JUDGMENT A.P. Sen, J. 1. This appeal by the plaintiff is directed against a judgment of the IInd Additional District Judge, Jabalpur dated 11th April 1975, affirming the judgment and decree of the IInd Civil Judge, Class II, Jabalpur dated 24th July 1963, dismissing the plaintiff's suit for eviction u/s 12 (1) (a), (f), (g) and (h) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. 2. The plaintiff Abdul Hameed who is the landlord, brought the suit for ejectment of the defendant Hakeem Ahmedullah Khan from house No. 866, Omti, Marhatal Ward, Jabalpur, on the ground that the defendant was in arrears of rent from December 1967, i.e. for the period from 5.12.1967 to 4.4.1970, amounting to Rs. 600/- @ Rs. 20/- per month and did not pay the same despite notice, that he bona fide requires the suit accommodation for continuing his business in scents and perfumed hair-oils which he is carrying on from a rented premises and has no other alternative suitable accommodation of his own in the city for that purpose, that the house was in a dilapidated condition and unsafe for human habitation and it cannot be repaired without the defendant vacating it and that he wants to make substantial additions and alterations thereto which cannot also be carried on without the accommodation being vacated, under clauses (a), (f), (g) and (h) of sub-section (1) of S. 12 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. The defendant contested the claim of the plaintiff and dined all the allegations and pleaded that the plaintiff was not entitled to a decree for ejectment. Both the Courts below have negatived the plaintiff's claim, hence the appeal. 3. It is not necessary to go into the ground specified in clause (f) of sub-section (2) of S. 12 of the Act, inasmuch as the Courts below have found, as a fact, that the demised premises were let out for residential purposes and therefore, cannot be had by the plaintiff for any non-residential purpose. In view of this, learned counsel for the appellant did not press the ground u/s 12 (1) (f) of the Act. 4. In view of this, learned counsel for the appellant did not press the ground u/s 12 (1) (f) of the Act. 4. The appeal must however, succeed with respect to the grounds mentioned in clauses (a), (g) and (h) of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act, as the learned Additional District Judge, I am constrained to say, has not applied his mind to the question whether the requirements of these clauses are fulfilled or not. Both the parties, indeed, agree that the appeal be remanded to him for a decision afresh. 5. The learned trial Judge had dismissed the claim u/s 12 (1) (a) on the ground that the defendant was not in arrears of rent. In appeal, the learned Additional District Judge declined to interfere on the ground that the plaintiff having filed no appeal against the dismissal of the suit in so far as arrears of rent was concerned, his claim for eviction of the defendant u/s 12 (1) (a) of the Act could not be considered. I am afraid the view taken by both the Courts cannot be accepted. If the learned trial Judge was of the view that mere payment of deposit of the arrears by the defendant, was sufficient to non-suit the plaintiff so far as his claim u/s 12 (1) (a) was involved, she was labouring under a misconception of law. The Court has still to enquire whether the defendant has or has not complied with the requirements of section 13 (1) of the Act. The learned Additional District Judge was also wrong that the failure of the plaintiff to claim in appeal the arrears of rent must result in dismissal of his suit for ejectment u/s 12 (1) (a) of the Act. Merely because the plaintiff did not appeal against the dismissal of his claim for arrears of rent, that would not entail in dismissal of his suit for ejectment in appeal. These are two distinct and separate matters. There was, indeed, no occasion for the plaintiff to have preferred an appeal claiming arrears of rent and mesne profits inasmuch as the arrears of rent due on the date of suit, amounting to Rs. 600/- had been deposited by the defendant in Court on 29.7.1970 and the rents falling due thereafter were being deposited by him. There was, indeed, no occasion for the plaintiff to have preferred an appeal claiming arrears of rent and mesne profits inasmuch as the arrears of rent due on the date of suit, amounting to Rs. 600/- had been deposited by the defendant in Court on 29.7.1970 and the rents falling due thereafter were being deposited by him. Due to this, the plaintiff could not obviously claim anything by way of arrears of rent in appeal. 6. It is well settled that a tenant against whom a suit for eviction is brought u/s 12 (1) (a) must, in order to get the benefit of protection of section 12 (3) of the Act against eviction u/s 12 (1) (a) must comply with both the requirements of section 13 (1), namely, (i) he has to deposit or pay to the landlord the arrears due, within one month of the service of the writ or summons on him or within such further time as may be allowed and (ii) thereafter, continue to deposit or pay month by month a sum equivalent to the rent on the 15th day of each succeeding month. It the present case, the defendant had pleaded that he had deposited Rs. 600/- as rent from January 1969 to June 1970. This was obviously a mistake. The rent of the demised premises is Rs 20/- per month the plaintiff alleges that the defendant was in arrears from December 1967, i.e., for 30 months as on the date of suit, which was brought on 8.5.1970. The deposit of Rs. 600/- was, therefore, for 30 months from January 1968 to June 1970. The question still remains whether the defendant had or had not deposited the rent for December 1967 in Civil Suit No. 277-A of 1967. There is nothing on record to substantiate this it has also to be seen whether the said deposit was to the credit of the plaintiff. There appears to be no order of the Court u/s 13 (1) expressly granting an extension of time for deposit. The only order is that of the learned Judge dated 21.11.1970 by which she declined to strike off the defence u/s 13 (6) of the Act. 7. There appears to be no order of the Court u/s 13 (1) expressly granting an extension of time for deposit. The only order is that of the learned Judge dated 21.11.1970 by which she declined to strike off the defence u/s 13 (6) of the Act. 7. Even if the defendant had complied with the first requirement of section 13 (1) of the Act, i.e. paid the arrears due on the date of suit within one month of the service of writ of summons, that would not confer on him protection against eviction u/s 12 (3) of the Act, unless it is shown that he had also complied with the second requirement of section 13 (1) i.e. thereafter, after making the initial deposit, he paid the rents for the subsequent months on the 15th day of each month during the pendency of the suit as well as the proceedings in appeal and second appeal. In view of the decision of the Full Bench in Firm, Ratanchand Darbarilal Satna & others vs. Rajendra Kumar Khoob chand & other, 1969 JLJ 854 & AIR 1970 MP 1 (FB) the provisions of section 13 (1) are applicable in an appeal or second appeal by the landlord. The defendant was, therefore, bound to comply with the requirements of section 13 (1) not only in appeal before the Lower Appellate Court, but also during the pendency of the appeal in this Court. There is nothing on record to show that the defendant has complied with the second requirement of section 13 (1) of the Act. 8. Learned counsel for the respondent has, however, filed a chart showing the various payments made by the defendant from time to time. From this chart, it appears that the defendant paid the rent during the pendency of the suit month by month till the month previous to the judgment, but rents for 3 months were not deposited by the 15th day of the succeeding month, viz. for December 1971, May 1972 and May 1973. It is said that the delay was due to circumstances beyond the control of the defendant because the Court was closed. It also appears that the defendant made a lumpsum deposit of Rs 60/- towards the rent for the months of July, August and September 1973. This, it is mentioned, was done on receipt of the notice of appeal on 24.7.1973. It also appears that the defendant made a lumpsum deposit of Rs 60/- towards the rent for the months of July, August and September 1973. This, it is mentioned, was done on receipt of the notice of appeal on 24.7.1973. This again appears to be a mistake. The appeal was not filed till 5.9.1973 and it was admitted on 18.9.1973. The defendant must have been served with the, notice thereafter. During the pendency of the appeal, the defendant appears to have deposited rent month by month till the disposal of the appeal. He stopped making deposits with the dismissal of the appeal and made a lumpsum deposit of Rs. 100/- on 10.9.1975 on receipt of the notice of the second appeal. 9. The learned Additional District Judge should decide whether there was due compliance of both the requirements of section 13 (1) of the Act. I may draw the attention of the learned Additional District Judge to the decisions in Ved Prakash & other vs. Smt. Prabha Bai and Gaurishankar vs. Bhag wandas. 10. I am afraid, the learned Additional District Judge has failed to mark the difference between clauses (g) and (h) of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act. If the requirement is for the purpose of building or re-building or making substantial additions or alterations, the matter goes out of the scope of clause (g) and comes within the purview of clause (h). There is a clear distinction between "repairs" and "building or re-building or making substantial additions or alterations". The discussion on the point is contained in para 16 of his judgment. I regret to say, the Courts below have mixed up both the clauses (g) and (h). 11. In dealing with the plaintiff's claim, the learned Additional District Judge observes:– "In his report Ex. P.3, in the concluding para, plaintiff's expert witness S.D. Sharma has stated that the ground floor is dangerous as the ceiling may fall down. The first floor is wholly unfit for habitation as the flooring has become useless and the tiled roof is liable to fall down due to rotten ballis rafters and bamboo baiten. The building warrants dismantling of roof. walls and flooring of the first floor and major alterations additions and remodelling in the ground floor are required as per approved plan and this is only possible when the building is vacated completed. The building warrants dismantling of roof. walls and flooring of the first floor and major alterations additions and remodelling in the ground floor are required as per approved plan and this is only possible when the building is vacated completed. The photos of the suit premises Exs. P-6 and P-7 give an idea about the nature of construction of the suit premises. From their perusal, it appear, that the suit house is in quite a sturdy condition." Then again, he continues stating:– In his report, S.D. Sharma (PW4) has not mentioned as to which alterations, additions and remodelling are necessary on the ground floor. He has however stated in his report that dismantling of roof, walls and flooring of the first floor need to be carried out. He has admitted in his cross-examination that if the ballis and bamboos of the roof are replaced, the life of the roof can be extended. He has further admitted that the roof of the verandah and the kadias are strong. He has stated that 75% of the planks fitted in the roof of the room are rotten same is the case with the rear veranda. He however admitted that if the beam and bamboos are replaced, the verandah would be in a good condition." This, in my view, is not the proper approach. 12. It is difficult to subscribe to the view that a landlord cannot make substantial repairs such as dismantling of the ceiling or the removal of the supporting walls and get the accommodation vacated, unless the house is actually on the verge of collapse. The photographs, Exs. P-6 and P-7, only give the outer view of the verandah, and they have no relevance to the actual condition of the building inside. The learned Judge has relied upon the testimony of S.D. Sharma (PW 4). In his report, Ex. P-3 the states that the ground floor is in a dangerous condition as the ceiling may fall down. It is accepted before me that due to this the first floor is unoccupied and therefore, not fit for human habitation. I cannot see how the dismantling of roof, walls and flooring of the first floor can be carried out unless the defendant vacates the premises. This is, however, a matter for the learned Additional District Judge to decide. He may also inspect the house before coming to a decision. 13. I cannot see how the dismantling of roof, walls and flooring of the first floor can be carried out unless the defendant vacates the premises. This is, however, a matter for the learned Additional District Judge to decide. He may also inspect the house before coming to a decision. 13. Under clause (h) of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act, the condition of the building does not come into picture and the plaintiff, if he proves the bona fide nature of his requirement for the purpose of re-construction, is entitled to a decree, provided he fulfills the condition pre-requisite in section 12 (7) of the Act. In Wasudeo Hari Sathe vs. Jagdish Prasad, I had occasion to deal with section 12 (1) (h). In Panchamlal Narayan Shenoy vs. Basthi venkatesha Shenoy, their Lordships of the Supreme Court, while interpreting section 21 (1) (g) of the Mysore Rent Control Act, 1961, which is in terms identical with section 12 (1) (h) ibid, stated as follows:– In considering the reasonable and bona fide requirement of the landlord under this clause, the desire of the landlord to put the property to a more profitable use after demolition and re-construction is also a factor that may be taken into account in favour of the landlord. It is not necessary that the landlord should go further and establish that the condition of the building is such that it requires immediate demolition." In a case falling u/s 12 (1) (h), she condition of the building is, therefore, immaterial. No doubt in Netaram & others vs. Jiwanlal & Another, AIR 1963 SC 499 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court while dealing with section 13 (3) (a) (iii) and (b) of the Patiala and East Punjab States Union Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (8 of 2006 BK), had stated that the condition of the building was one of the relevant circumstances, but that view of theirs proceeded on slightly differently worded provision. 14. The three-fold requirements u/s 12 (7), which put a restraint on the passing of a decree u/s 12 (1) (h), must according to the settled view, exist on the date or the passing of the decree. The question whether these requirements are fulfilled or not is essentially a question of fact which has to be tried on the evidence adduced by the parties. The question whether these requirements are fulfilled or not is essentially a question of fact which has to be tried on the evidence adduced by the parties. In this context, I am constrained to observe that the pleadings of the plaintiff are defective. He has nowhere pleaded the existence of the three-fold requirements of section 12 (7) of the Act. There was consequently, no specific issue framed by the learned trial Judge as to whether the said requirements of section 12 (7) are fulfilled or not. The issue as framed namely, relating to the condition of the building, was wholly irrelevant for purposes of a suit u/s 12 (1) (h) of the Act. To prove the bonafide of his requirements, the plaintiff's case is that the building is in a dilapidated state although that may not be, strictly speaking a relevant consideration in cases falling u/s 12 (1) (h). That is only to show that his need for re-construction bonafide and not just a pretence. 15. The result, therefore, is that the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the Additional District Judge are set aside and the appeal is remanded to him for a decision afresh. The costs shall abide the event. Hearing fee, as per schedule, if certified.