JUDGMENT K. C. Agrawal, J. 1. RESPONDENT nos. 4 and 5 are the landlords of the disputed shop. It was let out to the petitioner in the year 1955 on a monthly rent of Rs. 40/-. Misc. Case No. 170 of 1974 was filed by the respondent nos. 4 and 5 for the release of the aforesaid shop in their favour on the ground that Suresh Chand, the respondent no. 4, was unemployed and that he required the shop to start a new business. It was also alleged that the family of respondent no. 4 consists of himself, his wife and four children, two of whom were school going and without starting a business It was impossible for him to maintain the big family. The allegations made further were that the petitioner was a rich person and had constructed a big building on an area of 2000 sqr. yards, he had a number of shops in this building where he could shift his business. 2. THE application was contested by the petitioner on the grounds that he was the tenant of the premises in dispute since 1955 and had acquired a goodwill for running his business. The respondent nos. 4 and 5 had two vacant shops, one in Sotiganj in which formerly Sri Suresh Chand, the respondent no. 4, was running a Saree Emporium and another shop in the same locality in which he was formerly running a Laundry. According to the pleas taken in the written statement these two shops were vacant and that the respondent no. 4 could start his business in either of them. The petitioner denied that he had another alternative accommodation available to him which could shift his business. Both the parties adduced evidence in support of their respective cases. The petitioner filed his own affidavit and that of one Santosh Singh, whereas the respondent no. 4, besides his own affidavit, filed an affidavit of one Udai Ram. The parties also adduced documentary evidence in support of their versions. The Prescribed Authority having found that the shop in question was required by the respondent no. 4 for occupation by himself allowed the release application. Aggrieved by the judgment of the Prescribed Authority, the petitioner filed an appeal before the District Judge. The appeal was dismissed by the impugned judgment dated November 13, 1975. Hence the writ petition. 3. The Prescribed Authority having found that the shop in question was required by the respondent no. 4 for occupation by himself allowed the release application. Aggrieved by the judgment of the Prescribed Authority, the petitioner filed an appeal before the District Judge. The appeal was dismissed by the impugned judgment dated November 13, 1975. Hence the writ petition. 3. THE first question that arises for decision in this case is about the bonafide requirement of the premises by the landlords. It is true, as emphasised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, that an application under Section 21 of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 can succeed only when a landlord establishes his bona fide need for the premises for occupation by himself or his family. The need, therefore, has to be established. In the instant case we, however, find that the Prescribed Authority and the District Judge went into this question and after discussing the evidence filed by the parties found that Suresh Chand, the respondent no. 4, was unemployed. He had unsuccessfully applied for an employment even for the post of a peon. Taking this circumstance the finding given by the learned District Judge was that the respondent no 4 was in genuine need of the accommodation. An attempt was made by the learned counsel for the petitioner to challenge the finding on the question of genuine need by the respondent no. 4 on the ground that the same is erroneous which I am unable to sustain. Apart from the fact, that the Prescribed Authority- and the District Judge had perused the entire evidence and thereafter rightly found that the need of the respondent no. 4 was genuine. I find that the question of bona fide requirement of the premises being one of fact, it is not open to be challenged in the present proceedings. It is settled that the question of bonafide requirement of the premises by a landlord is a question of fact. 4. COMING to the question of hardship, the submission made was that as he was doing his business in the premises since 1955, the petitioner had acquired goodwill and, therefore, the application filed by the respondent no. 4 should have been rejected. Reference was made to clause (a) of sub rule (2) of rule 16 of the rules framed under the Act in support of his argument. 4 should have been rejected. Reference was made to clause (a) of sub rule (2) of rule 16 of the rules framed under the Act in support of his argument. I do not find any substance in the submission of the petitioner. Acquisition of good will by a tenant cannot operate as an absolute bar to the maintainability of the application by the landlord. It can only be one of the considerations for deciding the question of comparative need. This fact does not advance the case of the petitioner any further. No clause including clause 16 (2) (a) is determinative or conclusive of the controversy of need. This clause does not contain an over-riding consideration in the sense if this clause is applicable all other considerations go into the background. In the instant case, the learned District Judge found that the petitioner had an alternative accommodation available to him for doing the business. The alternative accommodation, according to the finding of the learned District Judge, belongs to the petitioner himself. The petitioner, therefore, can shift his business to the said building which belongs to him and can secure his good will. Counsel for the petitioner, however, urged that the building pointed out by the learned District Judge is not situated in a locality comparable to one in which the disputed shop is situated. This may be so, but as he has available with him suitable accommodation to which he can shift his business without substantial loss, the plea of the petitioner cannot be accepted. In this connection reference be made to the third proviso added to section 21 of the Act providing for the payment of compensation to the tenant engaged in any profession, trade or calling. Legislature has made provision for awarding compensation to the tenant for the possible loss which he might suffer by vacating the premises. Normally, this compensation should be considered to have sufficiently protected the interest of the tenant. Consequently, since the need of the respondent no 4 is genuine and bona fide, the mere fact that the petitioner might not make that income which he is presently having from the disputed shop is not a sufficient ground for rejecting the application In this case the District Judge, while dismissing the appeal, has directed the respondents nos. 4 and 5 to deposit two years' rent in court for compensating the petitioner. 5. 4 and 5 to deposit two years' rent in court for compensating the petitioner. 5. IT may be noted in this regard that there is no definition of the word 'hardship' in the Act. In its context to my mind, the word 'hardship' should comprehend any matter of appreciable detriment whether financial, personal or otherwise. It is capable of being descriptive of adverse repercussions of every kind. It is, in fact, not possible to classify the manifold from that hardship may take, as the aspects of detriment are as diverse and varied as the exigencies of human affairs. Accordingly, each case must depend upon its particular facts. Therefore, the authorities will have to keep the facts established into account, while judging or deciding this question. Nonetheless, it appears to me that mere transcient discomfort or inconvenience causing some disadvantage or annoyance are not the matters which strictly fall within the scope or ambit of this expression. What the law requires is that each party must adduce evidence to show what hardship would be caused to him by the granting or refusal of the release and it is for the court to determine whether suffering of a tenant would be more than that of a landlord by its refusal. The whole process of weighing the hardship is a difficult one, where various factors would have to be thrown into the scale and the court has to examine how each factor tilts the balance on either side, thereafter it has to find out the balance of hardship. It is only when greater hardship is on the side of the tenant that the application filed by the landlord would be rejected. In the instant case we find that both the authorities after looking into the entire evidence, found that the respondent no. 4 was unemployed and had no source of income. These authorities also held that he had no other alternative accommodation available to him, where he could start a new business. These circumstances coupled with the fact that the petitioner had an alternative accommodation available to him were rightly taken into account by the authorities named above for holding that the respondent no. 4 would have suffered greater hardship, in case the application filed by the respondent nos. 4 and 5 was rejected. These circumstances coupled with the fact that the petitioner had an alternative accommodation available to him were rightly taken into account by the authorities named above for holding that the respondent no. 4 would have suffered greater hardship, in case the application filed by the respondent nos. 4 and 5 was rejected. As in my opinion, the question of hardship is also one of fact, the finding given thereon would also be a question of fact. Such a finding is not amenable to correction in the writ jurisdiction. Therefore, even if it is assumed in favour of the petitioner that the authorities committed any error in recording the finding of hardship against him, that would not entitle him to say any relief in these proceedings. 6. IN view of the discussions made above, the writ petition is liable to fail. As the petitioner is carrying on his business, it appears appropriate to grant him six months' time to vacate the premises. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs. The petitioner is granted six months' time to vacate the premises. The stay order is discharged. Petition dismissed.