Judgment :- 1. The petitioners in this original petition are kudikidappukars who were respondents in O. A. 145 of 1973, an application for shifting filed by respondents 1 and 2 before the 3rd respondent-Land Tribunal, Panthalayini. By Ext. P-2 order the 3rd respondent allowed the above application for shifting. The petitioners challenge the above order of the 3rd respondent in this original petition. Though a number of contentions are raised, the fate of this original petition depends upon the question whether an application for shifting under S.77 (1) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act,1 of 1964, for short the Act, will lie if the bona fide requirement is for putting up a building for the land holder's mother. 2. The petitioners are kudikidappukars in the land owned and possessed by the 2nd respondent. The said land was gifted to the 2nd respondent by the 1st respondent who is none other than the 2nd respondent's mother. O. A. No. 145 of 1973 was filed by the 2nd respondent as the land in which the kudikidappu of the petitioners is situated was required for the purpose of constructing a house for the 1st respondent. The petitioners contested and one of the contentions taken by the petitioners before the 3rd respondent was that the petition itself is not maintainable as the bona fide requirement is for putting up a house for the mother who will not be either a member of the 2nd respondent's family or one coming under S.75 (2) (a) of the Act. But the 3rd respondent by Ext. P2 order dated 28-11-1974 allowed the application for shifting. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the application itself is not maintainable as under S.75 (2) (a) of the Act a kudikidappukaran cannot be asked to shift if the bona fide requirement is for building a house for the land holder's mother since shifting can be asked for only for building purposes for the landholder or any member of his family including major sons and daughters. Learned counsel points out that the definition of 'family' in S.2 (14) of the Act also will not take in the mother. Learned counsel also contends that Ext. P-2 order is defective as it is not in accordance with the conditions contained in S.75. Learned counsel points out that the definition of 'family' in S.2 (14) of the Act also will not take in the mother. Learned counsel also contends that Ext. P-2 order is defective as it is not in accordance with the conditions contained in S.75. Learned counsel also has taken the contentions that there is no bona fide requirement and that the alternate site is not suitable. Learned counsel then refers to Unichekki Lakshmi v. Krishnan Perumal (1970 KLT. 436) wherein Krishna Iyer J. (as he then was) has held: "It is clear that the Land Reforms Act wants to limit the scope of a family in its demand for recovery of possession; and understanding the intendment of the statute, it is difficult to accept the expansive connotation that children means children's children how-low-so-ever and sons and daughters include all progeny. In contexts where the statute wants to be liberal, it has used wider language. It is obvious, therefore, that the legislature has taken particular care to express itself precisely when dealing with the concept of family. S.75 (2) leaves no doubt that the requirement contemplated must be that of the land-holder or of any member of his family, which means the husband or wife, as the case may be, their unmarried minor children and their major sons and daughters. It does not go further to include a grandson. And if a grandson has no place in a family as defined in S.75 (2) of the Act, the scheme of eviction of a kudikidappukaran contained in that provision will not enable the landholder to remove or shift the kudikidappukaran from his existing site on the score of the bona fide requirement of the grandson." On the strength of the above decision learned counsel contends that S.75 (2) (a) will not take in the mother of the landholder. Learned counsel also has referred to Janaki v. Land Tribunal, Tellicherry (1973 KLT. 923). On the question of bona fides of the claim and on the question that the order is defective also learned counsel has addressed arguments. 4. Learned counsel for respondents 1 and 2 contends that the house to be put up after shifting the petitioners from the kudikidappu is for the daughter to accommodate the 1st respondent mother and hence the application for shifting will be maintainable in view of S.75 (2) (a) of the Act. 4. Learned counsel for respondents 1 and 2 contends that the house to be put up after shifting the petitioners from the kudikidappu is for the daughter to accommodate the 1st respondent mother and hence the application for shifting will be maintainable in view of S.75 (2) (a) of the Act. Learned counsel points out that under S.75 (2) (a) of the Act the building that is to be put up need not be for the residence of the landholder. Learned counsel then refers to S.75 (3) of the Act which reads: "Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (1) and (2), where the total extent of land held by a person, either as owner or as tenant, is less than one acre and there is a kudikidappu on any land held by him, he may, if he requires the land occupied by such kudikidappu for constructing a building for his own residence apply to the Government for the acquisition of land to which the kudikidappu may be shifted:" (Proviso and Explanation which are not relevant for the purpose of this case are omitted). Learned counsel points out that under S.75 (1) of the Act the purpose for which the kudikidappukaran is to be shifted must be for putting up a building for the residence of the landholder whereas under S.75 (2) (a) it need only be for his building purposes. Learned counsel also points out that the petitioners have not raised any objection before the 3rd respondent regarding the suitability of the alternate site. 5. There is considerable force in the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners. S.75 (2) (a) of the Act reads: 7 5. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the person in possession of the land on which there is a homestead or but (hereinafter in this sub-section referred to as the landholder) in the occupation as a kudikidappukaran may, if he bonafide requires the land (a) for building purposes for himself or any member of his family including major sons and daughters; or" It is clear that under S.75(2)(a) the bona fide requirement must be for building a house for the landholder or any member of his family including major sons. If the purpose for which the building is to be put up is not for the residence of the landholder or any member of his family including major sons and daughters then, a kudikidappukaran can be shifted even if the landholder requires the land for building a house for letting it out on rent. In that case, every kudikidappukaran in the State can be asked to shift from his kudikidappu and that will be virtually denying the valuable rights conferred upon kudikidappukars by the Act. If the provision is interpreted in consonance with the object of the Act an application for shifting for building purposes can be maintained under S.75(2)(a) of the Act only if the building to be put up by shifting the kudikidappukaran is for the residence of the landholder or any member of his family including major sons and daughters. It is true that in S.75(3) of the Act there is a difference in the wording. But the absence of the words 'for his own residence' in S.75(2) (a) of the Act cannot be a reason for holding that under S.75(2)(a) the building purposes can be for purposes other than the residence of the landholder or others mentioned therein. Hence it goes without saying that a kudikidappukaran cannot be asked to shift if the bona fide requirement is to put up a building for the residence of the landholder's mother. 6. In view of the above finding on the question of maintainability of the application for shifting, I am not considering the other contentions raised by the parties. I set aside Ext. P-2. 7. The original petition is allowed. There will be no order as to costs. Allowed.