JUDGMENT H.N. Agarwal, Member. - These are three connected appeals against the judgment and decree of Sri O.P. Sharma, Additional Commissioner, Rohilkhand Division Bareilly dated November 15, 1971 dismissing the appeals nos. 11, 12 and 13 of 1969 and confirming the decree dated September 11, 1969 passed by the Judicial Officer (Revenue) Bareilly in suits nos. 11, 12 and 13 under Section 229-B/209, U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record. 3. During the pendency of the appeal in this Court, Ram Lal, appellant no.2 had died and has bee substituted his heirs Srimati Mohan and Ram Pal, Respondent nos. 1 Srimati Khema has also died and has been substituted by her daughter's son and heir Summer. 4. Plaintiff-respondent nos. 1 and 2, Srimati Khema and Srimati Ram Devi alias Srimati Ram kali had filed three suits seeking declaring of their contenancy rights in certain plots alongwith the present appellants. Their case is that the land in dispute originally belonged to one Bheem Sen, common ancestor of the parties. Bheem Sen had two sons Purni and Khanna. The appellants Mool Chand and Ram Lal are the sons of Purni. Srimati Ram Devi alias Srimati Ram Kali is the widow of Gomid who was son of Khanna. The trial court decreed the suit in favour of Srimati Kemna, plaintiff-respondent no.1. The order of the trial court has also been upheld by the lower appellate court. Aggrieved by this order, Mool Chand and Ram Lal have now come up in second appeal before this court. 5. The first contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the courts below have erred in law in decreeing the suit of Srimati Khema when her rights to the land in suit were specially denied on the ground that she was not the widow of Khanna, and in any case was the step mother of Gomid and not entitled to succeed to his share as such. The contention of learned counsel is based upon misconception of law. The law does not provide that the widow of the father is not entitled to succeed the son if she may be stepmother of the son Section 171 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act lays down the general order of succession when a Bhumidhar, sirdar or asami being a male dies. The law does not provide that the widow of the father is not entitled to succeed the son if she may be stepmother of the son Section 171 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act lays down the general order of succession when a Bhumidhar, sirdar or asami being a male dies. Clause (b) of this section reads as follows: "(b) Widow and widowed mother and widow of a pre-deceased male lineal descendant in the male line of descent, who have not remarried: Provided firstly that co-windows, will together get one share ; and Provided secondly that the widow of a nearer descendant, will excluded that of a remoter one in the same branch. A close scrutiny of this sub-clause would show that not merely the widowed mother but also a widow of a predeceased made lineal descendant in the male line of descent is entitle to succession. If there are more that one widow, all co-widow will get share. The only exception is that the widow of a near descendant will excluded the widow of remoter one. In other words, the widow of the sons, if she has not remarried will exclude the widow of the father. But if the widow of the son has remarried, the widow of the father will be entitled to succession under that clause irrespective of the fact whether she be the real mother or the step mother of the son. Now, in the present case, both courts below have held that both Khanna and Gomid, father and son, have died; that Srimati Khema is the widow of Khanna and the mother of Gomid and Srimati Ram Devi alias Srimati Ram Devi alais Srimati Ram Kali is the widow of Gomid. Srimati Ram Devi, however, remarried and hence has lost her rights. Accordingly, both the courts below have held that Srimati Khema will succeed to the co-tenancy as a consequence of death of Khanna and Gomid. Now, the appellant Mool Chand has himself admitted in his statement the Srimati Khema lived with Khanna for twenty-five years as his wife after the death of his first wife. He had, however, added that Srimati Khema is into the mother of Gomid. It is with reference to this statement of the appellant that the learned counsel for the appellant has take the place that the step mother of Gomid would not be entitled to succession. He had, however, added that Srimati Khema is into the mother of Gomid. It is with reference to this statement of the appellant that the learned counsel for the appellant has take the place that the step mother of Gomid would not be entitled to succession. As, however, seen above, this is not he correct view of law. The widow of the father is clearly entitled to succession irrespective of the fat whether she is the mother of the step mother of the son. 6. The second contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that Srimati Khanna was bound to prove her case by entering into the witness box and deposing about her relationship with Gomid, and having failed to do so the courts below were bound in the law to presume that her case was not proved. In this connection the learned counsel had referred to Sardar Gurbaksh Singh v. Gurdial Singh and another A.I.R. 1927 P.C. 230, in which the Privy Council has observed as follows: "Their lordships think it unnecessary to repeat the numerous details of the story, but, as it involves a general and important question of the procedure and practice, they think it expedient to make the following reference to what occurred at the trial court of this civil suit. At the Bar of the Board it was admitted by the respondents that she, Bhagwan, had been present in Court when the evidence was being taken, and that she did not go into the witness box, and was not examined as a witness on her own or her alleged son's behalf. Notice has frequently been taken by this Board of this style of procedure. It sometimes takes the form of a manoeuvre under which counsel does not call his own client, who is an essential witness, but endeavours of force the other party to call him, and so suffer the discomfiture of having him treated as his, the other party's own witness. This is thought to be clever, but it is a bad and degrading practice. Lord Atkinson dealt with the subject in Lal Kunwar v. Chiranji Lal 1910, 32 All, 104-5 I.C. 549-37 I.A.I., calling it "a vicious practice, unworthy of a high-toned or reputable system of advocacy." The present case, however, is a pointed instance of the evils which flow form such a pratice. Lord Atkinson dealt with the subject in Lal Kunwar v. Chiranji Lal 1910, 32 All, 104-5 I.C. 549-37 I.A.I., calling it "a vicious practice, unworthy of a high-toned or reputable system of advocacy." The present case, however, is a pointed instance of the evils which flow form such a pratice. Bhagwan's case had been the subject to prolonged investigation in the revenue Courts,and had been pronounced by them a bogus case. She had appeared and told a story there, and it had not been believed. She was, however, also present in the civil suit, the issue in which was the legitimacy of the boy that she was putting forward as the jaghir of the estate. Her non-appearance in answer to the challenge, that is to say, to disclose the actual fact as to her condition shortly after her husband Jawala's death, her disappearance into a foreign state, and all the other circumstances mention, had been established. It her story, were, notwithstanding all this, a true story, it was her bounded duty to give evidence in the suit, telling the whole facts in support of her and her alleged son's case; but she did not. If under advice she did not do so, that advice was of the word description, and worthy of the animadversion above made. But in any view her non appearance as a witness, she being present in Court, would be the strongest possible circumstances going to discredit the truth of her case. How did the High Court deal with this? They say: It is true that she has not gone into the witness box, but she made a full statement before Chaudhari Kesar Ram, and it does not seem likely that her evidence before the subordinate Judge would have added materially to what she had said in the statement. Their lordships disapprove of such reasoning. The true object to be achieved by a Court of justice can only be furthered with propriety by the testimony of the party who personally knowing the whole circumstances of the case can dispel the suspicious attaching to it. The Story can then be subjected in all its particulars to cross-examination." In the present case, however, the non-appearance of Srimati Khema in the witness box is not a sufficient ground to challenge the concurrent verdict of the courts below. Her non-appearance may simply be due to her extreme old age. The Story can then be subjected in all its particulars to cross-examination." In the present case, however, the non-appearance of Srimati Khema in the witness box is not a sufficient ground to challenge the concurrent verdict of the courts below. Her non-appearance may simply be due to her extreme old age. She was seventy years of age at the time of filing of the suits and has since died. There is, however, overwhelming oral and documentary evidence to support the verdict of the courts below that she was the widow of Khanna. The oral evidence on this point consists of the statements of P.W.1 Dalpat, P.W. 2 Bhopal, P.W.3. Srimati Ram Devi and P.W. 4 Duari. Even the appellant Mool Chand as D.W.1 has admitted that after the death of his first wife, Khanna brought Srimati Khema who lived with him as his wife for twenty five years. None of the witnesses on behalf of the appellants have dared to say hat Srimati Khema was not the widow of Khanna. Apart from the oral evidence, there is the documentary evidence consisting of the Kutumb register of the Gaon Sabha Dubari in which Srimati Khema is recorded as the wife of Khanna. In the face of these overwhelming oral and documentary evidence it cannot be said that the courts below were bound to make the presumption hat Srimati Khema's case was not proved. 7. The third contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Kutumb Register relied upon by the courts below could not conclusively determine the nature of the dispute involved between the parties. Certainly the entry in the Kutumb Register by itself is not conclusive, but the entry of the Kutumb Register along with the oral and documentary evidence is very good evidence of the relationship shown in the register and the courts below have not erred in law in relying upon this entry as it has not been rebutted. 8. The forth contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that even according to the plaintiff-respondent's own case she was only living with the deceased Khanna as his wife and she could not prove the marriage with him and the consequent birth of Gomid by Khanna who was the son of a pre-deceased wife of Khanna. 8. The forth contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that even according to the plaintiff-respondent's own case she was only living with the deceased Khanna as his wife and she could not prove the marriage with him and the consequent birth of Gomid by Khanna who was the son of a pre-deceased wife of Khanna. As we have seen above, the question whether Srimati Khema is the mother or the stepmother of Gomid is of no consequence from the legal point of view. As regards the distinction that Srimati Khema merely lived with the deceased Khanna as his wife but did not prove the actual fact of marriage, the question of producing direct evidence of the fact of marriage ceremony which might have taken place twenty five years before the death of Khanna, would have arisen if the appellants had taken the specific pleading in the written statement before the trial court to the effect that Srimati Khema lived with Khanna as his wife but was not married to him. However, a perusal of the written statement filed by the appellants in the trial court shows that they merely contended themselves by taking the following plea regarding Srimati Khema in para 2 of their written statement: "That Srimati Khema, plaintiff no.2 is not the mother of Gomid. Therefore, under the law no right accrues to Srimati Khema in the land in suit as a consequence of remarriage of Srimate Ram Devi plaintiff no.1. In the Court of first appeal, the appellant had taken the following plea regarding Srimati Khema in para 4 of their grounds of appeal: "Because it was fully proved beyond any shadow of doubt that respondent no.1 was not the real mother of Gomid deceased but was the step mother and the learned lower court has erred in holding otherwise." It will be observed that it is for the first time in the second appeal that the appellants have taken the curious plea that Srimati Khema lived with Khanna as his wife but was not married to him. In both the courts below the appellants did not deny that Srimati Khema was the wife of Khanna. In the lower appellate court the appellants have specially admitted that Srimati Khema was the step mother of Gomid who was son of Khanna. In both the courts below the appellants did not deny that Srimati Khema was the wife of Khanna. In the lower appellate court the appellants have specially admitted that Srimati Khema was the step mother of Gomid who was son of Khanna. Over whelming order and documentary evidence has been produced in the court below to the effect that Srimati Khema lived with Khanna as his wife fore twenty five years and was recorded as his wife in the Kutumb Registered. There being no evidence to the contrary, the logical interfere would be that the she was in fact married to khanna. The learned counsel for the appellants has referred to Arjun Singh v. Cirendra Nath and anothers A.I.R. 1971 Alld. P.29 in which and following observations have been made:" "It is always necessary to have direct evidence of authority to adopt. But neither the principle that both the factum of adoption proved by circumstantial evidence alone i.e. by conduct repute and recognition, etc,. nor the consideration that evidence naturally gets lost with the passage of time would justify the acceptance of an oral testimony which merits rejection on account of its inherent improbability or intrinsic defects. The scantiness of direct evidence may certainly, in a fit case, be regarded as having been made up by circumstantial evidence of a convincing nature; but a direct evidence that not only fails to inspire confidence but also appears to be definitely untrue cannot be accepted by reason of the consideration that no better evidence might have remained available." According to the above judgment, as direct evidence which fails to inspire confidence and also appears to be definitely untrue, cannot be accepted by reason of the consideration that no better evidence might have remained available because of laps of time. This observation will, however, not help the appellants in the present case. Since the appellants had failed to take the specific plea that no marriage between Khanna and Srimati Khema took place. Srimati Khema was not required to produce direct evidence about the marriage ceremony. It was sufficient for her to produce evidence to the effect that she live with Khanna as his wife and was recognized as such. 9. Since the appellants had failed to take the specific plea that no marriage between Khanna and Srimati Khema took place. Srimati Khema was not required to produce direct evidence about the marriage ceremony. It was sufficient for her to produce evidence to the effect that she live with Khanna as his wife and was recognized as such. 9. Th last contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that there being a dispute regarding their interest in the land in dispute between the plaintiffs inter se, the suit ought to have been dismissed on this ground alone. This contention has no force. A perusal of the plaint filed before the trial court would show that the plaintiff-respondents Srimati Ram Devi and Srimati Khema had claimed the following alternative relief: "In the alternative, if for any reason or on the showing of the defendant nos. 3 and 4, the plaintiff no. 1 be held to have lost her contenancy rights in the suit holding on account of the alleged-remarriage, then in that case ?th share in the suit holding having been partitioned and allotted in a separate qura, the plaintiff no. 2 be given exclusive possession over the same as sirdar thereof." This world clearly go to show that there was no inter se dispute between the plaintiff-respondent. Both of them had claimed co-tenancy right Srimati Ram Devi claiming to be the widow of Gomid and Shrimati Khema claiming to be the widow of Khanna. As a mater of fact, the courts below have held that Srimati Ram Devi is the widow of Gomid and Srimati Khema is the widow of Khanna. However, the question of remarriage of Srimati Ram Devi could change the legal position. It is, therefore, that the plaintiffs have claimed to above alternative relief which clearly shows that there was no inter se dispute between the plaintiffs. 10. The judgments of the courts below are well-based on oral and documentary evidence and are sound in law. I find no force in the grounds of appeals and hereby dismiss them. 11. This order will govern the connected second appeal nos. 110 to 112 of 1971-72/Distt. Bareilly.