Judgment :- 1. The first defendant in O.S. No. 186 of 1969 on the file of the Court of the District Munsif, Periyakulam, who lost before the Courts below, is the appellant herein. 2. The controversy lies within a very narrow compass. Admittedly, the suit property of an extent of 1 acre 75 cents belonged to one Annamalai Pillai under a settlement deed, the original of Ex. A-2 d. 16th December 1907, by his natural father Ramaswamy Pillai. After the death of Annamalai Pillai, leaving two widows, viz, Unnamalai Ammal and Veerayee, Veerayee instituted O.S. No. 482 of 1927 on the file of the District Munsifs Court, Periyakulam, for partition of the properties of Annamalai Pillai, impleading Unnamalai Ammal and the son of the natural brother of Annamalai Pillai, viz., the second defendant in this suit. That suit ended in a compromise as evidenced by Ex. A-5 d. 6th July 1935, being the certified copy of the final decree in I.A. No. 1009 of 1933 in O.S. No. 487 of 1927. Under the terms of the compromise the silent of 1 acre 73 cents was to be enjoyed by Unnamalai Ammal during her life time, and the same was to belong absolutely to the sons of the second defendant herein. The plaintiffs in the suit are the sons of the second defendant. After the death of Unnamalai Ammal on 26th July 1968, the plaintiffs in the present, action instituted this suit for declaration and possession and for past and future mesne profits. The appellant herein, who was the first defendant in the suit claimed to be the lessee of the suit lands under Unnamalai Ammal under the original of Ex. A-7 d. 27th March 1961. He put forward several contentions, even denying the title of the plaintiffs to the suit property, but the effective contention, which was put forward, and which alone was urged repeatedly before me was that the appellant is a cultivating tenant entitled to the benefits of the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, and consequently, he could not be evicted from the suit lands. Both the Courts below, following the judgment of this Court in Mangalathachi v. Kalyanarundara Mudallar 1966-II M.L.J. 49:79 L.W. 440, negatived this claim of the appellant, and decreed the suit as prayed for. Hence, the present second appeal by the first defendant in the suit. 3. Mr.
Both the Courts below, following the judgment of this Court in Mangalathachi v. Kalyanarundara Mudallar 1966-II M.L.J. 49:79 L.W. 440, negatived this claim of the appellant, and decreed the suit as prayed for. Hence, the present second appeal by the first defendant in the suit. 3. Mr. T.R. Mani, the learned Counsel for the appellant, does not dispute the title of the plaintiffs to the suit property, nor the status of the appellant as the tenant of the suit property, but only contends that the appellant is entitled to the protection of the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, and, therefore, he is not liable to be evicted in the present suit. The question for consideration is whether that contention is correct or not. 4. Of course, the Courts below relied on a decision of this Court referred to already, though a subsequent Full Bench decision in Chandrasekaran v. Kunju Vanniar and others 88 L.W. 216 (F.B.) has taken a different view. However, that decision as well as the judgment of the Full Bench dealt with a case where the mortgagee in possession had leased the properties, and the question for, consideration was whether the tenant under the mortgagee in possession was entitled to the protection of the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act after redemption of the mortgage. The Full Bench had no occasion to consider the question whether a tenant under a limited owner or a life estate-holder can claim the protection of the Act after the death of the lessor, viz., the life estate-holder. In the present case, as I have pointed out already, under Ex A-5, the compromise decree, Unnamalai Ammal acquired only an interest to enjoy the property for her life and she alone had inducted the appellant into possession; and admittedly, Unnamalai Ammal died on 26th July 1968. The question is whether the appellant can claim the protection of the Act as against the ultimate owners of the property, viz., the plaintiffs in the suit. 5. There are two direct decisions on this point by this court. One is the judgment of Ramanujam, J., in O.J.V. Ramanathan and Nagappa Ambalagarar S.A. Nos. 499 and 645 of 1970 disposed of on 3rd August 1972).
5. There are two direct decisions on this point by this court. One is the judgment of Ramanujam, J., in O.J.V. Ramanathan and Nagappa Ambalagarar S.A. Nos. 499 and 645 of 1970 disposed of on 3rd August 1972). In that case also, under a settlement deed, one Alamelu Ammal became entitled to enjoy the property for her life, and after her death, the property belonged absolutely to the appellant in the second appeal. Ramanujam J., had to consider whether the tenant under Alamelu Ammal could claim the rights under the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, after the death of Alamelu Ammal at against the absolute owner. Ramanujam J., negatived the claim of the tenant and held that he could not claim the protection of the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act. 6. The second decision is that of Mohan, J., in Rajappa Thenkandar v. Ramanathan Sundaram Thenkadar and Muthukumara Thenkandar S.A. No: 1691 of 1979. The judgment is dated 14th July, 1975. Mohan J., followed the judgment of Ramanujam, J., and held that a tenant from a life estate-holder will not be entitled to claim the benefit of the Tamilnadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act. It must be pointed out that the judgment of Mohan, J., was rendered after the judgment of the Full Bench referred to already, viz., Chandrasekaran v. Kunju Vannier and others 88 L.W. 216 (F.B.). These two judgments, though by single Judges, are binding on me, unless I am convinced that the said decisions require reconsideration, in which event I shall have to refer this matter to a Bench. 7. Mr. T.R. Mani, the learned Counsel for the appellant, attempted to convince me that the said two decisions are erroneous and require reconsideration. The argument of Mr. Mani is that on the analogy of S. 76(a) of the T.P. Act, the aots done bona fide and prudently in the ordinary course of management by the life estate-holder will bind on the reversioners for the owners of the vested remainder.
The argument of Mr. Mani is that on the analogy of S. 76(a) of the T.P. Act, the aots done bona fide and prudently in the ordinary course of management by the life estate-holder will bind on the reversioners for the owners of the vested remainder. That question was actually considered by Ramanujam, J., who held that in the case of a tenant under the life estate-holder, S. 76(a) of the T.P. Act as such will not apply, and there is no scope for applying the provisions of that Section by way of analogy, because S. 111(c) of the T.P. Act actually provides that a lease of immovable property determines where the interest of the lessor in the property terminates on, or his power to dispose of the same extends only to, the happening of any event by the happening of such event. As a matter of fact, in such cases, there is no scope for applying any principle of law, by way of analogy, because the right that is claimed by the appellant herein is a specific right pursuant to a particular statutory provision, and, therefore, the question of applying the principles contained in S. 76(a) of the T.P. Act by way of analogy does net arise. 8. The second submission of Mr. Mani was that admittedly Unnamalai Ammal was entitled to collect the rents from the appellant, and was actually collecting the rents from him, and, therefore, she will be the landlord as defined in the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, and the tenancy agreement under the original of Ex. A-7 entered into between Unnamalai Ammal and the appellant would come within the scope of that Act, 50 as to make the appellant a cultivating tenant entitled to protection under that Act. I am unable to accept this argument either. In the first place, the two judgments referred to above dealt with the identical circumstances with regard to the provisions contained in the Tamilnadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, and, therefore, unless I hold that the learned Judges had failed to take into account the provisions contained In the Act, I cannot say that their judgments require consideration.
In the first place, the two judgments referred to above dealt with the identical circumstances with regard to the provisions contained in the Tamilnadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, and, therefore, unless I hold that the learned Judges had failed to take into account the provisions contained In the Act, I cannot say that their judgments require consideration. Apart from that, the conclusion arrived at by them is not rested on any provision contained in the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, but on the normal and general rule that a grantor cannot confer on another a larger interest than he himself had in the property. In view of this, I am of the opinion that there is no subtance in this contention either. 9. Thirdly, Mr. Mani contends that several decisions with reference to S. 76(a) of the T.P. Act had held that if a mortgagee in possession had leased out the mortgaged property in bona fide exercise of his right to enjoy the property and the transaction happened to be a prudent transaction, the tenant would acquire the rights conferred by statutes subsequent to the tenancy. In my opinion, this argument is misconceived. In the first place, the said principle has been applied by the courts only with reference to S. 76(a) of the T.P. Act, and once it is held that S. 76(a) will not apply to the tenancy created by a limited owner, the question involved is one of absence of power and net the manner of exercise of power. Under these circumstances, I am unable to hold that the decisions of Ramanujam, J., and Mohan, J., referred to already require reconsideration, and following those judgments, it must be held that the appellant is not entitled to the protection of the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act. 10. Accordingly, the second appeal fails and it is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. No leave.