JUDGMENT 1. This application is directed against two orders in annexures 'B' and 'C' dated October 23, 1976 and dated December 11, 1976, respectively. 2. The petitioner was a M.R. Distributor at Dinhata, Cooch Behar. Such appointment was made on February 8, 1974 and subsequently an agreement to that effect was executed on February 27, 1974. The clauses of the said agreement amongst others which would be relevant for our consideration are clauses 12, 13 and 14. The original of the said agreement, on being requested was produced by Mr. Moitra, the learned Advocate for the petitioner and the clauses of the same as mentioned hereinbefore are quoted hereinunder : 12. The District Magistrate or the Controller with the approval of the District Magistrate without assigning reason and without prejudice to the rights and remedies of the Government against the Distributor for any breach or contravention of the provisions of this Agreement may suspend supply of foodstuffs to the Distributors forthwith and terminate this agreement if, in the opinion of the Controller, the Distributor has committed any breach of the terms and conditions of the agreement or has failed to observe or carry out any directions given to the Distributor according to the provisions of this agreement. The decision of the Controller in that behalf, shall be final 13. Notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, the District Magistrate or the Controller, as the case may be, shall at any time be at liberty in his uncontrolled discretion and without assigning any reason to terminate this agreement for and on behalf of the Government on giving one month's notice in writing of his intention so to terminate this agreement and the Distributor shall have no claim for losses or damages on that account against the Government and similarly the Distributor shall be at liberty to terminate this agreement after giving similar notice as aforesaid. 14. Any stocks of foodstuffs remaining with the Distributor after cancellation of his appointment and/or termination of this agreement shall be dealt with or disposed of according to the directions issued in this behalf by the District Magistrate or the Controller as the case may be and not otherwise. Save as aforesaid Government shall have no liability in respect of such stock. 3. Save as aforesaid Government shall have no liability in respect of such stock. 3. On or about October 23, 1976 there was an inspection of the petitioner's godown and shortages in respect of stocks of rice and wheat as mentioned in annexure 'B' were detected. On such detection there was a seizure of the books of accounts of the petitioner. Thereafter the impugned order in annexure 'C' as issued by the Sub-Divisional Controller of Food and Supplies, Cooch Behar was served on the petitioner. 4. Mr. Moitra submitted that the said order in annexure 'C', being vague and indefinite and since the same has not mentioned the particulars of the licences other than wheat which were required to be suspended, should be deemed to be bad. He further submitted that the said order was also bad and against principles of natural justice as no opportunity or hearing was given to the petitioner. He also submitted that the appointment of the petitioner as M.R. Distributor being prior to the agreement, so the action as taken in the instant case can be challenged in this jurisdiction instead of filing an action for wrongful suspension of the agreement and the clauses of the said agreement as referred to above would not be a bar. It was further submitted by him that in terms of the said agreement there can at best be and if at all the suspension of supply and not the suspension of the Distributorship. It was further submitted by Mr. Moitra that no satisfaction or approval of the Controller having been admittedly obtained, the entire action has become null and void and the more so when there has been no satisfaction either of the District Magistrate or Controller in terms of clause 12 of the said agreement. It was submitted by Mr. Moitra that for violation of the agreement, if any, the other licenses of the petitioner including one for wheat cannot in any event be suspended. After, considering the argument of Mr. Moitra, I am of the view that no writ will be available against the action in annexure 'B' in view of its nature and character and the more so when such action of search and seizure by the respondents is authorised under the agreement in question. Thus the other order which is left for consideration is one in annexure 'C'. Moitra, I am of the view that no writ will be available against the action in annexure 'B' in view of its nature and character and the more so when such action of search and seizure by the respondents is authorised under the agreement in question. Thus the other order which is left for consideration is one in annexure 'C'. The agreement in the instant case has not been admittedly entered under any statute. In fact the same is not a statutory agreement. So the question is, even if there is some or any violation of the said non-statutory agreement, whether writ would be available for quashing the same or any action taken thereunder. Mr. Moitra on the basis of the determination in the case of (1) The D.F.O. South Kheri and Anr. v. Ram Sanehi Singh, AIR 1973 SC 205 submitted that when the action of the Respondents, who are public authorities and invested with statutory powers, have been challenged, the present petition would be maintainable. In view of the agreement in the instant case and the more so when the same is not a statutory one, I do not think any statutory power of the respondents is involved and that too when they have acted according to the terms of the said non-statutory agreement. As such, the case as cited by Mr. Moitra would be of no avail or assistance. Mr. Moitra then relied on the case of (2) M/s. Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd. v. State of West Bengal & Anr., (1975) (1) SCC 70 wherein it has been observed. "Equality of opportunity applies to matters of public contracts. The Government cannot choose to exclude by discrimination. The order of blacklisting has the effect of depriving a person of equality of opportunity in the matter of public contract. A person who has been dealing with the Government in the matter of sale and purchase of materials has a legitimate interest or expectation. When the State acts to the prejudice of a person it has to be supported by legality. It has been held that the Government is a Government of laws and not of men. It is true that neither the petitioner nor the respondent has any right to enter into a contract but they are entitled to equal treatment with others who offer tender or quotations for the purchase of the goods. It has been held that the Government is a Government of laws and not of men. It is true that neither the petitioner nor the respondent has any right to enter into a contract but they are entitled to equal treatment with others who offer tender or quotations for the purchase of the goods. This privilege arises because it is the Government which is trading with the public and the democratic form of Government demands equality and absence of arbitrariness and discrimination in such transactions. The activities of the Government have a public element and, therefore, there should be fairness and equality. The State need not enter into any contract with any one but if it does so, it must do so fairly without discrimination and without unfair procedure. Reputation is a part of a person's character and personality. Blacklisting tarnishes one's reputation. It has further been observed that exclusion of 11 member of the public from dealing with a State in sales transactions has the effect of preventing him from purchasing the doing a lawful trade in the goods in discriminating against him in favour of other people. Supreme Court has also observed that where the State is dealing with individuals in transactions of sales and purchase of goods, the two important factors are that an individual is entitled to trade with the Government and an individual is entitled to a fair and equal treatment with others. A duty to act fairly can be interpreted as meaning a duty to observe certain aspects of rules of natural justice. A body may be under a duty to give fair consideration to the facts and to consider the representations but not to disclose to those persons details of information in its possession. Sometimes duty to act fairly can also be sustained without providing for an oral hearing. It will depend upon the nature of the interest to be effected, the circumstances in which a power is exercised and the nature of sanctions involved therein. 5. The said determination, in my view, is also distinguishable in the facts of the present case. The basis for determination in that case was discrimination and discriminatory treatment, which fact is absent in this case and in fact there is practically no challenge on that behalf. 5. The said determination, in my view, is also distinguishable in the facts of the present case. The basis for determination in that case was discrimination and discriminatory treatment, which fact is absent in this case and in fact there is practically no challenge on that behalf. Here the petitioner out of his own volition entered into a non-statutory agreement and as such for any violation of such agreement he would at least be entitled to bring an action for the same in other forum and not to maintain a writ application. Thus I hold that since the petitioner in the instant case is not governed by any statutory order or agreement, he will not be entitled to maintain the present application for any violation of the agreement and the suspension of distributorship has been duly and properly made. I further find no substance in Mr. Moitra's argument that since the agreement in the instant case was subsequent to the appointment of the petitioner as Distributor, so far any action of the respondents, writ application was maintainable and the agreement should not be taken into consideration, because the agreement, although entered later should prevail as without the same the petitioner cannot have or will not be entitled to have any right against the respondents. 6. Thus we are left with the other submission of Mr. Moitra viz., the other license of the petitioner including that of wheat cannot be suspended for any violation of the agreement or the suspension of the Distributorship. In this matter he referred to clause 14 of the West Bengal Rice & Paddy (Licensing and Control) Order, 1967 and more particularly to sub-clause (2) thereunder. On a consideration of clause 14(2) of the said order, I find no difficulty or hesitation in holding that the power in the instant case has been duly exercised and that too when the petitioner may be considered to have contravened any other law for the time being in force relating to Food and Supplies. I am further of the view on consideration of the said sub-clause that no opportunity is required to be given to a person before suspension of his Distributorship and such opportunity is required to be afforded only before cancellation of the same. That stage has not admittedly reached in this case. Mr. I am further of the view on consideration of the said sub-clause that no opportunity is required to be given to a person before suspension of his Distributorship and such opportunity is required to be afforded only before cancellation of the same. That stage has not admittedly reached in this case. Mr. Moitra, in support of his submissions for maintaining the petition and also on the question of application of principles of natural justice, further referred to the determination in the case of (3) Mahabir Prosad Bansal v. State of West Bengal & Ors. 1976 (2) CLJ 79 . The facts of that case are clearly distinguishable from those of the present one. In that case a charge-sheet was framed against the dealer which was followed by an order of suspension. The dealer was kept in suspension for an indefinite period and thereafter without holding any inquiry into the charges and without affording the dealer any reasonable opportunity of presenting his case before the authority concerned, an order was made terminating his dealership in terms of the agreement. On consideration of some extraneous materials and on being objectively satisfied that the dealer was guilty of the charges framed against him. The above facts or circumstances for which the order in that case was held to be highly irregular are not present in this case. So I hold that the determination in that reported case has no application in the fact and circumstances of this case. 7. In view of the above, the points as raised by Mr. Moitra fail, so also the application. The application is thus dismissed.