Order.- Whether prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, can be launched against a retired Government servant is the question raised in these petitions. The petitioner was formerly a Chief Educational Officer in the Madras Education Service. He retired from service on 24th November, 1970. Three cases were registered against him by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption on 22nd October, 1971 which is nearly 11 months after the retirement of the petitioner. Later, i.e., on 5th December, 1973 charge-sheets were filed against him. The contention of the petitioner is that since he has retired from service, he can no longer be prosecuted under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. In support of this contention, Mr. S. Pichai, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, cites the decision in Manmal v. State of West Bengal1. An identical question arose for consideration there, and a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that a public servant who has ceased to be a public servant can neither be prosecuted in respect of any scheduled offence (under the West Bengal Criminal Law Amendment (Special Courts’) Act, 1949), nor of an offence under section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, and as such the trial of such a person cannot be in accordance with the provisions of those two statutes. 2. The learned Advocate-General appearing for the State opposes the petitions and contends that the petitioner can be validly prosecuted under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act in spite of the fact that he had retired from service even before the First Information Report was registered. The Advocate-General contends that some of the decisions of the Supreme Court lend support to the view that the retirement of a Government servant cannot have any impact in so far as a prosecution launched against him under the Prevention of Corruption Act is concerned. Secondly, he would urge that the purpose of the Act has to be borne in mind when considering the contention of the petitioner. According to the Advocate-General the statute has been enacted to put down corruption, and effectively deal with delinquent Government servants, and as such, the policy intended for the benefit of the public should not be allowed to be defeated by trivial technicalities. According to the Advocate-General the statute has been enacted to put down corruption, and effectively deal with delinquent Government servants, and as such, the policy intended for the benefit of the public should not be allowed to be defeated by trivial technicalities. The further argument is that if the petitioner’s contention is to be upheld, it would then embolden officials on the verge of retirement to indulge in corruption with impunity and then claim exemption from prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act, on the ground of retirement. 3. On a consideration of the matter, I find the contentions of the petitioner cannot be accepted. It is no doubt true the petitioner retired from service on 24th November, 1970 and the First Information Report was registered against him nearly 11 months later, and charge-sheets were laid about 3 years after the date of retirement. Notwithstanding these facts, it has to be borne in mind that the acts complained of against the petitioner were delinquencies committed during his tenure of office as an officer in the Educational Service. The prosecution is, therefore, closely linked with the official career of the petitioner. The Prevention of Corruption Act has been specifically enacted for more effective prevention of bribery and corruption, as the preamble of the Act itself says. Therefore, the provisions of the Act must be held applicable to all public servants irrespective of the fact they are in service or not at the time the prosecution is launched. Otherwise, as pointed out by the learned Advocate-General, persons on the verge of retirement can indulge in acts of corruption without fear and then claim to be treated as any ordinary offender under the Indian Penal Code with all its concomitants of presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. 4. Though the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court has held that once a public servant has ceased to be one due to retirement, the special provisions contained in the Prevention of Corruption Act, will not apply to him, I find the view of the Supreme Court seems to be at variance with that view. 4. Though the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court has held that once a public servant has ceased to be one due to retirement, the special provisions contained in the Prevention of Corruption Act, will not apply to him, I find the view of the Supreme Court seems to be at variance with that view. In S.A. Venkataraman v. The State1, the Supreme Court had held that in respect of proceedings under section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, no sanction for prosecution under section 6 of the Act was necessary, if the accused had retired from service by the time the charge-sheet was laid. This view has been followed, in K. Mohanlal Shah v. State of Bombay2. It is pertinent to point out that in both those cases though the officers against whom prosecutions had been launched after they had retired from service, yet, their prosecution under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, was not challenged. The challenge was only focused on the question of sanction. Mr. Pichai contends for the petitioner that since the question of the competency of the prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act was not raised before the Supreme Court in those two cases it must be held that the judgments of the Supreme Court will not apply to the facts of the instant case, and instead, it is the Calcutta case that would directly apply. There are several fallacies in the contention put forth by Mr. Pichai. 5. In the first instance, the Supreme Court, has not indicated in the judgments that the Prevention of Corruption Act, would not apply to prosecutions launched against retired public servants. Secondly, it must be noted that if a differentiation is to be made between Government servants in service and Government servants retired from service, it would bring about a discriminatory treatment between the two sets of officers. While the public servant who is in service will have to face an onerous prosecution under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the officers of the latter category will have the benefit of being tried under the Indian Penal Code. While the public servant who is in service will have to face an onerous prosecution under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the officers of the latter category will have the benefit of being tried under the Indian Penal Code. In the former case, the officer will have to discharge the onus of proof cast on him to show that the acquisition of wealth or articles by him was not done unlawfully, while in the case of an officer falling under the latter category, the burden of proving that the officer had been corrupt will be on the prosecution. Surely, it could not have been the intention of the Legislature when it enacted the Prevention of Corruption Act, that two sets of treatment must be meted out to corrupt officers on the basis of their remaining in service or not. Thirdly, the view of the Supreme Court that section 6 of the Act will not apply to a retired officer cannot be taken to mean that all the provisions of the Act will not apply to retired officers. Section 6 relates only to a procedural matter, whereas, section 4(2) of the Act relates to a rule of evidence. The application of that rule is not dependent upon the officer being in service, but upon the main factor, viz., whether, as a public servant the accused had misused his position and indulged in corrupt practices. In such circumstances, I cannot accept the petitioner’s contention that he can be prosecuted only under the provisions of the Indian Penal Code and not under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Consequently, the petitions will stand dismissed. 6. Mr. Pichai urges that ex facie the prosecution is not maintainable and that he may be permitted to canvass that position. Though it is mentioned in the petitions that the petitioner had been exonerated by the Director of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption after due enquiry and there is a report to that effect in the file, this matter was not fully canvassed before me. In such circumstances, the further contention of Mr. Pichai cannot be gone into. If so advised, the petitioner may urge that point afresh after getting permission for the matter being spoken to. S. Pichai, for Petitioner. The Public Prosecutor, on behalf of State. The Court made the following Order.- After the pronouncement of the order, Mr. In such circumstances, the further contention of Mr. Pichai cannot be gone into. If so advised, the petitioner may urge that point afresh after getting permission for the matter being spoken to. S. Pichai, for Petitioner. The Public Prosecutor, on behalf of State. The Court made the following Order.- After the pronouncement of the order, Mr. Pichai, learned Counsel for the petitioner, represented that he may be given an opportunity to make some further representation on behalf of his client. He further prayed that the petitioner too wanted to be heard in person, and therefore, the petition was again posted for being mentioned. 8. Availing of the opportunity, Mr. Pichai argued that a crucial factor in S.A. Venkataraman v. The State1and another in K. Mohanlal Shah v. State of Bombay2, had not been noticed in the earlier order, and therefore, those cases could not be used to repeal the contentions of the petitioner. It was urged that in S.A. Venkataraman v. The State1, the First Information Report against S.A. Venkataraman, the accused, had already been filed before he ceased to; hold office and that factor justified proceedings being continued under the Prevention of Corruption Act, whereas, in the instant case the First Information Report itself was laid about eleven months after the petitioner had retired from service. The other case, K. Mohanlal Shah v. State of Bombay2, was sought to be distinguished on the ground the prosecution therein was under section 409, Indian Penal Code, and not under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, as in the present case. Though there is room for the petitioner’s Counsel to put forth the factual distinctions referred to above, I am of opinion they cannot advance the case of the petitioner in any manner. The reason for Parliament enacting the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, and the object sought to be achieved by the Act have been succinctly explained by the Supreme Court in S.A. Venkataraman v. The State1, in the following words: “The object of the Act was to suppress bribery and corruption. Its provisions are severe. The reason for Parliament enacting the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, and the object sought to be achieved by the Act have been succinctly explained by the Supreme Court in S.A. Venkataraman v. The State1, in the following words: “The object of the Act was to suppress bribery and corruption. Its provisions are severe. Certain presumptions of guilt of offences committed under sections 161 and 165-A, Indian Penal Code, were enjoined by section 4 of the Act unless the contrary was proved by the accused, section 5 of the Act created the offence of criminal misconduct on the part of a public servant, an offence unknown to any of the provisions of the Indian Penal Code dealing with bribery or corruption. Sub-section (2) made such an offence punishable with imprisonment which may extend to a term of 7 years, or with fine, or with both. Under sub-section (3), the Court shall presume that the accused was guilty of misconduct if it was proved that he or any other person on his behalf, was in possession, for which the accused person could not satisfactorily account, of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income. These provisions of the Act indicate that it was the intention of the Legislature to treat more severely than hitherto corruption on the part of a public servant and not to condone it in any manner whatsoever. If section 6 had not found a place in the Act, it is clear that cognizance of an offence under sections 161, 164 or 165 of the Indian Penal Code, or under section 5 (2) of the Act committed by a public servant could be taken by a Court even if he had ceased to be a public servant. The mere fact that he had ceased to be a public servant after the commission of the offence would not absolve him from his crime”. I find, therefore, no basis for the contention of Mr. Pichai that my earlier view that the petitioner can be prosecuted under the Prevention of Corruption Act, required a second thought. 9. Though the petitioner was represented by Counsel, yet I acceded to his request to make some further representations personally. The petitioner then gave written representation and addressed the Court with reference to the matter set out therein. (Vide: Further written arguments of the petitioner). 9. Though the petitioner was represented by Counsel, yet I acceded to his request to make some further representations personally. The petitioner then gave written representation and addressed the Court with reference to the matter set out therein. (Vide: Further written arguments of the petitioner). Some of the points raised therein related to the merits of the case, but those matters are beyond the scope of consideration in the present petition. They are matters which have to be urged before the trial Court and pleaded in justification of the petitioner’s contention that he is innocent and the prosecution against him is a motivated one. 10. Only two points raised by the petitioner require to be dealt with here. The first point was that the moment the petitioner retired from Government service, the Government had absolutely no control over him, and therefore, they were not entitled to treat him as a public servant and prosecute him under the Prevention of Corruption Act. In support of this contention reliance was placed on Gidroniye v. State of M.P.1. Therein it was held that as the appellant was not in the service of the Government (since 9th June, 1964), it was not open to the Government to take any disciplinary proceedings against him. On a reading of the judgment, I find, the decision to have been rendered on a totally different set of ‘facts. That was a case where the appellant was a probationary Naib Tahsildar and had been appointed temporarily. A departmental enquiry was ordered against him and in connection with that, an order of suspension was also passed, but even before the show cause-notice was issued, the appellant gave a notice to Government terminating his services in accordance with the terms of his appointment. It was in that situation, the Supreme Court held that the appellant was validly entitled to terminate his services, and he having exercised the right available to him, he ceased to be a public servant, and therefore, the Government were not entitled to place him under suspension or hold a departmental enquiry treating him, on the basis of the suspension order, to be still in service. What we are concerned with in the present case is whether a Government servant, in spite of his retirement, can be proceeded against under the Prevention of Corruption Act, for charges relating to offences of bribery and corruption. What we are concerned with in the present case is whether a Government servant, in spite of his retirement, can be proceeded against under the Prevention of Corruption Act, for charges relating to offences of bribery and corruption. Nowhere we find in the Prevention of Corruption Act, any expression or stipulation confining the operation of the Act only to persons who are in service and not to persons who had ceased to be public servants by efflux of time. 11. The other point urged was that as per Article 351-A of the Madras Pension Code, the right of the Government to withhold the pension of a Government servant will not cover events of grave misconduct or negligence committed by the Government servant more than four years prior to the institution of the departmental proceedings. As the offences alleged to have been committed by the petitioner are referable to the years 1968 and 1969, the petitioner contends, the filing of a charge-sheet on 5th December, 1973 against him was beyond the period of four years contemplated under Article 351-A of the Madras Pension Code and, therefore, the proceedings were vitiated. Even this contention must fail, for, a prosecution under section 161 and | or section 165, Indian Penal Code, read with section 5(1)(a) and 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, is not controlled or restricted or trammelled in any manner by the Madras Pension Code. The provisions of the Pension Code may, if at all, be relied on only for safeguarding the pension, and cannot be pressed into service to defeat a prosecution on the threshold itself. 12. For the reasons given above, my earlier view will stand reiterated.