JUDGMENT 1. - This is an unfortunate litigation. I say unfortunate because it concerns the University. To an average citizen, University is a place of quite contentment, with persons deeply involved in study & research of truth and permanent values. Whenever therefore this picture gets blurred, irrespective of who is at fault, the loss is of the Society and the future citizens. But as the matter has come to this Court, the unhappy task of deciding the controversy by the mundane touch stone of legal technique has to be gone into one can only hope and expect that such occasions will be rare indeed. 2. Petitioner is a Professor and Head of Department of Mining Engineering, in the Faculty of Engineering Department in the University of jodhpur. 3. By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, he challenges the impugned resolution No. 39 dated 10.3.76 of the Syndicate, University of jodhpur by which it was resolved to hold an inquiry against the petitioner. It also challenges the impugned order dated 28.3.76 of suspension of the petitioner made by the respondent No. 2, Vice Chancellor of the University of jodhpur. 4. It appears that certain complaints were made against the Mining Engineering Department and the Syndicate by its resolution on 24/25 273 decided that a Committee of inquiry consisting of two persons be constituted to inquire into the working of the Mining Engineering Department and also make recommendations to ensure its proper functioning. In persuance thereof Committee was appointed headed by then Justice Mr. C.B. Bhargawa, a Judge of this Court. A report was submitted by it on 7-11-73. This report came up for consideration before the meeting of the Syndicate on 29.12.73. It is relevant to point out that at that time Dr. P.N. Masaldan was Vice Chancellor of the Jodhpur University. Having considered the report of the Committee the Syndicate decided that the Vice-Chancellor is authorised to frame charges and place them before special meeting of the Syndicate for full consideration. It is relevant to point out that at that time Dr. P.N. Masaldan was Vice Chancellor of the Jodhpur University. Having considered the report of the Committee the Syndicate decided that the Vice-Chancellor is authorised to frame charges and place them before special meeting of the Syndicate for full consideration. It appears that for something over a period of two years charges were not framed and the matter only came up before the Syndicate at it impugned meeting held on 10.3.76 wherein the Syndicate considered the charges which had been framed by the Vice-Chancellor in pursuance of its earlier resolution No. 255 of 29.12.73 and resolved that the charges framed by the Vice Chancellor be communicated to the petitioner and further authorised the Vice Chancellor to appoint a Committee and to nominate a Chairman of the Committee as provided by the clause (3) of Schedule II to Appendix-B (Ordinance 320) (form of Agreement for Service for University Teachers) to investigate the matter and directed that the Committee will submit its report to the Syndicate. In pursuance of the above decision of the Syndicate the Vice Chancellor appointed a Committee a consisting of three persons and an office order of 25.3.76 was issued to that effect. On 28.3.76 the Vice Chancellor in exercise of powers vested in him under section 12(5) of the Jodhpur University Act (hereinafter to be called 'the Act') placed the petitioner under suspension pending an inquery. He also directed that the petitioner will be entitled to 50% of his basic pay plus such D.A. as is admissible on the amount during the period of suspension, as subsistence allowance. 5. A meeting of the Syndicate was held on April 17, 1976. Amongst others Items, item No. 9 and 10 of the agenda were as follows : "Items No. 9 and 10 of the Actions Taken by the Vice-Chancellor. 9. With reference to the Syndicate Resolution No. 39 dated March 10, 1976 the Vice Chancellor has appointed the Committee on March 25, 1976 consisting of the following to investigate into the case of Prof R. Bbadada, Head, Mining Engineering Department and nominated Prof. M.C. Joshi as its Chairman ;- Dr. M.C. Josbi, Dean, Faculty of Arts Chairman Dr. H.C. Arya Member Prof. & Head, Department of Botany Shri S.N. Goel Director of Technical Education Member Rajasthan, jodhpur." 10. To report that the Vice Chancellor has Suspended Prof. M.C. Joshi as its Chairman ;- Dr. M.C. Josbi, Dean, Faculty of Arts Chairman Dr. H.C. Arya Member Prof. & Head, Department of Botany Shri S.N. Goel Director of Technical Education Member Rajasthan, jodhpur." 10. To report that the Vice Chancellor has Suspended Prof. R. Bbadada w.e.f. 28.3-1976." 5A. The Syndicate by its resolution No. 52 of the same date i.e. April 17, 1976 noted the report on be actions taken in pursuance of the decision taken by the syndicate at its meeting held on March 10, 1976 and after noting that the Vice-Chancellor had appointed a Committee and also that the Vice-Chancellor had in exercise of the special powers under section 12(5) of the Act suspended the petitioner resolved that the "Syndicate noted and confirmed the action taken by the Vice Chancellor. Thereafter the petitioner on 6.5.76 sent a memorandum to the Syndicate objecting to the constitution of the Committee and the order of suspension and at asking that the same be revoked. Not having got any relief the petitioner filed this petition in this Court. 6. In the petition various allegations have been made giving the history of the apparent strained relations between the petitioner & the present Vice-Chancellor and it has been suggested that there has been misunderstanding because the petitioner's right to be appointed Dean of Faculty of Engineering has been denied because of the Vice-Chancellor being prejudiced against him. This is of course categorically denied in the return and it is stated that the petitioner has no real grievance and is only imagining bias and the real purpose is just to delay and prejudice the inquiry ordered against him. I feel it totally unnecessary to go into these allegations and counter allegations because they have no relevancy for the purpose of determining the controversy before me which is only to the effect whether the inquiry which has been ordered against the petitioner has been validly ordered and whether the order of suspension against the petitioner is legally sustainable. I can only give expression to my sense of unhappiness that relations in the University between such senior officers should not be what one is entitled to expect in a temple of learning where character and the whole life of the further generations are to be formed. 7. It does not matter who is at fault, or whether any one is at fault, at all. 7. It does not matter who is at fault, or whether any one is at fault, at all. The fact of disharmony normally not to be expected in cool atmosphere of the University Campus is enough to make one unhappy. I need not persue it any further. 8. Section 35(1) of the Act provides that every salaried officer and teacher of the University shall be appointed by means of a written contract. Ordinance 320 of the University provides the form of agreement for service of University teachers as envisaged in sub-section (1) of the Act, and is given in Appendix B. Clause 8 of Appendix B provides that the engagement of and the penalties to be imposed on the teacher shall not be determined except in the manner provided hereinafter in the schedule II. The said schedule provides the procedure for imposing various penalties including suspension and termination of service and also provides a procedure for imposing suspension and termination. 9. The first argument of Mr. Bhargava, learned counsel for the petitioner is based on the procedure for imposing the suspension & termination in Para 3 of Schedule II which empowers the Syndicate to cause an investigation of all matters reported to it by the Vice-Chancellor about the grave misconduct and persistent negligence of duty of teachers, such investigation shall be done by a Committee comprising of members to be nominated by the Syndicate. The first limb of this argument is that the charges which have been framed against the petitioner do not amount to grave misconduct and negligence of duties and therefore the inquiry can not proceed against the petitioner. A reference to the charges framed against the petitioner will show that it has been alleged that he refused to give marks to certain persons for sessional work which were due; that he forced certain students to do a topic so that he could utilise for his own Ph.D. Degree and that his obstructive tactics also prevented the teacher candidates of the Mining Engineering Department from obtaining their M.E. Degree. It is also alleged that he made a false excuse for cancelling the survey camp of B.E. Final/Mining class. I am not concerned here with the veracity or otherwise of the charges. It is also alleged that he made a false excuse for cancelling the survey camp of B.E. Final/Mining class. I am not concerned here with the veracity or otherwise of the charges. All that I am saying is that the charges as alleged do prima facie show a grave misconduct or negligence in duty (Subject of course to their being proved). If a professor does not perform his duty is giving guidance to the other teachers and the students under him certainly it cannot be treated lightly. Mr. Bhargava referred we to Bhagwat Prasad v. I.G. of Police, (AIR 1970 Punjab 81) for the definition of misconduct. In that case it was found that a Constable while off duly who was found in a drunken condition and making noises was guilty of graves mis-conduct. It that case it was held that the term 'misconduct' does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent and that there can be no precise scale of graduation in order to arithmetically compare the gravity of the one from the other. 10. Grave misconduct was held to make the character of the conduct serious or very serious. It should also be noted that the charges are still to be inquired into and it would certainly be open to the petitioner to urge that even if the charges are proved they are not of that grave nature as to call for any action against him. 11. Without any matter having been decided, by the Committee & without the benefit of full material on record I consider it both hazardous and inadvisable to express any view on it, and also it would not be proper. 12. The next infirmity urged was that as the form of agreement requires the Committee which is to investigate into the matter to be nominated by the Syndicate but the present Committee has not been so constituted, as it was formed by the Vice-Chancellor as is clear from the Office Order of March 25, 1976. Had the matter stood there alone, there may have been some force in the argument of the counsel for the petitioner. It appears however that the matter was placed before the Syndicate at its meeting held on April 17, 1976. Had the matter stood there alone, there may have been some force in the argument of the counsel for the petitioner. It appears however that the matter was placed before the Syndicate at its meeting held on April 17, 1976. The Syndicate by its resolution No. 52 of same date took note specifically of the fact that 3 Persons (who constitute the present committee) had been nominated by the Vice-Chancellor and specifically affirmed the action taken by him. The argument of Mr. Bhargava that inspite of the fact that the Syndicate approved of the names of the present committee, the present committee continues to be invalidly constituted is unacceptable. Para 3 of Schedule II no doubt requires a committee to be nominated by the Syndicate. Had the committee proceeded to conclude its work without the Syndicate having had occasion to indicate its approval of its constitution the grievance of the petitioner could have been understood; or had even the grievance been to some action taken by the Committee between March 25, 1976 to April 17, 1976 there may have been some validity in that. But the grievance which is now being urged is that inspite of the Committee having been specifically approved by the Syndicate on 17.4.76, it is not competent to proceed with the matter. This I find difficult to follow because in terms of Para 3 the committee (which may have been originally formed by the Vice-Chancellor) must now be taken to have been nominated by the Syndicate when it approved their names at its meeting on 17.4.76. 13. In Shardul Singh of M.P., (AIR 1966 Madhya Pradesh 193) it was held that disciplinary authority can not delegate to the subordinate to initiate disciplinary proceedings but must do it itself. In that case the Superintendent of Police initiated the proceeding who was not competent to take disciplinary action and it was for that reason that it was held that the show cause notice issued by the Inspector General of Police who was the appointing authority could not cure the defect because the initiation was done by the Superintendent of Police who was not competent to do so. I do not see how that helps the petitioner because the Syndicate itself has initiated the proceeding on 10.3.76 vide Annexure-8. 14. In Jagannadharao v. Registrar, Andhra University, (1974) II An. I do not see how that helps the petitioner because the Syndicate itself has initiated the proceeding on 10.3.76 vide Annexure-8. 14. In Jagannadharao v. Registrar, Andhra University, (1974) II An. W.R. page 181) the University did not empower the Vice-Chancellor to appoint or dismiss an Upper Division Clerk and the Vice Chancellor having done so, his action was held to be illegal. No question arose in that case whether the competent authority had approved of the action of the Vice Chancellor before initiation of proceedings. The case is therefore clearly distinguishable. 15. In Anandilal Verma v. State of Rajasthan, (1975 RLW 34) it was held that as the control of the subordinate judiciary vests in the High Court it means full court and action initiated by the Chief Justice or any other Jude nominated by him is not in compliance with Article 235 and the dismissal following in pursuance of that inquiry is illegal. It also found that the action of a single judge was not ratified or validated by the full court, and therefore it refused to find that single Judge discharged his disciplinary authority on behalf of the full Court under Article 235. It is however relevant to note that in that case the Bench accepted the argument that if an authority has cited on behalf of the ratifying authority and later on the said authority ratifies the action, the subsequent authorisation dates back to the time when the act was actually performed by the unauthorised person. In that reward the Bench quoted with approval para 756 (page 452) of Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edition, Vol. 1 : "Where the act has been done by a person not assuming to act on his own behalf, but for another, though without his precedent authority or knowledge, and is subsequently ratified by that other person the relation of principal and agent is constituted retrospectively, and the principal is bound by the act whether it is to big advantage or detriment and liability therefore is founded in contract or in tort, to the same extent and with all the same consequences as if it had been done by his previous authority." 16. A reference to the office order of March 25, 1976 by which Vice-Chancellor appointed the committee clearly shows that he was acting in pursuance of the decision of the Syndicate held on March 10, 1976. A reference to the office order of March 25, 1976 by which Vice-Chancellor appointed the committee clearly shows that he was acting in pursuance of the decision of the Syndicate held on March 10, 1976. He was thus not purporting to act as if he had the power himself to nominate the committee. This act of his was on behalf of the Syndicate; when this act was approved and confirmed by the Syndicate at its meeting on April 17, 1976 it must be held to have approved & owned the action of the constitution of the committee retrospectively from the date it was so appointed. One has to see the substance of the matter. The substance is that a committee which is to investigate against the petitioner in order to inspire confidence must be one nominated by the Syndicate. All that one therefore has to see is whether the committee though Initially formed by the Vice-Chancellor in pursuance of authorisation given by the Syndicate at its meeting on March 10, 1976, & approved & ratified by the Syndicate on 17.4.1576 can be said to be an invalidly constituted committee. It seems to me that this argument does not even have the merit of hypertechnicality. It cannot be disputed that the Syndicate would be competent to nominate the very present members constituting the committee to investigate into the matter against the petitioner. In view of the fact that hardly any proceedings of any consequence at all have taken place before the committee it would scarcely serve any purpose to set aside the constitution of this committee, when the very body i.e. Syndicate which his already approved the very committee on April 17, 1976. The argument therefore that the committee has been invalidly constituted cannot be accepted and must be rejected. I may mention that though some kind of allegations were made in the petition about the (sic) fitness of the committee members, no argument have been raised before me regarding that aspect and advisedly, because at one time it had been suggested from the court that if objection was to the (sic) (without going into the merits of this allegation) the committee could be constituted of some outside independent persons possibly even of a retired judge of this Court. This suggestion had been immediately accepted by the counsel for the University, but the petitioner found it difficult to agree presumably because he maintains that the very initiation of proceedings against him are illegal. It is unnecessary now to (sic) on this aspect. The constitution of the committee therefore must be held to be legal and valid. 17. The next contention of the counsel is regarding the order of suspension passed against the petitioner on March 28, 76, Mr. Bhargava's contention is that under the rules there is no power to suspend a teacher pending an inquiry and he refers me to Para 3 of Schedule II & says that though the Syndicate is entitled to suspend or determine the engagement of a teacher this limits the power of suspension only as a measure of punishment and not during the pendency of the inquiry. According to Mr Bhargava as there is no provision in the rules and the Schedule II of power of suspension pending an inquiry could not have been exercised at all. This extreme proposition that if there is no provision in the Rules for suspending an employee during the pendency of an Inquiry, the same cannot be exercised at all must be rejected in view of the clear enunciation of law on this subject by the Supreme Court in R.P. Kapur vs. Union of India, (AIR 1964 SC 887). It has been laid down that the dispute as to suspension pending a department inquiry must be comprised within the words disciplinary matter. The purpose of such suspension is generally to facilitate a departmental inquiry and to ensure that while such inquiry is Going on an officer is not in a position to misuse his authority in the same way in which he might have been charged to have done so in inquiry. It was observed with reference to cases decided earlier : "It is well settled that under the ordinary law of master and servant the power to suspend the servant without pay could not be implied as a term in an ordinary contract of service between the master and the servant but must arise either from an express term in the contract itself or a statutory provision governing such contract. It was further held that an order of interim suspension could be passed against an employee while inquiry was pending into his conduct even though there was no specific provision to that effect in his terms of appointment or in the rules. But in such a case he would be entitled to his remuneration for the period of his interim suspension if there is no statute or rule existing under which it could be withheld," This view was reiterated in B.R. Patel v. State of Maharashtra, (AIR) 1933 SC 800) wherein it was observed : "If there is no express term relating to payment during such suspension or if there is no statutory provision in any enactment or rule the employee is entitled to his full remuneration for the period of his interim suspension." These authorities clearly lay down that even if there is no specific rule for interim suspension pending an inquiry, the employer is still entitled to pass an order of suspension pending an inquiry. Only in such a case the employee will be entitled to full remuneration for the period of his interim suspension. Therefore the broad proposition that the power of suspension cannot be exercised if it is not provided in the rules has got to be rejected. As a matter of fact I find that the power of interim suspension is clearly given by Para 3 of Schedule II, governing the petitioner. Clause 3 states that investigation can be carried out whether a teacher has been suspended or not. This shows that the power to investigate can take place even if an employee has been suspended pending an investigation. Clause (j) further states that where termination is after suspension the termination may be from the date of suspension if the Syndicate so directs When clause (j) therefore empowers the Syndicate to direct that the termination may be from the date of suspension it is evidently contemplating a situation where the teacher is under suspension during the pendency of inquiry because otherwise clause (j) has no purpose. Mr. Mr. Bhargava sought to suggest that Clause (j) should be read to mean that after the inquiry has been concluded and the Syndicate is of the opinion that the services of the teacher should be terminated, it may suspend the teacher and then issue notice to the teacher to Show cause against the action and then if it happens to pass an order of termination, the same may take place from the date of suspension. I can hardly see any justification to adopt such as involved and uncalled for interpretation. Clause (j) clearly shows that there is power to suspend an employee, pending a departmental inquiry. Thus it must be held that power of interim suspension has been specifically provided by the rules In Para 3 (j) of Schedule II. 18. The next submission is that even if it is assumed that the order of suspension could be passed the authority to do so vests in the Syndicate and as the order of 28.3.76 suspending the petitioner was passed by the Vice-Chancellor the same is incompetent. No doubt clause 3 of Schedule II shows that the power of suspension is vested in the Syndicate. But the Vice-Chancellor has however purported to act under section 12 (5) of the Act which states that in any emergency when in the opinion of the Vice Chancellor, immediate action is required, the Vice Chancellor shall take such action as he may deem necessary and shall at the earliest opportunity report the action taken to the officers authority, or body who or which in the ordinary course would have dealt with the matter. Mr. Bhargava's objects to the invoking of section 12(5) by the Vice-Chancellor and says that the power could only be exercised in case there was any emergency which is a condition precedent to exercise of powers by the Vice Chancellor, but as there was no emergency in the present case, the action is vitiated. He referred me to Mrs. Priti Prabha v. Dr. C.P. Singh and others, (ILR 1968 Raj. 712) to urge that if there is no emergency exercise of powers by the Vice-Chancellor cannot be upheld. In that case the challenge had been made to the appointment of a Professor and Head of Hindi Department by the Vice-Chancellor in exercise of the emergency powers. Priti Prabha v. Dr. C.P. Singh and others, (ILR 1968 Raj. 712) to urge that if there is no emergency exercise of powers by the Vice-Chancellor cannot be upheld. In that case the challenge had been made to the appointment of a Professor and Head of Hindi Department by the Vice-Chancellor in exercise of the emergency powers. The Bench after referring to the Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law Board, ( AIR 1967 SC 295 ) held that if it is shown that the circumstances for emergency did not exist or that the circumstances were such that it was impossible for anyone to form an opinion there from suggestive of the existence of emergency, the opinion is challengable on the ground of non-application of mind or perversity or on the ground that it was formed on collateral ground and was beyond the scope of statute. The Court examined the various circumstances & came to a conclusion on facts that it was transparently clear that no circumstances existed suggesting that there was any emergency requiring the appointment of the Professor in the Hindi Department and it was impossible for anyone to form an opinion suggestive of such an emergency. Applying the ratio of above case, can it be said that no circumstances existed on the basis of which the Vice Chancellor, could have, as a reasonable man assumed that an emergency existed permitting him to act under section 12 (5) of the Act. As a justification of the action by the Vice Chancellor it is stated that complaints were received from the Dean Faculty of Engineering (a copy of which has been attached as Ex. 2 to the reply) and which suggested that the petitioner was acting in a manner to interfere with and disturb the working of the Department under his charge apparently because an inquiry committee has been constituted. In the rejoinder filed by the petitioner serious objection has been taken to this letter and it has even been suggested that this letter has been manipulated to justify the action under section 12 (5). It is also suggested that this letter was never mentioned in the order written by Vice-Chancellor on file nor was this brought to the notice of the petitioner and that the justification for action by the Vice-Chancellor on this basis is an after thought. It is also suggested that this letter was never mentioned in the order written by Vice-Chancellor on file nor was this brought to the notice of the petitioner and that the justification for action by the Vice-Chancellor on this basis is an after thought. I am afraid this disputed question of fact can hardly be gone into by me in the present proceedings & I have prima facie to proceed on the basis that the Vice Chancellor took action on the basis of the complaints Ex. 2 sent by the Dean. Now whether the letter was of such a nature as to call for immediate action by him without calling the Syndicate meeting may be a (sic) question, but hardly the one which this Court can be expected to decide. Evidently what was administratively desirable and proper at the relevant time has to be determined by a person who was incharge therein. It may he that even on the receipt of the Dean's letter the Vice-Chancellor may have inquired from the petitioner whether the allegation made therein were correct of that he may have delayed taking any action & called a meeting of the Syndicate. But I cannot persuade myself to strike down suspension only on the ground to at a possible alternative course which is suggested by the petitioner may have been a better course. Evidently bow a particular emergent situation has to be handled has to be left to the person concerned. There was a complaint from the Dean and if the Vice-Chancellor took the view that in the interest of teaching work immediate action was called for it cannot be said to be such an unreasonable view as to call for interference in these extra ordinary proceedings. It is necessary to emphasise that this Court is not sitting as a court of appeal over the opinion which has to be formed subjectively by the Vice Chancellor in deciding whether he should act under section 12(5) of the Act. The test is not an objective one, in the sense whether had this Court been in the position of a Vice-Chancellor, it would have taken the same action as the Vice-Chancellor took. The test in short is whether there were some circumstances on the basis of which the Vice-Chancellor could have acted as a reasonable man in the manner he did. The test in short is whether there were some circumstances on the basis of which the Vice-Chancellor could have acted as a reasonable man in the manner he did. Keeping all the circumstances I cannot find that the action of the Vice-Chancellor was as arbitrary as to call for interference. 19. Another objection raised by Mr. Bhargava against the suspension of the petitioner by the Vice Chancellor was that the power to suspend vests in the Syndicate and the same cannot be delegated and the action by the Vice-Chancellor therefore is nullity. He referred me to Bernard and others v. National Dock Labour Board and another, (1953(1) All ER 1113). In that case the National Labour Board set up under the Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Order had delegated to the Local Board certain disciplinary functions including the power to suspend a workman for failing to comply with a provision of the Order. The plaintiff refused to obey a lawful order issued by employer and the Secretary to the Board, the Port Manager purporting to act under a delegation made by the Local Board suspended the plaintiff from work. In these circumstances the court of appeal held that power of suspension conferred by Clause 16(2)(b) on the local board was a quasi judicial function and the Local Board has no power to delegate it. Consequently the action taken by the Port Manager was a nullity. That case has no applicability to the present case. The order of suspension passed by the Vice-Chancellor is not by virtue of any delegation made by the Syndicate but is by virtue of power given to him under section 12 (5) of the Act. This is an independent power given by the statue and the Vice-Chancellor when be suspended the petitioner was thus not acting as a delegate, but in his own right. 20. I also find that the Vice Chancellor suspending the petitioner was brought to the notice of the Syndicate as required by section 12 (5) of the Act and this action of suspension was noted and confirmed by the Syndicate at its meeting held on 17.4.76. It is thus apparent that even if the position be accepted that the power of suspension could only have been exercised by the Syndicate, the saw was exercised on 17.4.76 and the suspension of the petitioner was therefore by a competent authority. It is thus apparent that even if the position be accepted that the power of suspension could only have been exercised by the Syndicate, the saw was exercised on 17.4.76 and the suspension of the petitioner was therefore by a competent authority. Thus though on my earlier finding the action of the Vice Chancellor suspending the petitioner on 23.3.76 in proper and legal yet even if I was inclined to take a different view of that matter the suspension of the petitioner In any case would be valid from 17.4.76 when the Syndicate by specific resolution confirmed the suspension, and thus its continuation. Surely it was open to the Syndicate to have passed a fresh order of suspension on 17.4.76 and no infirmity could attach to suspension when the Syndicate put his stamp of approval on it. The only result in such a case can be as to the remuneration that would be payable to the petitioner. In case the Vice Chancellor's action suspending the petitioner was bad he may at best be entitled to claim full remuneration during that period i.e. from 28-3-76 to 17-4-76 (of course no such question arises in the present case because of my finding in favour of the action taken by the Vice-Chancellor). 21. One of the objections also urged by Mr. Bhargava that power of interim suspension is not to be found in the rules was by urging that no mention is made of the remuneration that is to be payable to such a suspended employee. This is not correct, because clause (i) of Schedule II clearly says that during the period of suspension the teacher shall be entitled to 50% of his basic pay plus such dearness allowance as is admissible on that amount. Of course I do not find any provision as to what is to happen in a case in which the suspended employee is ultimate y exonerated. But I should assume that in case a teacher is ultimately exonerated it will be reasonable to expect that he will be entitled to full pay during the period of interim suspension because giving him 50% only otherwise may take on the colour of punishment which could be directly contradictory to the finding of exoneration. No such question however arises before me and the matter need not be pursued any further. The argument of Mr. No such question however arises before me and the matter need not be pursued any further. The argument of Mr. Bhargava therefore that the suspension of the petitioner was not valid and legal is therefore rejected. 22. The result is that the writ petition is dismissed but with no order as to costs. *******