JUDGMENT S.S. Ahmed, Member. - This is a plaintiff's second appeal arising out the order of Additional Commissioner, Allahabad Division, dated February 13, 1975, allowing the appeal filed by Shanker Singh and Bidhuti Singh, against the judgment dated August 18, 1971, passed by J.O./Assistant Collector 1st Class, Kanpur, decreeing the suit filed u/s 209 of Act 1 of 1951. 2. Briefly speaking the facts of the case are that Sheo Prasad and Har Prasad brought a suit for ejectment of Shanker Singh and Bibuti Singh u/s 209 of the UP.Z.A. and L.R. Act with the allegation that they were the sirdars of the land in suit and that the defendant having been disposed from their holding in July 1372 F, they were liable to ejectment in this suit and were also liable to pay damage to extent of Rs. 100/- per annum. Shankar Singh and Bibhuti singh contested the suit on various grounds but specially on the plea that they had acquired sirdari right u/s 210 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act and the suit was barred by time. The plaintiffs' suit for ejectment and damages was decreed by the trial court on August 18, 1971 and the defendants went tin appeal before the Additional Commissioner, who allowed it by his order dated February 13, 1975, the plaintiffs have now come up in second appeal before the Board. 3. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties and have also perused the record of this case. 4. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs tracing the history of this suit pointed out that there was no dispute regarding the fact that the plaintiffs were the recorded sirdars of the land in suit. He stated that while the village in which the disputed property is situate was under consolidation operations, the question of title between the plaintiff, i.e., the recorded tenure holder and the defendant the, the alleged trespassers had been adjudicated upon by the consolidation authorities. On October 18, 1965, the Consolidation Officer had held in his order that the plaintiffs were sirdars and defendants were trespassers from 1362 F. An appeal was made against this order before the S.O.C., who dismissed it by his order dated January 29, 1966. A revision was preferred against the S.O.C.'s order before the Deputy Director of Consolidation and he also dismissed it by his order dated June 22, 1966. 5. A revision was preferred against the S.O.C.'s order before the Deputy Director of Consolidation and he also dismissed it by his order dated June 22, 1966. 5. Giving these dates and the nature of the orders passed by the consolidation authorities, the learned counsel for appellants has assailed the order of the Additional Commissioner on the ground that the consolidation courts are required to give decisions on the titles of parties and once these titles have been adjudicated upon they will operats as res judicata in subsequent litigation between the same parties. Relying on the case of Ram Adhar Singh v. Ram Roop Singh 1968 R.D. p. 83, he has contended that according to their wardships of the Supreme Court provision have also been made for an aggrieved party to file an appeal before the Settlement Officer and Section 11 provides that the order of the Settlement Officer is the final and that it cannot be questioned in any court of law.' Next, he has referred to the case of Ram Lal v. Deputy Director of Consolidation 1971 R.D 106, in which a division bench of Allahabad High Court has held that under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, person found in actual occupation of land without consent of tenure holders is also to be recorded in clause 9 of Khatauni. However, the Allahabad High Court has made it quite clear both in case of Rakesh kumar v. Board of Revenue 1972 A.L.J. p. 796, and of Ramsanehi lal v. Board of Revenue 1974 R.D. p. 241, that once a final adjudication has been made in respect of title of the parties over the land in suit, the same question cannot be raked up again. It has also been held that the rights determined in consolidation proceedings either after contest or without contest are final. 6. The learned counsel ha conceded that disputed land in 'achak' land but he maintains that this fact has absolutely on bearing on the limitation aspect of instant suit because in the light of observations made by a learned Member of Board of Revenue in the a case of Basudeo Rai v Ganesh Rai 1976 R.D. p. 2, the principles that all possession on any party must be deemed to be washed off, up to the date of denotification, is applicable to all lands within the area of consolidation without making any distinction. In the same case the Hon'ble Member has held that the period of adverse possession must be counted form the date of denotification under the U.P. consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953. The learned counsel has further maintained that during the time area remains under chakbandi operations, the period of limitation remains suspended for that period. For this proposition, he has relied upon the case Smt. Muradan v. Borad of Revenue, U.P. Revenue Judgments 1973, p. 186 in which it has been held by the Allahabad HIgh Court that the period of limitation is arrested during the consolidation proceedings and that the non-filing of a suit u/s 209 of u/s 202 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act, after the start of consolidation proceedings cannot affect the right of the tenure holder to get appropriate relief. The same case has been reported in 1973 R.D. on page 415. 7. The question would now be, according to the learned counsel as to what is that date form which the limitation would start running in the instant suit. The learned counsel has relied on the case of Jaswant Sugar Mills v. Naubat 1970 A.L.J. p. 43, in which the following principles have been laid down regarding the running of limitation and revival of the case of action: (1) That limitation can only run when there in a subsisting and enforceable case of action. (ii) that when a claim is satisfied, nullified or rendered in capable of enforcement, no action can be taken in respect of it, because there in nothing which can be enforced: (iii) that the satisfaction or nullification of a claim or cause of action wipes out any time which may have run before the satisfaction or nullification as there after no action can be maintained to a successful result and, for the same reason, time will not run thereafter. (iv) that if the satisfaction or nullification is set aside, the claim or cause of action revives and action can then be taken to enforce it; and (v) that time will start running afresh when the claim or cause of action is revived by the setting aside or vacation of the 'satisfaction or nullification. (iv) that if the satisfaction or nullification is set aside, the claim or cause of action revives and action can then be taken to enforce it; and (v) that time will start running afresh when the claim or cause of action is revived by the setting aside or vacation of the 'satisfaction or nullification. The learned counsel for the appellant concluded by maintaining that even if it be assumed that the consolidation operations case to an end when the Deputy Director or Consolidation passed the final order in revision no June 22, 1966, the suit would still be within time because it was field no October 20, 1970, i.e., at least two years before the defendant could claim to have been able to mature his title and to seek the protection of section 210 of Act 1 of 1951. 8. The learned counsel for the respondent argued, in reply, that these has been an early suit between the parties, that this suit has been field by the same plaintiffs against the same defendants regarding the same matter on March 3, 1966, but that due to the start of consolidation operation this suit has abated on March 27, 1968. Thus, according to him, if the suit has abated once, it could not be revised again. 9. Next, he contended, that the disputed land being admittedly 'achak' land, it could not be considered to be land in which he adjudication of the title between the parties had assumed some sort of finality. 10. Besides, he pointed out that in respect of 'achak' land limitation cannot be deemed to be arrested as held by the Allahabad High Court in the case of Abdul Vaheed Khan v. Deputy Director Consolidation A.I.R. 1968 (Allahabad) 402. 11. Finally, he submitted in view of fact the specific dates when the village was notified for Consolidation and it was denotified after consolidation were not available, the matter should be the trail court for making further inquiry in the matter 12. I have given careful thought to the arguments of the learned counsel and I regret that I cannot hold the contention of the learned counsel for respondent either tenable or convincing. I have given careful thought to the arguments of the learned counsel and I regret that I cannot hold the contention of the learned counsel for respondent either tenable or convincing. To begin with the case of Allahabad High Court, cited by him, i.e.; Abdul Vaheed Khan v. Deputy Director of consolidation, cannot be said to hold field after the pronouncement of Supreme Court contained in the Supreme Court case of Ramadhar Singh v. Ramproop Singh and others 1968 R.D. 83 (S.C.). This has been clearly brought out in the case of Smt. Sakuntala v. Deputy Director of Consolidation 1968 R.D 18. Again, the abatement of the earlier suit cannot be said to have any effect on the fortunes of the instant suit because, as pointed out in the earlier case of it is Jaswant Singh Sugar Mills v. Naubat, 1970, A.L.J. 43, generally accepted principle or nullification of the cause of action by subsequent event wiping out the time which has run and the starting of fresh period limitation on the revival of the cause of action from the date of revival which can hardly be the disputed. 13. As regards the point of the land being 'achak', I agree with my learned colleague who has held in the case of Basudeo Rai v. Ganesh Rai 1976, R.D. 2, that no distinction can be drawn between the 'chak' and 'achak' land because both the notification and the denotification are equally applicable to all land within the area of consolidation. In fact if such a distinction had been possible, the question of abatement of the earlier suit would have never arisen. 14. Finally, there is hardly any force in the plea that the case be remanded for ascertaining the dates of notification and denotification. The order of C.O., S.O.C. and the D.D.C. are on record and it is abundantly clear that these orders were passed during the pendency of consolidation operations. Obviously, therefore, the village could not have been denotified before Jun 22, 1966, when the order of the D.D.C. was passed. 15. Before concluding, it may be observed that the principle that the right and title, decided between the parties during consolidation operations, are final in nature and would operate as re judicata in subsequent litigation between the same parties, is now such a widely accepted principles that there can be hardly any two opinions about it. 16. 15. Before concluding, it may be observed that the principle that the right and title, decided between the parties during consolidation operations, are final in nature and would operate as re judicata in subsequent litigation between the same parties, is now such a widely accepted principles that there can be hardly any two opinions about it. 16. In the result, the appeal must succeed and is accordingly allowed. The parties will their own costs.