JUDGMENT This Rule is directed against an order No. 25 dated 17.5.73 passed by the learned Judge, Second Labour Court dismissing the petitioner's application under Section 33 (2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 on the ground that the proviso to the said Section had not been complied with. 2. Respondent No.3, Gangeswar Ojha was a peon under the employment of the petitioner's company. The said respondent, the workman was charge-sheeted for his indecent behaviour. There was a domestic enquiry. He was found guilty of the charges levelled against him and thereafter he was dismissed from service by a letter dated 29th December, 1971. An industrial dispute with respect to an individual workman referred under section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act was pending adjudication before the Second Labour Court, West Bengal. By way of abundant precaution the petitioner filed an application under Section 33 (2)(b) of the Act before the said Second Labour Court praying for approval of the petitioner's action in dismissing the workman. The petitioner company at the same time raised a preliminary objection before the Labour Court that as the Respondent No. 3 was not a “workman concerned” in the dispute referred to the Industrial Tribunal under Section 2A of the Act, provisions of Section 33(2)(b) were not applicable and as such the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the said application. The learned Judge of the Labour Court was of opinion that by the “deeming” provision of Section 2A of the Act an individual dispute was actually converted to an industrial dispute within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Act. In fact without the said of Section 2A an individual dispute could be converted into an industrial dispute when it was sponsored by a number of workmen or the Union representing a section of the workmen. According to him, the workman could be treated as “concerned workman” within the meaning of Section 33(2) (b) of the Act, although the original dispute was under Section 2A of the Act. 3. Mr. Chakravarti, appearing on behalf of the petitioner-company contended that an individual dispute with regard to discharge, dismissal, retrenchment and/or termination of service was deemed to be an industrial dispute by the deeming provisions contained in Section 2A of the Act. 3. Mr. Chakravarti, appearing on behalf of the petitioner-company contended that an individual dispute with regard to discharge, dismissal, retrenchment and/or termination of service was deemed to be an industrial dispute by the deeming provisions contained in Section 2A of the Act. But even then such deeming provision did not affect or concern other workmen of the employer and as such termination proceedings of an industrial dispute as defined the pendency of adjudication proceedings of an industrial dispute as defined in Section 2A of the Act did not attract the provisions of Section 33(2)(b). 4. In (1) New India Motors (P) Ltd. v. K.T. Morris, AIR 1960 SC 875 the Supreme Court held that the expression “workmen concerned” includes all workmen on whose behalf the dispute has been raised as well as those who would be bound by the award which may be made in the said dispute. But in later decision in (2) Digwadhi Colliery v. Ramji Singh, 1964 (2) Lab. LJ 143, the Supreme Court observed that unless the nature of the pending dispute was ascertained and considered, it could not be said that the concerned workman was workman concerned in the pending dispute simply on the ground that there was some reference pending. 5. In Upper (3) Ganges Valley Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. G. S. Srivastava, 1963 (1) Lab. LJ 237 (SC) in construing section 23 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act 1950, the Supreme Court held that an application under Section 23 of that Act was not maintainable because the workman was not concerned in the pending appeal before the Labour Appellate Tribunal which was related to an individual dispute. 6. By the deeming provision of Section 2A of the Act an individual dispute becomes an industrial dispute. But in that dispute the other workmen are not concerned. There must be a common feature in the nature of dispute in the two cases which would serve as a connecting link thereby tendering workman in the later case also a workman “concerned” in the dispute in the earlier case. So, where the pending Reference was an individual dispute in respect of one employee, it could not be said that all other workmen were concerned in that dispute. So, where the pending Reference was an individual dispute in respect of one employee, it could not be said that all other workmen were concerned in that dispute. Accordingly, in my view, provisions of Section 33(2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 are not attracted where a reference under Section 2A of the Act is pending before any Industrial Tribunal. 7. In the result, this Rule is made absolute. The impugned order of the learned Judge, Second Labour Court, is quashed by a writ of certiorari. This order, however, shall not prevent the respondent No.3 the workman to approach the State Government for a reference under Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. There will be no order for costs.