N. H. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) THE plaintiffs in the instant case claiming to represent all the residents of village Fatehpura of Bayad taluka of Sabarkantha District claimed that all the people in the village had a right to graze their cattle on two parcels of land and they had also a right to remove from the said land fire-wood as could be carried on the head. The plain- tiffs claimed inhabitants of both these villages right from the time imm- emorial enjoyed these rights. ( 2 ) THE first point for determination that arises in this second appeal before me is whether the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 are the owners of the land in dispute namely survey Nos. 125 and 108/2. The learned appellate Judge in paragraphs 13 14 and 15 of his judgment has dealt with the question of the ownership of the defendants Nos. 1 and 2. The learned Judge quoted sec. 8 of the Jagir Abolition Act and came to the conclusion that as these lands were not cultivated they were waste lands and as they were waste lands they got vested in the State. It appears that the learned Joint Judge did not appreciate the distinction between the waste land and the jungle land. After having accepted that this Jagir was a proprietary jagir and after having found that these lands were forest lands it was not open to the learned Joint Judge to say that the lands were waste lands because they were uncultivated lands. It is too naive to state that forest lands are waste lands. If any authority on the proposition is needed we can lay our hands on the case of SHRI U. P. MAVINKURVE V. THAKORE MADHAVSINGHJI GAMBHIRSINGHJI and OTHERS REPORTED AT A. I. R. 1965 S. C. 1747. It was a case arising under the very Jagir Abolition Act. In para 8 of that judgment it has been observed as follows: we are accordingly of the opinion that after coming into force of the Jagirs Abolition Act the respondents Nos. It was a case arising under the very Jagir Abolition Act. In para 8 of that judgment it has been observed as follows: we are accordingly of the opinion that after coming into force of the Jagirs Abolition Act the respondents Nos. 1 to 11 became occupants in respect of the forest lands in the 36 villages and the only rights which they have are those of occupants under the provisions of the Bombay Land Revenue Code and such rights do not include the right to cut and remove the trees from the forest lands of the villages in question. ( 3 ) THE Division Bench of this Court consisting of S. H. Sheth and B. K. Mehta JJ. while disposing of the First Appeal No. 291 of 1967 on 7 February 1975 has held that forest lands are not waste lands. This view is expressed authoritatively by the Division Bench after referring to various earlier authorities. The Division Bench has observed as under: for the reasons which we state below we are of the opinion that forest lands are not waste lands. Therefore they have not vested by virtue of the provisions of sec. 8 of the Jagir Abolition Act in the State of Gujarat. Mr. Justice J. B. Mehta in Special Civil Application No. 570 of 1963 decided by him on 5th November 1968 has observed that a land can be said to be waste if it is so useless that it is incapable of any use. In the case of Ibrahim Akbarali (Supra) this court has accepted that view. The question therefore is that in order to style forest lands as waste lands can we say that they are so useless as to be incapable of any use ? In our opinion lands where timber trees grow which in their turn yield rich forest produce can never be said to be waste lands because they cannot be said to be so useless as to be incapable of any use. Lands such as rocky stony or saline lands may fall under the category of waste lands. Since in our opinion forest lands are not waste lands within the meaning of the Jagir Abolition Act they have not by virtue of sec. 8 of the Jagir Abolition Act vested in the State. The fourth contention which Mr. Lands such as rocky stony or saline lands may fall under the category of waste lands. Since in our opinion forest lands are not waste lands within the meaning of the Jagir Abolition Act they have not by virtue of sec. 8 of the Jagir Abolition Act vested in the State. The fourth contention which Mr. Chhaya has raised before us therefore fails and is rejected in both its aspects. ( 4 ) THIS brings me to the really controversial question in this Second Appeal. The plaintiffs in their plaint did not append any legal nomenclature to the two rights claimed by them. They did not call them customary rights nor did they call them by any other legal terminology. They simply stated that they were the rights of the village people in general having been enjoyed by them from time immemorial. The first question therefore that crops up for my determination is regarding the nature of those rights. At one stage it was suggested that they were customary rights referred to in sec. 18 of the Indian Easements Act. But a closer look at the said provision shows that they cannot be the customary easement because the easement must necessarily be a right annexed to a dominant heritage. The plaintiffs did not state that they were claiming the said right as customary easements. It therefore appears that the rights claimed by them can fall under clause (b) of sec. 2 of the Indian Ease- ments Act. In other words they can be said to be customary rights not being licensees in the immovable properties in question which they claimed irrespective of other immovable property. If a strict nomenclature is requ- ired their rights can be said to be customary rights in alieno solo. In other words they claim profits a prendre in favour of a fluctuating body of men. The Supreme Court had an occasion to deal with this sort of right in the case of STATE OF BIHAR and OTHERS V. SUBODH GOPAL BOSE AND ANOTHER A. I. R. 1968 S. C. 281. Paragraphs 18 to 23 deal with this sort of right. In that case the right to remove minerals was the bone of contention. The Supreme Court had an occasion to deal with this sort of right in the case of STATE OF BIHAR and OTHERS V. SUBODH GOPAL BOSE AND ANOTHER A. I. R. 1968 S. C. 281. Paragraphs 18 to 23 deal with this sort of right. In that case the right to remove minerals was the bone of contention. The Supreme Court in paragraph 18 has observed as follows: ( 5 ) A profit-a-prendre in gross - that is a right exercisable by an indeterminate body of persons to take something from the land of others. but not for the more beneficial enjoyment of a dominant tenement - is not an easement with the meaning of the Easements Act. To the claim of such a right the Easements Act has no application. Sec. 2 of the Easements Act expressly provides that nothing in the Act contained shall be deemed to affect inter alia to derogate from any customary or other right (not being a license) in or over immovable property which the Governments the public or any person may possess irrespective of other immovable property A claim in the nature of a profit-a-prendre operating in favour of an indeterminate class of persons and arising out of a local custom may be held enforceable only if it satisfies the test of a valid custom. A custom is a usage by virtue of which a class of persons belonging to a defined section in a locality are entitled to exercise specific rights against certain other persons or property in the same locality. To the extent to which it is inconsistent with the general law undoubtedly the custom prevails. But to be valid a custom must be ancient certain and reasonable and being in deroga- tion of the general rules of law must be construed strictly. A right in the nature of a profit-a-prendre in the exercise of which the residents of locality are entitled to excavate stones for trade purposes would ex-facie be unreasonable because the exercise of such a right ordinarily tends to the complete destruction of the subject- matter of the profit. It is said in Halsburys Laws of England 3 Edn. Vol. A right in the nature of a profit-a-prendre in the exercise of which the residents of locality are entitled to excavate stones for trade purposes would ex-facie be unreasonable because the exercise of such a right ordinarily tends to the complete destruction of the subject- matter of the profit. It is said in Halsburys Laws of England 3 Edn. Vol. II Art. 324 at p. 173: if a right in alieno solo amounts to a profit a prendre it cannot be claimed under an alleged custom; for no preflt-a-prendre and therefore no right of common can be claimed by custom except in certain mining localities; nor can there be a right to a profit-a-prendre in an undefined and fluctuating body of persons. The above authority of the Supreme Court therefore recognises such a right on the basis of a valid custom even if it be in favour of a fluctuating body provided the said right is not unreasonable and provided it does not ultimately go to annihilate the very subject matter of the property. ( 6 ) AS said above the plaintiff did not specifically state in their plaint that they were raising their alleged two rights on the alleged custom and the learned advocate appearing for the appellants-original defendants had very strenuously urged before me that in absence of any such specific pleading the plaintiffs should be non-suited. On going through the plea- dings it appears reasonably clear that the plaintiffs have been claiming the said rights as the ones having been enjoyed by the villa people from times immemorial and as of right. So the non-mention of the epithet customary would not make the plaint defective. Pleadings of mofussil courts as it has been emphasised time and again are to be interpreted liberally and I am not inclined to reject the plaintiffs claim in limine on this technical plea because I am satisfied on the perusal of the plaint as a whole that the plaintiffs have pleaded customary rights though they have not used that adjective in their pleadings. ( 7 ) THE learned counsel appearing for the appellants contended that the right to reclaim the waste land is not lost even if there be a grazing right and in this connection he invited my attention to the case of RAM SARAN SINGH V. BIRGI SINGH I. L. R. 19 ALLAHABAD 193. ( 7 ) THE learned counsel appearing for the appellants contended that the right to reclaim the waste land is not lost even if there be a grazing right and in this connection he invited my attention to the case of RAM SARAN SINGH V. BIRGI SINGH I. L. R. 19 ALLAHABAD 193. It is a case dealing with waste land and in the light of the general provision contained in a sort of a deed to the effect that village cattle might graze cattle on the waste lands of the village It is a case resting Oil the interpretation of that document and it cannot be called in aid to deal with a case like the one on hand. The result is that as far as the right to graze cattle is concerned it has got to be upheld. ( 8 ) THIS brings me to the case of the plaintiffs to remove firewood. As far as the plaint is concerned it is all vague in this connection It simply says that village people have got a right to remove dried firewood on head. This is a jungle land and in this land trees would go on getting dried gradually. It is not stated in the plaint as to how much wood how many times a day and how many persons in a family can remove it. Suppose a family has got 10 adult members who take it into their head to go to the land a number of times a day and claim this right. If this is allowed to be done it would abolish for all practical purposes the right of the owner to the jungle. Had the plaintiffs stated that each family had a right to remove headload of firewood for domestic purposes only or had they stated that once in a month or a fortnight a man had such a right it could have been appreciated. What is claimed is a sort of a blanket right for all village people for any purpose whatsoever. The authority of the Supreme Court quoted above in the case of State of Bihar and Ors (Supra) A. I. R. 1968 S. C. 281 would be clearly attracted to the facts of this case. What is claimed is a sort of a blanket right for all village people for any purpose whatsoever. The authority of the Supreme Court quoted above in the case of State of Bihar and Ors (Supra) A. I. R. 1968 S. C. 281 would be clearly attracted to the facts of this case. If by the exercise of a customary right in favour of an indefinite body of persons the property which is the subject matter of the profit-a-prendre is in danger of being destroyed the customary right will not be recognised. As observed by the Supreme Court in paragraph 23 of the above reported case where the right claimed by the tenants of certain villages does not relate to taking of spontaneous produce of forest and minerals for domestic or agricultural purposes. . such a custom would if exercised in its amplitude as claimed may lead to breaches of the peace for it would be open to all tenants to claim to work any quarry simultaneously for trade purposes and may also tend to the destruction of the subject matter. Such a custom would be unrea- sonable. In the case on hand also if all the village people act in the manner they can possibly claimed and they have claimed of removing all dried wood wherever and whenever found in those two big pieces of land survey Nos. 135 and 108 it would leave no wood for the owner and this may in its turn lead to breach of peace also. In view of the want of specification and amplitude of the right such a blanket right cannot be recognised. In this view of the matter the right to carry firewood on head for all village people is difficult to be sustained. APPEAL allowed. : L. P. A. against the judgment dismissed by S. Obul Reddi C J. and D. P. Desai J. .