JUDGMENT K.C. Agrawal, J. - By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the petitioners have challenged the validity of the order of the learned First Additional District Judge, Kanpur dated 21-9-1974, dismissing the revision filed by the petitioners under section 3(2) of the U.P. Act. No. III of 1947. The facts, which led to the filing of the present writ petition, are as under. 2. The petitioners are admittedly the owners of House No. 2/215 Nawabganj, Kanpur. This house is in the tenancy of respondent No. 3. An application under section 3 of the U.P. Act No III of 1947 was filed by the petitioners on September 13, 1971 for permission to bring a suit for ejectment against respondent No. 3 on the ground of their personal need. An objection was filed by the respondent No. 3 disputing the correctness of the ground on which the application filed by the petitioners was founded. One of the grounds raised in the objection, filed by the respondent No. 3, was that as an earlier application filed by the petitioners for permission to bring a suit for ejectment had been dismissed, precisely on the same grounds, therefore, the present application was not maintainable. 3. The objection raised by the respondent No. 3 found favour with the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. As a result thereof, the application of the petitioners was dismissed. The petitioners filed revision under section 3(2) of the U.P. Act No. III of 1947, before the Commissioner. During the pendency of this revision U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 came into force with effect from 15th of July, 1972. Consequently, the revision filed by the petitioners was sent to the District Judge for decision in accordance with the provisions of section 43(2)(m). By the impugned judgment the revision filed by the petitioners was also dismissed. 4. Sri A. N. Srivastava, counsel for the petitioners, urged that the learned District Judge committed an error in dismissing the revision filed by the petitioners without considering the effect of the papers filed by the petitioners, in the revision, under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He invited my attention to paragraphs 10 and 11 of the writ petition and also to the Annexures 6 to 10. He invited my attention to paragraphs 10 and 11 of the writ petition and also to the Annexures 6 to 10. One of the Annexures is a copy of the application filed by one Suraj Prasad Gupta, against the petitioners, in respect of house No. 2/175 Nawabganj, Kanpur in which the petitioners are living. By this application Suraj Prasad Gupta, the landlord of the petitioners, sought the eviction of the petitioners. Along with the copy of the petitioner they also filed a copy of the objection in the aforesaid proceedings. The respondent No. 3 has not disputed in the counter affidavit that the application mentioned above was filed by the petitioners before the Dist. court. 5. The question that arises is whether the judgment of the learned District Judge is liable to be quashed on the ground suggested by the learned counsel for the petitioners. It would be seen from the discussion given above that one of the controversies before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was whether a new ground had come into existence justifying the tiling of the above application by the petitioners under section 3 of U.P. Act No. III of 1947. The application was rejected as according to the opinion of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer no new ground existed at the time of the trial of the application but if the landlord of the petitioners had filed an application under section 21 and there was imminent danger of the petitioners being evicted, this was certainly a new ground, which ought to have been considered by the learned District Judge in the appeal. As the learned District Judge did not consider this in the judgment rendered by him against the petitioners it is liable to be quashed. In the absence of all these papers the judgment given by him cannot be upheld. The District Judge will now consider the question of admissibility of these papers, if not already considered as well as its correctness. He will also give opportunity to the respondent No. 3 to file evidence in rebuttal. 6. The next submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners was that one of the prayers made in the application under section 3 by the petitioners was that his need could be satisfied even if a part of the premises in occupation of the respondent No. 3 was given to them. 6. The next submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners was that one of the prayers made in the application under section 3 by the petitioners was that his need could be satisfied even if a part of the premises in occupation of the respondent No. 3 was given to them. It is true, as urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners, that the District Judge has not even considered this aspect of the case. 7. Sri P. D. Koshik, counsel for the respondent No. 3, however, disputed that an application in respect of the part of the premises was maintainable under section 3 of the Old Act. On this ground he suggested that the application made by the petitioner could not he granted in respect of a portion alone. Without expressing any concluded opinion of this question, I think it would be better that the learned District Judge considers this controversy in the appeal along with other questions which may arise for his decision. 8. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The order of the District Judge dated 21-9-1974 is quashed. He is directed to decide t appeal afresh in accordance with law. In the circumstances of the case the pa shall bear their own costs.