Research › Browse › Judgment

Rajasthan High Court · body

1976 DIGILAW 370 (RAJ)

Bilamchand v. Vidya Devi

1976-11-03

M.L.JOTHI

body1976
JUDGMENT 1. - This is a revision application challenging the order of the learned Additional Munsiff-cum-Judicial Magistrate No. 5 Jaipur City, Jaipur, allowing the non-petitioner by way of amendment to add one more ground of ejectment relating to the letting of the premises by the tenant. 2. The brief facts out of which this revision arises are as follows : 3. The plaintiff-non-petitioner Smt. Vidyadevi filed a suit against the petitioner-defendant for ejectment on the ground that the defendant has neither paid nor tendered the arrears of rent for six months and further that plaintiff-non-petitioner requires the suit shop reasonably and bonafide for the business of the husband. It is alleged that subsequent to the filing of the written statement and before the striking of the issue the petitioner sublet the shop to other person and, therefore, the plaintiff wanted to amend by adding the ground of subletting. The amendment was allowed by the Court and the plaintiff was permitted to amend the plaint by adding para 8 A in respect of subletting. The trial Court which allowing amendment observed that application was moved at an earliest even when issues have not been framed; that the proposed amendment shall not change the jurisdiction of the Court and further that the defendant will not be prejudiced as he will have the opportunity of defending himself against the case based on subletting. Hence this revision. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended before me that the order allowing amendment suffers from material irregularity as the proposed amendment will allow the plaintiff to base his case entirely on the different cause of action which procedure is not permissible, under Rule 17ORDER6 C.P.C. He has placed reliance on Nathu Ram v. STA Tribunal, AIR 1973 Rajasthan 24. Jawanmal v. Gaj Singh, AIT 1974 Rajasthan 184, and Rajeswere Dayal v. Padam Kumar Kothari, 1969 RLW 546. On the other hand Mr. Khejriwal, the learned counsel for the non-petitioner has paced reliance on Shikharchand v. D.J.P. Karini Sabha, AIR 1974 Supreme Court 1178. In Shikharchand v. D.J.P. Karini Sabha (supra), it has been held that ordinarily a suit is tried in all the stages on the cause of action as it existed on the date of its institution. Khejriwal, the learned counsel for the non-petitioner has paced reliance on Shikharchand v. D.J.P. Karini Sabha, AIR 1974 Supreme Court 1178. In Shikharchand v. D.J.P. Karini Sabha (supra), it has been held that ordinarily a suit is tried in all the stages on the cause of action as it existed on the date of its institution. But it is open to a Court to take notice of events which have happened after the institution of the suit and afford relief to the parties in the changed circumstances in order to shorten the litigation or to do complete justice between the parties. Bearing this principle in mind it may be mentioned that the event of subletting is alleged to have taken place after the filing of the suit. The proposed amendment will in no way cause prejudice to the defendant petitioner as he will have opportunity to defend his case on the ground of subletting also. On the other hand, the proposed amendment will shorten the litigation and avoid multiplicity of litigation. It is salutary principle of law that the Court leans towards allowing amendment in order to shorten the litigation and further to avoid the multiplicity of the litigation. The proposed amendment shall serve both the purposes. It is true that if the proposed amendment based on distinct cause of action is likely to cause prejudice the Court may not allow such an amendment but that is not the case here, inasmuch as the petitioner-defendant will have due opportunity to defend himself on the ground of subletting also. The trial Court has exercised its jurisdiction while granting amendment which is of a discretionary character and this Court in the facts and circumstances of this case will not invoke its revisional jurisdiction to interfere with the discretionary order which is in no way perverse and meets the requirements of justice. In view of the ratio laid down in the Supreme Court case I need not discuss the other authorities cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner. However, I may make a reference to Nathuram v. S.T.A. Tribunal (supra), wherein Jagatnarain C.J. as he then was, had held that in a suit to evict the tenant on the ground of non-payment of rent, the landlord cannot be allowed to amend the plaint by adding a new ground of bonafide necessity as it would require fresh evidence. However, I may make a reference to Nathuram v. S.T.A. Tribunal (supra), wherein Jagatnarain C.J. as he then was, had held that in a suit to evict the tenant on the ground of non-payment of rent, the landlord cannot be allowed to amend the plaint by adding a new ground of bonafide necessity as it would require fresh evidence. In the present case as stated earlier the evidence has yet to commence. Therefore, the above case is distinguishable. 5. In the result, the revision application is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. The parties are directed to appear before the trial Court on 6th of December, 1976.Revision dismissed. *******