JUDGMENT K.C. Agarwal, J. - Shri Sita Ram Sharma, respondent No. 1, filed an application under Section 21(l)(a) of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 for release of the portion in occupation of the petitioner on the ground that the accommodation in his possession being insufficient, he required the same for his use and occupation. The application was resisted by the petitioner. He did not only assert that the need of the landlord was not genuine, but also claimed that his require. meat for the premises was greater than that of respondent No. 1. The application was rejected by the Prescribed, Authority but, in appeal preferred by respondent No. 1, the judgment of the prescribed Authority was set aside and the application was granted. Feeling aggrieved, the tenant has come to this Court by means of the present writ petition. 2. Two questions were urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner. One of them was that the learned District Judge committed an error in admitting the will in appeal and holding on its basis that the application filed by respondent No. 1 was maintainable. He invited my attention to Rule 15 and asserted that as the said rule requires an application to be filed by all the landlords, the apply cation in the instant case having been filed only by Sita Ram Sharma was liable to be rejected. He also contended that as the attestation of the Will had not been proved in accordance with Section 68 of the Evidence Act, the Will ought to have been ignored. In the counter-affidavit, respondent No. 1 alleged that the only ground on which the application for admission of additional evidence was challenged by the petitioner was that the case was not covered by Order 41 Rule 27 C P.C. The petitioner did not raise the question of admissibility of the will before the learned District Judge. The assertion made in the counter-affidavit appears to be correct. As the document has also been exhibited, the first ground urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner has no substance, especially when there is nothing on record to indicate that the case was fought out by him on this ground in the court below. 3. The assertion made in the counter-affidavit appears to be correct. As the document has also been exhibited, the first ground urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner has no substance, especially when there is nothing on record to indicate that the case was fought out by him on this ground in the court below. 3. The other submission of the learned counsal appearing for the petitioner was that the learned District judge having not compared the question of hardship, as required by the proviso added to Section 21 by U.P. Act. No. 28 of 1976, the judgment of the learned District Judge is erroneous. Before this proviso was added to Section 21, Rule 16 of the Rules framed under the Act provided for consideration of likely hardship to the tenant from the grant of the application as against the likely hardship to the landlord from the refusal of the application. The submission further was that the learned District Judge only considered the needs of both the parties and did not compare the hardships. The argument of the learned Counsel that in the absence of the consideration of the question of hardship, the judgment of the learned District Judge could not be said to have complied with the mandatory requirements of the aforesaid provision, is not correct. The learned District Judge, after consideration of the evidence of both the parties, made the following observations : "But, in a case in which the needs of the landlord and tenant were equi balanced, preference is to be given to the need of the landlord. As such, the application for release should have been allowed." 4. These observations of the learned District Judge considered in its context would show that he was doing nothing else but considering the question of hardship, otherwise he would not have made the above observations. It is true that the word 'hardship' has not been used in the Judgment, but not using the word hardship in the judgment by the learned District Judge would not vitiate the judgment. The proper thing to be seen is as to whether the District Judge was aware of the requirement of law. As the observation noted above show that such a provision was present in his mind, the omission to use the word 'hardship' is inconsequential. The proper thing to be seen is as to whether the District Judge was aware of the requirement of law. As the observation noted above show that such a provision was present in his mind, the omission to use the word 'hardship' is inconsequential. The cases cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner are distinguishable and, therefore, need not be considered. 5. In C. V. Massey v. B. C. Daniel and others, 1976 All. Weekly Cases, 278 a Division Bench of this Court was considering a case where the Commissioner had observed that as the landlord had established the need, his need for the accommodation and need of the tenant had to be scrutinised. In the background of these facts, the Division Bench observed that the same did not require consideration of the likely hardship which the tenant would suffer from the grant of the application. In the instant case, the learned District Judge, after considering the need of both the parties, considered the question as to what would be the proper course in the matter where the need was equibalanced. It is not possible to take any exception to the judgment of the learned District Judge, especially when the question of consideration of hardship is one of fact. The Act has not defined the word 'hardship' at any place. In judging the question of hardship, one will have to take into account several factors, financial or otherwise, which may be proved by the parties for the purposes of establishing the case. The finding given on such a question wyuld naturally be on fact, and it is not possible to interfere with the same in the present proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. 6. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed. No order as to costs. The stay order is discharged. The petitioner is allowed three months' time to vacate the premises.