JUDGMENT K.C. Agarwal, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution for a writ of certiorari quashing the order and judgment of the IX Addl. District Judge, Allahabad dated March 26, 1976. The circumstances which led to the filing of this petition are these. 2. House No. 128 Chowk Ganga Das, Allahabad belonged to one Laxmi Narain Ghaddha. This was let out by him to Smt. Raj Kumari Bhatnagar. Laxmi Narain Ghaddha died in 1969. In December 1974, Adarsh Kumar Chaddha and Smt. S.D. Chaddha, son and wife of Laxmi Narain Chaddha respectively, sold this house to Ganesh Lal Malviya, Respondent No. 3. On April 21, 1975, S.K. Tandon, Respondent No. 2, filed an application for allotment of a portion of the: aforesaid house alleging that Smt, Raj Kumari Bhatnagar, the tenant in chief, had sub-let a portion of this premises illegally to Shambhu Nath Tandon, the Petitioner, therefore, Smt. Raj Kumari Bhatnagar ceased to be the tenant of that portion and the said premises would be deemed to be vacant for the purposes of allotment u/s 12 read with Section 16 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent & Eviction) Act, 1972, being Act No. 13 of 1972, hereinafter referred to as Act No. 13 of 1972. On the same date another application for allotment of this portion was filed by one Krishna Kant. 3. As required by Rule 8(2) of the rules framed under this Act, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer directed the Rent Control Inspector to submit a report about the facts existing on the spot. On April 28, 1975, the Rent Control Inspector submitted a report to the effect that Sushil Kumar Tandon, Respondent No. 2, was occupying a portion of the disputed house as a sub-tenant. Soon thereafter he submitted another report dated 14th May 1975 that Shambhu Nath Tandon claimed to be a tenant of this house since 1942. On May 15, 1975, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer finding that the house was not vacant rejected the applications made for allotment. In the appeal, preferred by Respondent No. 2, the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was set aside and the case was remanded with a direction to decide it again after hearing the parties and giving them an opportunity of adducing evidence. In the appeal, preferred by Respondent No. 2, the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was set aside and the case was remanded with a direction to decide it again after hearing the parties and giving them an opportunity of adducing evidence. Finding that Shambhu Nath Tandon had been occupying the portion from before the commencement of U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer held on 16th January 1976 that the premises could not be deemed to be vacant as required by Section 12 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, hence was not available for allotment. In this view, the application for allotment was directed to be filed and consigned to record. 4. Treating the aforesaid order as one of dismissal of the application for allotment, the Respondent No. 2 preferred an appeal before the District Judge u/s 18 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 without impleading Shambhu Nath Tandon, as a party. Holding that in the circumstances specified in Section 12(1)(b) the vacancy should be deemed to have occurred, the learned Addl. District Judge allowed the appeal and sent back the case to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer with a direction to notify the vacancy and to allot the portion to a suitable applicant. Aggrieved Shambhu Nath Tandon and Smt. Raj. Kumari Bhatnagar filed this writ petition. 5. In order to appreciate the contention, advanced by counsel for the parties, it is necessary to make a brief survey of the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. This Act was passed with a view to provide, inter alia, for the regulation of letting and rent, and the eviction of tenants from certain classes of buildings situated in urban areas. On its enforcement with effect from 15th July, 1972, the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act was repealed. This new Act provided for certain new matters, which were earlier not spoken to in the old Act. Chapter HI of this deals with Regulation of Letting. Section 11 imposes prohibition on letting without allotment order Section 13 in its terms, places restriction on occupation of building without allotment or release. Section 15 casts obligation on landlord and tenant to intimate a vacancy to District Magistrate. Chapter HI of this deals with Regulation of Letting. Section 11 imposes prohibition on letting without allotment order Section 13 in its terms, places restriction on occupation of building without allotment or release. Section 15 casts obligation on landlord and tenant to intimate a vacancy to District Magistrate. Section 12 creates fiction laying down the circumstances when a vacancy would be deemed to have occurred u/s 16 on the intimation of vacancy or otherwise, the District Magistrate may either allot the premises or release it in favour of the landlord on being satisfied that the same is bona fide required by him. An order passed u/s 16 is subject to an appeal u/s 18 of the Act. 6. Now, adverting to the points the first ground of attack of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner was that Section 12(1)(b) being not applicable to a case, where illegal sub-letting took place before the enforcement of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, the appellate court had no jurisdiction to hold that the possession of Shambhu Nath Tandon was illegal and that the portion in his occupation was available for allotment. The question whether a sub-letting before coming into force of the Act is within the purview of Section 12(1)(b) depends upon the construction of that clause, which reads: 7. Deemed vacancy of building in certain cases: (1) A landlord or tenant of a building shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building or part thereof if: (a) x x x x x x (b) he has allowed it to be occupied by any person who is not a member of his family, or (c) x x x x (2) x x x x x (3) x x x (4) Any building or part which a landlord or tenant has ceased to occupy within the meaning of Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) or Sub-section (3), shall, for the purposes of this Chapter be deemed to be vacant. 8. It would be seen that Section 12(1)(b) contemplates that in a case where, the tenant has allowed the building or part thereof to be occupied by any person, who is not a member of his family, the tenant would be ceased to be in possession of the building and the same would be considered vacant. 8. It would be seen that Section 12(1)(b) contemplates that in a case where, the tenant has allowed the building or part thereof to be occupied by any person, who is not a member of his family, the tenant would be ceased to be in possession of the building and the same would be considered vacant. The expression "has allowed to be occupied" embraces within its sweep all sub-lettings by tenants without the permission of landlord either before or after enforcement of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. There is nothing in this clause, which could make it applicable only to sub-lettings talking place after the enforcement of this Act. This clause having been expressed in present perfect tense signifies an act fully accomplished connected in some way with the present time. It is, therefore, clear that any sub-letting or occupation of a premises by a person without permission of the landlord is covered by this clause, irrespective of the time when it takes place. Giving to the words, their plain, normal and grammatical meaning, used in this clause, I do not find that any other conclusion is possible even though the subletting by the tenant was perfectly legal at the time when the same was effected. In Goppu lal v. thakurji Shrijee Shryi Dwajkadeeshji AIR 1969 SC 1291 , a similar question for decision arose, whether u/s 13(1) of the Rajasthan Act the tenant was liable to be evicted on the ground of sub-letting which took place before the Act came into force? Section 13(1)(e) which set out the grounds of eviction reads as under: That the tenant has assigned, sublet or otherwise Parted with the possession of the whole or any part of the premises without the permission of the of the landlord. 10. Interpreting the words "has sub-let" used in this provision the Supreme Court held that these words take within their sweep any sub-letting which was made in the past and has continued up to the present time. It was of opinion that it did not matter whether sub-letting was either before or after the Act came into force. All such sub-lettings are within the purview of Clause (e). In instant case as well the words "has allowed" have to be interpreted in the same sense. It was of opinion that it did not matter whether sub-letting was either before or after the Act came into force. All such sub-lettings are within the purview of Clause (e). In instant case as well the words "has allowed" have to be interpreted in the same sense. Dealing with this question, the Supreme Court further observed: We find no reason for presuming that Section 13(1)(e) is not intended to apply to sub-lettings before the Act came into force. If the "tenant" has sub-let the premises without the permission of the landlord either before or after the coming into force of the Act, he is not protected from eviction u/s 13(1)(e), and it matters not that he had the right to sub-let the premises u/s 108(j) of the Transfer of Property Act. 11. Sri S.P. Gupta, counsel for the Petitioner, urged that neither the language used in this provision nor the context warrant this conclusion, hence, if accepted, would be against the cannon of interpretation. Distinguishing Gappu Mal's case (supra) counsel submitted that Section 13(1)(e) of the Rajasthan Act, with which the Supreme Court was concerned dealt with the grounds of eviction of a tenant whereas Section 12(1)(b) furnishes a ground to the rent control authorities to treat a house as vacant. In his submission, since an act of sub-letting without the permission of the landlord and the District Magistrate did not provide any ground for holding that the house was vacant under the Old Act, the court cannot while interpreting Clause 12(1)(b) hold the same to be illegal by giving it a retrospective effect. Reliance was placed by Sri S.P. Gupta on Nanha and Another Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Kanpur and Others, AIR 1976 All 91 , in which a Full Bench of this Court held that no vacancy would occur under the provisions of the Old Act in case a tenant sub-lets a portion of his accommodation without permission of the landlord and the District Magistrate. Such an illegal sub-letting could only provide a ground to the landlord to bring a suit for eviction against the tenant. The view of the Full Bench is, however, based on the interpretation of Section 7 of the Old Act which was altogether differently worded. The Old Act did not provide for any 'deemed' vacancy as in the present Act. Such an illegal sub-letting could only provide a ground to the landlord to bring a suit for eviction against the tenant. The view of the Full Bench is, however, based on the interpretation of Section 7 of the Old Act which was altogether differently worded. The Old Act did not provide for any 'deemed' vacancy as in the present Act. In fact, this was the lacuna in the Old Act, which has been tried to be filled in. Section 12 of the New Act attempts to regulate such lettings so that the rent control authorities may have full control to effectuate the object of regulation of letting. The legislature having thought that sub-lettings or occupation of the premises by persons other than members of the family of tenants being against the spirit of the regulation of letting provided for under the Old Act as well, tried to cover the same by providing for its regulation in the New Act. Section 12 is wide in its amplitude and, therefore, its operation cannot be confined to transactions talking place after the enforcement of the New Act. Counsel for the Petitioner, however, invited my attention to certain observations made in Ram Mani Devi's case (supra) where T.S. Misra, J. observed as under: Sections 12 and 25 of the repealing Act, XIII of 1972 are not retrospective in character and do not affect any right or privilege occurred under the repealed provision of Section 7 of the earlier Act. 12. Reading these observations in its context, it appears to me that the learned Judge only meant to lay down that Section 12 could not be applied to cases which were being tried under the old provision of Section 7. He was not called upon to consider the scope and implications of Section 12 in the said case. These observations hence have to be read in its context. They, in my opinion, do not advance the case of the Petitioner. 13. The other ground of distinction pointed out by Sri Gupta also does not impress me, simply because Section 13(1)(e) of the Rajasthan Act was dealing with the ground for eviction of a tenant at the instance of a landlord does not in any way, alter the interpretation. They, in my opinion, do not advance the case of the Petitioner. 13. The other ground of distinction pointed out by Sri Gupta also does not impress me, simply because Section 13(1)(e) of the Rajasthan Act was dealing with the ground for eviction of a tenant at the instance of a landlord does not in any way, alter the interpretation. The irresistible conclusion being that Section 12(1)(b) applies to sub-lettings before the Act came into force as well, it is not possible to accede to the argument of the Petitioner. The Act being within the legislative competence of the State Legislature it could make a provision for a notional vacancy to be sufficient for proceedings with u/s 16 of the New Act. As observed above, Section 12 read with Section 16, in fact, subserves the main objection of the Act viz., Control of Letting. 14. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner in support of his argument pointed out that if the Legislature intended to cover cases of sub-letting which took place before the New Act it would have clearly made a provision to that effect as was done by making Section 20(2)(e) of the Act. It is true that in this section the legislature has specifically provided that the contravention of the provisions of the Old Act would be a ground for eviction of a tenant, but that itself is of no assistance to the Petitioners. Sub-section (4) of Section 12 read with Section 25 makes it abundantly clear that in a case of deemed vacancy, the tenant would be deemed to have ceased to occupy the premises and consequently would be liable to eviction. Simply because Clause (b) of Section 12 does not say like Section 20(2)(e) that sub-lettings which took place under the Old Act are also covered by it, that does not mean that the legislature did not want to cover the sub-lettings taking place during the period in which the Old Act was operating by Clause 12(l)(b). Use of the same phraseology cannot be insisted upon as it is some-times neither feasible nor practicable. 15. Lastly, Shri Gupta urged that acceptance of the interpretation mentioned above would bring about absurd results. Having given my considered thought over it, I find myself unable to accept the suggestion. I do not find that any absurd result would ensure if the interpretation suggested above is accepted. 15. Lastly, Shri Gupta urged that acceptance of the interpretation mentioned above would bring about absurd results. Having given my considered thought over it, I find myself unable to accept the suggestion. I do not find that any absurd result would ensure if the interpretation suggested above is accepted. By this interpretation, the sub-lettings which took place before the Act would also come within its purview. 16. The submission of the counsel for the Petitioner that such an interpretation would be against the intention of the legislature is also devoid of substance. The intention of the legislature is always to be gathered by words used by it. In so doing, the courts have to give to the words their plain, normal, grammatical meaning. Applying this rule of interpretation, no other view is possible. In my opinion if the legislature intended it to be prospective in operation, it would have used the word 'allows' instead of 'has allowed' just as it was done by it in Sub-section (2) of Section 12 by using the word 'admits'. As at present advised Sub-section (2) of Section 12 being differently worded, appears to cover only those cases in which a person is admitted as a partner after the enactment. There was no difficulty in using the same language by the legislature in Section 12(1)(b) had it so desired. One can also think of the use of the expression like "That the tenant has, since the coming into operation of this Act, unlawfully allowed it to be occupied by a person who is not a member of his family". The legislature cannot be held to be ignorant of the expressions, confining its application to cases coming into existence after the Act, had it so desired. 17. The next submission was that Shambhu Nath Tandon having not been impleaded as a party in the appeal preferred by Sushil Kumar Tandon before the District Judge, the impugned judgment is a nullity as against him. The fact that he was not impleaded is not in dispute. Counsel for the Respondent No. 2, however, pointed out that Shambhu Nath Tandon, being a subtenant of Smt. Raj Kumari Bhatnagar had no independent rights of his own. He was claiming through her and as she was admittedly not only a party but also was heard in the appeal, the judgment of the court below cannot be questioned in these proceedings. 18. He was claiming through her and as she was admittedly not only a party but also was heard in the appeal, the judgment of the court below cannot be questioned in these proceedings. 18. Having heard counsel for the parties I do not find any substance in this point either. There is no provision in the Act or in the rules providing for the persons who are entitled to be impleaded as parties or to be heard before a final order is passed on the application made for allotment on the ground" mentioned in Section 12. Hence we do not get any guidance on this question from the Act. So far as the general principles applicable for impleadment of a sub-tenant are concerned, it is settled that in a suit for ejectment brought by a landlord against a tenant-in-chief, such a sub-tenant is only a proper party. He stands or falls with the tenant-in-chief. Law is beyond doubt that as between the original lessor and the sub-lessee, there is no privity of contract, and therefore, sub-lessee does not acquire as a general rule, by virtue of the sub-lease any independent rights to enforce against the original lessor. A sub-lease is, in fact, is grant by a cement of an interest in the demised premises less than his own, retaining to himself reversion. This being the nature of relationship, a subtenant cannot be considered as a necessary party, without whom no effective order can be passed. Such a sub tenant, as held in Importers and Manufacturers Ltd. Vs. Pheroze Framroze Taraporewala and Others, AIR 1953 SC 73 and in South Asia Industries Private Ltd. Vs. S. Sarup Singh and Others, AIR 1966 SC 346 , is a proper party. So far as, the instant case is concerned, Shambhu Nath Tandon was, though not formally impleaded, was not only permitted to adduce evidence but heard also He ought to have been impleaded in the appeal as well. 19. The question, however, is about the effect of his non impleadment in the appeal. Smt. Raj Kumari Bhatnagar was, however, impleaded and heard. Her defence in the case was the same as that of Shambhu Nath Tandon. In fact, the judgment of the District Judge shows that she referred to and relied' on the evidence of Shambhu Nath Tandon in the appeal. Smt. Raj Kumari Bhatnagar was, however, impleaded and heard. Her defence in the case was the same as that of Shambhu Nath Tandon. In fact, the judgment of the District Judge shows that she referred to and relied' on the evidence of Shambhu Nath Tandon in the appeal. In these circumstances it appears tome that Shambhu Nath Tandon has not suffered through denial of procedural due process hence it would not be proper to quash the judgment on this technical ground. Sri S.P. Gupta however, contended that if a tribunal fails to act in accordance With law. He persons affected by their decision can seek redress in the courts. I am afraid I am not prepared to go to this length with the learned Counsel in this case, as his argument omits the real character of the right of Shambhu Nath Tandon and his relationship with his tenant-in-chief. He derives right through his tenant Smt. Raj Kumari Bhatnagar. She must be deemed to have not only represented her interest in the appeal but that of her sub tenant as well. Hearing granted to her in the appeal was for the benefit of her sub-tenant as well. As in the appeal, the entire evidence was considered and the presence of Shambhu Nath Tandon could not alter the decision, the judgment of the appellate court is not liable to be set aside on this ground. 20. Another important feature of this case appears to be that Shambhu Nath Tandon is hand in gloves with Smt. Raj Kumari Bhatnagar. The same is established from the fact that the present petition was jointly filed by them. Only when they were faced with this situation that Smt. Raj Kumari Bhatnagar, having been heard in the appeal, these Petitioners could not be heard on this point, that the statement was made on her behalf that she did not intend to press the petition on merits. Subsequent withdrawal does not wipe out the impression that the plea of non-impleadment of Shambhu Nath Tandon is not bonafide. Moreover, as in my view, substantial justice was done, in the instant case by the impleadment of Smt. Raj Kumari Bhatnagar in the appeal, this ground must also fail. 21. The third submission of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is equally without substance. Moreover, as in my view, substantial justice was done, in the instant case by the impleadment of Smt. Raj Kumari Bhatnagar in the appeal, this ground must also fail. 21. The third submission of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is equally without substance. The same was that the appeal filed by the Respondent No. 2 u/s 18 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 before the District Judge being against the order rejecting the application for allotment was not applicable under this section. According to him Section 18 provides for appeals against orders granting applications for allotment. Section 18 of the Act lays down that "any person aggrieved by an order u/s 16 - 19...prefer an appeal against it to the District Judge..." Section 16 provides for applications for allotment and release. On application being filed under this section, they can either be granted or rejected. In either case, the order passed would be u/s 16 and will be covered by Section 18. I do not find any rational basis to confine the applicability of Section 18 to orders of allotment and not to apply to orders rejecting applications for allotment and release. The learned Counsel attempted to draw some support to his argument from authorities interpreting Section 7-F of Act No. III of 1947 which provides for a representation to the State Government against an order of directing a person to vacate accommodation u/s 7-A. As this Section confers right of representation to only one class of cases, the question of filing representations against orders rejecting applications u/s 7-A did not arise. Unlike Section 7-F, Section 18 lays down that an aggrieved person could file an appeal against an order passed u/s 16, irrespective of rejection or acceptance of the application for allotment or release. In the circumstances there is no warrant restricting the appeals to the allotment or release orders. 22. The submission that the Respondent No. 2 was not an 'aggrieved person' within the meaning of this expression used in Section 18 is too obviously wrong to merit any detailed discussion. It was his application, which was rejected by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, hence if he was not an injured or aggrieved person, who else could be. 23. In order to appreciate the last contention of the Petitioners which was relating to the merits of the case we may recall the facts very briefly. It was his application, which was rejected by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, hence if he was not an injured or aggrieved person, who else could be. 23. In order to appreciate the last contention of the Petitioners which was relating to the merits of the case we may recall the facts very briefly. It has been noted above that the house in question originally belonged to L.N. Chaddha, He died in 1939. Thereafter the same was purchased by Ganesh Lal Malviya. After this purchase an application was filed by Respondent No. 2 u/s 16 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 for allotment of the portion of the aforesaid house in occupation of S.N. Tandon. As stated above, Shambhu Nath according to the allegations of Respondent No. 2 had been unauthorisedly put in possession by Raj Kumari Bhatnagar without prior permission of the landlord. In the affidavits filed on behalf of Shambhu Nath and Smt. Raj Kumari, it was asserted that Raj Kumari had obtained consent of L.N. Chaddha or the previous owner and thereafter had let out the portion to Sharabhu Nath in 1943. The controversy thus was whether Shambhu Nath Tandon was admitted as a sub-tenant in 1943 with the consent and permission of Laxmi Narain Chaddha, the then owner and landlord. Both the parties filed affidavits in support of their respective versions. The Respondent No. 2 had filed an affidavit of Adarsh Kumar Chaddha the son of L.N. Chaddha. In this affidavit he stated that he was told by his father that he had not granted any permission to Raj Kumari Bhatnagar for sub-letting to Shambhu Nath Tandon. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer accepted the case of Shambhu Nath Tandon whereas in the appeal, the view taken by Addl. District Judge was that Shambhu Nath Tandon was inducted into possession by Smt. Raj Kumari Bhatnagar in 1956 without any consent of the landlord. The only question thus is whether the finding of the learned Judge on this controversy is erroneous. The question mentioned above being of fact, the finding thereon is nothing but fact. It is settled that this Court cannot interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution with the findings recorded by a subordinate tribunal on a question of fact even if it is erroneous. The question mentioned above being of fact, the finding thereon is nothing but fact. It is settled that this Court cannot interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution with the findings recorded by a subordinate tribunal on a question of fact even if it is erroneous. The High Court has the limited jurisdiction to seeing that the subordinate court or tribunal functions within the limits of its authority. It cannot correct errors of fact by examining the evidence and re-appreciating it. Counsel, however submitted that as the finding of District Judge is based on the affidavit of Adarsh Kumar Chaddha who had no personal knowledge of the fact of permission, therefore the whole judgment of the court below is vitiated by an error amenable to writ jurisdiction. This submission is devoid of merit. Admittedly L.N. Chaddha died in 1969 he could therefore not be procured for any statement. A.K. Chaddha who was his son was in a position to show (that) L.N. Chaddha could be presumed to have informed that a subletting in favour of S.N. Tandon was without his permission. A.K. Chaddha had also entered in the witness box. In these circumstances, the criticism of the Petitioner that the judgment of the learned District Judge being based on heresay evidence, cannot be sustained. As a general rule here say evidence is excluded as the best evidence is required to be given to inspire confidence but there are exceptions to this general rule. In a case where the person knowing a certain fact is dead the fact within his knowledge could be proved by another person to whom in the natural course of conduct the deceased must have told about it. A.K. Chaddha being the son of L.N. Chaddha could legitimately be considered as a person to whom the deceased informed about the true state of affairs. 24. Moreover, the finding of the learned District Judge is not based merely on the affidavit of A.K. Chaddha. He considered the entire evidence filed by both the parties. Disbelieving the evidence of Raj Kumari Bhatnagar on whom the burden lay that she had been permitted to sublet by L.N. Chaddha in 1943 the court below found that no such permission was ever granted to her and that Section H Tandon was brought in the house in 1956. In 1956 U.P. Act No. III of 1947 was in force. Disbelieving the evidence of Raj Kumari Bhatnagar on whom the burden lay that she had been permitted to sublet by L.N. Chaddha in 1943 the court below found that no such permission was ever granted to her and that Section H Tandon was brought in the house in 1956. In 1956 U.P. Act No. III of 1947 was in force. Section 7 of this Act required that sub-tenancy could be created by the permission of the District Magistrate and the landlord. Admittedly, the permission of the District Magistrate was not obtained. Consequently, the possession of S.N. Tandon was in contravention of law. Hence the last submission fails. 25. Before parting with the judgment, I wish to make it clear that consequent upon the direction of the District Judge applications would now be invited for allotment. It will be open to S.N. Tandon also to apply for it. I have no doubt that the authorities would consider those applications on merits and would act in accordance with law in making allotments. But so far as these applications have not been disposed of by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, it appears appropriate that S.N. Tandon may be permitted, to remain in the house. Accordingly, I direct the authorities not to dispossess him so long the allotment order is not passed. This direction would, however, cease to be operative immediately with the disposal of the allotment applications by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. 26. Subject to above, the writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs. The stay order is discharged.