JUDGMENT S.S. Ahmed, Member. - This is a defendant's second appeal arising out of the order of Additional Commissioner, Allahabad Division, dated March, 15, 1975 by which he dismissed the appeal filed by Ram Babu and Ram Naresh, against the judgment and decree dated October 31, 1973 passed by Revenue Officer/Assistant Collector 1st class, Fatehgarh, district Farrukhabad, in a case u/s 229-B of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. 2. The facts of the case relevant for the purposes of this appeal can be shortly summed up. Puttu Lal filed a suit against Jangi and others for a declaration in his favour. It was contested on various grounds. One of the issue which was framed was, 'whether the suit was barred by Sec. 49 of the C.H. Act'. On February 12, 1969 the trail court decided the issue answering it in the affirmative an dismissed the plaintiff's suit. Puttu Lal went up in appeal before the Additional Commissioner, who allowed it holding that he suit was not barred by Section 49 and it was, therefore, remanded for decision afresh on the merits of the case. After remand the trial court decreed the suit on October 31, 1973. Ram Babu and Ram Naresh, the defendants aggrieved by this order, went up in appeal before the Addl. Commissioner who dismissed it holding that the question of the bar of Section 49 C.H. Act having been decided by the Additional Commissioner, at the time of remand, and not having been challenged at the appropriate time, had not become final and could not be reopened before the appellate court. 3. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties and have also gone through the record of this case. 4. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, two courses were open to the aggrieve party when the case was remanded as a result of decision on one issue-either the impugned order should have been challenged in revision at that very time or it should now be possible to assail the earlier order of the Additional Commissioner at this stage of the second appeal. In support of his proposition, the learned counsel relied upon the case of Satyadyan Ghosal v. Smt. Deorajin Debi and another A.I.R. 1960 (S.C.), 941, in which it has been held that a special provision has been made in Section 105 (2) C.P.C. as regards the orders of remand and the correctness of an order of remand can be challenged in appeal from the final decision and that if an appeal did not lie from the order of remand, the correctness thereof could be challenged by an appeal from the final decision. 5. The other case on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for appellant, is that of Kesho Ram v. Board of Revenue R.D. 1972, 107. In this also it has been held that if no appeal lies from a remand order, its correctness can be disputed in the same suit subsequently. 6. Stranger as it might appear, these are also the cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the Respondent in support of his plea that if the remand order was appealable but was not appealed against, that order had become final and could not subsequently be challenged on account of the principle of res judicata. He has pointed out that in the 1960 Supreme Court case it has been very clearly laid down that the principle of res judicata in based on the need of giving a finality to judicial decisions. What it says is, that once a res judicata, it shall not be adjudged again. Primarily it applies as between past litigation and future litigation. When a matter whether on a question of fact or a question of law has been decided between two parties in one suit or proceeding and the decision is final either because no appeals was taken to a higher court or because the appeal was dismissed or no appeal lies, neither party will be allowed in a future suit or proceedings between the same parties to convas the matter again. In the same case it has bee held by their lordships of the Supreme Court that the principle of res judicata applied as between two stages in the same litigation to this extent that a court, whether the trial court or a higher court, having at an earlier stage decided a matter in one way or the other, will not allow the parties to reagitate the matter again at the subsequent stage of the same proceedings. 7. Similarly the same view is borne out of the case of Kesho Ram v. Board of Revenue (Supra), in which it has been held that under Section 105(2) C.P.C. a party aggrieved by an order of remand, form which an appeal lies, and does not appeal therefrom, is thereafter precluded from disputing its correctness. 8. The learned counsel for the respondent has argued that there are other cases in which the same view point has been held in an even more emphatic manner. Referring to the recent case of Daleep Singh v. Deputy Director of Consolidation A.W.C. 1976 112, he pointed out that the Allahabad High Court was of the opinion that it was well settled that a decree or order which had become final, operated as res judicata even thought it may have been based upon an erroneous decision of a question of law. 9. The learned counsel cited several other cases in support of his argument that the order of remand passed the learned Additional Commissioner in appeal nos. 79 of 1969 had become final because it was an appealable order and no appeal had been filed against it. In fact the validity of this order could have been challenged in second appeal both on account of the fact that the Addl. Commissioner's decision that the suit U.P.C.H. Act, was erroneous but also on the ground that on the basis of this incorrect finding an order of remand was quite unjustified. Since no appeal had been filed, this order of the Additional Commissioner holding that the suit was not barred by Section 49 of the C.H. Act has become final and could not be challenged in any subsequent litigation between the same parties. 10. Since no appeal had been filed, this order of the Additional Commissioner holding that the suit was not barred by Section 49 of the C.H. Act has become final and could not be challenged in any subsequent litigation between the same parties. 10. The next point on which the learned counsel for appellant has assailed the impugned order is that it does not deal with the merits of the case at all, even through arguments were adduced before the Additional Commissioner regarding that order points involved in the instant suit. When the attention of the learned counsel was drawn to the remark of the Additional Commissioner in the last portion of the judgment that 'no other point was argued before me,' the learned counsel said that the could produce the affidavit of Sri Saxena, the counsel who had argued that a case in the could of the Additional Commissioner. However, an affidavit to this effect was not produce. But even if it has been, I doubt if in would have been of much avail in view of observances of Supreme Court in the case of Bank of Behar v. Mahabir Lal A.I.R. 1964 (S.C.), 337. In this case it has been clearly held that where a statement of P.L.O. in the judgment of a court that a particular thing happened or did not happen before it, ought not ordinarily to be permitted to be challenged by a party unless both the parties to litigation agree that the statement was wrong or the court itself admits that the statement is erroneous. The remedy of a party aggrieved, is by way of review. 11. In the instant case if the learned Addl. Commissioner had not heard the appeal on merits and decided it solely on the question of law involved, the most appropriate thing for the appellant would have been move an application for review on the ground that the arguments on the merits of the case had either not been considered by the learned Additional Commissioner or if they had been considered, no reasons had been given why those arguments were ignored, overlooked or discarded by the Additional Commissioner. Falling this an affidavit should have been field in the court of Additional Commissioner immediately after the pronouncement of judgment had been made on the merits of the case but the Additional Commissioner had made an incorrect observation by saying that no other points had been pressed before him. Finally, in the absence of these two valid procedures an affidavit of the counsel concerned should have been reproduced before me to show that arguments had been made to the case but had not bee considered by the learned Addl. Commissioner. In the absence of any of these actions having been taken, I have every reason to assume that the Additional Commissioner's observation, that no other arguments has been presses before him, is quite correct. 12. In the result, I find that the appeal has no merits and is accordingly dismissed. However, the parties will bear their own costs.