Order.- The petitioner, who was P.W . 1 in S.C. No. 116 of l971 on the file of the Assistant Sessions Judge, Coimbatore, has preferred this revision challenging the order of discharge passed by the Assistant Sessions Judge of Coimbatore, under section 494 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Old Code) on his consenting to the withdrawal of the Special Public Prosecutor from the prosecution of the respondents 1 and 2 (acccused 1 and 2). The prosecution was launched on the first information of one Ramaswami Naidu (P.W . 1) as against the two respondents. The two respondents stood charge-sheeted by the Sub -Inspector of Police, Pothanurn Crime No. 217 of 1971, Pothanur Railway Police station for offences punishable under section 420, read with section 34, Indian Penal Code and section 406, 467 and 471, Indian Penal Code on the allegation that on 10th May, 1971 between 1 p.m. and 5 p.m. in between Coimbatore and Singanallur goods yard the respondents joined together with the common intention of committing the offences of cheating, criminal breach of trust and using as genuine forged documents namely the three railway receipts and in furtherance of the above -said common intention, the first respondent cheated the complainant, P.W. 1, Ramaswami Naidu, Managing Director of Kadri Mills Co. Ltd. by dishonestly inducing him to deliver the three railway receipts in respect of 196 bales of cotton against which the Bank of India, Coimbatore, advanced Rs.2,58,000 by offering to obtain delivery of these bales and deposit then in the Bank of India Pledge Godown at the said mill premises. Believing the representations made by the first respondentf, the complainant handed over the said three railway receipts after affixing bis signature on the blank forms. Both the respondents have committed criminal breach of trust in respect of three railway receipts and the other allied offences. 2. The preliminary enquiry was held by the learned Sub-Magistrate, City No. 2, Coimbatore in P.R.C No. 6 of 1971 and both the respondents were committed to sessions on 23rd November, 1971. This case was taken on file in S.C. No. 1.16 of 1971 by the First Additional Assistant Sessions Judge, Coimbatore, and the same was pending in that Court. 2. The preliminary enquiry was held by the learned Sub-Magistrate, City No. 2, Coimbatore in P.R.C No. 6 of 1971 and both the respondents were committed to sessions on 23rd November, 1971. This case was taken on file in S.C. No. 1.16 of 1971 by the First Additional Assistant Sessions Judge, Coimbatore, and the same was pending in that Court. It transpires from the records that while the case was pending before the First Additional Assistant Sessions Judge, P.W. 1 moved an application in Crl.M.P. No. 1147 of 1,973 before this Court praying for transfer of this case from the file of the First Additional Assistant Sessions Judge’s Court to the file of the Sessions Court, Madurai, on the ground that even though the committal Order has been made as early as 23rd November, 1971, the First Additional Assistant Sessions Court has not disposed of the same. But, Crl.M.P. No. 1147 of 1973 was dismissed by this Court on 30th March, 1973. During the pendency of that transfer petition, the Special Public Prosecutor, who was in charge of the case, filed a petition on 12th March, 1973 under section 494, Criminal Procedure Code (old) on the basis of the order of the Government of Tamil Nadu passed in G.O. No. 772 MLCI/ 73-3, dated 21st February, 1973, for the withdrawal of the said prosecution and thereby requested the Court to permit him to withdraw from the prosecution of both the respondents -accused with respect to all the charges for which they have been committed to sessions to take their trial. As a sequel to the said petition, the learned First Additional Assistant Sessions Judge permitted the Special Public Prosecutor to withdraw the prosecution and discharged both the respondents under section 494 (a) of the Criminal Procedure Code (old). It is as against this that the revision petitioner comes to the Court challenging the order dated 13th March, 1973 mainly on the following three grounds, Firstly, the learned Public Prosecutor has not given any reason, much less cogent reasons, to satisfy the Court so that the Court can exercise its judicial discretion. It is as against this that the revision petitioner comes to the Court challenging the order dated 13th March, 1973 mainly on the following three grounds, Firstly, the learned Public Prosecutor has not given any reason, much less cogent reasons, to satisfy the Court so that the Court can exercise its judicial discretion. Secondly the Sessions Judge (First Additional Assistant Sessions Judge) has not given any reason whatsoever for granting the permission under section 494 of the old Criminal Procedure Code to withdraw the case, and thirdly the Government of Tamil Nadu did not authorise the Special Public Prosecutor to file an application under section 494, Criminal Procedure Code and as such the entire order is vitiated. 3. Coming to the first ground, though the learned First Additional Assistant Sessions Judge says in his order that be was satisfied that there were sufficient grounds for granting the permission sought for, he has not mentioned what those grounds were. The memo filed under section 494, Criminal Procedure Code by the learned Special Public Prosecutor for permission to withdraw from the prosecution merely states as follows: “By virtue of Government Memo No. 772/MLI/Cr. 73-3, dated 21st February, 1973 issued by the Industries department, it is requested that I may be permitted to withdraw from the prosecution of both the accused with respect to all the charges for which they have been committed to sessions to take their trial.” Thus, it is seen that the Public Prosecutor has not giver any reason to satisfy the Court while exercising its judicial discretion in granting the permission. It is true that the section does not contemplate and say in express terms that the Public Prosecutor is bound to state the reasons. Nonetheless, it is for the Public Prosecutor to satisfy the Court which is to grant the permission for the withdrawal of the case so as to enable it to satisfy its judicial conscience, and it is open to the Public Prosecutor to withdraw the case at any stage of the case even after the commencement but before the judgment is pronounced. The granting of the permission is at the discretion of the Court. The question is, therefore whether the order of discharge passed by the Assistant Sessions Judge of Coimbatore permitting the prosecution to withdraw the case on a memo filed by the Special Public Prosecutor without any reason whatsoever is correct. 4. The granting of the permission is at the discretion of the Court. The question is, therefore whether the order of discharge passed by the Assistant Sessions Judge of Coimbatore permitting the prosecution to withdraw the case on a memo filed by the Special Public Prosecutor without any reason whatsoever is correct. 4. On this question, though, in the past there were varying opinions of various High Court, the point is set at rest by the Supreme Court in its later rulings. So far as this Court is concerned in dealing with the powers of withdrawal under section 494, Criminal Procedure Code. Govinda Menon, J., in a case reported in Kasi Viswanadhan v. Madan Singh1 has discussed the scope of section 494, Criminal Procedure Code, and held following the decision reported in In re, Sadavan2 that: "...........Neither the Public Prosecutor, nor the Judge is called on to give any reasons for his action, that is, either in the application to withdraw or in granting permission to withdraw. * * * * Section 494, Criminal Procedure Code, does not expressly require the Court to give any reason for consenting to the withdrawal nor is there any provision which compels the Court to write a reasoned judgment establishing the propriety of the order." Ultimately, the petition was dismissed observing that it was not obligatory upon the Magistrate to record any reasons for the withdrawal, and since it was not shown that he had acted arbitrarily or in any unjudicial manner, the order of discharge could not be interfered with. But, with great respect to Govinda Menon, J, 1 may say that his view cannot prevail now in the light of the views, expressed by the Supreme Court. 5. But, with great respect to Govinda Menon, J, 1 may say that his view cannot prevail now in the light of the views, expressed by the Supreme Court. 5. The Supreme Court in a case reported in The State of Bihar v. Ram Naresh Pandey3 has held; "Though the function of the Court in giving the consent under section 494 of the Code is a judicial one, it is not necessary that the discretion is to be exercised only with reference to material gathered by the judicial method, and what the Court has to do is to satisfy itself that the executive function of the Public Prosecutor in applying for withdrawal of the prosecution has not been improperly exercised, or that it is not an attempt to interfere with the normal course of justice for illegitimate reasons or purposes." A division Bench of the Kerala High Court following the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court, has observed in a case reported in Ouseph Yakop v. Jose and others4 thus: "Under section 494, Criminal Procedure Code, is is the Public Prosecutor and not the Government that withdraws from the prosecution. He does this in his own right and not on behalf of the Government, unlike the Advocate-General acting under section 333, Criminal Procedure Code and, although he functions in an executive capacity, and is therefore, not precluded from acting at the instance of the Government, the withdrawal itself can only be by him and since it is a matter on which the Court must give or refuse consent in the exercise of its judicial discretion, he must give adequate reasons in support of his withdrawal. That he has acted under the direction, or with the approval of the Government, is something with which the Court is not concerned.......... The reasons for the withdrawal must be such as to satisfy the judicial conscience of the Court. Consent is not to be lightly given merely because the Public Prosecutor has asked for it, without a careful and proper scrutiny of the grounds or which it is sought. The reasons for the withdrawal must be such as to satisfy the judicial conscience of the Court. Consent is not to be lightly given merely because the Public Prosecutor has asked for it, without a careful and proper scrutiny of the grounds or which it is sought. And where consent has been improperly giver, the order of consent, and of discharge or acquittal consequent thereto, is open to correction by the High Court in exercise of its powers of appeal or revision, as the case may be." The Kerala High Court once again has had the opportunity of observing the scope of section 494, Criminal Procedure Code in another decision reported in Deputy Accountant-General v. State of Kerala5, wherein it has observed as follows: "The power under section 494 of the Criminal Procedure Code to withdraw a case is conferred on the Public Prosecutor and on no ore else, and, although this is an executive power, it is a power which he must exercise in the light of his own judgment and not at the dictation of some other authority, however high. The power of withdrawal conferred on the Public Prosecutor is not an absolute power. He can withdraw from the prosecution only with the consent of the Court and this curb is placed on his power in order to ensure that the power is not abused or exercised for improper reasons or to serve improper ends, * * * * The test, to decide the grounds on which the Court can properly grant or withhold its consent is the general test, that consent should be withheld if the withdrawal would tend to further the mischief the law seeks to prevent and that it should be granted if it is likely to have the opposite effect. This is too general to be of much use in practice. This is too general to be of much use in practice. The Court gives its consent in the exercise of its judicial discretion and before granting consent; it must be satisfied that the grounds stated for withdrawal are proper grounds, grounds which, if true, would make the withdrawal a furtherance of, rather than an hindrance to, the object of the law.” It has been held in M.N. Sankaranarayanan Nair v. P.V. Balakrishnan and others1, as follows: “The power in section 494 gives a general executive direction to withdraw from the prosecution subject to the consent of the Count which may be determined on many possible grounds and is therefore wide and uncontrolled by any other provision in the Code. It is in pari materia with section 333. The section does not, however, indicate the reasons which should weight with the Public Prosecutor to move the Court nor the grounds on which the Count will grant or refuse permission. Though the section is in general terms and does not circumscribe the powers of the Public Prosecutor to seek permission to withdraw from the prosecution the essential consideration which is implicit in the grant of the power is that it should be in the interest of administration of justice which may be either that it will not be able to produce sufficient evidence to sustain the charge or that subsequent information before prosecuting agency would falsify the prosecution evidence or any other similar circumstances which are difficult to predicate as they are dependent entirely on the facts and circumstance!; of each case. Nonetheless, it is the duty of the Court also to see in furtherance of justice that the permission is not sought on grounds extraneous; to the interest of justice or that offences which are offences against the State go unpunished merely because the Government as a matter of general policy or expediency unconnected with its duty to prosecute offenders under the law, directs the Public Prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecution and the Public Prosecutor merely does so at its behest.” The Andhra Pradesh High Court has further observed in Y. Chandrasekhara Reddi v. Tikkavarapu Ramanujulu Reddi2, thus: “The Public Prosecutor who is a responsible officer of the Court and an authorised representative of the State must be considered to have been invested under section 494 with a specific discretionary power to be exercised only in appropriate, just and reasonable cases. The Court, while giving its consent has also a duty to consider the entire material and the facts and circumstances in withholding or granting consent for the request of the Public Prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecution of any person. It is the Court that has seisin of the matter, as the case is pending before it. Hence, the Court has a duty to exercise its powers judiciously but not unreasonably and arbitrarily. The consent, contemplated under section 494 should not be given as a matter of course, simply because it way requested for by the Public Prosecutor. The Public Prosecutor as well as the Court while taking a decision have been invested with a statutory discretion to be exercised judiciously, honestly, objectively and reasonably, keeping in mind the furtherance of justice as a prima guide or factor and none else. There is no rule of thumb, having universal application in exercising the powers vested in the Public Prosecutor and the Court under section 494. However the Public Prosecutor and the Court have to exercise their discretion judiciously taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of each case without being influenced by any outside agency or extraneous or irrelevant consideration. There is no rule of thumb, having universal application in exercising the powers vested in the Public Prosecutor and the Court under section 494. However the Public Prosecutor and the Court have to exercise their discretion judiciously taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of each case without being influenced by any outside agency or extraneous or irrelevant consideration. The Public Prosecutor and the Court are invested under section 494 with executive and judicious discretions respectively and the power so vested being a statutory one affecting the rights of the citizens, it is not only desirable, just and proper for the Public Prosecutor to indicate atleast broadly the reasons that prompted him for preferring the application for withdrawal under section 494 and the Court to pass a speaking order disclosing the reason for its conclusion." From the above observations of the Supreme Court and. the High Court, it is clear that the functions of the Court in granting its consent may well be taken to be a judicial one. It follows that in granting the consent, the Court must exercise a judicial discretion. In understanding and applying the section, two main features thereof have to be kept in mind. The initiative is that of the Public Prosecutor and what the Court has to do is only to give its consent by exercising its judicial discretion. The judicial function, therefore, implicit in the exercise of the judicial discretion for granting the consent, would normally mean that the Court has to satisfy itself that the executive function the Public Prosecutor has not been improperly exercised, or that it is not an attempt to interfere with the normal course of justice for illegitimate reasons or purposes. In this context, it is right to remember that the Public Prosecutor is in a larger sense also an officer of the Court and that he is bound to assist the Court with his fairly considered view and the Court is entitled to have the benefit of the fair exercise of its unctions. When the prosecution files an application for withdrawal of the case under section 494 of the old Criminal Procedure Code, corresponding to section 321 of the new Code, the consent is not lightiy to be given on the application of the Public Prosecutor without a careful and proper scrutiny of the grounds on which the application for consent is made vide. The State of Bihar v. Ram Naresh Pandey1. That is to say, the Court has to apply its mind to the grounds on which the application is made and exercise its judicial discretion as to whether it would grant its permission or not. 6. The Supreme Court in a recent decision in Bansilal v. Chandanlal2 has considered the applicability of section 321 of the new Criminal Procedure Code, and held that permission to withdraw from the prosecution should not be granted for the mere asking; but the Court must be satisfied, on the materials placed before it, that the grant of Permission would serve the administration of justice. Further, on the facts of the cast reported, their Lordships have held that where the prosecution has reached the stage of framing charges in the Sessions Court, and no occasion for the defence to make out a case has arisen, and there is no material before the Court justifying the withdrawal of the case against some accused, the order granting permission is wrong in law. The facts of the above decision are almost similar to the facts of the present case. In the instant case, the case was taken on file by the Sub-Magistrate, City No. 11, Coimbatore, in P.R. C. No. 6 of 1971 and after examining the witnesses, he committed the accused to take the trial before the Court of Session. The said case was pending before the Court of Session for a considerable length of time viz., for nearly 16 months. The petition for withdrawal of the case was filed by the Special Public Prosecutor before the charges were framed. Therefore, the observation of the Supreme Court in Bansilal’s case1 would squarely apply to the present case. 7. As I have already held, the memorandum filed by the Public Prosecutor under section 494 of the old Code does not contain any reason, must less cogent reason to satisfy the Court so as to invoke its judicial discretion in granting the permission. But, it is very strange to note that the learned Judge has conceded that be was satisfied that there was sufficient ground for granting the permission sought for. I am unable to understand what were the reasons on which he exercised his judicial discretion to grant his permission. But, it is very strange to note that the learned Judge has conceded that be was satisfied that there was sufficient ground for granting the permission sought for. I am unable to understand what were the reasons on which he exercised his judicial discretion to grant his permission. Thus, in this case, the memorandum filed by the Special Public Prosecutor does not show that be considered the matter independently and decided to withdraw from the prosecution with the permission of the Court. But, he has merely referred to the order of the Government and sought for permission of the Court, which permission was granted by the Court without applying its mind. Mr. Calvin Jacob is not able to satisfy me on the third point, that the Special Public Prosecutor has not been authorised to withdraw the case by the Government. But it is seen from the order passed by the Collector that the Special Public Prosecutor has been permitted to move the Court for the withdrawal of the case. So, I do not find any force in this contention. However, as points 1 and 2 are in favour of the petitioner herein, this point does not loom larged. For the above discussion, I hold that the order of the learned Judge cannot be sustained. 8. Accordingly, J allow this revision petition, set aside the order passed by the Assistant Sessions Judge and restore the case to his file for being disposed of according to law expenditiously. If again the learned Public Prosecutor in charge of the case makes out sufficient grounds for withdrawing from the prosecution and requests for permission of the Court, the learned Sessions Judge would consider it in the light of the observations contained in this judgment.