ORDER M.N. Shukla, J. - This is a tenant's writ petition arising out of proceedings under section 21 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and is directed against the orders of the Prescribed Authority and the Appellate Authority dated 20-11-1973 and 30-8-1974 respectively (Annexure 3 and 4 to the writ petition). 2. The facts of the case are that the petitioner was a tenant of a portion of House No. 109/423, Nehru Nagar, Kanpur at Rs. 130/- per month of which the respondent No. 1 Gopal Dass is the owner/landlord. The aforesaid respondent made an application for eviction of the petitioner from the house in dispute under section 21 of the Act claiming that he was the owner of the disputed house and the Karta of the joint family consisting of his own family and his nephews, and the accommodation in dispute was required by the family for residential purposes. The application was resisted by the petitioner on a number of grounds which would be referred to in the latter part of this order. The Prescribed Authority, however, by its order dated 20-11-1973 partly allowed the application under section 21 and held that the respondent No. 1 was the sole owner of the disputed house and that he should get some portion in the house with the result that two rooms and a verandah on the south were ordered to be released in his favour. Both parties preferred appeals against the order of the Prescribed Authority. The Appellate Authority by its order dated 30-8-1974 allowed the landlord's appeal and dismissed the appeal filed by the tenant. In other words, the landlord's application tinder section 21 of the Act was allowed 'in toto'. In these circumstances two orders have been challenge by means of this writ petition. 3. This case was heard on several dates in the past and a number of important questions of law were canvassed before me on behalf of the parties but before the case concluded the Legislature intervened and the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulations of Letting, Rent and Eviction) (Amendment) Act, 1976 was passed. Today when the hearing of the case commended the amendment has become an accomplished fact and the Act has received the sanction of the President. Today when the hearing of the case commended the amendment has become an accomplished fact and the Act has received the sanction of the President. In these circumstances the case acquires a now complexion and in fact the problem has been very much simplified and the vexed questions of law need not be gone into. The matter can now be disposed of on a short point. 4. It may, however, be mentioned that on the previous hearing of the case the following points were argued by the counsel for the parties : 1. That the Rent Control authorities had not decided the case in accordance with Rule 16 (2)(a) and (b) of the Act. In other words, it was vehemently argued on behalf of the petitioner that the hardship which was likely to be caused to the tenant in the event of eviction was completely disregarded by the Rent Control authorities while passing the impugned orders. 2. That the accommodation in dispute was exempt from the operation of the Act by virtue of the provisions of section 2 (1)(c) and (d). In other words, it was submitted that the building in question was being used as a factory and for manufacturing purposes, hence the case did not attract the provisions of the Act. 3. That the respondent No. 1 was the sole owner and landlord of the house and his family alone should be taken into consideration for purposes of an order under section 21 and the needs of other persons not covered under the definitions of the terms 'landlord' and 'family' were wholly irrelevant for the purposes of this case. Although these grounds were not expressly raised in that form before the Red Control anthorities, yet in view of the facts of the case and the material already on record I permitted counsel for the parties to canvass the above points before me. Now as a consequence of the amending Act one more point which malt merit consideration has also been pressed before me by Sri S. N. Varma appearing for the respondents. Now as a consequence of the amending Act one more point which malt merit consideration has also been pressed before me by Sri S. N. Varma appearing for the respondents. The proviso which has been added to section 21(1) of the Act by the amending Act reads as follows : "Provided also that the prescribed authority shall, except in case provided for in the Explanation, take into account the likely hardship to the tenant from the grant of the application as against the likely hardship to the landlord from the refusal of the application and for that purpose shall have regard to such factors as may be prescribed." In my opinion it would not be proper to preclude the landlord from urging the point also. Now on the facts of the case and the material already on record, as a result of the amendment incorporated in the Act he may be permitted to argue that point also. It is significant that the above proviso has been given restrospective effect by the Legislature. 5. The crucial alteration which has resulted by virtue of the amendment is that it has now become incumbent on the Prescribed Authority while acting under section 21(l)(a) to take into account the likely hardship to the tenant from the grant of the application as against the likely hardship to the landlord from the refusal of the application. This point, when initially pressed before me on behalf of the petitioner, appeared to be devoid of force in view of the full Bench decision of this court in Chandra Kumar Sah v. District Judge, 1976 A.W.R. 50. Since, however, a fresh proviso has been added to section 21(l)(a) by the amending Act, the rule laid down in the full Bench decision referred to above shall no longer govern this use. I have carefully pressed the order passed by the Appellate Authority disposing of the respective appeals of the landlord and the tenant and it cannot be gain said that the order is founded on the solitary consideration that the need of the landlord was proved to be bona fide and genuine. It omitted to take into consideration the hardship that was likely to be caused to the tenant from the grant of the application. Therefore, the impugned orders cannot be sustained and must be quashed. 6. It omitted to take into consideration the hardship that was likely to be caused to the tenant from the grant of the application. Therefore, the impugned orders cannot be sustained and must be quashed. 6. For these reasons allow this writ petition, quash the impugned orders and send the case back to the Appellate Authority for deciding the two appeals afresh after hearing the parties on the material and evidence already on record on the various points which I have outlined and in the light of the observations made by me. The parties shall not be allowed to adduce fresh evidence in the case. In view of the peculiar circumstance of the case I make no order as to costs.