Judgment :- 1. Two Second Year students of the Government Engineering College, Trichur have approached this Court challenging the order of their Principal marked as Ext. P1 in the case suspending them from the College till the beginning of next semester in June 1976 as a punishment for the ragging incident in which they are alleged to be involved. They have also been, by the said order permanently expelled from the College hostel. 2. The incidents which led to the action had taken place on 5-11-1975 and 6-11-1975. The action against those alleged to be involved in the incidents was initiated on complaints received from three first year students of the college. The petitioners along with another student were first suspended pending enquiry. They were also sent out of the hostel. 3. Two senior members of the staff, Professor of Mechanical Engineering and Professor of Electrical Engineering were appointed enquiry officers to conduct the enquiry into the matter. The charges against the petitioners were that they had along with some other senior students ill-treated by threatening, intimidating and causing mental agony three first year students of the college! The petitioners denied the charges totally. 4. After enquiry into the charges the enquiry officers found that two charges have been proved against the petitioners. (1) Calling the complainants bad names and (2) causing mental agony to them. 5. The College Council met on 2411-1975 to discuss the enquiry report and the following decision was taken unanimously: "Based on the enquiry Commission's report and other evidence it was recommended that the following students (who were kept under suspension from 6111975) may be suspended from the college till the beginning of the next semester in June 1976 and permanently dismissed from the Engineering College hostel as a punishment for the ragging incidents. 1. Sri. John K. Kurian-IIIrd Semester (Electrical) 2. Sri. Zakharia Thomas-IIIrd Semester (Chemical) 3. Sri. Thomas Rajan -IIIrd Semester (Chemical)" Petitioners are the first two of these students. 6. In attacking the impugned orders the petitioners have taken up various grounds. It is alleged that copies of the complaints were not given to the petitioners so as to enable them to have an effective cross-examination of the complainants at the time of the enquiry. The warden of the hostel, it is said, was acting as the prosecuting officer and also as the judge in the enquiry. It is alleged that copies of the complaints were not given to the petitioners so as to enable them to have an effective cross-examination of the complainants at the time of the enquiry. The warden of the hostel, it is said, was acting as the prosecuting officer and also as the judge in the enquiry. AH the materials gathered by the enquiry officers are, it is alleged, not supplied to the petitioners and the principles or natural justice thereby violated. The petitioners contend that reasonable opportunity to give explanation ought to nave been given after the enquiry was over and before the punishment was inflicted, which opportunity was denied to them. According to them charges were not framed in clear and unambiguous terms for the petitioners to give an effective reply. Petitioners also plead that as the enquiry only revealed that petitioners' guilt was calling the complainants bad names, even if that finding be sustainable on the records, the punishment imposed which will result in the petitioners' losing one year, is out of all proportion. 7. The Principal, the first respondent denies the allegations and seek to sustain the impugned order. Sufficient opportunity as required in law has been afforded to the petitioners to meet the charges against them. The charges were clear and what the petitioners had done had been briefly explained in the memorandum issued to them. The enquiry officers were heads of departments in the college and their report was unanimous. Toleration of misbehaviour will result in undermining the discipline of the institution. The punishment, it is contended on behalf of the respondents is only an appropriate one in the nature of the charges. It is also pointed out that the Union Education Ministry had directed putting down of ragging incidents with a firm hand. Unless a deterrent punishment is given, it is contended, the peaceful atmosphere of academic life will be polluted. 8. In considering the question of validity of disciplinary proceeding by academic bodies, following a domestic enquiry conducted by them it will pertinent to take into account the following observation of Gajendragadkar (as he then was) in the Board of High School and Intermediate Education, U. P. v. Baglesdwar Prasah and Others, 1967 SCR. 767 at 77: "and unless there is justification to do so, courts should be slow to interfere with the decisions of domestic tribunals appointed by educational bodies like the Universities. 767 at 77: "and unless there is justification to do so, courts should be slow to interfere with the decisions of domestic tribunals appointed by educational bodies like the Universities. In dealing with the validity of the impugned orders passed by the universities under Art.226, the High Court is not sitting in appeal over the decision in question, its jurisdiction is limited and though it is true that if the impugned order is not supported by any evidence at all, the High Court would be justified to quash that order Enquiries held by domestic Tribunals in such cases must, no doubt be fair and students against whom charges are framed must be given adequate opportunities to defend themselves, and in holding such enquiries, the Tribunal must scrupulously follow rules of natural justice, but it would we think, not be reasonable to import into these enquires all consideration which govern criminal trials in the ordinary courts of law." These observations have been recalled by Hegde J. in Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala (1969 KLT. 290) (Supreme Court). 9. In a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in Hira Nath v. Rajendra Medical College, Kanchi (AIR. 1973 S.C.1260) the Supreme Court said that the principles of natural justice are not inflexible and may differ in different circumstances. When a proper enquiry is held by an enquiry committee consisting of three respectable and independent members of the staff as appointed by the Principal of a Medical College to enquire into the complaint of the inmates of the Girls' hostel against certain male students of that College about their indecent behaviour with them in the hostel compound itself during odd hours of night, in such a case the rules of natural justice do not require that statement of girl students should be recorded in the presence of the male students concerned or that the latter should be furnished with the report of the enquiry committee. The Court said that the doctrine of natural justice cannot be imprisoned within the strait jacket of a rigid formula and its application depends upon several factors. The Court also referred in that case to the decision of Byrne v. Kinematograph Renters Society Ltd. (1958) 2 All ER. 579 where Harman J. observed "what, then, are the requirements of natural justice in a case of this kind? The Court also referred in that case to the decision of Byrne v. Kinematograph Renters Society Ltd. (1958) 2 All ER. 579 where Harman J. observed "what, then, are the requirements of natural justice in a case of this kind? First, 1 think that the person accused should know the nature of the accusation made: secondly that he should be given an opportunity to state his case; and thirdly, of course, that the tribunal should act in good faith. I do not think that there really is anything more". The Supreme Court said that in the case concerned the committee had collected the evidence from the girls informing the accused student about the complaints against them and the charge. So in that case there was no question of acting on evidence in respect of which the petitioners were not given an opportunity to controvert or explain. In fact their Lordships referred to the decision of Lord Loreburn in Board of Education v. Rice 1911 AC. 179 where his Lordship said that the Board could obtain information in any way it thought best, however, always giving a fair opportunity to those who were parties in the controversy to correct or contradict any relevant statement prejudicial to their view. 10. In this connection it will be useful and interesting to refer to an English decision-GIynn v. Keele University (1971) 1 WLR. 487 a case in the Chancery Division decided by Vice Chancellor Sir. John Pennycuick. The facts of the case were as follows: "At the end of the summer term, a university undergraduate, who had been identified as one of a number of undergraduates seen naked in the precincts of the university, was punished by the vice-chancellor by a fine of £ 10 and by exclusion from residence at the university for the ensuing academic year. By Para.3 of S.6 of the statutes of the University the vice-chancellor had a general responsibility to the council for maintaining and promoting the efficiency and good order of the university, and by Para.4 he "may suspend any student from class or classes and may exclude any student from any part of the University or its precincts," The Vice-chancellor did not give the undergraduate an opportunity of being heard but wrote to inform him of the penalties and of his right to appeal against his decision. The undergraduate wrote expressing his wish to appeal, but he went abroad on holiday before receiving notification of the date on which the appeal would be heard, and he did not return until after the date fixed for the hearing. The Vice-chancellor's decision was upheld by the appeal committee of the council, the undergraduate being neither present nor represented. On his return from holiday, the undergraduate did not ask for a rehearing, but issued a writ against the university and the vice-chancellor, and, by motion, sought an injunction restraining them from excluding him from residence for the remainder of the academic year". The learned Judge Pennycuick V. C. disposing of the matter said: (for a proper understanding of the law on the matter, so clearly enunciated therein I would rather quote in extension from the judgment) "I now come to the question which has been most debated on this motion, and which I find a very difficult one. The question is whether, when the Vice-chancellor takes a decision under S.6, he is acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, and if that question is answered in the affirmative, whether there has been some failure of the requirements of natural justice in the present case. The two questions as to what constitutes a quasi-judicial capacity, and the duty to comply with the requirements of natural justice, are very closely inter-related. I was referred to Ridge v. Baldwin (1964) AC. 40, in which Lord Reid. at p. 63, made a lengthy and thorough survey of the principles applicable in this connection. I do not think it would be useful to quote from that case for the present purpose. I was also referred on the matter of general principles to Durayappah v. Fernando (1967) 2 AC. 337. I will read one passage from the judgment of Lord Upjohn in that case The passage is addressed to the principle of audi alteram partem, but it is I think applicable to the allied question whether any given body or person is acting in a quasi-judicial capacity. He said at p. 349: "Their Lordships were of course referred to the recent case of Ridge v. Baldwin (1964) A. C. 40 where this principle was very closely and carefully examined. In that case no attempt was made to give an exhaustive classification of the cases where the principle audi alterm partem should be applied. He said at p. 349: "Their Lordships were of course referred to the recent case of Ridge v. Baldwin (1964) A. C. 40 where this principle was very closely and carefully examined. In that case no attempt was made to give an exhaustive classification of the cases where the principle audi alterm partem should be applied. In their Lordships' opinion it would be wrong to do so. Out side well known cases such as dismissal from office, deprivation of property and expulsion from clubs, there is a vast area where the principle can only be applied upon most general considerations. For example, as Lord Reid (1964) AC. 40, 76 when examining Rex v. Electricity Commissioners (1924) 1 KB. 171 pointed out, Bankers L,J., at p 198, inferred the judicial element from the nature of the power, and Atkin L.J., at pp. 206-7, did the same, Pausing there, however, it should not be assumed that their Lordships necessarily agree with Lord Reid's analysis of that case or with his criticism of Nakuda Ali v. Jayaratne (1951) A.C. 66. Outside the well-known classes of cases, no general rule can be laid down as to the application of the general principle in addition to the language of the provision. In their Lordships' opinion there are three matters which must always be borne in mind when considering whether the principle should be applied or not. These three matters are; first, what is the nature of the property, the office held, status enjoyed or services to be performed by the complainant of injustice. Secondly, in what circumstances or upon what occasions is the person claiming to be entitled to exercise the measure of control entitled to intervene. Thirdly, when a right to intervene is proved, what sanctions in fact is the latter entitled to impose upon the other. It is only upon a consideration of all these matters that the question of the application of the principle can properly be determined." The context of educational societies involves a special factor which is not present in other contexts; namely the relation of tutor and pupil; that is to say the society is charged with the upbringing and supervision of the pupil under tuition, be the society a university or college, or a school. Where this relationship exists it is quite plain that on the one hand in certain circumstances the body or individual acting on behalf of the society must be regarded as acting in a quasi judicial capacity expulsion from the society is the obvious example. On the other hand, there is a wide range or circumstances in which the body or individual is concerned to impose penalties by way of domestic discipline. In these circumstances it seems to me that the body or individual is not acting in a quasi-judicial capacity at all but in a magisterial capacity, i. e., in the performance of the rights and duties vested in the society as to the upbringing and supervision of the members of the society. No doubt there is a moral obligation to act fairly, but this moral obligation does not, I think, lie within the purview of the court in its control over quasi-judicial acts. Indeed, in the case of a schoolboy punishment the contrary could hardly be argued. I was referred in connection with educational societies to two cases, namely Ceylon University v. Fernando (1960) 1 W.L.R. 223 in the Privy Council and Reg v. Aston University Senate, Ex parte Roffey (1969 2 Q. B. 538). Those cases, although they contain many valuable statements, do not take one very far in deciding the present question. In the earlier case it was admitted that the body concerned was acting in a quasi-judicial capacity. The later case was concerned with an act which, although not in form expulsion, was tantamount to expulsion from the society. I turn now to the present case. The vice-chancellor has under the provisions which I have read no power of expulsion. That power is vested in the council alone. On the other hand, the powers which he has under S.6 are of an extremely far reaching character. He may under Para.4 in S.6 suspend any student from any class or classes and may exclude any student from any part of the university or its precincts. Those powers, although they do not amount to exclusion, amount in terms to suspension, and also amount in substance to something very like expulsion. If a student is excluded from the university it is hard to see how he can carry on his studies at the university. Those powers, although they do not amount to exclusion, amount in terms to suspension, and also amount in substance to something very like expulsion. If a student is excluded from the university it is hard to see how he can carry on his studies at the university. I have found considerable difficulty in making up my mind as to which side of the line those powers fall. When the vice-chancellor exercises those powers should he be regarded as act ing in a quasi-judicial capacity, or should he be regarded as acting merely in a magisterial capacity? On the best consideration I can give it but let me say at once it is by no means the end of the matter I have come to the conclusion that those powers are so fundamental to the position of a student in the university that the vice-chancellor must be considered as acting in a quasi-judicial capacity when he exercises them: I do not think it would be right to treat those powers as merely matters of internal discipline. Having reached that conclusion, I must next decide whether in exercising his powers in the present case the vice-chancellor complied with the requirements of natural justice. I regret that I must answer that question without hesitation in the negative." Having expressed the principle in such terms, it is noteworthy to see that the learned judge still refused to exercise his discretion in favour of the plaintiff in the case. "I have, again after considerable hesitation, reached the conclusion that in this case I ought to exercise my discretion by not granting an injunction. I recognise that this particular discretion should be very sparingly exercised in that sense where there has been some failure in natural justice. On the other hand, it certainly should be exercised in that sense in an appropriate case, and I think this is such a case. There is no question of fact involved, as I have already said. I must plainly proceed on the footing that the plaintiff was one of the individuals concerned. There is no doubt that the offence was one of a kind which merited a severe penalty according to any standards current even today. I have no doubt that the sentence of exclusion of residence in the campus was a proper penalty in respect of that offence. There is no doubt that the offence was one of a kind which merited a severe penalty according to any standards current even today. I have no doubt that the sentence of exclusion of residence in the campus was a proper penalty in respect of that offence. Nor has the plaintiff in his evidence put forward any specific justification for what he did. So the position would have been that if the vice-chancellor had accorded him a hearing before making his decision, all that he, or anyone on his behalf, could have done would have been to put forward some plea by way of mitigation. I do not disregard the importance of such a plea in an appropriate case, but I do not think the mere fact he was deprived of throwing himself on the mercy of the vice-chancellor in that way is sufficient to justify setting aside a decision which was intrinsically a perfectly proper one. In all the circumstances, I have come to the conclusion that the plaintiff has suffered no injustice and that I ought not to accede to the present motion." 11. In the light of the law as laid down in the foregoing decisions when we look into the question posed in this case, two factors emerge. (1) The disciplinary authority-the College Council or the Principal as the case may be has to act in this matter in a quasi-judicial capacity. The effect of the decision on the students concerned is of such a far-reaching character that they not only lose one year in their studies but also are permanently expelled from the College hostel. The authority is bound in the circumstances to comply with the principles of natural justice. But then as has been said often the requirements of natural justice are not immutable. As was said in Russel v. Duke of Norfolk (1949) 1 All ER. 109 at p. 118 (by Tucker, L. J.): "There are, in my view, no words which are of universal application to every kind of inquiry and every kind of domestic tribunal. But then as has been said often the requirements of natural justice are not immutable. As was said in Russel v. Duke of Norfolk (1949) 1 All ER. 109 at p. 118 (by Tucker, L. J.): "There are, in my view, no words which are of universal application to every kind of inquiry and every kind of domestic tribunal. The requirements of natural justice must depend on the circumstances of the case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject-matter that is being dealt with, and so forth." But then there cannot be any doubt that in any kind of domestic enquiry, a Tribunal should not rely on evidence taken behind the back of the party accused in respect of which the said party has not been given an opportunity to controvert or explain the same. In this case in regard to the enquiry conducted by the two Professors there is nothing for any serious complaint. The College Council has taken the decision in the case not merely on the basis of the said enquiry report. The decision is taken on the basis of the enquiry report and 'other evidence'. What is this 'other evidence' is not clear. But from the context one can only infer that it is not evidence revealed in the enquiry. Therefore the disciplinary authority has taken into account evidence got behind the back of the petitioners and in respect of which they were afforded no opportunity to meet the same. 12. In the circumstances the order has to be characterised not merely as illegal, but as non-est in law, it having been issued in violation of the principles of natural justice. 13. The difficult part of the question as far as I am concerned is whether this Court should interfere in the matter. In the English case of Glynn v. Keele University, Pennycuick V. C. relies upon the decision of Lord Parker C. J. in Reg. v. Oxford University, Ex parte Bolchover, stating that the court has a discretion as to whether to set aside by way of certiorari a decision of a quasi-judicial body even where there has been a failure in natural justice. No doubt the learned judge says that this particular discretion should be very sparingly exercised in that sense where there has been some failure in natural justice. No doubt the learned judge says that this particular discretion should be very sparingly exercised in that sense where there has been some failure in natural justice. In this case as the petitioners point out implementing the order Ext. P1 would result in their losing one year of their studies apart from facing permanent expulsion from the hostel. The enquiry officers have found the petitioners guilty only of the charges of abusing the complainants and thus causing mental agony to them. With regard to use of force by dragging the complainants to the hostel etc. they have been exonerated. Therefore there is much to be said for the view that but for the 'other evidence' referred to in the proceedings of the College Council the petitioners would not have been meted out the drastic punishment now imposed. According to the petitioners they are completely innocent of the whole matter. Therefore to allow the punishment to stand on the basis of information which is not disclosed to the petitioners and about which the petitioners have not been afforded an opportunity to state their case would be unjust. Therefore I set aside the impugned order Ext. P1 and stay all the proceedings pursuant to the same. In the circumstances the petitioners will be entitled to continue their studies ignoring Ext. P1 order. The O. P. is disposed of as above. There will be no order as to costs.