JUDGMENT H.N. Agarwal, Member. - There are two connected revision against the judgment and order Dated 12-10-1973 passed by Sri S.M. Ifrahim Commissioner, Jhansi Division, dismissing appeals nos. 266 and 267 of 1972-73 and maintaining the orders of the Kumari Uma Verma, Sub Divisional officer, Moth, district Jhansi, dated 27.2.1973 in cases nos. 285 and 286 of 1971-72 under section 229-B, U.P.Z.A and L.R. Act. 2. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties, and have gone through the record. 3. Respondent no. 1 mandir Awadhnath ji Maharaj through Mahant Sri Janki Ballabh Dass, had filed two suit against Gaon Sabha, Bahadurpur U.P. State through the Collector, Jhansi and Mandir Hanuman ji Maharaj through Srimati Gori Dulhan. Defendant no. 1, Gaona Sabha did not file any written statement in spite of due service. Defendant no. 2, U.P. State through the Collector, Jhansi filed a written statement in spite of the due service. Defendant NO. 2, U.P. State through the Collector, Jhansi filed a written statement stating that the plaintiff had no rights in the land in suit and instead the defendant no. 3, Mandir Hanuman Maharaj was the sirdar of the land in suit. As regards defendant no. 3, the summons were returned with the remark that Srimati Gori Dulhan refuse to take the summons. Aster that, summons were again sent by registered post. This was also returned with the endorsement "refused". Thereafter the trial court proceeded ex parte in the case, and decreed the suit on 26.10.1972. after recording the evidence of the plaintiff alone. On 23.12.1972, Mandir Hanumanji Maharaj through the Manager Srimati Gori Dulhan, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte decree and for restoring the suit, alleging that no summons or notice of the case was ever served on her nor did she ever refused to take the summons and the notices. The trial court rejected this application on 6.3.1973. The lower appellant court in its order dated 12.10.1973 has upheld the order of the trial court. Mandir Hanumanji Maharaj through Gori Dolhan has now come-up-in revision before this court. 4. The learned counsel for the revisionist has contended that there was no person service on the revisionist and as such she was legally justified in moving the application for setting aside the ex parte decree within thirty day from the date knowledge of the decree. Mandir Hanumanji Maharaj through Gori Dolhan has now come-up-in revision before this court. 4. The learned counsel for the revisionist has contended that there was no person service on the revisionist and as such she was legally justified in moving the application for setting aside the ex parte decree within thirty day from the date knowledge of the decree. Article 123 of the schedule for the Limitation Act reads as follows:- Description of application Period of Limitation Time from which period begging of run 123. To set aside a decree passed ex-parte or to rehear an appeal decreed or heard ex parte. Explanation., for the purpose of this article, substituted service under rule 20 order v of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) shall not be deemed to be due service. Thirty days The date of the decree or where the summons or notice was not duly served, when the applicant had knowledge of the decree. The explanation to the Article makes it clear that substituted service shall not be deemed to be due service of the purpose of this Article. The contention of the revisionist is that she never received the summons or notice from the trial court, and that endorsements that she refused to take the summons were got manipulated by the plaintiff opposite party. Without going into the merits of this allegation, it can be safely sated that there was no more than substituted service on the revisionist and such substituted service is not due service within the meaning of Article 123 of the Limitation. Therefore, the revisionist was quite justified in moving an application for setting aside the ex parte decree within thirty days of her knowledge of the decree. The learned counsel for the revisionist has also contended that the courts below failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in them by holding that the application was beyond time the date of decree, whereas the starting pint ought to have been the date of knowledge of the decree as service was not personal but substituted. In view of the above discussion, this contention must be upheld. In view of the above discussion, this contention must be upheld. The learned counsel for the opposite party has invited my attention to sub-rule (2) of Rule 21, Order v code of Civil Procedure which has been framed by the Allahabad Hight Court and made applicable to all the civil court in the State of U.P. reads as follows- "(2) In lieu of or in addiction to the procedure indicated in sub-rule (1), such summons may also be served by sending it by registered post addressed to the defendant at the place where he ordinarily resides or carries on business or works for gain. Unless the cover it returned undelivered by the post office on account of want of proper address or other similar reason, the summons may be deemed to have been delivered to the addressee at the time when it should have reached him in the ordinary corse." The above sub-rule merely states that if a summons it sent by the registered post, it may by deemed to, have been delivered to the addressee in the ordinary course. The sub-rule however, does not override the provisions of the Limitation Act. There is therefore, little doubt that refusal of registered post can constitute no more than substituted service is due service for most purposes but not for the purpose of Article 123 of the Limitation Act. Hence, the courts below have erred in law and failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in them by ignoring the provisions of Article 123 of the Limitation Act. 6. Quite apart from the contention made on behalf of the revisionist, in may be observed that in a declaratory suit under section 229-B, U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act, the State of U.P. and the Gaon Sabha are necessary parties and not merely formal defendants. The State of U.P. through the Collector, Jhansi had filed a written statement denying the title of the plaintiff-opposite party and had also stated that the suit was bad as no notice under section 80 C.P.C. had been given. The State of U.P. through the Collector, Jhansi had filed a written statement denying the title of the plaintiff-opposite party and had also stated that the suit was bad as no notice under section 80 C.P.C. had been given. The trial court had framed a specific issue to the effect whether the suit was defective on account of failure to give notice under Section 80 C.P.C. The trial court has erred in law in holding that the State was merely a formal party and had no interest in the land and the suit was not bad on account of the failure to give notice under section 80 C.P.C. This is not the correct position of law. Under Section 4 of the U.P. Zamindar Abolition and Land Reforms Act all agricultural land vests in the State and it is only thereafter settled by the State government with the tenants under Section 19 of the Act. The interest of the state in agricultural land is very real. In the legal sense the state is not a formal party but one of the most important necessary parties. 7. The result is that I find that the courts below have filed to exercise jurisdiction and have also exercise such jurisdiction with material illegality. I hereby allow the revisions and set aside the orders of the courts below. The ex parte decree dated 26.10.1972 is also get aside. The trial court shall now proceed in hear and decided the cases a fresh in accordance with law. 8. This order will govern both the connected Revisions no. 77 and 78 of 1973-74, District Jhansi.