Judgment 1. THIS is an application under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 for committing the respondents for contempt and taking appropriate action against them. It is alleged that the respondents committed contempt of the City Civil Court at Calcutta, a court subordinate to this Court, by violating an order of injunction passed by the said court on June 28, 1976, in Suit No. 1219 of 1976 instituted by the petitioners. The application has been heard on contest on the point as to whether a Rule should be issued and a proceeding for contempt should be started by this Court or not. 2. ACCORDING to the petitioners, they were appointed the sole distributor for distribution of products of the manufacturing firm, the respondent No. 1, in certain specified areas in terms of an agreement dated May 3, 1976, but the respondents in breach of that agreement failed to distribute the products of the respondent No. 1 through the petitioners and were taking steps for appointing other distributors when they instituted the above suit and obtain an injunction restraining the respondents from appointing any distributor or from selling the product of the respondent No. 1 through anybody else other than the petitioners. In the present application it is alleged that the respondents have willfully violated the said order of injunction when they have sold and are still selling the products of the respondent No. 1 either independently or through other agents. It is not in dispute that the order of injunction, which is alleged to have been violated, is one passed by the City Civil Court at Calcutta under order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure. That being the position, violation, if any, would necessarily attract Order 39 Rule 2 sub-rule (3) of the said Code. The petitioners would not avail of such a remedy specifically provided by the Code itself and, on the other hand, they invited this Court to take appropriate action for the contempt in exercise of its power under section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. In our considered opinion, it would not be a sound exercise of our discretion if we do so. 3. In our considered opinion, it would not be a sound exercise of our discretion if we do so. 3. VIOLATION of an order of injunction constituting disobedience to an order of a court, subordinate to this Court, if willful, may constitute civil contempt as defined by the Act and this Court may also be invested with powers to take action for such contempt. But civil contempt is by its very nature remedial, the primary object being to enforce the order for the benefit of the party in whose favour the order had been made. Such being the nature of civil contempt, it would. be reasonable to think that where the law otherwise specifically provides a remedy for breach of such order as also the means for its enforcement, the parties must normally avail of such remedies and this Court should not encourage by passing such remedies by initiating proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act. The learned counsel for the petitioners contends that if we take this view, we shall only render section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act nugatory. We, however, find no force in this contention. Section 10 of the Act no doubt invests this Court with ample powers to take cognizance of such contempt committed with regard to the courts subordinate to this Court, which in an appropriate case may be exercised. But that does not mean that in each and every case of such an alleged contempt this Court should exercise such powers, allowing the same to be used as a convenient substitute for the specific remedies otherwise provided by the law. Existence of such a specific remedy and non-availing of such a remedy without any justifiable reason are factors which this Court is entitled to consider when exercising its discretion in committal for contempt. (See Kisan Krishnaji Title Vs. Nagpur Conference of Society of St. Vincent De Paul, A. I. R. 1943 Nag., 334 and Basan Vs. S. Rou 43 C. L. J. 41)The power of court to punish contempt is sui generis. But it should be exercised with greatest circumspection. (See Kisan Krishnaji Title Vs. Nagpur Conference of Society of St. Vincent De Paul, A. I. R. 1943 Nag., 334 and Basan Vs. S. Rou 43 C. L. J. 41)The power of court to punish contempt is sui generis. But it should be exercised with greatest circumspection. As pointed out by Oswald, "it is highly necessary therefore in all questions of that nature where the functions of the court have to be exercised in a summary manner, that the Judge in dealing with the alleged offence should not proceed otherwise than with great caution and deliberation and only in cases where the administration of justice would be hampered by the delay in proceeding in the ordinary course of law. " it would be pertinent to remind oneself of the words of Sir George Jessel, M. R. in the case of In re (3) Cleements Republic of Costa Rica Vs. Erlanger (1876.) 46 L. J. Ch., 375 at p. 383 : "it seems to me that this jurisdiction of committing for contempt being practically arbitrary and unlimited should be most jealously and carefully watched, and exercised, if I may say so, with the greatest reluctance and the greatest anxiety on the part of Judges to see whether there is no other mode which is not open to the objection of arbitrariness and which can be brought to bear upon the subject. I say that a Judge should be most careful to see that the cause cannot be fairly prosecuted to a hearing unless this extreme mode of dealing with persons brought before him on accusations of contempt should be adopted. I have myself had on many occasions to consider this jurisdiction, and I have always thought that necessary though it be, it is necessary only in the sense in which extreme measures are sometimes necessary to preserve men's rights, that is, if no other pertinent remedy can be found. " Judging the present application on the test as above, we are not at all inclined to initiate any proceeding in our summary jurisdiction for committing the respondents for contempt for their alleged violation of the order of injunction of the City Civil Court at Calcutta. The petitioners have an appropriate and specific remedy under the Code itself for enforcement of such an order of injunction and taking action on its breach before the said court itself. The petitioners have an appropriate and specific remedy under the Code itself for enforcement of such an order of injunction and taking action on its breach before the said court itself. No ground has been made out why the petitioners would not avail themselves of such a remedy and instead thereof would invoke this summary jurisdiction of this Court. Moreover, entertaining such an application as an ordinary alternative substitute for a proceeding under Or. 39 Rule 2 (3) of the Code would throw open a flood gate for such applications in this Court in innumerable cases of injunction issued by the courts subordinate to this Court on allegations of breach thereof. This would mean by-passing the specific remedy under the law and should never be encouraged. In this view this application is dismissed not on consideration of the merits of the allegations as to violation of the order of injunction but on the ground that the petitioners having a specific remedy under Or. 39 Rule 2 (3) of the Code, they must avail themselves of that remedy before they can move this Court in this jurisdiction.