Aluminium Corporation Of India v. Commissioner Burdwan Division
1976-11-26
M.M.Dutt, SABYASACHI MUKHARJEE
body1976
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment 1. THE appellant is a large concern manufacturing aluminum metal and fabricated products. It has its factory at Jaykaynagar assansol in the district of Burdwan. The plants in the factory of the appellant are driven by electricity, for the supply of which the factory of the appellant has a power house. The said power house is fed by coal which is raised by the appellant from the colliery situated within the same boundaries of the appellant's said factory. The appellant's factory, power house and colliery are all situated within the same compound and all are owned by the appellant, as contended by the appellant, as a single industrial unit. The appellant states that the distance between the pithead of the appellant's colliery and its power house is very short. The coal consumed in the power house is carried to the power house from the pithead of the said colliery by means of trolley along the train lines belonging to the appellant. It is the case of the appellant that the said colliery has an average annual output of about one lac tonnes of coal. The bulk of that coal, according to the appellant, is consumed by the appellant in the said power house for the generation of electricity, which is used in the said factory for the production of aluminum as also in the said colliery. A comparatively small portion of said coal is consumed by the boiler in the colliery used for the purpose of haulage work in the colliery. It is the case of the appellant that if after consumption of coal as aforesaid any excess quantity is available the same is sold by the appellant. 2. THE question involved in this appeal, is, whether the coal used or transported from the said colliery to the power house for the purpose of the said factory is liable to duty under the cess Act, 1880. The Deputy Collector, burdwan has overruled the objection of the appellant and has held that such coals were liable to duty. The appellant moved the Additional District Magistrate who confirmed the order of the said Deputy Collector.
The Deputy Collector, burdwan has overruled the objection of the appellant and has held that such coals were liable to duty. The appellant moved the Additional District Magistrate who confirmed the order of the said Deputy Collector. The appellant thereupon, filed an appeal before the Commissioner, Burdwan Division being the appropriate authority, who in his turn has also confirmed the departmental view and has rejected the appellant's contention that such coals removed from colliery for user in the power house were not liable to duty. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid decisions the appellant moved this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, and by judgment delivered and order passed on the 1st of March, 1974 S. K. Dutta, J. has dismissed the said application. This appeal arises out of the said decision of the learned Trial Judge. By the West Bengal Cess (Amendment) Act, 1964 the new word 'despatch' was inserted in section 4, in the following manner: -"despatch" in relation to coal mine means the quantity of coke and coal despatched from the coal mine section 6 of the Cess Act, 1880 was also amended and substituted as follows:- "the word cess and public work cess shall be assessed- (a) in respect of lands, on the annual value thereof, (b) in respect of coal mines, on the annual despatches there from" In the objects and reasons of the said amendment it was stated as follows:- "under section 6 read with Section 72 of the Cess Act, 1880, cess is levied on coal and coke in the State of West Bengal on the basis of the annual net profits from the Collieries. The working of the present system of levy has disclosed some defects and the system seems to have given scope for evasion of payment. It has, therefore, been considered advisable to levy cess on the basis of despatch of coal and coke from collieries as in being done in the State of Bihar. The Act has been passed with this object in view". 3. THE effect of the said amendment is that on the coal mines cess would be levied on the annual dispatches there from, and dispatch has been defined as to mean quantity of coal despatched from the coal mine. Prior to the amendment cess was livable on the annual net profits from mines. That was found to be unsatisfactory and there was scope for evasion.
Prior to the amendment cess was livable on the annual net profits from mines. That was found to be unsatisfactory and there was scope for evasion. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the proper meaning of the expression despatch. The ordinary meaning of the expression despatch as appears from the Shorter Oxford English dictionary, 3rd Ed., Vol. I, Page 491 is "to send away, get rid of". It is true that the expression used in a fiscal provision must be construed strictly but as the Supreme Court has observed in the case of Nariruddin v. S.T.A. Tribunal A.I.R. 1976 S.C. page 331 that if the precise words used in a statute are plain and unambiguous these are bound to be construed in their ordinary some. The mere fact that the result of the statute might be unjust does not entitle any Court to refuse to give its effect but if there are two different interpretations of the words in an Act the Court would adopt that which is just, reasonable and sensible rather than that which is none of these things. If there is inconvenience which is an absurd inconvenience by reading an enactment in its ordinary sense, where as if it is read in a manner in which it is capable though not in an ordinary sense there would not be arty inconvenience at all that would be the reason why one should not read tine word in the ordinary grammatical meaning. When coal is moved from one part of the same establishment to another by way of domestic appropriation can it be said that the coal has been sent away or despatched from the colliery ? Literally speaking if the power house is treated as a separate place from the coal mine then coal undoubtedly has been moved from the colliery to another place but having regard to the mischief which the amendment sought to cure, in our opinion, such a narrow literal construction of the meaning of the expression 'despatch' should not be given, in the facts and circumstances of this case. We are in respectful agreement with the view of the Chief Justice Chakrabartti, in the case of Aluminum Coloration of India v. Coal Board A. I. R. 1959 Calcutta, page 222 at page 229 that 'despatch' carries with it the idea of sending to a different and separate place.
We are in respectful agreement with the view of the Chief Justice Chakrabartti, in the case of Aluminum Coloration of India v. Coal Board A. I. R. 1959 Calcutta, page 222 at page 229 that 'despatch' carries with it the idea of sending to a different and separate place. Movement from one part to another of the same establishment for domestic appropriation or consumption in our opinion would not be despatch in terms of the amended provision of the Cess Act, 1880. To hold that such removal of coal from the pithead for domestic appropriation within the same industrial unit in the same compound is sending out coal from the colliery is to give a strained meaning to the expression 'despatch', repugnant to the ordinary nature of the expression. it is true that Chief Justice Chakravarti expressed the aforesaid view in the context of a different Act namely Coal Mines (Conservation and Safety) Act, 1952 and also there the expression used in sub-section (2) of section 8 was clear indication that such movement from one part to another of the same establishment was not despatch, which indication is absent in the instant case, we are of opinion that the ratio would also be applicable in construing the meaning of the expression despatch in the context of the facts and circumstances of this case. We must, however, emphasise that where such movement is not for domestic appropriation or user within one establishment but for other purposes namely, storage etc. such removal might become 'despatch' in terms of the section. 4. IN the aforesaid view of the matter this appeal must be allowed and the judgment and order of the learned trial Judge are hereby set aside. The rule nisi issued is made absolute. Let appropriate writs in the nature of certiorari and mandamus issue. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.