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1976 DIGILAW 417 (ALL)

Misiria Kumari v. Maheshwari

1976-06-07

G.S.SIAL

body1976
JUDGMENT G.S. Sial, Member. - These are five connected second appeals against the judgment and decree Additional Commissioner, Varanasi Division, in first appeals against out of suit under section 229-B of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. 2. Briefly, the facts of the case are that the plaintiff instituted the suits alleging that the land in suit came down from the Sheo Govind the common ancestor and ultimately was held by his grandson Bal Govind, that Bal Govind had two sons Parmanand and Ganesh who were co-tenants, that the title of Parmanand devolved on his son Basisth and the share of Ganesh devolved on his widow Smt. Jonha Kuer who died in 1961 and on her death the plaintiff being the daughter of Ganesh inherited the title and share of Ganesh and, therefore, was a co-tenant with defendant Nos. 1 having share in the land in suit. The defendant admitted all the facts alleged by the plaintiff and yet claimed to be sole tenant of the land in suit on the ground that by family partition between the two brothers Parmanand and Ganesh the land in suit was given to Parmanand only and Ganesh was given 'Jai-mani'. The trial court dismissed the suits. The lower appellate court allowed the appeals, set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court had decreed the plaintiff's suit. Hence the second appeals by the defendant appellant before the Board. 3. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the suit in only under section 229-B and no relief or possession is claimed and, therefore, the suit is barred by section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. He stated that a suit merely under section 229-B is not maintainable as the plaintiff had not claimed possession. He referred to 1972 RD. page 342 and 251 (S.C.) in support of his contention. He further argued that the revision of record in Ballia district had taken place in 1345F and a huge number of revenue cases were filed and no action was taken by the plaintiff or her mother for getting her name entered in the revenue records. He, therefore, submitted that obviously the plaintiff had no claim otherwise he would have raised it before the concerned authorities. He, therefore, submitted that obviously the plaintiff had no claim otherwise he would have raised it before the concerned authorities. He further stated that as the possession of the defendant is of a very long-standing the law of estoppel would apply and the plaintiff is now debarred from claiming any share in the holding in dispute. 4. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that it is admitted by the parties that the land in dispute was the ancestor tenancy. The pedigree is also admitted. Admittedly the tenancy belonged to Bal Govind. Jonha Kuer died in 1961 and, therefore, her daughter became their under the law. He stated that the learned Addl. Commissioner has recorded a finding of fact that there was no private understanding of dividing the property and unless the partition is proved the holding must be held to be a joint tenancy. He, therefore, stated that the suit as brought was maintainable because there can be no question of claiming possession against a co-tenant. It is the settled law that the possession of a co-tenant is the possession of all the co-tenant and, therefore, the rulings referred to by the learned counsel for the appellant do not apply to sole tenancy cases. The referred to 1967 R.D. page 224, 1942 R.D. pages 448 and 512 is support of his contention. He argued that in case of joint tenancy unless the separation is proved the holding has to be presumed to be joint and if any settlement operations have intervened, they will have no bearing, on the disputes of joint property. 5. I have considered the arguments and gone through the records of the case. It is undisputed that the land in dispute came down from the common ancestor. In normal circumstance, therefore, the two branches of the family will be co-tenants unless it be proved that they had separate through a family arrangement. The learned addl. Commissioner has examined the evidence on the point of private partition between the two branches. He has come to the finding of fact that there was no private partition or any family arrangement between Ganesh and Parmanand. I have gone through the evidence as well as the record and find that there is no reason why this finding of the learned Addl. Commissioner should be disturbed in any manner. He has come to the finding of fact that there was no private partition or any family arrangement between Ganesh and Parmanand. I have gone through the evidence as well as the record and find that there is no reason why this finding of the learned Addl. Commissioner should be disturbed in any manner. Thus it is quite clear that the two branches of the family are co-tenants and are entitle to share each. It is the settled law that the possession of a co-tenant is the possession of all the co-tenant and, therefore the mere fact that the name of the plaintiff does not find in revenue records will not come in the way other being co-tenant. I am fortified in this view by the ruling contained in 1942 R.D. page 48 which says that he mere fact that the name of co-tenant was not entered in the papers for a long period during which a settlement intervened does not extinguish his rights for the principle that the possession of one co-tenant is the possession of all co-tenants. Similar is the decision continued in 1942 R.D. at page 512 wherein it has been said that the rights of a co-tenant can be extinguished only if it is shown that the party has relinquished his rights or that he has lost it by separation or by adverse possession. None of these conditions obtained in the present case. In a much later ruling that in 1967 R.D. page 224 it has been said that a co-share unless there is a division of property, is entitled to share of every inch of the plot. In view of these rulings, which are fully applicable to the facts of the present case, I am of view that co-tenancy is fully established and the holding has to be presumed to be joint and the share of each of the parties thereto is 1/2 and 1/2. 6. As regard the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the suit is barred by section 42 of the Specific Relief Act because a suit under section 229-B is not maintainable as the plaintiff had not claimed possession, I am of the view that the ruling referred to by the learned counsel namely 1972 R.D. page 342 and 351 (S.C.) is not applicable to the facts of the case. I have already stated above that it is the settled law that the possession of a co-tenants is the possession of all the co-tenants and the Hon'ble Supreme Court ruling quoted above applied to the case of tenancy. In fact, in the case of co-tenancy a suit under section 229-B alone lies. I am fortified in this view by the Hon'ble High Court ruling contained in 1967 R.D. page 224. In this ruling it has been said "in the case of a co-tenure-holder there can be no ejectment by another co-tenure-holder, the other co-tenure-holder can get a decree for joint possession only. A suit by one co-tenure-holder cannot lie under section 209 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. 7. Accordingly, I find that that there is no force in these second appeals which are hereby dismissed with costs and counsel's fee of Rs. 40/- 8. This order will govern S.A. Nos. 285 to 289 of 71-72/Ballia.