JUDGMENT - M.N. CHANDURKAR, J.:---The petitioners in this petition are challenging the judgment of the District Judge, Poona, by which he reversed the decision of the Second Additional Judge, Small Cause Court, Poona, who had decreed the petitioners suit for eviction. 2. The three petitioners are brothers who jointly own the suit premises which consist of a room occupied by respondent No. 1 on rent of Rs. 15.50 per month. Alleging that the defendant had secured residence and employment at Davenewadi, Taluka Purandar and that plaintiff No. 2 who was presently staying in the rented premises needed the suit premises bona fide and for his own use, a notice of eviction was served on the defendant-respondent No. 1 and a suit for ejectment was filed. In the plaint the plaintiffs also alleged that the defendant had neglected to pay rent and that the premises were being used for business purposes as he was carrying on business of preparing bidis in the suit premises through some other persons. The defendant denied the plaintiffs claim. According to him, his wife and children were still staying at Poona, though he himself served at Davenewadi. He denied that he was carrying on any business or that he had changed the user of the premises. He also denied that he had neglected to pay any rent and, according to him, he had sent rent by money orders to the plaintiffs, but plaintiff No. 1 had refused to receive the money order. 3. The trial Court negatived the plaintiffs claim for possession on all grounds except the ground of bona fide and reasonable requirement. Before the trial Court plaintiff No. 2 whose need was set out in the plaint was examined and, according to him, he had vacated the rented premises as he had so promised his own landlord and was staying in the premises of his son-in-law one Gangaram who was also examined as a witness. The trial Court accepted the evidence of plaintiff No. 2 and his son-in-law Gangaram. The trial Court further held that plaintiff No. 2 was staying in rented premises and he could not be compelled to stay in rented premises when he had got his own premises. Thus he came to a finding that the plaintiffs reasonably and bona fide required the suit premises for residence. The trial Court further held that plaintiff No. 2 was staying in rented premises and he could not be compelled to stay in rented premises when he had got his own premises. Thus he came to a finding that the plaintiffs reasonably and bona fide required the suit premises for residence. On the issue of hardship, the trial Court held that the defendant would be able to get alternative accommodation and no hardship would be caused to him if a decree for possession would be passed. The trial Court further held that greater hardship would be caused to the plaintiff if a decree for possession will be refused as he was staying in premises of another person and the reference obviously was to the premises of his son-in-law Gangaram. Thus, though the plaintiffs claim for possession on other grounds was rejected, since it was found that the plaintiff No. 2 required the premises reasonable and bona fide, a decree for possession of the suit premises was passed as also a decree for Rs. 29.50. The trial Court also fixed the standard rent of the premises at Rs. 6.50 exclusive of electricity charges and education cess. 4. The defendant challenged the decree of the trial Court in an appeal which was decided by the learned District Judge, Poona. The learned District Judge held that there was no agreement between the defendant and the plaintiffs that the defendant would vacate the suit premises within six months as alleged by plaintiffs. The learned District Judge, however, set aside the finding given by the trial Court that plaintiff No. 2 had vacated house No. 1183 and was staying in the house of his son-in-law. The learned District Judge, however, seems to have accepted the evidence of plaintiff No. 2 that there was darkness in house No. 1183. But the learned Judge seems to have taken the view that plaintiff No. 2 had a ration card at the rented premises and the rented premises were sufficient for his occupation and since the landlord had not filed a suit for eviction against plaintiff No. 2, he reached the conclusion that plaintiff No. 2 had failed to prove his bona fide requirement. The learned Judge further went on to observe that simply because the landlord possesses a house and resides in a rented premises, it cannot be said that he required the suit premises bona fide for his personal use and occupation. Consequently, the learned District Judge held that plaintiff No. 2 had failed to prove that he reasonably and bona fide required the suit premises. The learned Judge further reversed the finding on the issue of hardship holding that the landlord had not shown that any alternative accommodation was available or was suggested to the defendant and that the trial Court had ignored the statement of the defendant that he would be thrown on the streets as he could not get alternative accommodation. In view of these findings, the learned District Judge set aside the decree of eviction. 5. In this petition filed on behalf of the plaintiffs it is contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the learned District Judge has committed an error of law in misreading the plaintiffs claim as one solely based on the ground that plaintiff No. 2 is living in rented premises and, therefore, he needs his own premises. The averments in the plaint show that according to the plaintiffs, the rented premises were insufficient having regard to the number of the members of the family of plaintiff No. 2 and were also inconvenient. It was also averred that as promised to his landlord, plaintiff No. 2 had vacated the rented premises. The question as to whether a person reasonably and bona fide needs the premises in the possession of the tenant has to be decided on the facts of each case. There is no provision in the Rent Act which prohibits a landlord who is occupying rented premises from making a claim for possession of his own property which may at the material time have been in occupation of the tenant if he can make out a case that the rented accommodation is insufficient and inconvenient. In the instant case, plaintiff No. 2 had come to Court with a positive case that the rented premises which he has been occupying were insufficiently lighted and in the plaint, it was recited that even during day time lights have to be put on. This darkness in the rented premises has been referred to by plaintiff No. 2 in his evidence. This darkness in the rented premises has been referred to by plaintiff No. 2 in his evidence. Coupled with this, plaintiff No. 2 has further deposed that he had already vacated his rented premises as he had so promised his own landlord and he was staying with his son-in-law. The trial Court had accepted the evidence of the son-in-law and of plaintiff No. 2 that plaintiff No. 2 was staying with the son-in-law. Now, the son-in-law Gangaram admitted in his evidence that plaintiff No. 2 had premises in the house No. 1183. The learned Judge seems to have read this evidence as to mean that plaintiff No. 2 continued in possession of the premises in house No. 1183. The evidence of Gangaram has to be read as a whole and it is obvious from his evidence that when he was referring to the premises in House No. 1183, he was referring to plaintiff No. 2 being in possession not on the date of his evidence but earlier before plaintiff No. 2 came to reside with the family of Gangararm. 6. There is no doubt some discrepancy in the evidence of Gangaram and plaintiff No. 2 because the plaintiff had stated he was going to sleep at a place in Nana Peth, while Gangaram had stated that his father-in-law stayed and slept in his own house. This discrepancy was not considered to be very material by the trial Court who had the advantage of recording the evidence and seeing the witnesses. There was, therefore, no justification for the learned District Judge to reject the entire story of plaintiff No. 2 residing with Gangaram on the basis of this discrepancy. 7. As already stated, the learned District Judge has not rejected the plaintiffs case that there was darkness in house No. 1183. Thus if plaintiff No. 2 wanted to shift to his own room, which was better situated than the rented premises, it is difficult to see why such a claim cannot be said to be bona fide or reasonable. The judgment of the learned District Judge shows that his whole approach to the case was conditioned by the impression that the landlord was seeking to make a claim for possession merely on the ground that he did not want to stay in rented premises. The judgment of the learned District Judge shows that his whole approach to the case was conditioned by the impression that the landlord was seeking to make a claim for possession merely on the ground that he did not want to stay in rented premises. If this was the manner of the approach by the District Judge, there was clearly an error of law in the impugned judgment and it must be held that the learned District Judge was not justified in reversing the decision of the trial Court. 8. Even on the issue or hardship, the approach of the learned Judge was vitiated because of the wrong burden of proof which he placed on the landlord. Section 13(2) of the Rent Act requires the Court to decide the issue of comparative hardship and to find out whether greater hardship would be caused to the tenant by passing a decree for eviction than the hardship that would be caused to the landlord by refusing to pass such a decree. This comparison becomes possible only when the respective parties put on record material to show that nature and the extent of the hardship that would be caused. In a case where the defendant wants to defeat the rights of the plaintiff to get promises which he reasonably and bona fide needs and bona fide, and where the Court has found that the plaintiff has proved his need reasonably and bona fide, then the Court can be persuaded not to pass a decree for possession only if the Court can be satisfied that greater hardship would be caused to the tenant by passing a decree for eviction. The burden to show that greater hardship would be caused to the defendant by passing a decree for eviction will, therefore, be on the tenant. The learned District Judge has, however, held that the landlord had not shown that any alternative accommodation was available or was suggested to the defendant. While a landlord in order to further strengthen his case for getting a decree for eviction may bring on record material to show that a defendant will not suffer any hardship or in any case the hardship suffered by him will not be greater than the hardship that will be suffered by the landlord, primarily it is not for him to show that a tenant will suffer lesser hardship. Thus, here again on the issue of hardship, the learned District Judge has adopted an entirely erroneous approach not justified by the provisions of section 13(2) of the Rent Act. 9. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent has referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in (Babhutmal v. Laxmibai)1, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1297 for the proposition that even if there is misreading of the evidence, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution should not interfere with the finding of fact recorded by the Rent Court. It is no doubt true that the Supreme Court has pointed out in Babhutmals case that the High Court cannot while exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 interfere with findings of fact recorded by the Appellate Court or Tribunal and it cannot correct mere errors of fact by examining the evidence and reappreciating it. In the instant case, however, I have pointed out that there is an apparent error of law on the face of the judgment of the learned District Judge which has resulted in an erroneous approach to the appreciation of the material facts. In such a case where there has been an erroneous approach in law, the findings recorded by the Appellate Court are bound to be vitiated and they will, therefore, have to be struck down. 10. In the view which I have taken, the order of the learned District Judge is quashed. Rule made absolute. However, there will be no order as to costs. -----