JUDGMENT 1. - This special appeal has been preferred against the order of the learned Single Judge dated September 10, 1976. The appellant Ramcharanlal Goel was appointed to the Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service by an order of the Government of Rajasthan. Judicial Department dated February 9, 1973 as a direct recruit. He joined his post on May 5, 1973 The appointment was made on probation of two years under rule 25 of the Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1969. His services were, however, dispensed with by an order of the State Govt, dated April 30, 1975 under sub-rule (1) of rule 26 of the aforesaid Rules with effect from the afternoon of May 4, 1915. Shri Ramcharanlal Goel has challenged this second order by a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying that the impugned order of termination of his services be quashed and further that he be declared To be a member of the Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service. He alleged that during the period of probation, his performance has been appreciated in writing by the High Court and its Chief Justice. His disposal and quality of work, conduct and integrity have been also found excellent and above average. A note for his confirmation, accordingly, was circulated among the Judges of the High Court sometime in December 1974 Every Judge of the High Court found the petitioner suitable and concurred with the recommendation of the Chief Justice for his confirmation. But, instead of an order of confirmation being conveyed to him, he was served with the impugned order. According to him, the termination of his services was arbitrary, illegal, mala fide and null and void. 2. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition summarily on two grounds. Firstly, the petition was filed on April 6, 1976, though the order of termination was communicated on May 1, 1975. This delay of about ore year was not explained and the learned Single Judge thought that the petition was liable to be rejected on the ground of delay alone Secondly, the learned Single Judge also addressed himself to the merits of the case. He found that the order was in accordance with rule 26 of the aforesaid Rules and he rejected the contention that it amounted to punishment and attracted the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution. 3. He found that the order was in accordance with rule 26 of the aforesaid Rules and he rejected the contention that it amounted to punishment and attracted the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution. 3. We have heard Shri Bhargava, learned counsel for the appellant at length and have considered the cases cited by him. In R. S. Deodhar and others v. The State of Maharashtra and other, AIR 1974 SC 259 , it was observed that the rule which says that a Court may not enquire into belated or State claims is not a rule of law but a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion, and there is no inviolable rule that whenever there is delay, the Court must necessarily refuse to entertain the writ petition. The question is one of discretion to be followed on the facts of each case. These observations were subsequently also adopted in Jogindernath v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 511 : 1975 (2) SLR 33 : 1974 SLWR 793 where the writ petition filed even after two years was not thrown out, as the filing of the writ petition was not considered designedly delayed. In P. S. Sadisivaswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1975) 1 SCC 152 : 1976 (1) SLR 53 , the Supreme Court did, no doubt, purport to say that a person should approach the Court at least 6 months or at the most a year of such orders but the High Court can refuse to exercise its extraordinary powers under Article 226, in case of persons who do not approach expeditiously for relief and put forward State claim and try to unsettle settled matters. But all these cases do not advance the case of the appellant any further. The learned Single Judge did rightly observe that there is no hard and fast rule regarding the time within which a writ petition must be filed and yet considering the responsible and important nature of the post, the delay of one year disentitle the petitioner from making the petition. The only explanation which the petitioner had to offer for delay in the case was that, in the first instance, he filed a representation, but the learned Single Judge considered that such a representation, which is not provided for by the Rules, was a mere exercise in futility. The only explanation which the petitioner had to offer for delay in the case was that, in the first instance, he filed a representation, but the learned Single Judge considered that such a representation, which is not provided for by the Rules, was a mere exercise in futility. We are in entire agreement with these observations of the learned Single Judge. 4. Not much can be said in favour of the merits of the case. According to rule 27 of the aforesaid Rules, a probationer can be confirmed at the end of his probation if the Government after consultation with the Court, is satisfied that he is fit for confirmation. Rule 26 lays down that if it appears at any time during or at the end of the period of probation that the Officer has not made sufficient use of his opportunities or he has otherwise failed to give satisfaction, the Government may, after consultation with the Court, dispense with his services. It is obviously implied that the appellant could not be confirmed as he was not found fit for confirmation and his services had to be terminated in accordance with Rule 26 as aforesaid. When the services of a probationer are dispensed with in compliance with the Rules, then it cannot amount to punishment within the mischief of Article 311 of the Constitution. In State of Punjab v. Sukhraj Bahadur, AIR 1968 SC 1089 : 1968 SLR 701 , the Supreme Court categorically stated that a civil servant could not by virtue of the probationary period being over, claim to have a substantive appointment. The matter was dealt with at still greater length in Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1974 SC 2192 : 1974 (2) SLR 701 : 1974 SLWR 643 . In the latter case, it was observed that though no abstract proposition can be laid down, that where the services of a probationer are terminated, it can never amount to a punishment but in the absence of any rules governing a probationer in this respect, the authority may come to the conclusion that on account of inadequacy for the job or for any temperament or other object, not involving moral turpitude, the probationer is unsuitable for the job and hence must be discharged. No punishment is involved in this If the probationer is faced with an enquiry on charges of misconduct or inefficiency or corruption, and if his services are terminated without following the provisions of Article 311, he can claim protection In the instant case, the services of the appellant were dispensed with in accordance with the relevant rules By no stretch of imagination, therefore, can the dispensing with the services of the appellant be considered to be by way of punishment or illegal or arbitrary. The learned Single Judge was, therefore, absolutely right when he said that no punishment was involved in this case, as the order of termination being in accordance with the Rules does not cast any stigma upon the petitioner. 5. As we find no facts on which an allegation of mala fide could be sustained, we feel ourselves unable to go behind the order and examine the contention that the High Court had at one time approved a proposal of his confirmation but changed its mind later on and instead recommended his removal. Firstly, there is nothing which precludes the Court from doing so; and secondly, the ultimate decision has to be that of the Governor of course in consultation with the Court. The order clearly shows that it was made after such consultation There is nothing either to show that the order is a mere facade, cloak or camouflage for an order of punishment. 6. Accordingly, we find no merit in this special appeal and dismiss it summarily.Appeal dismissed. *******