JUDGMENT 1. - This is a second appeal by the defendant-tenant Sanwar Mal and it arises out of a suit for eviction and recovery of arrears of rent. 2. The dispute relates to two shops situate at Sikar, fully described in paragraph No. 2 of the plaint. These two shops were let out by the plaintiff respondent under rent-note dated March 10, 1958 to the defendant on the monthly rent of Rs. 19/-. On July 15, 1968, the plaintiff served a notice to the defendant terminating the tenancy and calling upon him to vacate the shops on or before September 6, 1968. When the defendant did not vacate the shops in spite of notice, the plaintiff instituted the present suit on November 19, 1968 for eviction and recovery of arrears of rent for the period of commencing from July 6, 1966 to November 6, 1968. The plaintiff sought eviction of the defendant on two grounds; firstly, that the plaintiff required the suit premises reasonably and bonafide for his own use as well as for the use of his brothers; and secondly, that the defendant had committed default in payment of rent for a period more than six months. 3. The defendant contested the suit and denied that the plaintiff required the suit premises for his own use or for the use of his brothers. The defendant further denied that the rent was due from him from July 6, 1966. According to hi, the rent was due from December 6, 1967. 4. On the first day of hearing i.e. January 27, 1969, the defendant moved an application that he was prepared to deposit the rent due from him from December 6, 1967 along with interest thereon and costs of the suit.A copy of this application was supplied to the plaintiff. The court thereupon passed the following order:- " Jh /kUukyky odhy oknh gkftjA Jh 'kEHkwn;ky odhy e; izfroknh gkftjA izfroknh us tokcnkok is'k fd;kA udy oknh dks nh xbZA nhxj nj[okLr izfroknh us fdjk;s gsrq is'k dhA udy oknh dks nh xbZA oknh dh fdjk;k ( p<+s gq,s ) tek djkus esa ,rjkt ugh gSA btktr fdjk;k tek gksus dks nh xbZA okLrs dk;eh rudhgksr rk0 8&2&69 dks is'k gksA " The arrears of rent due from the defendant were admittedly not deposited on the first day of hearing. It appears that a sum of Rs. It appears that a sum of Rs. 527/- was deposited in court by the defendant on February 6, 1969. 5. On the pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed on April 25, 1969 by the learned Munsiff, Sikar,- " 1- D;k nqdku okn vLr dh oknh dks ln~Hkkoiw.kZ o mfpr vko';drk gS\ 2- D;k izfroknh fo'ks"k gtkZ izkIr djus dk vf/kdkjh gS\ 3- lgk;rk\ " The learned Munsiff, after evidence, decided all the issues against the plaintiff and dismissed the suit vide his judgement dated April 5, 1971. He held that the plaintiff had failed to prove bonafide necessity for the use of the disputed shops. Dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgement and decree, the plaintiff preferred an appeal to the court of the Additional District Judge, Sikar. 6. During the pendency of the appeal, on July 28, 1972, the plaintiff moved an application under section 13(6) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter called as "the Act") praying for for striking out the defence against eviction on the ground that the defendant had failed to deposit arrears of rent, interest thereon and costs of the suit, on the first day of hearing i.e. January 27, 1969. That application runs as under,- eqjkjh yky cuke lkWaojey fnokuh vihy la- 31@71 eqjkjhyky vk;q 32 o"kZ iq= Jh ctjaxyky] tkfr egktu vxzoky] rksVh fuoklh okMZ ua- 2] lhdj vihykUV&izkFkhZ cuke lkaojey iq= iUukyky] tkfr egktu vxzoky lkselfj;k] fuoklh okMZ ua0 2] lhdj jslikMsUV&vizkFkhZ nj[okLr fMQkYVl ds f[kykQ fMQsl LV~kbd vkQ djus gsrq rgr /kkjk la- 13 ( 6 ) jktLFkku izhehlst ( dUV~ksy vkQ jsUV ,.M ) ,foD'ku ,DVA ekU;oj Jh eku~th] nj[okLr izkFkh viksykUV gLc tsy vtZ gS%& 1- ;g fd mijksDr 'kh"kZd esa oknh us nkok fnukad 19-11-68 dks is'k fd;k Fkk ftlesa izFke rkjh[k 27-1-69 FkhA 2- ;g fd mDr izfroknh us fnukad 27-1-69 dks fdjk;k tek djkus dh nj[okLr is'k dh Fkh ftl ij vnkyr ekrgr ls fdjk;k fof/kor~ tek djkus gsrw rk0 27-1-69 dks vkns'k ns fn;kA 3- ;g fd fQj Hkh jsLikMsUV izfroknh us u rks ifgys dk p<+k gqvk fdjk;k vnk fd;k vkSj u fdjk;k e; C;kt o eqdnek [kpkZ tek djk;k vkSj u mlds mijkUr ekg o ekg le; ij HkkM+k tek djk;kA fygktk nj[okLr gktk is'k djds vthZ gSa fd izfroknh dk fMQkYV ds f[kykQ fMQsUl 'V~kbd vkQ djus dks vkKk vrk QjekbZ tkosA izkFkhZ eqjkjh yky iq= ctjax yky egktu vxzoky rkach fu0 lhdj okMZ ua0 2 vihykUV " The defendant submitted the reply on September 1, 1972. The reply runs as under,- eqjkjh yky cuke lkacj ey Fnokuh vihy la0 Jheku~ Tokc nj[okLr fuEu izdkj fuosnu gS %& 1- ;g fd nj[okLr dh en uEcj 1 esa nkok rkjh[k 16-11-63 dks is'k djuk Lohdkj gSA 2- ;g fd nj[okLr dh en uEcj 2 esa 27-1-69 dks #i, tek djkus dk vkns'k nsuk Lohdkj gSA 3- ;g fd nj[okLr dh en uEcj 3 xyr gS Lohdkj ugha gSA nkok nk;j gksus ds ckn igyh rkjh[k ls p<+k gqvk fdjk;k e; C;kt tek djk fn;k FkkA mlds ckn nkos ds lQy gksus rd fdjk;k izfroknh tek djkrk jgkA ckn esa nkok [kkfjt gks x;kA 4- ;g fd nkok [kkfjt gks tkus ds ckn Hkh ;ksX; v/khuLFk U;k;ky; esa izfroknh us fdjk;k tek djkuk pkgk ijUrq ;ksX; v/khuLFk U;k;ky; us fdjk;k tek ugha fd;kA blfy, fdjk;k tek ugha gks ldkA izfroknh us oknh ds tfj, efuvkMZj fdjk;k Hkstk ijUrq oks oknh us ugha fy;k blfy, fdjk;k vnk ugha gqvkA ijUrq oks oknh us ugha fy;k blfy, fdjk;k vnk ugha gqvkA izfroknh fdjk;k tek djkus dks rS;kj Fkk vkSj vc Hkh rS;kj gSA exj oknh mlds HkkbZ fdjk;k ugha ysrs gSA 5- ;g fd vnkyr okyks ls Hkh ,slk dksbZ vkns'k ugha gqvk fd fdjk;k tek djk;k tkosA bl fy, fdjk;k vnkyr ekrgr ds u ysus ds dkj.k tek ugha djk;k tk ldkA vxj vnkyr okys equkflc le>rs gS rks vkns'k gksus ij fdjk;k tek djk;k tk ldrk gSA vr% tokc is'k dj izkFkZuk gS fd nj[okLr vihykaV [kkfjt dj QjekbZ tkosA izkFkhZ lkaoj ey jsLiksMsUV ,lMh lakoj ey izfroknh ,lMh f'k'kq n;ky " By his judgement dated May 9, 1973, the learned Additional District Judge allowed the appeal and sent the case back to the trial court for fresh decision after framing the following additional issues:- 3 D;k izfroknh us fdjk;s dh jde vnk djus esa ;k VsUMj djus esa dksbZ fMQkYV ugha fd;s gSA 4- D;k izfroknh dh fdjk;snkjh oknh us fof/kor :I ls i;Zokflr ugha dh gSaA 5- D;k oknh cd ;k fdjk;k 551 #i;k C;kt 18 #i;k o uksfVl [kpkZ 15@& #i;k ;kfu dqy 584 #i;k izfroknh ls izkIr djus dk vf/kdkjh gSA 6- D;k izfroknh us jktLFkku izhehlsu ( dUVjksy vkWQ jsUV ,.M ,foD'ku ,DV ) 1950 dks /kkjk 13 ( 4 o 5 ) ds vUrZxr jde vnk djus o tek djus esa foQy gqvk gSA vkSj nkok lquokbZ dh igyh rkjh[k vkSj vk;Unk jde fdjk;k tek u djkus dk mldk fMQsul vxsULV bohD'ku [kkfjt fd;s tkus ;ksX; gSA 7- vuqrks"k " 7. After remand, the learned Munsiff recorded additional evidence of the parties and on consideration of the entire evidence, recorded the following finding,- (1) That the defendant failed to deposit rent for the period from July 6, 1966 to December 6, 1967. (2) That the defendant failed to deposit arrears of rent, interest thereon and costs of the suit amounting to Rs. 569/- on the first day of hearing i.e. January 27, 1969 and further that the defendant also failed to deposit rent month by 15th of each succeeding month. (3) That since the defendant did not comply with the provision of section 13(4) of the Act, his defence against eviction was liable to be struck out under section 13(6) of the Act. 8. On the above findings, the learned Munsiff by his judgement dated August 21, 1974, held the defendant to be a defaulter within the meaning of section 13(1)(a) of the Act and decreed the suit for eviction in favour of the plaintiff. The defendant then preferred an appeal, which was dismissed by the Civil Judge, Sikar, by his judgement dated July 15, 1976. The learned Civil Judge upheld the findings arrived at by the trial court. The defendant has now come up in second appeal challenging the decree of the Civil Judge dated July 15, 1976. 9. During the pendency of the appeal in the lower appellate court, the provisions of the Act were amended by the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1975 published in the Rajasthan Gazette dated September 29, 1975. This Ordinance was subsequently adopted by the State Legislature and it is now in the form of Amendment Act of 1976. The Amendment Ordinance of 1975 provided some special provisions relating to pending matters in section 13A. The relevant provisions of section 13A, for the purposes of this appeal, are contained in sub-sections (a), (b) and (c) which runs as under,- "13A. Special provisions relating to pending and other matters,- Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act as it existed before the commencement of the Amending Ordinance or in any other law. The relevant provisions of section 13A, for the purposes of this appeal, are contained in sub-sections (a), (b) and (c) which runs as under,- "13A. Special provisions relating to pending and other matters,- Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act as it existed before the commencement of the Amending Ordinance or in any other law. (a) no court shall, in any proceeding pending on the date of commencement of the amending Ordinance pass any decree in favour of a landlord for eviction of a tenant on the ground of non-payment of rent, if the tenant applies under clause (b) and pays to the landlord, or deposits in court, within such time such aggregate of the amount or rent in arrears, interest thereon and full costs of the suit as may be directed by the court under and in accordance with that clause; (b) in every such proceeding, the court shall, on the application of the tenant made within thirty days from the date of commencement of the amending Ordinance notwithstanding any order to the contrary, determine the amount of rent in arrears upto the date of the order as also the amount of interest thereon at 6% per annum and costs of the suit allowable to the landlord; and direct the tenant to pay the amount so determined within such time, not exceeding ninety days, as may be fixed by the court; and no such payment being made within the time fixed as aforesaid, the proceeding shall be disposed of as if tenant had not committed any default; (c) the provisions of clauses (a) and (b) shall mutanis mutandis apply to all appeals, or application for revision, preferred or made, after the commencement of the amending Ordinance against decrees for eviction passed before such commencement with the variation that in clause (b), for the expression 'from the date of commencement of the amending Ordinance', the expression 'from the date of the presentation of the memorandum of appeal or application for revision' shall be substituted; (d) ........ ......... ......... It is common ground between the parties that no application as provided in clause (a) of section 13-A was made by the defendant within the prescribed period of 30 days from the date of the commencement of the Amending Ordinance. ......... ......... It is common ground between the parties that no application as provided in clause (a) of section 13-A was made by the defendant within the prescribed period of 30 days from the date of the commencement of the Amending Ordinance. That being the admitted position, the defendant, prima facie, cannot take benefit of the provisions contained in sub sections (a) and (b) of section 13-A of the Act. The learned counsel for the appellant has however placed reliance on the decision of this court in Chunnilal v. Vaspujaiji Maharaj, 1966 RLW 295 . In the aforesaid case, the point arose whether a tenant, who has committed default in the payment of rent and who has been held entitled not to take advantage of provisions of section 13 of the Act, can take benefit of section 13-A of the Act which was inserted in the Act by the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) (Amendment) Act No. 12 of 1965. It may be mentioned here that the provisions of section 13-A of the Amendment Act of 1965 were almost analogous to the provisions of section 13-A of the Amendment Ordinance of 1975. In Chunnilal's case (1), Hon'ble Bhandari J as he then was, while dealing with S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 149 of 1961 - Udaram v. Barkatali observed as follows:- "In S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 149 of 1961 - Udaram v. Barkatali : no application was made after the coming into force of the amending Act, but the tenant had already made applications when the suits for eviction were pending in the trial court showing his preparedness to pay the entire amount of rent due and the cost of the suit. It is urged by the learned counsel for tenants that such application must be deemed to be application under Section 13-A, as what is envisaged under clause (b) is that an opportunity be given to the tenant to pay to the landlord the rent in arrears, with interest and costs of the suit. It is urged by the learned counsel for tenants that such application must be deemed to be application under Section 13-A, as what is envisaged under clause (b) is that an opportunity be given to the tenant to pay to the landlord the rent in arrears, with interest and costs of the suit. No doubt, there was no application made by the tenant in this appeal specifically under section 13-A, but, in my opinion, there is no reason why the benefit of this section should not be given tot he tenant who had already made an application for the payment of arrears of rent even when the provision of section 13-A was not on the statute book. Section 13-A has been incorporated in the statute book to grant relief to the tenants who are otherwise liable to be ejected under the law then existing. It is a law which calls for a liberal construction in favour of the tenants. The purpose of law is to benefit a tenant and to see that if he fulfils certain conditions, he should not be evicted. In interpreting the provisions of a beneficial piece of legislation the court must lean in favour of that interpretation which advances the purposes. A tenant who has already made an application which is more or less in terms of clauses (a) and (b) of section 13-A even before the amendment came into force, must be held entitled to obtain relief under clause (a) of Section 13-A. In this view of the matter. I am of the view that even a tenant, who had not made an application after the coming into force of the amending Act, but had made application before it came into force to the same effect as required under clause (a) and (b) is entitled to take advantage of section 13-A. On the basis of the above observations, it is urged on behalf of the appellant that the reply filed by the defendant on September 1, 1972, which has been reproduced above may be treated as an application under sub section (a) of Section 13-A of the Amending Ordinance. It has been further argued that this reply fully satisfies the requirement of sub section (a) of section 13A of the Amending Ordinance of 1975 as in that application, the defendant showed his readiness to pay whatever amount of rent the court thought to be due to the landlord. It has also been argued that treating that reply to be an application under sub section (a) of section 13-A, the Court should now proceed to determine the rent, interest thereon and costs of the suit, and dispose of the appeal under sub section (b) of section 13-A of the Amending Ordinance. 10. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant, no doubt, finds support from the decision in Chunnilal's case (1). But with great respect to Hon'ble Bhandari J., I doubt very much if correct law has been laid down in that case. On a clear reading of sub section (a) and sub section (b) of section 13-A of the Amending Ordinance of 1975, it will be clear that the defendant has to move a fresh application within 30 days as provided in the aforesaid provisions and if he fails to do so, then my my humble opinion, he cannot fall back on any earlier application made before the Amending Ordinance of 1975 came into force. The question involved is an important one and I therefore think it proper that this point may be decided authoritatively by a large Bench. 11. In the circumstances, I refer this appeal for decision to a larger Bench. 12. Let this case be put up before Hon'ble the Chief Justice for constituting a Bench for disposal of this appeal. *******