JUDGMENT 1. - This is a petition by Smt. Awan Kanwar under Article 226 of the Constitution directed against an order of the Board of Revenue dated 21.8.1967 affirming the decision of the Deputy Collector (Jagir), Barmer dated 25.6.1966, by which her claim for compensation as a sub-grantee of jagir Ratanpura has been disallowed. 2. The petitioner's husband Thakur Jaswant Singh by a registered instrument dated 23.12.1949 assigned village Ratangarh forming part of his jagir to his wife Smt. Awan Kanwar by way of her 'Gujara'. On the basis of such grant, the petitioner claimed the status of a jagirdar and filed her statement of claim for payment of compensation under section 31 of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). During the course of the proceedings, the Jagir Commissioner by his order dated 30.7.1958 held the petitioner to be a sub grantee and accordingly recognised her as Jagirdar in respect of village Ratangarh. Her claim for compensation was finalised by the order of the Deputy Collector (Jagir) dated 31.12.1966 directing payment of Rs. 27,276.06. Out of this, the petitioner received Rs. 9,415/- as interim maintenance. The State Government filed an appeal regarding the quantum before the Board of Revenue. In appeal, the Government only challenged the correctness of the order of the Deputy Collector (Jagir) in so far as he included the income from grazing and from non agricultural uses, which according to it, should have been excluded. The Board of Revenue upheld the contention of the Government that it was not given an opportunity to cross examine the petitioner's witnesses whose evidence was recorded in its absence and, therefore, on this ground set aside the order of the Deputy Collector (Jagir) and sent back the case with the direction that a fresh award be made after giving the opportunity to the State Government of being heard. 3. On remand, the Deputy Collector (Jagir) by his order dated 25.6.1966 held that in view of the provisions of sections 191 to 198 of the Marwar land Revenue Act, 1949 read with section 26A of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagir Actr, 1952, the sub grant made in favour of the petitioner was void and, therefore, she was not entitled to any compensation whatever. He further directed that a sum of Rs. He further directed that a sum of Rs. 9,415/-, which had been drawn by the petitioner by way of interim maintenance along with interest at the rate of 6% per annum be recovered. The order of Deputy Collector (Jagir) has been affirmed in appeal by the Board of Revenue. 4. The order of the Board of Revenue has been principally assailed on two grounds, namely, (i) that in view of the provisions of section 37 of the Act, the petitioner's subs-grant having been recognised by the Jagir Commissioner, who was the sole and exclusive authority in this regard, the Board of Revenue could not have held that no maintenance grant could be made by the petitioner's husband in her favour,i.e. in favour of a female, contrary to section 195 of the Marwar Land Revenue Act, 1949 and, therefore, she could not acquire the status of a jagirdar, and (ii) the Board of Revenue was in error in going into the question of title as the right and title of the petitioner as a sub-grantee was never in question. It is urged that her right to maintenance as a 'Zanana Sardar' was expressly conceded before the Jagir Commissioner as recorded in his order dated 30.7.1958. It is further urged that the State Government in its appeal to the Board of Revenue against the award of the Deputy Collector (Jagir) dated 31.12.1963 did not contest her right to receive maintenance under section 31 on the ground that she was not a Jagirdar but only challenged the quantum of the amount of maintenance awarded, and only claimed that the income from grazing and non agricultural uses of land should be disallowed. 5. The contention that where, in the course of a proceeding under the Act, a question of title as to the right of a person claiming to receive compensation under section 31 of the Act as a jagirdar arises and the question so arising has not been determined by a competent court, the Jagir Commissioner has to enquire into the merits of the question so arising and the decision of the Jagir Commissioner thereon is final, cannot be accepted. Section 37(1) of the Act, in so far as it is material, reads as follows:- "37. Section 37(1) of the Act, in so far as it is material, reads as follows:- "37. question to title.- (1) If in the course of a proceeding under this Act any question relating to title, right or interest in any jagir land, other than a question as to........the correctness or otherwise of any entry relating thereto in settlement records.......arises and the question so arising has not already been determined by a competent authority, the Jagir Commissioner shall proceed to make an inquiry into the matter of the question to arising and pass such orders thereon as he deem fit." On its plain terms, the section does not contemplate the adjudication of any right or title of the person claiming to be a Jagirdar as against the State. 6. Under section 37(1), the Jagir Commissioner has to adjudicate upon disputes relating to right, title or interest in any jagir land as between rival claimant. In Bhopal Singh v. The Rajasthan State and others, ILR(1956)6 Raj.726 Wanchoo, C.J. and Modi, J., interpreting the section held that it had no relevance to the determination of such question. The learned Judges observed:- "All it says is that if any question of title arises with respect to a jagir which has been resumed under section 21, the Jagir Commissioner, shall inquire into such question if it has not already been determined by the Government and submit it after inquiry to the Government whose decision shall be final. We fail to see how a question of compensation per se where there is no dispute relating to title between a parent jagirdar and his 'Chhutbhai' or any other grantee from him could fall within the four corners of section 37". In The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Sardar D.K. Jadav, AIR 1968 SC 1186 , their Lordships, interpreting the analogous section 17 of the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act, Samvat 2008, held that the scope of the inquiry under section 17 only relates to disputes with regard to rival claimants to jagirdar title or right in jagir lands already resumed under section 3 of that Act. In that view, it follows that the order of the Jagir Commissioner dated 30.7.1958 holding the petitioner to be a sub-grantee and, therefore, a Jagirdar was not final. We may, however, point out that the Jagir Commissioner came to that conclusion upon a confession made by the learned Govt. In that view, it follows that the order of the Jagir Commissioner dated 30.7.1958 holding the petitioner to be a sub-grantee and, therefore, a Jagirdar was not final. We may, however, point out that the Jagir Commissioner came to that conclusion upon a confession made by the learned Govt. Advocate that there was a family custom. The board of Revenue observes that there is no material to prove that any custom or usage existed in the Jagir by which the jagirdar could assign any part of the jagir in favour of a female relation. 7. That apart, the order of the Jagir Commissioner was made in the course of the proceedings which ultimately culminated in the award of the Deputy Collector (Jagir) dated 25.6.1966 holding that the petitioner had not the status of a jagirdar and, therefore, was not entitled to receive any compensation. The order of the Jagir Commissioner dated 30.7.1958 taking a view to the contrary was one made in the course of the proceedings under section 31 of the Act. 8. The order of the Jagir Commissioner even though not appealed from, could be set right in appeal by the Board of Revenue against the eventual award, if the order was erroneous. Merely because at the earlier stage of the proceedings, the Jagir Commissioner had decided an interlocutory matter in one was and no appeal had been taken there from, it does not imply that the Board of Revenue being a higher court cannot at a latter stage at the same proceedings re-consider the matter afresh. The answer to the question is quite obvious. There is a long line of decisions starting from Maharaj Mohashur Singh v. Bengal Government (1965) 7 Moo Ind. App.283 to Satyadhyan Ghosal v. Smt. Deoralin Debi AIR 1960 SC 941 , holding that an interlocutory order which has not been appealed from either because no appeal lay or even though an appeal lay no appeal was taken, can be challenged in an appeal from the final order. In dealing with the question, the Privy Council observed:- "We are of opinion that this objection cannot be sustained. In dealing with the question, the Privy Council observed:- "We are of opinion that this objection cannot be sustained. We are not aware of any law or regulation prevailing in India which renders it imperative upon the suitor to appeal from every interlocutory order by which he may conceive himself aggrieved, under the penalty, if he does not so do,of forfeiting forever the benefit of the consideration of the appellate court. No authority or precedent has been cited in support of such a proposition, and we cannot conceive that anything would be more detrimental to the expeditious administration of justice than the establishment of a rule which would impose upon the suitor the necessity of so appealing, whereby on the one hand he might be harassed with endless expense and delay, and on the other inflict upon his opponent similar calamities. We believe there have been very many cases before the Tribunal in which their Lordships have deemed it to be their duty to correct erroneous interlocutory orders, though not brought under their consideration until the whole cause had been decided, and brought hither by appeal for adjudication." This view was re-affirmed by the Privy Council in Forbes v. Ameeroonissa Begum (1966) 10 Moo Ind App. 340 ; Sheonath v. Ramnath (1966) 10 Moo Ind App. 431 and by the supreme Court in Satyadhvan Ghosal v. Sms. Deoralin Debi AIR 19660 SC 941 . Thus there is no finality attached to the alleged adjudication by the Jagir Commissioner and the Board of Revenue was, therefore, fully competent to deal with the question of the petitioner's right, title or interest, as the question involved the determination of a jurisdiction fact under section 31 of the Act at the subsequent stage of the same proceeding. 9. Section 39 of the Act contemplates appeal from different orders. No doubt, as appeal under section 39 lies to the Board against the order of the Jagir Commissioner under section 37. Where no such appeal has been taken, it does not imply that the question could not be gone into by the Board in an appeal against the eventual award of the Jagir Commissioner or here by the Deputy Collector in an appeal under section 39(1) of the Act. Under section 39(4) of the Act the finality attaches to the order of the Board of Revenue. 10. Under section 39(4) of the Act the finality attaches to the order of the Board of Revenue. 10. it is needless to stress that person claiming compensation under section 31 must have the status of a jagirdar. The definition of 'Jagirdar' as contained section 2 (g) of the Act reads:- "(g). 'Jagirdar' means any person recognised as a jagirdar under any existing Jagir Law and includes a grantee of jagir land from a jagirdar;" The word 'grant' must and ought, in the context, means a valid grant. 11. Now, on 23.12.1949,i.e., on the date of the grant, the Marwar Land Revenue Act, 1949 was in force. Section 191 of the Marwar land Revenue Act provides that no jagir shall be transferable except to the extent provided in this Act. Section 192 enabled a jagirdar to grant a lease or 'jjara' of an estate or part thereof provided that the period of such lease did not exceed 24 years. Section 193 permits a mortgage of the rents and profits for the same period. Section 195 then provides that the holder of a scheduled jagir may assign a part of the jagir to a male lineal descendant. Section 198 enjoins that any transfer of any land in contravention of the provisions of the Act shall be void. In view of these provisions, there can be no doubt that the sub grant made in favour of the petitioner was not valid. Section 195 only permitted an assignment by the holder of a scheduled jagir to a male lineal descendant. The jagir held by the petitioner's husband was not a scheduled jagir but an unscheduled jagir. besides, the transfer of the jagir to a female was not permitted by law. That being so, the Board of the petitioner did not confer on her the status of a jagirdar. 12. It is, however, argued that the definition of the jagirdar as contained in section 2(g) was an inclusive one. No doubt, that definition includes a grantee of a jagir land. It is, therefore, urged that the Board of Revenue should have considered whether the grant could be recognised under section 26A of the Act as being one made in the normal course of the management and not in anticipation of the resumption of jagir lands. We regret, the contention cannot be accepted. 13. It is, therefore, urged that the Board of Revenue should have considered whether the grant could be recognised under section 26A of the Act as being one made in the normal course of the management and not in anticipation of the resumption of jagir lands. We regret, the contention cannot be accepted. 13. The question of recognition of a grant under section 26-A of the Act does not arise unless and until there was a valid grant. 14. The effect of the non-recognition of the transfer in favour of the petitioner by the Board of Revenue is that no compensation is payable to the petitioner as the sub grant made to her by her husband was invalid, and at the same time no compensation was paid to the petitioner's husband Thakur Jaswant Singh as the income from the village was not included in his statement of claim for compensation. This would result in a rather anomalous position. There can be no resumption of the jagir of village Ratanpura without payment of compensation under section 26. 15. The Board of Revenue should, therefore, consider whether or not in view of the fact that the transfer in favour of the petitioner being invalid, the Jagir Commissioner should be directed to review suo moto under section 40A of the Act the compensation case of Thakur Jaswant Singh and include the income from the village in the computation of his gross income for the resumption of the main jagir. 16. The writ petition, therefore, with this direction fails and is dismissed with costs. *******