JUDGMENT S.S. Ahmed, M. - This is a plaintiffs second appeal arising out of the order of Additional Commissioner, Allahabad Division, dated April 10, 1970, whereby he dismissed two appeals (Nos. 111 and 112) filed by Lal Man against the judgment and decree dated December 31, 1960, passed by an Assistant Collector, 1st Class, Etawah in suits Nos. 35 and 36 under Section 19 and under Section 180 respectively of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939. 2. The facts of the case need to be briefly recapitulated. Ram Nath and Ram Sanehi filed suit No. 35 under Section 49 of the U.P. Tenancy Act for a division of holding. In this suit it was alleged by Ram Nath that he and his brother, Ram Sanehi were co-tenants with Mahabir Prasad and others defendants who were also defendants in the other suit. He alleged that his brother Ram Sanehi was unheard of for more than 7 years with the result that it than 7 years with the result that it would be presumed that he had died a civil death and as such he was a co-tenure-holder of his share as well as of his missing brother along with Mahabir Prasad and the other defendants. In suit No. 36, Ram Nath was the sole plaintiff and he had filed it under Section 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act against Mahabir Prasad and other defendants for ejectment. In the former suit a decree for partition of share was passed in favour of Ram Nath by the two lower courts and a second appeal was filed by the defendants which was pending in the Board of Revenue when Ram Nath died. Similarly the other suit was decreed in favour of Ram Nath by both the courts below and a second appeal was pending against him in the Board when he died. In both the suits, Ram Nath had obtained possession (dakhal) in 1945 and when the second appeal came up for hearing before the Board of Revenue and when it was found that Ram Nath had died heir-less, the court allowed the appeals, set aside the decrees and abated the suits on January 27, 1951. In both the suits, Ram Nath had obtained possession (dakhal) in 1945 and when the second appeal came up for hearing before the Board of Revenue and when it was found that Ram Nath had died heir-less, the court allowed the appeals, set aside the decrees and abated the suits on January 27, 1951. In the meantime before this order of abatement could be passed, the Zamindar treating Ram Nath's tenancy (as extinguished) because he died heir-less, settled the land with the present plaintiffs, namely, Lalman and others and it is alleged that they took possession of the land as a result of the new settlement made with them by the zamindar. After the Board's orders the defendants Mahabir Prasad and others, whose appeals had been allowed, filed two application for restitution in the two suits under Section 144 C.P.C. against Zamindars and his subsequent lessees, Lalman and others who resisted the restitution applications on the ground that they were in possession and were not liable to be ejected. From all the three successive courts, Lalman and others lost their claim of remaining in possession and Mahabir and others were put in possession on March 29, 1951. Lalman claimed that the proceedings were ex-parte against him and, therefore, possession was redelivered to him and the other plaintiffs on June 13, 1951. After the restitution proceedings were again continued and the matter went up to the Board of Revenue and eventually possession was delivered to Mahabir and others in 1957. The final order of the Board deciding, the proceedings under Section deciding the proceedings under Section 144, C.P.C., is dated January 24, 1958. the present suits were filed on December 3, 1959 by Lal Man and others with the allegations that they had been wrongly dispossessed by an order which was not binding on them, as they were recorded occupants in 1356F. and were in cultivatory possession thereof in 1359F. they also claimed acquisition of rights by adverse possession. 3. The defendants contested the plaintiffs claim on several points and the most important point was that the suits were barred by the principle of res judicata. The suits were dismissed by the trail court, an appeal was filed and the Additional Commissioner allowed it and set side the judgment of the lower court. 3. The defendants contested the plaintiffs claim on several points and the most important point was that the suits were barred by the principle of res judicata. The suits were dismissed by the trail court, an appeal was filed and the Additional Commissioner allowed it and set side the judgment of the lower court. The defendants went up in second appeal before the Board and the case was remanded to the Additional Commissioner for decision on certain important points. By his order dated April 10, 1970, the learned Addl. Commissioner has dismissed the appeals. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the records of this case. 5. The appeal poses two neat questions of law : Firstly, whether the suit is barred by res judicata in view of the proceedings under Section 144, C.P.C. and secondly, whether the rights conferred by a fresh statute can be taken away on the basis of finding records in the course of proceedings under Section 144, C.P.C. 6. The learned counsel for the appellant has maintained that proceedings under Section 144, C.P.C. are of a summary nature and they do not bind a third person who was not a party to the proceedings. In support of his contention, he has referred to the case of Rajjabali Khan v. Faku Bibi, A.I.R. 1932 Cal. 29, the case of Mst. Chandra v. Rani Radha, A.I.R. 1928 Oudh 209, Ujagar Singh v. Likha Singh, A.I.R. 1928 Alld. 28 and Vindhyachal v. Board of Revenue, A.I.R. 1956 Alld. 663. The sum and substance of all these cases is, that in proceedings relating to restitution only a summary inquiry is contemplated and hence the complicated question of stranger's rights could not be gone into. 7. The learned counsel for the respondent has counted this argument by another array of cases, the most important of which are Samarjeet Singh v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1974.R.D. 168 and Maqbul Alam v. Khodaija, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1194. The relevant portion from the 1974 case bears reproduction : "The Zamindar after obtaining possession against Thekadars in execution of decree in suit under Section 180, U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 settled the disputed plots with the petitioners. The proceedings were abated.under Rule 5(1) under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules, 1952. The relevant portion from the 1974 case bears reproduction : "The Zamindar after obtaining possession against Thekadars in execution of decree in suit under Section 180, U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 settled the disputed plots with the petitioners. The proceedings were abated.under Rule 5(1) under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules, 1952. The Thekadar obtained possession over the plots in dispute in restitution proceedings under Section 144, Civil Procedure Code. The petitioners transferees were not parties to that restitution proceedings. The word 'parties' in Section 144, Civil Procedure Code would cover the transferee or the assignee of the losing party in the litigation,.the assignee or the transferee may have succeeded either by contract or by operation of law. The petitions would be bound by the order made in the proceeding under Section 144, Civil Procedure Code, notwithstanding that they were not parties to the proceedings." 8. The 1974 case referred to above is clearly distinguishable from the cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant. In the 1974 case, the persons were held to be the transferees or the assignees of the losing party and their case cannot be said to be at par with those of the appellants in the instant case. In the proceedings under Section 144, C.P.C., which were held prior to the instant suit, the position of the appellants was of complete strangers whose rights or titles were never adjudicated upon during the proceedings under Section 144, C.P.C. In the 1941 case of Allahabad, it has been clearly held that the proceedings under Section 144 cannot be applied to a person who was not a party to the suit and that as against such a persons the proceedings are entirely misconceived. 9. Besides there is another distinguishing feature of this case. Ram Nath, the original plaintiff died during the pendency of the second appeal and thus, by virtue of the fact that Ram Nath had died heir-less, the suits filed by him abated. The question of restitution arose only after the death of Ram Nath but there was none who could be treated as Ram Nath's legal representative. Thus the plaintiff in the instant suit cannot be said to be the assignees or transferees from Ram Nath and the proceedings under Section 144, C.P.C. will have absolutely no effect on their claim because they were never impleaded as parties in these proceedings. 10. Thus the plaintiff in the instant suit cannot be said to be the assignees or transferees from Ram Nath and the proceedings under Section 144, C.P.C. will have absolutely no effect on their claim because they were never impleaded as parties in these proceedings. 10. In view of these considerations, I have no hesitation in holding that the question of res judicata does not arise and the suits by the plaintiff were perfectly maintainable. 11. We may now pass on the the next equally important issue. It might be put simply like this ; can the plaintiffs be robbed of the fresh and altogether new rights conferred on them by Sections 240-A and 240-B of the Z.A. and L.R. Act. It is an admitted fact that the original plaintiff Ram Nath died heirless and had no legal representatives. Thereafter the Zamindar settled the land with the present plaintiffs who took possession of the land. They were recorded occupants in 1356 F. and in cultivatory possession in 1359F. Thus in the crucial year when the Z.A. and L.R. Act came in force, i.e., 1359F., the plaintiffs were recorded as being cultivatory occupants of the land in suit. It has been said on behalf of the respondent that this entry is of no significance because it was made otherwise than in accordance with law. However, such a contention is repelled by Amba Prasad v. Mahboob Ali, 1964 R.D. 303 in which it has been clearly held that although the word 'occupant' is not defined in Z.A. and L.R. Act yet it signifies occupancy and enjoyment. Their lordships of the Supreme Court have, in this case, referred to the divergence of opinion between the Board of Revenue and the Allahabad High Court and have endorsed the High Court's view that clause (b)(1) and (b)(11) of Section 20 do not required the proof of actual possession in the year 1356F. What they require merely is the entry of a person's name as on occupant in the Khasra or Khatauni of 1356F. The words of this section are clear and there is no warrant for introducing words in this section which are not there. Thus the fact that they were recorded in Khasra and Khatauni of 1356F. in tenant's column and in cultivtory possession in 1359F. The words of this section are clear and there is no warrant for introducing words in this section which are not there. Thus the fact that they were recorded in Khasra and Khatauni of 1356F. in tenant's column and in cultivtory possession in 1359F. are very strong circumstances in favour of the plaintiffs and clearly entitled them to the benefits of Sections 240-A and 240-B of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. 12. In view of all these considerations, I find that the plaintiffs acquired valuable rights as a result of the enforcement of Act I of 1951 and that these rights cannot be taken away by virtue of proceedings under Section 144, C.P.C. in which they were not a party. 13. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is accordingly allowed. The orders of both the learned lower courts are set aside. In the circumstances of the case, however, the parties will bear their own costs. 14. This order will also govern Appeal Nos. 91 and 92 of 1969-7/Etawah.