ORDER Shiv Dayal, C. J. - l. Dhaniram, non-applicant No.1, instituted a suit for possession under S. 325 of the Quanoon Mal Gwalior State on the allegation that he was wrongfully dispossed by the defendants on July 18, 1950, of his Khud-Kasht land in Khasra Nos. 211/1, 212/2 and 199 of village Khoyala, Tahsil Ambah, District Morena. This suit was instituted on July 12, 1951, in the Court of Tahsildar, Ambah. The Tahsildar passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff and that decree was upheld in all the higher Courts, i.e. the sub-Divisional Officer, the Additional Commissioner and the Board of Revenue. 2. The defence was that Khasra Nos. 211/1 and 212/2 were held by the defendants in Batai from the plaintiff; while Khasra No. 199 was held by the defendant under a Patta from one Ramsanehi, Co-sharer of the plaintiff. 3. The revenue Courts rejected the defence story and held that the lands in dispute were the Khud-Kasht lands of Dhaniram, who was the Zamindar of the village. Thy were recorded as Khud-Kasht in the revenue records of Samvat year 2006, which is the material year. 4. The only contention before us was, as was before the Board of Revenue, that since by virtue of the Abolition of Zamindari Act all land vested in the State on October 2, 1951. Dhaniram as an ex-proprieter, could only retain his Khud-Kasht lands, as defined in Sec. 4(2) of that Act. Since Dhaniram was not recorded as in possession in the revenue records of Samvat year 2006, and as the land was not in his possession before the date of vesting. he was not entitled to a decree for possession. As already pointed out Dhaniram was in cultivating possession up to July 18, 1950, when he was dispossessed by the defendants. The lands were recorded as Dhaniram's Khud-Kasht in Samvat year, 2006. Dhaniram had also instituted a suit for possession on July 12, 1951. It was during the pendency of the suit that the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, 1951, came into force i.e. on October 2, 1951 (Samvat year 2008). The lands were recorded as Dhaniram's Khud-Kasht in Samvat year, 2006. Dhaniram had also instituted a suit for possession on July 12, 1951. It was during the pendency of the suit that the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, 1951, came into force i.e. on October 2, 1951 (Samvat year 2008). Section 3 of that Act provides for vesting of proprietary rights in the State as follows : "(1) Save as otherwise provided in this Act and subject to the provisions of section 8, on and from a date to be specified by a notification by the Government in this behalf (hereinafter referred to as the date of vesting) all proprietary rights in a village Muhal land, chak or block in Madhya Bharat vesting in proprietor of such village, muhal, land chak or block as the case may be, or in a person having interest in such proprietary rights through the proprietor shall pass from such proprietor or such other person to and vest in the State free of all encumbrances. (2) After issue of a notification under sub-section (1) no right shall be acquired in or over the land to which the said notification relates except by succession or under a decree or order of a Court or under a grant or contract in writing made or entered into by or on behalf of the Government; and no fresh clearings for cultivation or for any other purpose shall be made in such land except in accordance with such rules as may be made by the Government in this behalf. (3) The Government may by notification published in the Gazette vary the date specified under sub-section (1) at any time before such date." Then the consequences of the vesting are indicated in section 4 of that Act, It reads thus :- "(1) Save as otherwise provided in this Act when the notification under section 3 in respect of any area has been published in the gazette, then notwithstanding anything contained in any contract, gram of document or in any other law for the time being in force, the con-sequences as hereinafter set forth shall from the beginning of the date specified in such notification (hereinafter referred to as the date of veeting) ensue, namely :- (a) all rights, title and interest of the proprietor in such area including land (cultivable, barren or bir), forests, trees, fisheries wells (other than private wells), tanks, ponds, water channels and ferries, path ways, village sites, hats and bazars and mela-grounds and in all sub-soil including rights if any in mines and minerals, whether being worked or not, shall cease and be vested in the State free from all encumbrances : (b) all grants and confirmation of title of or to lands in the property so vesting of or to any right or privilege in respect of such property or land revenue in respect thereof shall, whether liable to resumption or not, determine: (c) all rents and cesses in respect of any holding in the property so vesting for any period after the date of vesting which, but for such vesting would have been payable to the proprietor, shall vest in the State and be payable to the Government and any payment made in contravention of this clause shall not be a valid discharge of the person liable to pay the same : Explanation :- The word "Holding" shall tar the purpose of this clause be deemed to include also land given, on behalf of the proprietor, to any person on rent for any purpose other than cultivation : (d) all arrears of revenue, cesses or other dues in respect of any property so vesting and due by the proprietor for any period prior to the date of vesting shall continue to be recoverable from such proprietor and may, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery; be realised by deducting the amount from the compensation money payable to such proprietor under Chapter V : (e) the interest of the proprietor so acquired shall not be liable to attachment or sale in execution of any decree or other process of any Court, civil or revenue, and any attachment existing at the date of vesting or any order for attachment passed before such date shall, subject to the provisions of section 3 of the Transfer of property Act, 1882 cease to be in force : (f) every mortgage with possession existing on the property so vesting or part thereof on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting shall, to the extent of the amount secured on such property or part thereof, be deemed without prejudice to the rights or the State under section 3 to have been substituted by a simple mortgage. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) proprietor shall continue to remain in possession of his Khud-Kasht land, so recorded in the annual village papers before the date of vesting. (3) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall operate as bar to the recovery by the outgoing proprietor of any sum which becomes due to him before the date of vesting in virtue of his proprietary rights," 5. The provisions contained in sub-sec. (2) of S. 4 are abundantly explicit. The proprietor shall continue to remain in possession of his khud-kasht land so recorded in the annual village papers before the date of vesting. The word "Khud-Kasht" is also defined in section 2(c) of that Act, to mean "land cultivated by the Zamindar himself or through employees or hired labouers and included sir land." The combined effect of section 3, 4(2) and 2(c) is that a proprietor shall continue in possession inspite of the abolition of the Zamindari, (i) if the land was his 'Khud-Kasht' i.e. cultivated by the Zamindar himself or through employees or hired labourers, and (ii) it was recorded in the annual village papers before the date of vesting, i.e. before Sam vat year 2008. We do not see any force in Shri Dixit's contention that the expression before the date of vesting must be read as immediately before the date of vesting. There is no warrant for adding the word "immediately", which is not there in the section. All that the saving clause requires is (1) that by its nature the land should be Khud-Kasht, and (2) that it is not enough to be Khud-Kasht land it should also have been recorded as such. A tress-passer who having unlawfully dispossessed a proprietor was in possession in Samvat year 2007, cannot be heard to say that since the proprietor was not in possession in Samvat year 2007, or was not recorded as such in the Samvat year 2007, he lost his right to possession. It will be repugnant both to the letter and spirit of the law to deprive a person of his rights to possession merely because he was unlawfully and forcibly dispossessed. 6. It will be repugnant both to the letter and spirit of the law to deprive a person of his rights to possession merely because he was unlawfully and forcibly dispossessed. 6. It has to be recalled that the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act was enacted for acquisition of the rights of the proprietors in order to abolish the rights of intermediaries and to benefit the tenants and sub-tenants, who were the actual tillers of the soil, and who had been inducted as such by the proprietors, the intermediaries. The legislature did not conceivably intend to enact this law for the benefit of rank trespassers. In Biharilal v. State of M.P., 1961 JLJ 598 = 1961 MPLJ 493 , a Division Bench of this Court held that a wider meaning should be assigned to the word "possession" in section 45(1) of the M.P. Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienacted Lands) Act. 1950, so as to include within the ambit of that Section every person, who on the date of vesting held or was entitled to hold any land as an absolute occupancy or occupancy tenant even though, on that date, he was not in actual physical possession of such land. So also in Dayaram v. Maheshwar, 1961 JLJ 1099 =1961 MPLJ 837, another Division Bench of this Court held that the defendants 1 to 8 were mere trespassers and if the right of a person, who is entitled to be in lawful possession is extinguished by a tresspasser, who has not completed 12 years possession, it will be putting premium on wrongful acts. "Personal cultivation" appearing in section 54 of the M. P. Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act, means one's own cultivation. But, if one is prohibited from doing his own cultivation by a wrongdoer, the authorities ought to ignore the trespasser and ascribe the cultivation by the wrongdoer to the true owner by holding it to be his (true owner's) cultivation. 7. Shri Dixit strongly relied on the Supreme Court decision in Haji Sheikh Subhan v. Madhorao, 1962 RN 487=1962 JLJ 498= AIR 1962 SC 1230 in support of his contention that if a Khud-Kasht is not recorded in the revenue papers of Samvat year 2007, the proprietor does not get the benefit of sub-section (2) of S. 4 of the Abolition Act. Haji Sk. Haji Sk. Subhan's case (supra) is directly concerned with the expression "Home-farm" in the MP Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated lands) Act, 1950 There the word "Home-farm" is defined thus :- "Home-farm" means,- (1) In relation to the Central Province,- (i) land recorded as sir and Khudkasht in the annual papers for the year 1948-49, and (ii) land acquired by a proprietor by surrender from tenants after the year 1948-49 till the date of vestings :- (2) in relation to Merged territories, that part of the land under the personal cultivation of the proprietor on the date of vesting which was similarly under cultivation in the agricultural year 1949-50 and which he is entitled to retain on the termination of proprietary tenure under any instrument having the force of law and applicable to such tenure. Explanation- Land under personal cultivation includes land allowed to lie fallow in accordance with the usual agricultural practice, but does not include any land in lawful possession of a Raiyat or tenant." 8. ‘Home-farm’ in relation to Central Provinces, (i) is the land recorded as sir and Khudkasht in the name of a proprietor in the annual papers for the year 1948-49, and (ii) laud acquired by a proprietor by surrender from tenants after the year 1948-49 till the date of vesting. Under that Act, therefore, the entry in the annual village papers for the year 1948-49 was material. There are no such words in the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act. No area is specified. All that is to be shown is that the land was cultivated by the Zamindar himself (or through employees or hired labourers) and that it was so recorded (in the annual village papers) before the date of vesting. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court appreciated and established this distinction in Meharban Singh v. Naresh Singh, 1970 RN 572=1970 JLJ 791= AIR 1971 SC 77 . In that case the Zamindar had created a mortgage of the suit land in the year 1939. The suit for redemption was instituted in July 1943, and during the pendency of that suit the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act was in force. The plaint was allowed to be amended. On October 10, 1958, the trial Court passed a decree for redemption. It was upheld in the District Court except on the question of mesne profits. The suit for redemption was instituted in July 1943, and during the pendency of that suit the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act was in force. The plaint was allowed to be amended. On October 10, 1958, the trial Court passed a decree for redemption. It was upheld in the District Court except on the question of mesne profits. It was held that the lands were under self-cultivation of the plaintiffs before the mortgage and that the mortgagees came into possession by reason of the mortgage. On defendant's Second Appeal, the High Court held that although the plaintiffs were entitled to redeem the mortgage by paying the mortgage money, yet they were dis-entitled to bet possession of the mortgaged land, inasmuch as the proprietary rights, including the right to get possession having vested in the State, the plaintiff could only claim compensation from the Government after redeeming the mortgage by making payment of mortgage money. Their Lordships held : "In our opinion the High Court was in error in allowing the appeal before it and dismissing the plaintiffs' suit for possession on the authority of this Courts decision in Haji Sheikh Subhan v. Madhorao, 1962 RN 487= 1972 JLJ 484 = l962 (Supp) 1 SCR 123= AIR 1962 SC 1230 . …….The approach of the High Court is erroneous and its decision highly unsatisfactory........ " 9. In Mathura Prasad v. Ranchod Prasad, 1970 RN 75=1970 JLJ 91= AIR 1970 SC 483 , a sub-lease was granted to Ranchhodprasad by Nathuprasad (plaintiff) on May 20, 1955 in contravention of section 73 of Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy' Act, No. 6 of 1950. On June 30, 1960, the plaintiff commenced an action in the Court of Civil Judge against the defendant claiming that as the lease was in contravention of the law, the defendants were trespassers. Their Lordships held that as Ranchhodprasad was inducted as a sub lessee contrary to the provisions of section 73 of the Act No. 66 of 1950, he did not acquire any right under the contract of sub-letting. 10. Thus the settled position of the law is that the possession of trespasser is no possession in the eye of law. It, therefore, follows that a person who was in possession but was dis-possessed by a trespasser must be deemed to be in possession and the trespasser cannot take advantage of his own wrong. 11. 10. Thus the settled position of the law is that the possession of trespasser is no possession in the eye of law. It, therefore, follows that a person who was in possession but was dis-possessed by a trespasser must be deemed to be in possession and the trespasser cannot take advantage of his own wrong. 11. In the above view of the matter we do not see any cause for disturbing the order passed by the Board of Revenue. 12. This petition is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 150/-. The outstanding amount of the security deposit, if any, after deduction of costs, shall be refunded to the petitioners.