JUDGMENT S.S. Ahmad, Member. - This is defendant second appeal against the judgment dated 6.1.1971 passed by the Additional Commissioner, Allahabad, dismissing the appeal file by Israr Husain and others against the judgment and decree dated 16.9.1970 passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Manjhanpur, district Allahabad in a case under section 229-B of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. 2. The facts of the case may be briefly set forth. Riyasat Hussain and others filed the suit for declaration setting up the following pedigree: They pleaded that the land in suit was ancestral grove planted by the ancestors of the plaintiffs and that of descendant Nos. 1 to 4 and that after the death of common ancestor the defendants had been in common possession along with the defendants referred to above. The land being grove, they had become its Bhumidhars at the time of abolition of zamindaris. The plaintiffs claimed ?rd share and sought a declaration of this effect. 3. The defendants Nos. 1 to 4 contested the suit on the grounds that Afzal Husain, the common ancestor, had only planted some trees; the plaintiffs are not the co-bhumidhars of the land in suit and that the pedigree set up by the plaintiff is wrong. They alleged that it was incomplete and misleading because Afzal Husain's son Zahid Husain had a son Ibrahim Husain who had a son Ibrahim Husain who had a son name Nazir Husain and that the plaintiffs were the successors of the said Nazir Husain. The trial court decreed the suit and aggrieved by it the defendants went up in appeal before the Additional Commissioner who dismissed it. They have not come up in second appeal before the Board. 4. I have heard learned counsels of the parties and have also gone through the record of this case. 5. In spite of the fact the pedigree was hotly contested in the trail court but subsequently it came to be accepted as a fact that the plaintiffs were not the son of Zahid Husain but they were the direct descendants of the said Zaid Husain. Zahid Husain had a son known as Ibrahim Husain and his son was called Nazir Husain and his sons were the four defendant viz. Israr Husain and three others. Zahid Husain had a son known as Ibrahim Husain and his son was called Nazir Husain and his sons were the four defendant viz. Israr Husain and three others. In other words, the defendants were the great-grandsons of Zahid Husain who had been shown to be the son of Afzal Husain in the pedigree set forth above. 6. Once this fact is admitted, it becomes abundantly clear that the plaintiffs and defendants 1 to 4 are members of the same family whose common ancestor was Afzal Husain. It is hardly necessary for me to go into those finding of fact of the two lower courts which are more or less concurrent. I would like to confine myself to the question of law which is vital for the decision of this case. This question is whether the admission of the defendants that the plots in dispute are the groves of contester is binding on them in the present suit or not. It would appeal that in 1964 a suit No. 69/47 of 1964 was filed by defendant Nos. 1 to 4 in the instant suit seeking declaration of the effect that the land in suit was ancestral grove. A pedigree was given in which Afzal Husain was shown as the common ancestor of the parties. In para 3 plaint, it was alleged that the ancestors of the plaintiffs (i.e. defendants in this suit were in possession of the ancestral grove. In para 5 of the plaint, it was alleged that the father, grandfather and great-grandfather of the plaintiffs in that suit had planted trees in sufficient number and that they were in possession thereof. The suit was contested by the State, it was decreed and the land was held to be the ancestral grove of the plaintiffs i.e. the defendants in this suit, and on the basis of this judgment the names of the present defendants 1 to 4 were recorded. In view of these facts was it now possible for the defendant to resile from their earlier position and to repudiate the claims of the plaintiffs that the land was neither a grove nor did it belong to common ancestors. 7. The case law which has been cited on subject needs to be dealt with in some detail. In view of these facts was it now possible for the defendant to resile from their earlier position and to repudiate the claims of the plaintiffs that the land was neither a grove nor did it belong to common ancestors. 7. The case law which has been cited on subject needs to be dealt with in some detail. The earned counsel for the appellants maintained that apart form the admission of the defendants, there was no evidence that the land was grove or that the ancestors who held hit land were grove-holders. According to him, the admission of the defendants was not against he plaintiffs but against he State and the Gaon Sabha. He argued that in view of section 115 of the Evidence Act, the admission of the dependants could not operate as estoppel because their claim was vis a vis the State and Gaon Sabha and not against the plaintiff respondents in this case. To prove his point, learned counsel relied on three important cases. The first case is of Mahadeo v. Baleshwar Prasad and other A.I.R. 1939 All. page 625 in which it has been held that the value of admission must depend upon the circumstances in which they are made and possible motive for incorrect statement by interest parties would not be ignored. The nature of the facts admitted is also a material point to be considered. If the fact admitted is one within the personal knowledge of the party admitting and there is no evidence of convincing a planting forthcoming its values inconsiderable. In the case of Ramabai Srinivas v. Bombay Government A.I.R. 1941 Bom. page 144, it has been held that the party is not bound by an admission in its pleasing except for the purposes of the suit in which the pleading is delivered. It frequently happens that a party is prepared in a particular suit to deal with the case of on the particular ground and to make an admission, but that admission is not binding in any other suit and certainly not of all times. Again in the case of Bombay Agarwal Company v. Ram Chand A.I.R. 1953 Nagpur page 154, it has been laid down that every admission is capable of being explained or withdrawn. Where no opportunity had been afforded to the plaintiff to be explain, or if so advised. Again in the case of Bombay Agarwal Company v. Ram Chand A.I.R. 1953 Nagpur page 154, it has been laid down that every admission is capable of being explained or withdrawn. Where no opportunity had been afforded to the plaintiff to be explain, or if so advised. To withdraw the admission and it is apparent that the admission was made in an application in a case in which the party making the admission was in danger of being prosecuted, the admission cannot be used against that party. 8. The reply, the learned counsel for the respondents has argued the even in the proposition of law laid down in the three cases, referred to above, may be accepted it would not be possible to argue that the admission of defendant appellants is not binging on them for them purpose of this case. To but with, there in an admission made by the defendant appellant Israr Husain in this very case. During the course of his cross-examination he admitted that the land in dispute was a grove at the time of common ancestor Afzal Husain and that it was acquired and planted by him. A similar admission is to be found in paras 8 and 10 of the written statement. Finally, it was been held in the case of Paras Nath Rai v. Tilesar Kunwar that an admission was the best evidence that an opposing party could rely upon and though not conclusive is decisive of the matter unless successfully withdrawn or proved erroneous. The following observation made in this case is very significant- "If a party desires that a previous statement made by him and amounting to an admission may not be effective against him the least that he is expected to do is to repudiate the correctness or truth of that statement by his evidence and to explain the circumstances in which the statement came to be made and the reason or motive for making it. But if even that is not done by him, he cannot ask the court to ignore the admission or minimise its value and effect on the basis of a mere hypothesis put forward in argument". But if even that is not done by him, he cannot ask the court to ignore the admission or minimise its value and effect on the basis of a mere hypothesis put forward in argument". In the instant case, we find that the defendant appellants had made on admission which was not merely in the courts of statement made before the court but was in the nature of appellant which was filed in a suit and on the basis of which they had been able to get valuable rights from the State. No extenquesting circumstance have been put forward as to why such a suit was filed in which such import an admissions were made. It would be highly unfair that a person were to obtain certain valuable concession from the Government on the basis of certain averment, made in the plaint and when the question of sharing those concessions with other members of the family arose to deny either that the averments had ever been made at all or that such averments were absolutely incorrect. The defendant appellants have not been able to adduce any convicting reason why they filed a suit seeking declaration in favour of themselves and other members of their family and have not decided to repudiate those averments by saying that the land was neither grove in nature nor was it the holding of their common ancestor. 9. This being the position of case law, I am in fullest agreement with the learned Additional Commissioner that defendant Nos. 1 to 4 could not resile from their position which they had taken when they had obtained a declaration in an earlier suit that the disputed land was ancestral grove. 10. There now remains only one more point to be decided and it is whether the court could have given the plaintiffs the relief only that they were co-bhumidhars in the land in shit or whether the courts could also determine their shares in the co-tenancy Section 229-B of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act, as it stood on April 30, 1966, simply provided for declaration of rights of an asami, bhumidhar or sirdar in a holding or nay part thereof. It did not provide for declaration of shares and the courts could not go behind it to determine the shares of the parties. It did not provide for declaration of shares and the courts could not go behind it to determine the shares of the parties. However, it was urged that the position has been changed since section 229-B was amended and now it is permissible for the court not only to give a declaration that a party has any share in the holding but also to determine as to what is the extend of that share. The original section 229-B was first amended by act VIII of 1955 and it was further amended by Act, XXXVII of 1958. The net result of these two amendments, is that a bhumidhar, a sirdar or an asami can sue not only for a declaration in his favour but he can also sue sue for a declaration of his share therein. The instant suit, having been filed in 1969, it was quite competent for the trail court to give the desired declaration and also to declare the extent of plaintiff's share in the holding. 11. In the result, I find that the appeal has little merits and it accordingly dismissed. However, the parties being close relatives, will bear their own costs.