Judgment :- (CHIEF JUSTICE): 1. In these writ petitions the legislative competence of the legislature in enacting the Tamil Nadu Debt Relief Act, 1976, (Presidents Act for Tamil Nadu, No. 31 of 1976) is questioned. We have held in N.A. Chidambaram Chettiar firm, by its partner, N.A. Chidambaram v. The State of Tamil Nadu represented by its Chief Secretary to Government, Madras-9 W.P. 2927 of 1976, etc., d. 6th August 1976, since reported in 90 L.W. 27 (D.B.)=1977 2 M.L.J, etc., that the Tamil Nadu Debt Relief Act, 1976 is within the competence of the State Legislature and was validly enacted by the President. We have also held the Act is not in contravention of the Provisions of part XIII of the Constitution and that the petitioners have no right to complain about the infringement of fundamental rights which include the rights that are mentioned in Part XIII of the Constitution. In writ Petition No. 3064 of 1976 Mr. Venugopal, the learned counsel for the petitioner, questioned the validity of the above Act on the ground that the Act is not Emergency orientated and as such does not fall within the law making power of the State Legislature under Art. 358 and 359 of the Contitution of India. 2. Art. 352 empowers the President to proclaim emergency if he is satisfied that a grave emergency exists whereby the security of India or of any part of the territory thereof is threatened, whether by war or external aggression or internal disturbance. Art. 358 states that while a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, nothing in Art. 19 shall restrict the power of the State as defined in part III to make any law or to take any executive action which the State would but for the provisions contained in that part be competent to make or to take: but any law so made shall, to the extent of the incompetency, cease to have effect as soon as the Proclamation ceases to operate, except as respects things done or omitted to be done before the law so ceases to have effect. The effect of this Article is that the provisions of Art. 19 are suspended during emergency and the State is at liberty to make any law, which the State would, but for the provisions contained in part III, be competent, to make or to take, but any law so made shall, to the extent of the incompetency of the law cease to have effect as soon as the proclamation ceases to operate. This Article confines itself to the suspension of the provisions of Art. 19. But, by a subsequent amendment to the Constitution, that is, by the Constitution (Thirty-eighth Amendment) Act, 1975, sub-Art.(1-A) was introduced to Art. 359. Under Art 359(1), the President, where a Procolamation of Emergency is in operation, may, by order declare that the right to move any court for the enforcement of such of the rights conferred by part III as may be mentioned in the order and all proceedings pending in any Court for the enforcement of the rights so mentioned shall remain suspended for the period during which the Proclamation is in force or for such shorter period as may be specified in the order. This Article enables the President to declare by order that the right to move any Court for the enforcement of such of the rights conferred by Part 111 be suspended. Art. 359(1-A), while an order under Art. 359(1) is in operation, empowers the State to make any law which the State would but for the provisions contained in Part III, be competent to make. But, the operation of such law to the extent of the incompetency shall cease to have effect as soon as the Presidential Order ceases to operate. The effect of this Constitutional amendment is that the State could make any law which it might not have been competent to make, if the fundamental rights could be enforced; but to the extent that the law would be incompetent as infringing the fundamental rights, it would cease to operate when the Proclamation ceases. The amended sub-Article, therefore empowers the State to make any law irrespective of the fact whether it is in contravention of the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III or not. 3. The contention of Mr. The amended sub-Article, therefore empowers the State to make any law irrespective of the fact whether it is in contravention of the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III or not. 3. The contention of Mr. Venugopal, the learned counsel for the petitioner in W. P. No. 3064 of 1976 is that the power of the State to make laws under Art. 358 and Art. 359 (I-A) is confined only to what he terms as “emergency orientated law.” The learned counsel admitted that there are no words in the Article restricting the power of the State to make laws contrary to emergency orientated law. The Article confers unfettered power on the State to pass any legislation, whether emergency orientated or not. 4. In Mohd. Yaqub v. State of J & K. the contention that an order passed under Art. 359 is made in the context of the emergency, and therefore, enforcement of only such fundamental rights can be suspended which have nexus with the reasons which led to the Proclamation of emergency was negatived by the Supreme Court, which held that there is nothing in Art. 359 which in any way limits the power of the President to suspend the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III. The Court expressed its opinion that there is no scope for enquiry into the question whether the fundamental right, the enforcement of which the President has suspended under Article 359 has anything to do with the security of India which is threatened, whether by war or external aggression or internal disturbance, for, Art. 359 posits that it may be necessary for the President to suspend any of the fundamental rights in Part III for the sake of the security of India. It is therefore, clear that the President can, without any reference to any nexus, suspend any of the fundamental rights and that cannot be questioned. Art. 359(1-A) refers to an order of Proclamation by the President under Art. 399 and enables the State to make a law which may not secure the fundamental rights during emergency. Equally, under Art. 358, though it is limited to the suspension of the provisions of Art. 13, the power of the State, to make law is unfettered and does not require that only emergency orienated law could be made. Equally, under Art. 358, though it is limited to the suspension of the provisions of Art. 13, the power of the State, to make law is unfettered and does not require that only emergency orienated law could be made. We see no restriction at all in the two Articles restricting the power of the Legislature to confine itself to emergency orientated law, that is, laws which have nexus to the grounds which enabled the declaration of emergency, by the President, namely, when the security of India or of any part of the territory thereof is threatened, whether by war or external aggression or internal disturbance. We do not think that there is any basis at all for the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. The learned counsel referred us to the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Kannappa Chettiar v. State of Tamilnadu 1973 II M.L.J. 212=86 L.W. (Supplement) Pages 1 to 56). After referring to the decision in Jan Mahomed Noor Mohamed v. State of Gujarat A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 385 the Bench observed at page 272 that Art. 358 proceeded on the principle that during an emergency, the power of the State, to control persons and property has to be greater than in ordinary times and that this consideration would apply, only to firstly Government control in the region of public law, and secondly to legislation enacted by reason of the emergency. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners in that decision that emergency can have no impact on legislation as to matters of private law was accepted. The two examples that are given are, list II, Entry 18 (land, that is to say, rights in or over land); Land Tenures including the relation of landlord and tenant, and the collection of rent; transfer and alienation of agricultural lands; and improvement and agricultural loans, colonization); and List III, Entry 5 (Marriage and divorce, infants and minors, adoption, Wills, intestacy and succession, joint family and partition; all matters in respect of which parties in judicial proceedings were immediately before the commencement of the Constitution subject to their personal law. We do not find any guidelines for determining which is private law and which is public law, and we are unable to decide whether the impugned legislation is a private law or a public law. We do not find any guidelines for determining which is private law and which is public law, and we are unable to decide whether the impugned legislation is a private law or a public law. If the learned Judges meant that the State cannot enact any law except emergency orientated law, it would be contrary to the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Mohd. Yaqub v. State of J. & K. A.I.R.1968 S.C. 763 where it has been clearly stated that there is no scope for enquiry into the question whether the fundamental Tight, the enforcement of which the President has suspended under Art. 359, has anything to do with the security of India and the Proclamation of the President suspending any of the fundamental rights cannot be questioned. In the circumstances, we do not see how the power of the State to legislate under Art. 359(1-A) of Art. 358 could be restricted as there are no grounds to warrant any such restriction. After the 38th Constitutional Amendment to 1975, which introduced sub-Art. (1-A) to Article 359 the matter has been put beyond all doubt. The decision in Kannappa Chetti v. State of Tamil Nadu 1973 II M.L.J. 212=86 L.W. Supplement, was rendered before the Constitutional amendment was introduced and the decision has not referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Mohd. Yakub v. State of J. & K. A.I.R. 1968 SC 765 In the circumstances the decision is no longer good law, we are satisfied that there is no substance in the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 3064 of 1976 and the writ petition is dismissed. 5. Mr. N. C. Raghavachari, the learned Counsel for the petitioner in writ Petition No. 3109 of 1976 adopted the contentions of Mr. Venugopal which we have rejected. Hence this writ petition also is dismissed.