1971 (Alld.), Dwivedi, J. who delivered the judgment of the court observed as follows : A Receiver is not to be appointed on the subjective satisfaction of the Collector. A Receiver may be appointed where the facts and circumstances of a particular case call for such appointment. Sections 279 and 286-A resemble Section 51, Code of Civil Procedure. Just as Section 51 indicates various modes for execution of decrees, Section 279 indicates various modes of recovery of arrears of land revenue. Sub-section (2) of Section 286-A is borrowed from Sub-rule (2) of Rule 1 of Order XL. Clause (d) of Sub-section (1) of Section 286-A resembles Clause (d) of Rule 1 of Order XL. It has been held that a Receiver is appointed only where the court thinks that it is "just and convenient" to do so. As there is a close similarity between Section 51 and Sections 279 and 286-A we think that a Receiver may be appointed by the Collector only where he is satisfied that it is just and convenient to do so. 7. As there is a close similarity between Section 51 and Sections 279 and 286-A we think that a Receiver may be appointed by the Collector only where he is satisfied that it is just and convenient to do so. 7. In Diamond Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh 1972 AWR 783, a Division Bench observed: The fact that the appointment of a Receiver may lead to speedy recovery cannot in each case form a basis for the appointment of a Receiver for what the Collector has to see is as to whether it is 'just and convenient' for both parties that Receiver should be appointed. Speedy recovery of dues by appointment of a Receiver may work injustice and inconvenience qua a defaulter in certain cases. We are thus of the view that the Collector passed the impugned order without taking into account relevant principles of law and circumstances. 8. Yashodanandan, J. who has made the reference doubted the correctness of these decisions. He observed: Both these decisions proceeded on the promise that proceedings for recovery of dues recoverable as arrears of land revenue could be likened to proceedings in execution of an ordinary decree. This basis of the decisions, itself, in my opinion, is unjustified.... It is thus, in my opinion, not justified to equate a proceeding for recovery of arrears of land revenue or other dues recoverable as such with execution of decrees under the normal law of the land. 9. The learned Judge then ordered: I, therefore, direct that the papers of this writ petition shall be placed before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice or the Senior Judge for constitution of a Full Bench for considering as to whether the views expressed in regard to matters mentioned in this order in the two cases cited above are correct. 10. The two questions which are before us can be formulated thus : (1) Whether the Collector in exercise of his power u/s 286-A has to objectively consider whether it is proper to appoint a Receiver; and (2) Whether the Collector has to take into consideration whether the recovery of the dues cannot be made by any other processes contained in Clauses (a) to (f) of Section 279 of the Act before appointing a Receiver u/s 286-A of the Act? 11. 11. I may observe with great respect to the learned Single Judge that keeping in view the principles of stare decisis and the principle that a learned Single Judge is bound by the decision of a Division Bench, a reference to a Full Bench for the reason that he found himself in disagreement with the Division Benches was not called for. However, since my predecessor has directed the case to be placed before a Full Bench, I need not further dilate upon the competency of the reference of the case to a Full Bench. 12. There is no doubt that under the Act a separate and exhaustive machinery has been set up for realisation of the arrears of the land revenue and other Government dues which under the Law are made realisable as arrears of land revenue. Any reference to the provisions of the CPC for appointment of a receiver in execution of decree may not be apt. The limitations of the power of the Collector, if any, must be found out from the phraseology of Sections 279 and 286-A of the Act with which we are concerned. I agree with the opinion of brother Misra that it is not the duty of the Collector that before appointing a receiver u/s 286-A, he must exhaust the procedure contained in Clauses (a) to (f) of Section 279(1) of the Act, as Sub-section (1) of Section 286-A opens with a non-obstante clause; "Notwithstanding anything in this Act, when an arrear of revenue is due, the Collector, may, in addition to or instead of any of the processes hereinbefore specified, by order (a) appoint for such period as he may deem fit, Receiver of any movable or immovable property of the defaulter." One of the modes for recovery of arrears of land revenue as contained in Clause (g) of Section 279(1) of the Act is by appointment of Receiver of any property movable or immovable of the defaulter. As the Collector need not first exhaust the processes of recovery contained in Clauses (a) to (f) of Section 279(1) of the Act before taking recourse to the mode of recovery by appointment of a Receiver of movable or immovable property of the defaulter, I have no hesitation in answering the question No. (2) formulated above, in the negative. As the Collector need not first exhaust the processes of recovery contained in Clauses (a) to (f) of Section 279(1) of the Act before taking recourse to the mode of recovery by appointment of a Receiver of movable or immovable property of the defaulter, I have no hesitation in answering the question No. (2) formulated above, in the negative. Any observations of the Division Bench in the case of Diamond Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State of U.P. containing the rule that the Collector first should exhaust the modes or the processes mentioned in Clauses (a) to (f) of Section 279(1) of the Act, in my opinion, will be erroneous. 13. I find myself in full agreement with the observation of Dwivedi, J. in Smt. Vimla Rani v. State of U.P. that the Receiver is not to be appointed on the subjective satisfaction of the Collector. He has to take into consideration all the facts and circumstances of a particular case before appointing a Receiver. The word 'Receiver' which has been used under Sections 279(1) and 286-A of the Act connotes that he will be an officer of the Collector under the supervision of the Collector for carrying out the specified duties under the terms and conditions of his appointment by the Collector just as a Receiver appointed by a Court is regarded as the officer of the Court. Since the appointment of the Receiver directly affects the rights and interest in property of the defaulter who is deprived of the control, supervision and possession of his property, he will be an interested party and the principles of natural justice required that he should be heard by the Collector before a Receiver is appointed. Though it may be said that a defaulter who owes dues to the Government will have no equities in his favour, yet the scheme for realisation of the arrears of revenue having been formulated under the Act, it will always be open to the defaulter to show that the arrears would be recovered expeditiously and satisfactorily by any of the other modes prescribed under the Act. If such a stand is taken by the defaulter the Collector will have to consider the same judiciously. The defaulter can as well contend before the Collector that realisation of the dues would not be practicable by appointment of a Receiver. If such a stand is taken by the defaulter the Collector will have to consider the same judiciously. The defaulter can as well contend before the Collector that realisation of the dues would not be practicable by appointment of a Receiver. There may be other objections on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. Though u/s 279(1)(g) or u/s 286-A the words 'just and convenient' have not been used but the rule of law compels the Collector to form an opinion whether it would be appropriate in the particular circumstances of a case to oppoint a Receiver depriving the defaulter of the control and possession of his property with a view to achieve the object of realisation of the dues. Sub-section (2) of Section 286-A says that nothing in this section shall authorise the Collector to remove from the possession or custody of property any person whom the defaulter has not present right to remove. Then Sub-section (4) of the section placed the provisions of Rules 2 to 4 of Order XL contained in the First Schedule to the CPC 1908, in relation of the Receiver appointed under this section. The Collector first has to find out whether the defaulter has present right to remove from the possession or custody of property any person found in possession instead of the defaulter on the defaulter's property. Thus the Collector is enjoined to make an enquiry. Naturally an enquiry will also have to be made as to the extent of the property of the defaulter and then he has to supervise the conduct of the Receiver and give direction as is done by a court under Rules 2 to 4 of Order XL. All this goes to show that the Collector has to apply his mind judicially and nothing is left to his subjective satisfaction under the scheme of the Act. Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 286-A of the Act says that the Collector by order will appoint a Receiver for such period as he may deem fit. The use of the words 'may deem fit' connotes that he has to take into consideration whether it would be just and proper to appoint a Receiver for particular period of movable and immovable property of the defaulter. To me it's a mere quibbling of words. The use of the words 'may deem fit' connotes that he has to take into consideration whether it would be just and proper to appoint a Receiver for particular period of movable and immovable property of the defaulter. To me it's a mere quibbling of words. Whether it is just and convenient, or whether it is just and proper or whether ft is deemed fit-all phrases substantially mean the same when considered from the practical point of view. Since my brothers Misra and Varma have fully discussed in their opinions different facets of the problem, I need not further dilate upon it. I would answer the first question formulated above in the affirmative. T.S. Misra, J. 14. The Petitioner No. 1 is a Private Limited Company, hereinafter called the 'company', owning a sugar mill at Jarwal Road, district Bahraich. Petitioner No. 2 is its Managing Director. It appears that the company fell in arrears in payment of cane cess, purchase tax, cane price, commission and Provident Fund dues for certain years. These dues were recoverable as arrears of land revenue under the various enactments. Ultimately, the District Government Counsel (Civil) filed applications on behalf of the State for appointment of a receiver on the undertaking of the Company for realisation of the said dues, whereupon a receiver was appointed. The initial order of appointment was impugned by means of a writ petition which was dismissed. The appointment of the receiver was extended from time to time by various orders, the last order being of 16th April, 1975, whereby the receiver has been permitted to function till 10th April, 1976. The Petitioners then filed writ petition No. 1061 of 1974 in this Court impugning the initial order of appointment of receiver as also the subsequent orders extending the term of the receiver. The Petitioners then filed writ petition No. 1061 of 1974 in this Court impugning the initial order of appointment of receiver as also the subsequent orders extending the term of the receiver. The Writ Petition was heard by a learned single Judge before whom the two principal contentions raised were: (1) that during the period the receiver has been in possession of and was in charge of the sugar mill, the arrears of cane dues instead of being cleared had continued to mount thus increasing the liability of the company, hence it is not 'just and convenient' within the meaning of Order XL, Rule 1 of the CPC that the receiver be continued and in this view of the matter the order for the continuance of the receiver is illegal and unsustainable and (2) that the Collector had no power to appoint a receiver in exercise of powers u/s 279(g) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act, hereinafter called the Act, till the process contemplated by Clauses (a) to (f) of Section 279 of the Act had been exhausted. 15. In support of these contentions learned Counsel for the Petitioners referred the learned single Judge to an unreported Division Bench decision of this Court in Vimla Rani v. State CMW No. 3264 of 1971 decided on 18th May, 1972, and another Division Bench decision in Diamond Sugar Mills v. State of U.P. 1972 AWR 783. The learned single Judge entertained grave doubts about the correctness of the views expressed in the said two decisions. He, therefore, directed that the papers of the said writ petition be placed before Hon'ble the Chief Justice for constitution of a Full Bench for considering as to whether the views expressed in the aforesaid two Division Bench cases are correct. This Full Bench is, therefore, called upon to express its opinion as to whether the views expressed in regard to matters mentioned in the order of the learned Single Judge in the two cases cited above are correct. 16. The Petitioners in Vimla Rani's case (supra) carried on the business of manufacturing and selling sugar in the name of Punnijee Sugar and General Mills Co., Bulandshahr. 16. The Petitioners in Vimla Rani's case (supra) carried on the business of manufacturing and selling sugar in the name of Punnijee Sugar and General Mills Co., Bulandshahr. The Petitioners having failed to pay cane price and commission, sugar cane purchase tax, income tax, and employee's Provident Fund contribution from 1954-55 to 1969-70 the District Government Counsel (Civil) moved an application on behalf of the State of U.P. before the Collector of the district for appointment of a receiver over the Petitioners' business and factory under Sections 279 & 286-A of the Act. The Collector accordingly appointed a receiver over the defaulters' business and factory. The order of the Collector appointing a receiver was first challenged in a suit filed by the defaulter. The suit was eventually dismissed. The defaulter then filed a writ petition in the Supreme Court against the appointment of a receiver. That writ petition was withdrawn. Meanwhile, the Collector had appointed by an order dated 17th of November, 1970 another receiver. The defaulter then filed a writ petition in this Court challenging the appointment of the receiver on a number of grounds, some of them being that the Collector did not exercise his independent discretion and appointed the receiver on the dictates of the Government, that the order is invalid as it was made without giving a prior hearing to the defaulter and Section 279 is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution as it indicates no guidelines to the Collector for selecting one or the other mode out of the various modes for the recovery of the arrears provided for therein. The writ petition was heard by a Division Bench of this Court which laid down the following propositions of law: I-A receiver is not to be appointed on the subjective satisfaction of the Collector but may be appointed where the facts and circumstances of a particular case call for such appointment. A receiver may be appointed in execution proceedings on the principles indicated in Rule 1 of Order XL, Code of Civil Procedure. In other words a receiver is appointed only when the Court thinks that it is just and convenient to do so. As there is a close similarity between Sections 279 and 286-A of the Act, a receiver may be appointed by the Collector where he is satisfied that it is just and convenient to do so. In other words a receiver is appointed only when the Court thinks that it is just and convenient to do so. As there is a close similarity between Sections 279 and 286-A of the Act, a receiver may be appointed by the Collector where he is satisfied that it is just and convenient to do so. II-An order appointing a receiver may be made ex-parte by the Collector. However, after a receiver has been appointed ex-parte the Collector should give an opportunity to the defaulter to satisfy him that the appointment should be discontinued, and if the Collector is satisfied that the receiver should not continue he should recall his order. III-Rule 242 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Rules provides that ordinarily a writ of citation should be issued before any other process is adopted. Rule 281 provides that the holding of the defaulter should be sold only when the other modes provided in Section 279 would be insufficient for the recovery of the arrears. The second rule does not strictly govern the appointment of a receiver u/s 279(g), but Rules 242 and 281 should also serve as a guideline in the appointment of a receiver. IV-As the phrase "just and convenient" is a sufficient guideline to the Court while acting u/s 51 CPC or Order XLI, Rule 1 CPC it will serve as a proper guideline to the Collector as well. 17. The Petitioner in the case of Diamond Sugar Mills (supra) owned and operated a sugar mill at Pipraich, district Gorakhpur. It also fell into arrears of sugarcane price, commission thereon, cess and purchase tax. The District Government Counsel (Civil) Gorakhpur made an application before the Collector for the appointment of a receiver u/s 286-A of the Act. The Collector accordingly appointed a receiver of the Mills. The order appointing the receiver was challenged by a writ petition That writ petition was also heard by a Division Bench of this Court. Following the reasonings given in Vimla Rani's case it was held that: I-The receiver should normally be appointed in cases where other processes are insufficient for the recovery of arrears; II-before making an order of appointment of receiver the Collector has to see as to whether it is 'just and convenient' for both parties that receiver should be appointed. 18. Following the reasonings given in Vimla Rani's case it was held that: I-The receiver should normally be appointed in cases where other processes are insufficient for the recovery of arrears; II-before making an order of appointment of receiver the Collector has to see as to whether it is 'just and convenient' for both parties that receiver should be appointed. 18. Thus in Vimla Rani's case (supra) as also in Diamond Sugar Mills' case (supra) it was laid down that (a) a receiver should normally be appointed only when other processes are insufficient for the recovery of the arrears and (b) the order for the appointment of the receiver should be made only when the Collector is satisfied that it is 'just and convenient' to appoint a receiver. Diamond Sugar Mills' case went a step further to lay down that the Collector has to see as to whether it is 'just and convenient' for both the parties that a receiver may be appointed. 19. The view expressed in Vimla Rani's and Diamond Sugar Mills' cases (supra) that the receiver should normally be appointed only in cases where the other processes are insufficient for the recovery of the arrears does not seem to be correct. Sections 279 and 286-A of the Act which deal with the appointment of a receiver read as follows: (His Lordship then quoted Section 279(1), (a) to (g) and Section 286-A(1), (a) to (d), (2), (3) and (4) and proceeded on to observe:) 20. A conjoint reading of Sections 279 and 286-A of the Act makes it quite manifest that any dues recoverable as an arrear of land revenue may be recovered by adopting one or more of the modes mentioned in Section 279, and it is not necessary for the Collector to follow the modes in the sequence in which they are given in Section 279. Thus, it is not necessary that before appointing any receiver of the property of the defaulter the Collector should first exhaust the processes mentioned in Clauses (a) to (f) of Section 279, inasmuch as Section 286-A provides that the Collector may in addition to, or instead of any of the processes mentioned in Clauses (a) to (f) of Section 279 appoint a receiver of any property of the defaulter. 21. This point came to be examined by the Supreme Court in Padrauna Rajkrishna Sugar Works Ltd. and Others Vs. 21. This point came to be examined by the Supreme Court in Padrauna Rajkrishna Sugar Works Ltd. and Others Vs. Land Reforms Commissioner, U.P. and Others, AIR 1969 SC 897 wherein it was held that because of the use of expression "under this section" in Sub-section (2) of Section 286 it is not intended that the Collector must resort in the first instance to the processes prescribed by Clauses (a) to (e) before he resorts to Clause (f) of Section 279. Clauses (d) and (e) of Section 279 have no application, where income tax dues and sugarcane cess or cane price are recoverable from the defaulter and Clause (h) is inapplicable where the defaulter is an artificial person like a Company, power to recover arrears of land revenue from a defaulter is governed by the processes mentioned in Section 279 Clauses (a) to (e), Section 286(1) places certain restrictions upon the power of the Collector to recover land revenue by attachment and sale of lands other than the holding in respect of which the land revenue is due. But the restrictions on the power of the Collector operate only when land revenue is in arrears. Restrictions, if any, upon the power of the Collector to recover dues under other statutes, as arrears of land revenue arise from the statute which is the source of the liability and not from Act 1 of 1951, which merely sets out the processes for recovery of the dues. To hold that Sub-section (2) of Section 286 requires the Collector in the first instance to recover out of the moveable property, or by arrest and detention of the defaulter before immovable property of the defaulter is attached and sold is to amend the substantive provisions of the Acts under which the liability for money due is recoverable as land revenue. 22. It was not disputed before us that the dues pertaining to cane purchase tax, commission, Provident Fund and cess are recoverable as arrears of land revenue under the provisions of the Act under which the liability arose. 22. It was not disputed before us that the dues pertaining to cane purchase tax, commission, Provident Fund and cess are recoverable as arrears of land revenue under the provisions of the Act under which the liability arose. The provisions of the Acts which authorise recovery of the dues as revenue do not require the Collector to follow the processes in sequence for recovery as are mentioned in Section 279 of the Act, and it is competent for the Collector to resort to any of the processes prescribed in Section 279 of the Act in aid of the recovery of the dues which are recoverable as arrears of land revenue. 23. Next, it was held in Vimla Rani's case and Diamond Sugar Mills' case (supra) that a receiver may be appointed by the Collector only when he is satisfied that it is 'just and convenient' to do so. The learned Advocate General submitted that the rule of 'just and convenient' was not applicable to the proceedings for appointment of a receiver u/s 286-A read with Section 279 of the Act and Vimla Rani's case and Diamond Sugar Mills' case did not lay down the correct law in that behalf. 24. Section 279 of the Act provides the various processes which may be resorted to for the recovery of the arrears of land revenue, one of the processes being the appointment of a receiver of any property moveable or immovable of the defaulter. Section 286-A of the Act confers power on the Collector to appoint for such period as he may deem fit a receiver of any moveable or immovable property of the defaulter. Section 293 of the Act makes the provisions of Chapters IX and X of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901, applicable to proceedings taken u/s 279 and 286-A of the Act. Thus an appeal from the order passed by a Collector appointing a receiver would lie to the Commissioner u/s 210 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act. A revision would also lie against the order of the Collector before the State Government. The Collector thus exercises the power u/s 286 quasi-judicially. The order appointing a receiver must, therefore, be a reasoned order so that the appellate and the revising authorities may know whether there were proper reasons for appointing a receiver. A revision would also lie against the order of the Collector before the State Government. The Collector thus exercises the power u/s 286 quasi-judicially. The order appointing a receiver must, therefore, be a reasoned order so that the appellate and the revising authorities may know whether there were proper reasons for appointing a receiver. True it is, that instead of realising the dues by attachment and sale of moveable and immovable property of the defaulter, the Collector may appoint a receiver of that property, but this can only be in a case where a receiver can be appointed. For instance, the Provident Fund money lying with the defaulter is exempt from attachment and is inalienable. Normally, no execution of a decree can lie against such a sum, hence execution cannot be sought against the Provident Fund money by way of appointment of a receiver. It would, therefore, not be correct that even though there is a statutory prohibition against attachment and alienation of a particular property, it can be reached by another mode of execution, namely, by appointment of a receiver - The Union of India (UOI) Vs. Hira Devi and Another, AIR 1952 SC 227 . The non-obstante opening words in Section 286-A of the Act only connote that the other modes of recovery are but concurrent and despite the other processes the Collector may appoint a receiver of the property of the defaulter for such period as he may deem fit. No positive or un-varying rule can be laid down as to in what circumstances the receiver is to be 'appointed. It all depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. The Collector has to consider as to how long the receiver of the property should be retained. The expression 'appoint for such period as he may deem fit' in Section 286-A of the Act imports some idea of discretion but it does not signify an arbitrary exercise of discretion; rather it implies a conclusion or decision based on reason and justice, and upon inquiry, primilarily the term 'deem' connotes 'believes', or 'considers' or 'thinks'. Similarly, the word 'fit' is construed as 'conformable to a standard of right, duty or appropriateness (See Corpus Juris Secondum Volume 35 A page 580). Similarly, the word 'fit' is construed as 'conformable to a standard of right, duty or appropriateness (See Corpus Juris Secondum Volume 35 A page 580). The expression 'deem fit' in Section 286A thus connotes that while making an order for appointment of receiver the Collector should be convinced that it is an appropriate means of securing the appropriate and that a receiver should be appointed for such period as may be just and proper. The Collector while appointing a receiver has to fix a period for which the receiver has to function. He has a discretion in fixing this period, but this discretion is to be governed by rule and not by humour. It should not be an arbitrary or whimsical discretion, but should be a discretion guided by law. The Collector, therefore will have to be satisfied on the facts and circumstances of the case that it is just and proper that a receiver of the property of a defaulter should be appointed for a particular period. It may be recalled that even in proceedings for execution of a decree a decree-holder cannot insist upon the appointment of a receiver inasmuch as he cannot claim that appointment as a matter of right. He has to make out a proper case to justify the exercise by the Court of its discretion to make the appointment. That discretion is controlled by the provisions of Rule 1 of Order XL Code of Civil Procedure. 25. The proceedings taken by the Collector u/s 279 and Section 286-A of the Act, though not being in the nature of execution proceedings, are quasi-judicial in nature and the Collector has to exercise his discretion while appointing the receiver for a particular period in a sound way. The object of the appointment of a receiver of the property of the defaulter is to preserve the corpus while satisfying the Government dues out of the income within such time as the Collector deems fit. The Collector may, therefore, make an order for appointment of a receiver of movable or immovable property of the defaulter if he is satisfied that on the facts and circumstances of the case it is 'just and proper' to do so, and it is open to the defaulter to show to the Collector that necessary circumstances do not exist to justify the appointment of the receiver or the continuance of the receiver. The expression 'just and convenient' used in Rule 1 of Order XL CPC has, however, not been used in Section 286-A though almost all other provisions of Order XL CPC have been engrafted in that section. The word convenient 'would signify' convenient to both the parties. The principle that a receiver may be appointed when it is also convenient to both the parties has thus not been made applicable to the appointment of a receiver u/s 286-A of the Act for the recovery of land revenue, or for the recovery of those dues which are recoverable as arrears of land revenue. Obviously in such cases the defaulter's convenience or inconvenience is not to be take into account while making an order of appointment of a receiver. The rule of balance of convenience will, therefore, have no bearing. But it cannot be said that a receiver can be appointed u/s 286-A of the Act even if it is not 'just' to do so. The expression 'deem fit' used in Clause (g) of Sub-section (1) of Section 286-A in relation to the duration of the appointment of a receiver furnishes a guideline. It gives a discretion to the Collector to appoint a receiver for such period as he may consider appropriate. The rule of 'just and proper' will, therefore, apply to such cases. I am, therefore, of the view that when a Collector proceeds to make an order for the appointment of a receiver u/s 286-A of the Act he has to be satisfied on the facts and circumstances of the case that it is 'just and proper' to do so. I would answer the question accordingly. K.S. Verma, J. 26. This writ petition came up for hearing before Yashoda Nandan, J. who by an order dated 16th May, 1975 directed that the pipers of the writ petition be placed before Hon'ble the Chief Justice for the constitution of a larger Bench as the learned Judge was of the view that the decision given in Smt. Vimla Rani v. State of U.P. Civil Misc. Writ No. 3264 of 1971, decided by Dwivedi and R.L. Gulati, JJ. and the decision reported in Diamond Sugar Mills Ltd. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh 1972 AWR 783 given by R.L. Gulati and C.S.P. Singh, JJ. Writ No. 3264 of 1971, decided by Dwivedi and R.L. Gulati, JJ. and the decision reported in Diamond Sugar Mills Ltd. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh 1972 AWR 783 given by R.L. Gulati and C.S.P. Singh, JJ. needed re-consideration in the light of the observations made by another Division Bench in the case of H.R. Sugar Factory (P) Ltd. Nekpur v. State of Uttar Pradesh 1970 ALJ 768. 27. The Petitioner No. 1, a Private Limited Co., is the owner of a Sugar Mill situate at Jarwal Road, Distt. Bahraich; the Petitioner No. 2 is the Managing Director of the Company. It is not disputed that the Company for various reasons fell in arrears in payment of purchase tax, cane price, commission and Provident Fund dues in the year 1951-62. The State Government made various efforts for the recovery of the amount but the Petitioner did not deposit the dues. Since the amount could not be recovered and further in view of the fact that the amounts were recoverable as arrears of land revenue, the District Government Counsel made an application to the Collector, Bahraich for the appointment of a Receiver of the Petitioner Company for the realisation of dues. The Collector appointed a Receiver of the Company and the initial order of appointment was challenged by means of a writ petition which was dismissed. Subsequently, an order dated 16th April, 1975 was passed whereby the Collector directed that the Receiver shall continue as the circumstances in which the original order of appointment was passed still exist. The order dated 16th April, 1975 has been filed as Annexure 14 to the writ petition. The Petitioner has challenged the order Annexure 14 and has also challenged the initial order of appointment of Receiver. 28. At the time of the hearing of the writ petition one of the submissions advanced on behalf of the Petitioner was that in view of the fact that during the period that the Receiver had been in charge of the Company, the arrears, instead of being liquidated, mounted up increasing the liablility of the Company and, therefore, it was not "just and convenient", within the meaning of Order 40, Rule (?) of the Code of Civil Procedure, to allow the continuance of the Receiver and the order Annexure 14 continuing the Receiver was liable to be set aside. In this respect reliance was placed by the Petitioner on the case of Diamond Sugar Mills Ltd. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh (supra). The Division Bench while adjudicating upon whether the appointment of a Receiver was legal or not made the following observations: The fact that the appointment of Receiver may lead to speedy recovery cannot in each case form a basis for the appointment of a Receiver for what the Collector has to see is as to whether it is 'just and convenient' for both parties that a Receiver should be appointed. Speedy recovery of dues by appointment of a Receiver may work injustice and inconvenience qua a defaulter in certain cases. 29. Relying on these observations, Mr. S.K. Srivastava, learned Counsel for the Petitioner contended that having regard to the objections made by the Petitioner that the Receiver had not liquidated the debts and instead of paying up the dues, the arrears had mounted up, the Collector, Bahraich, before directing the continuance of Receiver, should have applied his mind to the question as to whether it was 'just and convenient' to continue the Receiver. 30. On the other hand, the learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the State of Uttar Pradesh contended that the recovery of dues in the instant case is being made u/s 279 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (U.P. Act I of 1951) (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act). He has submitted that Section 279(1)(g) provides for the appointment of a Receiver of any property, movable or immovable, of the defaulter. He has further relied on Section 286-A of the Act which makes special provision for the circumstances in which a Receiver may be appointed. The learned Advocate General contended that a perusal of Section 286-A, indicated that it did not provide that before appointing a Receiver, the Collector had to be satisfied whether the appointment or continuance of Receiver was 'just and convenient'. He re-enforces his submission by contending that although Section 286-A(4) provides for the applicability of Rules 2 to 4 of Order 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the provisions of Rule 1 of Order 40 of the CPC had not been made applicable. He re-enforces his submission by contending that although Section 286-A(4) provides for the applicability of Rules 2 to 4 of Order 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the provisions of Rule 1 of Order 40 of the CPC had not been made applicable. According to the learned Advocate General, a combined reading of Sections 279 and 286-A of the Act would indicate that the Legislature invested the Collector with greater powers for the appointment of a Receiver in respect of the dues which were recoverable as arrears of land revenue. He further contended that since the State was eminently interested in the recovery of public dues and in the payment of which the entire public was interested, the Collector had been invested with the power to appoint a Receiver without recording a finding whether such an appointment was 'just and convenient'. He emphasizes that the existence of Government dues is a matter of grave concern which affects the public at large and since the Legislature had invested the power to recover the dues in the Collector, the Legislature in its wisdom had authorised the Collector to appoint a Receiver straightaway. It has further been contended that since the power to appoint the Receiver has been entrusted to a high Government officer and further in view of the fact that the public dues have to be recovered as soon as possible, the Legislature did not consider it necessary to require the Collector to record a finding that the appointment or continuance of a Receiver is 'just and convenient'; and he has been authorised to appoint a Receiver the moment he finds that there are public dues recoverable as land revenue. 31. It has further been contended by the learned Advocate General that Rule 1 of Order 40 of the CPC opens with the words "where it appears to the court to be just and convenient". He contends that the said words do not find place in Section 286-A of the Act and, according to him, that is a clear indication of the Legislature that it was not necessary to enter into the question whether the appointment of a Receiver was just and convenient when public dues were sought to be recovered u/s 286-A of the Act. Yashoda Nandan, J. 32. Yashoda Nandan, J. 32. In his referring order has mentioned that if it had been the intention of the Legislature that all factors for appointment of a Receiver under Order 40, Rule 1 of the CPC should also exist for the appointment of a Receiver under Sections 279 and 286-A(1) of the Act, the Legislature could have achieved that objective by merely incorporating Order 40, Rule 1 also in the Act. The Legislature might well have been of the view that so far as the dues to the public Exchequer were concerned which affect the financial stability of the State or the country, the convenience of the defaulter was of no account. 33. In order to appreciate the rival contentions of the parties, it is necessary to consider the provisions of the Act and the CPC in closer detail. Section 279 of the Act so far as it is relevant for purposes of the controversy in question is quoted below : * * * * * A perusal of the aforesaid provisions would Indicate that the Legislature used the word "Receiver" with a definite purpose. The Legislature could have used the word 'Manager' or might have given any other name to a person who was required to collect the Government dues from the defaulters. The use of the word 'Receiver' in Section 279(1)(g) of the Act alongwith reference to the provisions of the CPC in Section 286-A(4) of the Act indicates that the Legislature was conscious of conditions in which a Receiver may be appointed and was also conscious of the extent of his powers. This brings me to the question in what conditions a Receiver may be appointed. Apart from Section 51 and Order 40, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the concensus of opinion of the courts in India and in England is that a Receiver should not be appointed in supersession of a bona fide possessor of property in controversy unless there is substantial ground for interference. Apart from Section 51 and Order 40, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the concensus of opinion of the courts in India and in England is that a Receiver should not be appointed in supersession of a bona fide possessor of property in controversy unless there is substantial ground for interference. Without making reference to a large number of cases on the point, I think it would be enough to quote an observation made by a Division Bench in the case of Smt. Mathuri Debya v. Shibdayal XIV CWN 252 : The safe rule in these cases is that a Receiver should not be appointed in supersession of a bona fide possessor of the property in controversy unless there is some substantial ground for interference. Clark, on law of Receivers, Vol. I Third Edition has indicated in Paragraph 53, the considerations which should weight with the court in appointing a Receiver. The observations of the learned author are quoted below: 53. No complainant has a strict right to the appointment of a receiver, such appointment being an equitable remedy applied by the court. The courts in making the appointment must be governed as to their authority by the usages and rules of equity and any enabling or prohibitive statute or rule of procedure obtaining. Next the court will consider whether or not the appointment will accomplish the end in view, namely, preserving the properly. Will the good it does far outweigh the harm it docs either to the Defendant or oilier person or persons? These and other matters must be weighed by the court before it appoints a Receiver, and thus such appointment is subject to its discretion. Judicial discretion does not mean that a court may act or fail to act according to a mere whim or caprice. In receivership proceedings every important determination by the court calls for informed independent judgment. The power of a court of equity to appoint a receiver is something like the power of a skilful surgeon to use a sharp knife. If used skilfully by the court and with proper exercise of discretion, the power to appoint a receiver is frequently a great aid in business affairs, but when used unskilfully and without discretion it often results in loss to everyone concerned. If used skilfully by the court and with proper exercise of discretion, the power to appoint a receiver is frequently a great aid in business affairs, but when used unskilfully and without discretion it often results in loss to everyone concerned. The observations of the learned author made in paragraph 59 of the same book may also be usefully quoted : The appointment of a receiver is ordinarily a harsh, drastic and extraordinary remedy because it takes custody of the Defendant's property out of his hands on an interlocutory order, before the court has had an opportunity to hear the final merits of the case discussed, testimony relative to the final merits introduced, and to pass on the final relief prayed for against the Defendant. The appointment of a receiver should only be granted in a clear case. If it is in the power of the court to protect the Plaintiff by granting a less drastic remedy than the appointment of a receiver, the court will usually do so. 34. The observations quoted above clearly indicate that a very serious responsibility is placed upon the authority which is called upon to appoint a Receiver. Since the State Legislature has used the word 'Receiver' it can safely be assumed that the person called upon to appoint the Receiver has a very serious duty to discharge and has to be very careful while depriving the rightful owner of his possession over his property. It is thus obvious that the Legislature expects that the appointment of a Receiver shall be regulated by those principles which are generally recognized and have been accepted by all the Courts in India and in England. Judged in this back-ground, the conclusion is irresistible that the Legislature while empowering the Collector to appoint a Receiver expects that the Collector would discharge the duties of appointing a Receiver, keeping in regard to the well established principles for the appointment of a Receiver. Judged in this back-ground, the conclusion is irresistible that the Legislature while empowering the Collector to appoint a Receiver expects that the Collector would discharge the duties of appointing a Receiver, keeping in regard to the well established principles for the appointment of a Receiver. In my opinion, although the provisions of Rule 1 of Order 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure, have not been specifically mentioned, which require that the Receiver shall be appointed only when it is just and convenient, the intention of the Legislature, in using the word 'Receiver', which has over the years acquired a highly technical meaning, is that the Collector while appointing a Receiver will take into consideration the fact whether the appointment of Receiver is proper, just and convenient and whether the appointment of Receiver would serve the purpose of recovering Government dues or not. The Collector is also expected to take into account whether the appointment of Receiver, having regard to the nature and condition of the property, would be a suitable remedy for recovering the Government dues. If the intention of the Legislature is indicative of the fact that the aforesaid factors have to be taken into consideration while appointing a Receiver, it is obvious that the Collector is under a legal duty to satisfy himself whether the appointment of Receiver is 'just and convenient'. The view about the manner of appointment of Receiver, that I am taking, is inherent in the very appointment of Receiver and is apart from what is to be found in Rule 1 of Order 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure. I am of the opinion that although the Legislature did not mention Order 40, Rule 1, of the CPC as being applicable, the intention of the Legislature, by the use of the word 'Receiver' was that, while making the appointment, the Legislature expected that the Collector would do so after being satisfied that the appointment was 'just and convenient'. 35. Apart from the view that I have taken above, I am further of the view that the language of Section 286-A of the Act itself indicates that while making the appointment of Receiver the Collector should be satisfied that the appointment of Receiver is just and proper. 35. Apart from the view that I have taken above, I am further of the view that the language of Section 286-A of the Act itself indicates that while making the appointment of Receiver the Collector should be satisfied that the appointment of Receiver is just and proper. In Section 286-A(1)(a) of the Act, the Legislature has used the words "appoint for such period, as he may deem fit, Receiver of any movable or immovable property of the defaulter". The words "as he may deem fit" clearly indicate an intention on the part of the Legislature that the Collector while appointing a Receiver should apply his mind to the question whether the appointment was just and proper. The Legislature did not confer upon the Collector the absolute power to appoint a Receiver for the recovery of Government dues. The words "as he may deem fit" clearly indicate that the power has to be exercised with care and caution and not merely because Government dues have to be recovered by the appointment of a Receiver. The words "as he may deem fit" further indicate that before appointing the Receiver, the Collector has to make up his mind whether having regard to the circumstances of the case, the appointment of the Receiver would be just and convenient. The Collector has also to apply his mind as to whether any other mode for recovery has to be resorted to or not. As between the various modes for the recovery of Government dues, he has to make up his mind as to whether the recovery of dues by the appointment of a Receiver would be just and convenient for both the State Government and for the owner of the property. It is thus apparent that the Legislature by using the words "as he may deem fit" clearly indicated its intention that the appointment of Receiver could be made only when it was "just and convenient". 36. In his referring order relying upon H.R. Sugar Factory (P) Ltd. Nakpur v. State of Uttar Pradesh (Supra) observed that the recovery proceedings may resemble execution proceedings, but they cannot be equated with execution proceedings. 36. In his referring order relying upon H.R. Sugar Factory (P) Ltd. Nakpur v. State of Uttar Pradesh (Supra) observed that the recovery proceedings may resemble execution proceedings, but they cannot be equated with execution proceedings. He expressed his agreement with the view taken by the learned Judges constituting the aforesaid Division Bench and expressed his disagreement with the observations made in the cases of Smt. Vimla Rani v. State of U.P. (Supra) and Diamond Sugar Mills Ltd. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh (Supra). Having regard to the view that I have taken, it is unnecessary to decide as to whether in the instant case, the appointment of Receiver partakes of execution proceedings or not. A combined reading of Sections 279 and 286-A of the Act clearly indicates that a complete machinery has been provided for the recovery of Government dues, one of the modes for the recovery of Government dues is the appointment of a Receiver. If a Receiver can be appointed for the recovery of Government dues, it is immaterial as to whether the proceedings relating to the recovery of dues parttake of execution proceedings or not. 37. For the reasons above, I am of the view that the line of reasoning adopted by the learned Judges in the case of Diamond Sugar Mills Ltd. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh (Supra) represents the correct view in regard to the appointment of a Receiver for recovery of Government dues u/s 279 read with Section 286-A of U.P. Act I of 1951. My answer to the question referred by Yashoda Nandan, J. is that the Collector while appointing a Receiver u/s 279 read with Section 286-A of U.P. Act I of 1951 has first to satisfy himself that the appointment is "just and convenient". In the absence of such a finding, the appointment of Receiver will be without jurisdiction.