Judgment :- 1. The revision petitioner who is the defendant in the action is a Co-operative Society functioning under the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, Act 21 of 1969, and which I may call the 'Act'. Besides banking the society was also transacting business as a wholesale dealer in foodgrains and other rationed articles. For the purpose of carrying on that business it was necessary to transport the rationed articles from the go-downs of the Food Corporation, situated in different parts of this State and also beyond the borders of this State to the stocking place of the Society. The society thought of entrusting this work to third parties, and invited tenders through a publication in the Malayalam Daily'Mathrubhumi' dated 20th of May, 1974. In answer to that advertisement the plaintiff in this suit submitted a tender, which was eventually accepted by the society. Then followed Ext. B1, the regular agreement between the society on the one part and the plaintiff on the other. Sometime later it appears that there was some dispute between the parties regarding the transporting business, and the society by a unilateral act forfeited the security amount deposited by the plaintiff. The plaintiff thereupon instituted the suit which gave rise to this revision for return of the security amount and allied reliefs. The defendant society inter alia contended that the civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain the lis in view of S.69 of the Act. That matter was heard preliminarily by the trial court, which answered it against the defendant. 2. The short question that falls for decision is whether the civil court has jurisdiction to entertain this action. That the suit in question has a civil nature is not disputed, and consequently, by virtue of S.9 of the Code of Civil Procedure the civil court has got jurisdiction unless the cognisance is barred either expressly or by necessary implication. The bar relied on in this case is the provisions contained in the Act. S.100 of the Act enjoins that no civil or revenue court shall have any jurisdiction in respect of any matter for which provision is made in this Act. S.69 of the Act makes provision for deciding certain disputes. The bar relied on in this case is the provisions contained in the Act. S.100 of the Act enjoins that no civil or revenue court shall have any jurisdiction in respect of any matter for which provision is made in this Act. S.69 of the Act makes provision for deciding certain disputes. Both sides agreed that the relevant provision applicable is S.69(1)(c) of the Act, which I may extract hereunder for convenience: "69[1], Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, if a dispute arises xx xx xx xx [c] between the society or its committee and any past committee, any officer, agent or employee, or any past officer, past agent or past employee or the nominee, heirs or legal representatives of any deceased officer, deceased agent, or deceased employee of the society; or xx xx xx xx such dispute shall be referred to the Registrar for decision, and no court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or other proceeding in respect of such dispute." Even regarding the applicability of this provision the controversy lies within a narrow compass in the sense that the society rests its case exclusively upon the expression "agent" found in sub-section (c). The lower court took the view that by the terms and conditions provided for in Ext. BI the plaintiff cannot be considered as an agent of the defendant society and that he is an independent contractor. It is not necessary in this case to define with precision the exact legal status of the plaintiff in relation to Ext. B1 contract. I am concerned with the sole question whether the plaintiff is an "agent" for the purpose of S.69(1)(c) of the Act; and it is not relevant whether the plaintiff is an employee, independent contractor etc. 3. I am told that the expression "agent" is not defined in the Act, and consequently, one has to fall back upon the definition of 'agent" contained in S.182 of the Indian Contract Act. The section runs as follows: "An "agent" is a person employed to do any act for another, or to represent another in dealings with third persons. The person for whom such act is done, or who is so represented is called the 'principal'." The section treats as "agent" two categories of persons, viz. The section runs as follows: "An "agent" is a person employed to do any act for another, or to represent another in dealings with third persons. The person for whom such act is done, or who is so represented is called the 'principal'." The section treats as "agent" two categories of persons, viz. (a) a person employed to do any act for another; and (b) a person to represent another in dealings with third persons. The second category apparently is not applicable because the society docs not bargain for the position that the plaintiff can represent the society as against third parties. So the only remaining aspect that has to be considered is whether in view of the terms and conditions contained in Ext. BI the plaintiff in this case can be deemed to be a "person employed by the society to do any act for the society". It may be necessary to advert to the salient provisions of the contract to answer the above proposition. Under Ext. BI contract the plaintiff was to take delivery of rationed goods from the go-downs as a representative of the society. I was using the expression 'representative' not in its full legal sense because I was translating an expression found in Para.1 of the agreement. The representative capacity contemplated therein is for the sole purpose of getting delivery of goods from the Government go-downs. But the actual taking delivery according to the provision in the contract is on the responsibility of the plaintiff himself. The entire expenses for transporting the goods were to be met by the plaintiff, and towards costs thereof he was to be paid at specified rates both on the basis of the quantity transported and also the distance covered depending upon the place from which the goods were transported. Para.2, 3, 4, and 5 are practically indemnity clauses. The plaintiff is solely and exclusively responsible for damage, short delivery or other consequent losses of the property he has agreed to transport, and he is made answerable to all conceivable types of loss which the society may sustain due to laches, negligence or misfeasance on the part of the plaintiff. There are also provisions relating to forfeiture of the security in certain contingencies. There are also provisions relating to forfeiture of the security in certain contingencies. The contract was to remain in force for a period of one year unless it gets automatically revoked in consequence of termination of the arrangement by the government. These provisions, as far as I could see, would unmistakably show that the transporting was done by the plaintiff to benefit himself and not to benefit the society. The "act" contemplated herein is the process of transportation. The society does not profess to do that act, and consequently, there cannot be the question of the plaintiff being employed to do that work for the society. By Ext. BI, what the Society has done was to entrust the work of transporting to the plaintiff on payment to the plaintiff at the rates specified in the contract. I am unable to read the relevant provisions of Ext. BI as constituting the relationship of principal and agent as between the society on the one part and the plaintiff on the other. I would, therefore, hold that the plaintiff cannot be treated as an agent of the defendant for the purpose of S.69 (1) (c) of the 'Act'. I confirm the order of the lower court and dismiss the revision. No costs. Dismissed.