JUDGMENT A. Banerji, J. 1. THIS is a tenant's petition for setting aside an order passed by the Appellate Authority dismissing the appeal in default and rejecting the application to restore the appeal to its original number in a proceeding under the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Act. The principal contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that the order passed by the Prescribed Authority was a nullity as he had no jurisdiction to decide the application under section 21 of the Act and the Appellate Authority committed a manifest error of law in dismissing the appeal for default and in refusing to restore the appeal to its original number. 2. IT will be relevant to mention a few essential facts. The dispute relates to a ground floor of a house of which the opposite party no. 3 is the owner and the petitioner the tenant. The opposite party no. 3, hereinafter referred to as the landlord purchased the property on 4th November, 1966. He filed a suit in the year 1967 against the petitioner for arrears of rent and ejectment from the house in dispute. This suit was dismissed by the Munsif but was allowed by the first appellate court. Thereupon a second appeal no. 261 of 1971 was filed in this court which was allowed on the 29th July, 1974. IT was held in the second appeal that since the tenant had deposited under Sec. 7-C of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 a sum greater than that was due within time there was no default and as such the suit merited to be dismissed. It appears that the landlord had filed an application under Sec. 21 of the Act on the 30th March, 1974 before the Prescribed Authority, Sri Jai Krishan Paliwal. The petitioner sought to raise a dispute in this Court that the application was not filed on the 30th of March, 1974 but was filed sometime in November, 1974. His contention was that he was served with a notice dated 6th December, 1974 fixing the 23rd December, 1974. The petitioner sought to raise a dispute in this Court that the application was not filed on the 30th of March, 1974 but was filed sometime in November, 1974. His contention was that he was served with a notice dated 6th December, 1974 fixing the 23rd December, 1974. He had filed his written statement on 31st January, 1975 and had taken up a plea in paragraph 19 thereof that there was no cause of action for the landlord to move the application and that the court had no jurisdiction to hear the said petition. The Prescribed Authority by his order dated 5th May, 1975 allowed the application of the landlord and ordered for the ejectment of the petitioner. The petitioner had thereafter filed an appeal before the District Judge, Moradabad. The appeal came up for hearing before the Opposite Party no. 1 Fifth Additional District and Sessions Judge, Moradabad. The petitioner thereafter sought to get the appeal transferred from his court and with this intent moved a transfer application before the District Judge. This transfer application was ultimately not pressed and was dismissed. It is said by the petitioner that the District Judge orally suggested to the petitioner to move a transfer application before the Opposite Party no. 1. A transfer application was thereafter moved before the opposite party No. 1. It was rejected on the 18th February, 1976. Thereupon an application was moved for time to bring stay order. This application too was rejected the same day. The petitioner was thereafter directed to proceed with the case. He sought an opportunity to call his counsel. However, neither he nor the counsel turned up and the appeal was ultimately dismissed for default by the Opposite Party no. 1. A restoration application was moved by the petitioner but this application was rejected on the 5th of May, 1976. The Opposite Party no. 1 observed that the petitioner adopted delaying tactics. He further observed that the petitioner was not prevented from any sufficient cause for appearing when the appeal was called out for hearing. Aggrieved by the above orders the petitioner has come up to this Court in the writ petition. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on record. He further observed that the petitioner was not prevented from any sufficient cause for appearing when the appeal was called out for hearing. Aggrieved by the above orders the petitioner has come up to this Court in the writ petition. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on record. I had also sent for the original record of the case before the Prescribed Authority as well as the register of the institution of cases and the Peshi Bahi. 4. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner contended that the application under Section 21 of the Act was not made on the 30th of March, 1974 but was made sometime in November 1974 so as to escape the consequences of lack of jurisdiction brought about by the new Code of Criminal Procedure which came in force on the 1st of April, 1974. Shri Jai Krishna Paliwal, the then Prescribed Authority being an Executive Magistrate ceased to be a Prescribed Authority and had no jurisdiction to decide the application under Sec. 21 of the Act. It was further contended that Sri J. K. Paliwal ceased to be a Prescribed Authority under the Act for the Chandausi area where the disputed premises were situate. Learned counsel for the landlord, however, contended that the application had been made on the 30th of March, 1974 and that Shri J. K. Paliwal was competent and had jurisdiction to decide the petition. In any event his order having been confirmed by the Additional District Judge on appeal had merged in the later order and could not be called in question any further. Learned counsel for the petitioner in reply contended that the doctrine of merger would have no application in a case where the appellate order was not on the merits. A dismissal in default was not an order on the merits and as such it could not be said that the appellate court had gone into the question of want of jurisdiction and had given a decision thereon. Learned counsel for the parties, in support of their respective contentions cited a number of decisions. Having considered the arguments of the learned counsels for the parties the following points emerge for decision. 1. Whether the application under Sec. 21 of the Act was made by the landlord on the 30th of March, 1974 or in November, 1974 ? 2. Learned counsel for the parties, in support of their respective contentions cited a number of decisions. Having considered the arguments of the learned counsels for the parties the following points emerge for decision. 1. Whether the application under Sec. 21 of the Act was made by the landlord on the 30th of March, 1974 or in November, 1974 ? 2. Whether Shri J. K. Paliwal had no jurisdiction to decide the petition under Section 21 ? 3. Whether the doctrine of merger could be attracted in a case where the appellate court decided the appeal by default of appearance and without going into the merits of the case ? The petitioner's case was that the application under Sec. 21 of the Act was made some where in November, 1974 and not on 30th March, 1974. He relied on four circumstances. Firstly, that the notice of the application was served on the petitioner only on the 6th December, 1974 for appearance and reply on 23rd December. Secondly, that the entries in the order sheet and the institution register were ante dated. Thirdly, that there was no cause of action for the respondent landlord to move an application under Section 21 of the Act for there was already a decree standing in his favour on the 30th of March 1974 and which decree was only set aside by the judgment of the High Court on the 29th July, 1974. Fourthly, that a reference was made to the taking on lease of a premises by the petitioner's brother on the Dispensary Road in the application under Section 21 which was, however, struck off by the landlord and since a lease deed in respect of the aforesaid accommodation was executed only in October, 1974 the application under Section 21 could only have been made after that date. I have examined the institution register of cases of the Prescribed Authority. Serial no. 33 was a case instituted on the 30th of March 1974. Two cases were entered at serial no. 34-A and 34-B and both were entered after serial no. 33 and before serial no. 34. They are both dated 30th of March, 1974. It is possible that these entries were made subsequently but that would not lead to an inference that they were made in the month of November 1974. Two cases were entered at serial no. 34-A and 34-B and both were entered after serial no. 33 and before serial no. 34. They are both dated 30th of March, 1974. It is possible that these entries were made subsequently but that would not lead to an inference that they were made in the month of November 1974. There is nothing to show that the entries in this register were made usually on the day the case was instituted. The mistake may have been discovered later and accordingly corrected. The order sheet of the case would show the real state of affairs. The order sheet shows the filing of the application on the 30th of March 1974 and it bears the signature of the Prescribed Authority. No case was taken before the Prescribed Authority and even before the appellate authority that the order sheet had been tampered with or that the entries in the register were subsequently interpolated or that the order sheet did not contain the signatures of the Prescribed Authority. These pleas are being taken for the first time in the writ petition and cannot, therefore, be entertained. The plea that the application was not made on the 30th March, 1974 or that the ordersheet and the institution register were tampered with and antedated is worthy unsustainable. The plea that there was no cause of action on the 30th of March 1974 is also not correct. It is, however, true that on the 30th March, 1974 there was a decree in favour of the landlord and that the second appeal was pending in the High Court but there was nothing to prevent the landlord from making an application u/Sec. 21 of the Act. There was no bar under the Act from making an application under Section 21. The procedure for the eviction of a tenant under the Act is a simpler one and saves time. Thus if a party took recourse to these proceedings under the Act, which were available to him, it cannot be said that he had no cause of action. The fourth circumstance has also no substance. The portion of paragraph 10 of the application which was struck off made no reference to any lease deed. The petitioner's case was that his brother had taken an accommodation on the Dispensary Road, Chandausi, by means of a lease deed executed in October 1974. The fourth circumstance has also no substance. The portion of paragraph 10 of the application which was struck off made no reference to any lease deed. The petitioner's case was that his brother had taken an accommodation on the Dispensary Road, Chandausi, by means of a lease deed executed in October 1974. There is no reference to any lease deed in the application, under Section 21, even if the struck off portion is also read. It was further urged that even the process fee was not paid until November, 1974. That is not material in view of the fact that the proceedings before the Prescribed Authority were ordered to remain stayed by the order of the District Magistrate from the 15th of May, onwards. I, therefore, conclude that the application under Section 21 of the Act had been made on the 30th of March, 1974 and not in November, 1974 as claimed by the petitioner. 5. THE contention on behalf of the petitioner was that the application was said to have been moved on the 30th March, 1974 so as to avoid the consequences of lack of jurisdiction by the coming into force of the new Code of Criminal Procedure which deprived the jurisdiction of an Executive Magistrate to decide any case under the Act. This argument proceeded on the footing that an application made prior to the 1st of April, 1974 could be decided by the Prescribed Authority concerned. However, even assuming that the Prescribed Authority had no jurisdiction to decide the application under Section 21 and that his order was a nullity the point is whether that order could be called in question in view of the appellate order of the dismissal of the appeal. In other words I now take up the third point for consideration and examine whether the doctrine of merger would be applicable in a case where the appellate order was not on merits but merely dismissed the appeal for default. 6. THE doctrine of merger was developed in civil suits. In the case of Gojer Brothers v. Ratan Lal, AIR 1974 SC 1380 Justice Chandrachud had referred to the development of the principle in civil suits. 6. THE doctrine of merger was developed in civil suits. In the case of Gojer Brothers v. Ratan Lal, AIR 1974 SC 1380 Justice Chandrachud had referred to the development of the principle in civil suits. His lordship had thereafter expressed the law in the following words :- "The fundamental reason of the rule that where there has been an appeal, the decree to be executed in the decree of the appellate Court is that in such cases the decree of the trial Court is merged in the decree of the appellate Court. In course of time, this concept which was originally restricted to appellate decree on the ground that an appeal is a continuation of the suit came to be gradually extended to other proceedings like Revisions and even to proceedings before quasi judicial and executive authorities." In the case of the Commissioner of Income Tax v. M/s. Amrital Bhoglal Co., AIR 1958 SC 86 8 the Court was considering whether the order of the Income tax Officer merged into an order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner passed in appeal, in connection with the powers of the Commissioner of Income Tax in revision. The Court observed at page 871 :- "There can be no doubt that, if an appeal is provided against an order passed by a tribunal, the decision of the appellate authority is the operative decision in law. If the appellate authority modifies or reverse the decision of the tribunal, it is obvious that it is the appellate decision that is effective and can be enforced. In law, the position would be just the same even if the appellate decision merely confirms the decision of the tribunal. As a result of the confirmation or affirmance of the decision of the tribunal by the appellate authority the original decision merges in the appellate decision and it is the appellate decision alone which subsists and is operative and capable of enforcement........." The above pronouncement makes it clear that the order of the appellate authority is final and operates. Even if the appellate authority merely confirms the decision of the tribunal it is the order of the appellate authority which is enforceable in law not that of the tribunal. 7. Even if the appellate authority merely confirms the decision of the tribunal it is the order of the appellate authority which is enforceable in law not that of the tribunal. 7. IN the case of Collector of Customs v. East India Commercial Co., AIR 1963 SC 1124 the Court was considering whether the order of the original authority becomes merged in the order of the appellate authority even where the appellate authority merely dismisses the appeal without any modification of the order of the original authority. It observed : "It is obvious that when an appeal is made, the appellate authority can do one of three things namely, (i) it may reverse the order under appeal (ii) it may modify that order and (iii) it may merely dismiss the appeal and thus confirm the order without any modification .................. In all these three cases after the appellate authority has disposed of the appeal, the opreative order is the order of the appellate authority whether it has reversed the original order or modified it or confirmed it. In law, the appellate order of confirmation is quite as efficacious as an operative order as an appellate order of reversal or modification. The point was further emphasised in the following words : "It is this principle, viz. that the appellate order is the operative order after the appeal is disposed of, which is in our opinion the basis of the rule that the decree of the lower court merges in the decree of the appellate court and on the same principle it would not be correct to say that the order of the original authority is merged in the order of the appellate authority whatsoever its decision whether of reversal or modification or mere confirmation". 8. IN the case of U. J. S. Chopra v. State of Bombay, AIR 1955 SC 633 their lordships of the Supreme Court held that the principle that the decree of the trial court merges in the decree of the appellate court was held to be applicable to the order passed in criminal proceedings. In that case the High Court had dismissed the appeal summarily. Mr. Justice S. R. Das, as he then was, in the same judgment observed : "It makes no difference whether the dismissal is summary or otherwise". In that case the High Court had dismissed the appeal summarily. Mr. Justice S. R. Das, as he then was, in the same judgment observed : "It makes no difference whether the dismissal is summary or otherwise". In Durga Singh v. Wahid Raza, 1964 ALJ 217 a Division Bench of this Court held that the doctrine of merger applies even where a second appeal has been dismissed by the High Court summarily under .Order 41 rule 11 C. P. C. and that in such a case the High Court's decree is the final decree and the decree of the first appellate court merges with it. 9. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Purshottam v. Sheo Prasad, 1972 AWR 362 held that when the appeal was heard on the merits and the question of want of jurisdiction had been gone into, the defect was cured. In the case off Abdul Hameed v. VII Additional District and Sessions Judge, 1976 AWC 177 a learned single Judge of this Court has held in a case under the Act that even where the order of the Prescribed Authority was null and void, his order having been confirmed by the appellate authority on the merits was operative and binding. The infirmity in the order of the Prescribed Authority was cured. This decision supports the case of the respondent landlord. However, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that this judgment too speaks about the appellate decision being on the merits. He relied on the following passage in the above decision : "But where as here the appellate court does not chooses the course mentioned above and adjudicates on merits the finding recorded by the appellate court could not be said to be without jurisdiction." Emphasis was laid by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the above observation seeks to support his contention. As seen above the law laid down by the Supreme Court is clear and unambiguous. It is the decree of the appellate court or tribunal which is operative and the decree or order of the original court or tribunal gets merged in the appellate decree or order. Even if the appellate court merely confirm, that order it would be conclusive. Whether the dismissal is summarily or after hearing would not, in my opinion makes any difference. It is after all the final decision of the appellate court or authority. Even if the appellate court merely confirm, that order it would be conclusive. Whether the dismissal is summarily or after hearing would not, in my opinion makes any difference. It is after all the final decision of the appellate court or authority. An appeal is preferred and the appeal is decided by being dismissed. It does not matter whether the appeal is dismissed after hearing or for want of prosecution or by default. The ultimate result is that the decree or order passed by the original court or tribunal is confirmed. In this context it would be relevant to refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in Sheodan Singh v. Daryao Kunwar, 1966 AWR 449. In that case two suits were filed in the court of Munsif and two others were filed in the Court of the Civil Judge. All these four suits were tried by the Civil Judge and they were disposed of by a common judgment, but separate decrees were prepared in each suit. In all these suits five issues were common. In addition there were other issues in each case respecting the particular merits thereof. Two appeals were filed in the High Court and two others were filed in the Court of the District Judge. By an order of the High Court the two appeals pending before the Court of District Judge were transferred to the High Court. Thereafter one of the two appeals was dismissed as time barred and the other was dismissed by the High Court on the failure to apply for translation and printing of the record as required by the Rules of the Court. Thereafter the respondent in the other two appeals prayed that those appeals be dismissed as the main question involed in the suit regarding the title of Smt. Daryao Kunwar to the suit property had become final on account of the dismissal of the appeals by the High Court. A question arose whether the appeals were barred by Sec. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The question was referred to a Full Bench for decision in view of conflict between two Division Benches of the Court. The Full Bench held that the two first appeals were barred by resjudicata to the extent of the decision of the five issues which were common in four connected appeals. As a result of which the two first appeals were dismissed. The Full Bench held that the two first appeals were barred by resjudicata to the extent of the decision of the five issues which were common in four connected appeals. As a result of which the two first appeals were dismissed. Then the matter went up to the Supreme Court ana the appeals were dismissed. The Court expressed its conclusion in the following words :- "Our conclusion on the question of res-judicata raised in the present appeals is this. Where the trial court has decided two suits haying common issues on the merits and there are two appeals therefrom and one of them is dismissed on some preliminary ground like limitation or default in printing, with the result that the trial court's decision stands confirmed, the decision of the appellate Court will be res-judicata and the appeal Court must be deemed to have heard and finally decided the matter. In such a case the result of the decision of the appeal court is to confirm the decision of the trial court given on merits and if that is so the decision of the appeal court will be res-judicata and whatever may be the reason for the dismissal." It is clear from the above that there is a confirmation of the decree when the appeal is dismissed, whatever may be the reason for the dismissal. The principles laid down by their Lordships in the case of res-judicata would be fully applicable in a case where the principle of merger is involved. A decree is confirmed no sooner the appeal is dismissed. It does not matter whether it is dismissed summarily or for default, or for non-prosecution, or for non- compliance with any requisite provision of law. In applying the doctrine of merger a decision on the merits or after a hearing is not therefore, essential for the purposes of confirmation of the decree. In my opinion, therefore, there is a merger of the order of the original court or tribunal with that of the appellate Court no sooner the appeal is dismissed. 10. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner contended that the order passed by a tribunal without jurisdiction can be challenged at any stage. In support he cited the authority of the Supreme Court in the case of Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, AIR 1954 SC 340 . 10. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner contended that the order passed by a tribunal without jurisdiction can be challenged at any stage. In support he cited the authority of the Supreme Court in the case of Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, AIR 1954 SC 340 . There can be no dispute with the proposition laid down in the above case but the point in the present case is: what is the position after that order had become merged in the order of the appellate court. In the case of Purshottam v. Sheo Prasad (Supra) a Division Bench of this Court relied on the case of Janardhan Reddy v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1951 SC 217 and observed as follows :- "The fact that the order of cancellation was passed by an officer who had no jurisdiction to do so would not render the order passed by him unappealable and the appeal was in the present case taken to the Additional Commissioner, who was a competent authority. The judgment of the Additional Commissioner could not be held to be void for want of any jurisdictional defect. In that event the well-known doctrine of merger would come into play with the result that the order of the Assistant Collector second class became merged in the order of the Additional Commissioner and then in the order of the Board of Revenue. In this situation the decision of the Supreme Court in Janardhan Reddy v. State of Hyderabad ( AIR 1951 SC 217 ) is clearly applicable. In paragraph 26 it was observed that it is well settled that if a court acts without jurisdiction its decision can be challenged in the same way as it would have been challenged if it had acted with jurisdiction i. e. an appeal would lie to the Court to which it would lie if its order was with jurisdiction. It was held that the appellate court in a case which properly comes before it on appeal is fully competent to decide whether the trial was with or without jurisdiction and it has jurisdiction to decide the matter rightly as well as wrongly. It was held that the appellate court in a case which properly comes before it on appeal is fully competent to decide whether the trial was with or without jurisdiction and it has jurisdiction to decide the matter rightly as well as wrongly. If it affirms the conviction and thereby decided wrongly that the trial court had the jurisdiction to try and convict it cannot be said to have acted without- jurisdiction and its order cannot be treated as a nullity." Nothing could be shown that the order of the appellate authority was without jurisdiction or a nullity in the present case. As a matter of fact, there was no challenge to the order of the appellate authority. Learned counsel also relied on a decision of this Court by B. N. Nigam, J. in Paras Nath Shukla v. District Magistrate, 1966 AWR 330 (2). It was held that where there is a complete lack of jurisdiction by the inferior tribunal even though its order was confirmed by the appellate court both the orders could be challenged in writ jurisdiction. This decision was affirmed by a Division Bench in the case reported in District Magistrate v. Parasnath Shukla, 1967 AWR .485. A similar view was taken in the case of Collector of Customs v. A.H.A. Rahiman, AIR 1957 Mad. 496 . With great respect to the learned Judges I am unable to share their views in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above. Reliance was also placed on certain observations in the case of State of U. P. v. Mohammad Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86 but the Supreme Court in later cases said "Mohammad Nooh's case was a special case which stands on its own facts." See Madan Gopal Rungta v. Secretary to the Government of Orissa, AIR 1962 SC 1513 and Collector of Customs v. East India Commerical Co., AIR 1963 SC 1124 . The present case is one where the appellate court had confirmed the order of the Prescribed Authority. Thus the principle of merger is fully applicable notwithstanding that the appeal was dismissed for default. In this view of the matter even if it be taken that the order of the original tribunal was without jurisdiction it could not be challenged in view of the confirmation of that order. Thus the principle of merger is fully applicable notwithstanding that the appeal was dismissed for default. In this view of the matter even if it be taken that the order of the original tribunal was without jurisdiction it could not be challenged in view of the confirmation of that order. As regards the second point learned counsel for the petitioner contended that after the coming in force of the new Code of Criminal Procedure with effect from 1st of April, 1974 all Sub Divisional Magistrates ceased to be first class Magistrate and as such were no longer entitled to act as Prescribed Authority under the Act. It was further contended that all the cases pending with them which had not been disposed of, were transferred to the District Magistrate for being allocated to different Prescribed Authorities. In support thereof he relied on Annexure SA 5 to the supplementary affidavit which is purported to be a report by Shri J. K. Paliwal, the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Bilari. According to this report all the 88 cases were transferred by him. Further in support of his contention he relied on two decisions made by the opposite party No. 1 in two different appeals arising out of proceedings under Sec. 21 of the Act where the application had been made prior to 1st of April 1974; ( Annexure SA 1 and SA 2 to the supplementary affidavit ). He also relied on the copy of an order dated 10th November, 1975 passed by Shri J. K. Paliwal expressing his want of jurisdiction to proceed with a case under Sec. 21 of the Act ( Annexure RA-1 to the supplementary rejoinder affidavit). The respondent has filed the certified copy of the report by Shri J. K. Paliwal which is marked as Annexure H to the supplementary rejoinder affidavit. This certified copy does not contain any statement that all the 88 cases were transferred by Shri Paliwal. It shows that only 8 cases which had been instituted after the 1st April, 1974 were transferred to the Judicial Magistrate, Sambhal. Annexure SA-5, therefore, does not purport to be a correct copy of the report submitted by Shri Paliwal. Thus the 80 remaining cases remained with Shri Paliwal which included 36 cases from Bilari-Chandausi area. It shows that only 8 cases which had been instituted after the 1st April, 1974 were transferred to the Judicial Magistrate, Sambhal. Annexure SA-5, therefore, does not purport to be a correct copy of the report submitted by Shri Paliwal. Thus the 80 remaining cases remained with Shri Paliwal which included 36 cases from Bilari-Chandausi area. A Government Order dated 17th June, 1974 was issued by which the District Magistrate was directed to stay further action in pending cases (Annexure C to the supplementary rejoinder affidavit). A further Government Order was issued on the 26th June, 1974 directing that cases instituted before 1st April 1974 be kept pending till further orders (Annexure D to the supplementary rejoinder affidavit). Thereafter the Act was amended by U. P. Act 19 of 1974 wherein the definition of the 'Prescribed Authority' was amended. It included an Executive Magistrate also who had been so authorised but what is relevant is the transitory provision of Section 3. Section 3 (a) reads as follows ;- "Transitory provision-Notwithstanding the amendment of the Principal Act by this Act--(a) Every case instituted before or transferred to the Prescribed Authority as defined in the Principal Act (as it stood before the commencement of this Act) or recalled from such authority by the District Magistrate at any time before April 1, 1974 and pending at the commencement of this Act before such authority by the District Magistrate shall continue to be heard and decided by such authority or District Magistrate, as the case may be." It is apparent from the above provision that all cases which had been instituted prior to the 1st April, 1974 and were pending before any Prescribed Authority (as defined in the Principal Act) were to be heard and decided by such authority. Thus the instant case which had been instituted before Shri Paliwal as the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Bilari-Chandausi area and which had not been transferred or withdrawn by the District Magistrate was to be heard and decided by Shri Paliwal. Emphasis was laid that the provision of Sec.3(c) of the Amending Act 19 of 1974 applied and all the cases stood transferred from the Prescribed Authority (as defined in the Principal Act). Emphasis was laid that the provision of Sec.3(c) of the Amending Act 19 of 1974 applied and all the cases stood transferred from the Prescribed Authority (as defined in the Principal Act). Section 3 (a) provides that notwithstanding the amendment of the Principal Act by this Act every case instituted before a Munsif or a Magistrate of the first class on or after 1st April, 1974 is to stand transferred. The instant case was instituted before April 1, 1974 and, therefore, Section 3 (a) of the Amending Act would have no application in the present case. The two cases decided by the respondent No. I refer to the provision of Section 3(c) of the amending Act. The provision of Section 3 (a) of the amending Act was not considered in those two decided cases. Further, there is a Government Order dated 4th September, 1974 (Annexure E to the supplementary rejoinder affidavit of the respondent), whereby the order staying the disposal of cases by the Prescribed Authority (as defined in the Principal Act) were vacated and they were directed to decide the Rent Control cases as provided in Sec. 3 (a) of the amending Act 19 of 1974. A further Government Order dated 9th September, 1974 (Annexure F to the Supplementary rejoinder affidavit) directed that all the cases pending before the Prescribed Authority prior to 1st April, 1974 were to continue to be decided by them provided they had three years' experience as first class Magistrate prior to 1st April, 1974. It is therefore, apparent from the above that Shri Paliwal retained jurisdiction to decide Rent Control Cases which had been filed before him prior to 1st April, 1974. Having perused the copies of the various orders that had been filed in this case it is apparent that the proceedings in the rent control cases pending before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate were stayed after the coming in force of the new Code of Criminal Procedure but subsequently the Sub-Divisional Magistrates were authorised to hear and decide those cases as is clear from Annexures E, F, G and H of the supplementary rejoinder affidavit filed by respondent No. 3. Nothing could be shown that these orders were either not passed or were superseded by some other orders. Nothing could be shown that these orders were either not passed or were superseded by some other orders. This position appears to be correct in view of the provisions of Section 3 (a) of the U. P. Act 19 of 1974 which retained the jurisdiction of the Prescribed Authority as defined in the principal Act as it stood before the commencement of U. P. Act 19 of 1974 to decide such cases. It may be stated here that nothing could be pointed out that Shri J. K. Paliwal did not have the requisite qualifications or experience as was indicated in Annexure F to the supplementary rejoinder affidavit. I, therefore, conclude that the contention of the petitioner that Shri J. K. Paliwal had no jurisdiction to decide the instant case is not made out. 11. IT does not appear from a perusal of the order of the Prescribed Authority that any plea as regards the want of jurisdiction was pressed before him. There is no reference to this aspect of the case. A ground was undoubtedly taken in the memorandum of appeal but then no arguments were made in the appeal. 12. THE petitioner had an opportunity of challenging that order. He had filed an appeal but for reasons best known to him he had not pursued the appeal even though he knew that all his efforts to postpone the hearing of the appeal had failed he did not appear before the Court either himself or with his counsel to argue the appeal. The Court had given him an opportunity of bringing his counsel. It is not disputed that the counsel never appeared on that date. It is also not disputed that the petitioner had not sought any opportunity on the ground that his counsel was not available on that date. The finding arrived at by the appellate tribunal while dismissing the appeal was that the petitioner himself was at fault for he was taking recourse to delaying tactics. The order passed on the application for restoration gives adequate reasons for rejecting the application. The finding given by it that there was no sufficient cause is a finding which cannot be said to be perverse. That finding has to be accepted. In view of the above I do not find any merits in the contentions raised in this writ petition. This petition must therefore, fail and is accordingly dismissed with costs. The finding given by it that there was no sufficient cause is a finding which cannot be said to be perverse. That finding has to be accepted. In view of the above I do not find any merits in the contentions raised in this writ petition. This petition must therefore, fail and is accordingly dismissed with costs. The stay order is vacated. The record and registers of the Prescribed Authority shall be sent back forthwith. Petition dismissed.