Judgment :- 1. The text of S. 9(1)(b) and 9(2) of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act, 1921, is clear, and the lower court was right when it stated that it had virtually no power to grant the prayer asked for. The petitioner is the tenant and he claimed protection under the City Tenants Protection Act and filed the usual application under S. 9(1) to secure his entitlement to purchase that portion of the land in his occupation which would be necessary for the convenient enjoyment of the demise in his favour. The court below sustained the entitlement of the petitioner and granted relief. A Commissioner was appointed to find out the minimum extent of land which might be necessary for the convenient enjoyment by the tenant of the demise, who by then had admittedly put up a superstructure thereon. The court accepted the valuation made by the Commissioner, and finally fixed the price at Rs. 1,000/- and directed that the petitioner as tenant should pay that sum in monthly instalments of Rs. 31/-. The petition paid Rs. 31/- on 24th June, 1969, Rs, 93/- on 21st August, 1969, Rs. 155/. on 24th February, 1970 and Rs. 186/- on 20th August, 1970 and thereafter defaulted. It is common ground that within the period of three years from the date of the order made under S. 9(1)(b) of the Act the petitioner did not deposit the entire price as fixed by the Court. By reason of such default the landlord, claiming that he had secured a right under S. 9(2) of the Act, filed the prescribed application for the dismissal of the application made by the tenant to purchase the land and to enable him to purchase the superstructure by then put up by the tenant. It is represented by Mr. Kallappan that the landlords application has also since been ordered. The tenant, after the expiry of the period of three years from the date of the order which is the optimum limit fixed by the statute for the payment of the price ascertained by the Court, filed an application for the con donation of the delay, in such deposit of the price in 1974. He gave an excuse for such delayed application, which was followed by the payment of the unpaid price as fixed by the Court. He gave an excuse for such delayed application, which was followed by the payment of the unpaid price as fixed by the Court. The Court below held that, as the tenant had not paid the price within the period of three years from the date of the order made by the Court under S. 9(1)(b) of the Act, it had no jurisdiction to excuse the delay. It is as against this order the present revision petition has been filed. 2. Mr. O. Radhakrishnan contends that in equity, such an application ought to be ordered, even though that was filed beyond the period of three years expressly provided in both Ss. 9(1)(a) and 9(2) of the Act. According to him, such an application should he treated as an application for condonation of delay on proof of sufficient cause and that S. 5 of the Limitation Act can also be invoked, as is usually done, in an application filed by a tenant under S. 9(2) of the Act to condone payment of the defaulted instalment. On the other hand, it is submitted that S. 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked in such a case and that the equity pleaded by the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot benefit him. 3. A person who seeks equity should do equity. It is an essential principle. When the statute at more than one place has prescribed the period within which the price fixed by the court should be paid by the tenant claiming protection under the City Tenants Protection Act, 1921, then such a distinct pointer cannot be insignificant ignored and whittled down. Under S. 9(1)(b) of the Act courts are powerless to grant time to tenants for the payment of the price fixed by them beyond the period of three years, from the date of the order in which they so fix the price as well as delineate the minimum extent of the land which should be allotted to the tenant to enable him to purchase the same. This outer limit is unalterable. That this is the true intent and import of this period fixed under S. 9(1)(b) of the Act is also clear from a fair reading of S. 9(2). This outer limit is unalterable. That this is the true intent and import of this period fixed under S. 9(1)(b) of the Act is also clear from a fair reading of S. 9(2). Under that sub-Section the Court is, no doubt, empowered to excuse the delay in the payment of the instalments and directed by the court, but the Legislatu re has taken the precaution of reiterating that, when the court excuses such delay and passes any order consequent thereupon, it shall not extend the time for payment “beyond the three years above mentioned”. The phrase “above mentioned” has a relation to the time limit prescribed by S. 9(1)(b), which as already stated, fixes the outer Limit of not more than three years from the date of the order made under S. 9(1)(b). S. 9(2) read it conjunction with S. 9(1)(b) would not obviously entitle the civil court seized of such matters to excuse the delay in the payment of the price as fixed by the court beyond the period of three years from the date of its order. It is not in dispute in this case that default was made and that the defaulted instalments were paid after the expiry of the period of three years from the date of the order of the court made under S. 9(1)(b). Such a payment can be ignored by the landlord as non-est. It is in these circumstances that the court below stated that it had no jurisdiction to excuse the delay in the payment of the defaulted instalments. It may be that in equity the petitioner might have sufficient cause in not having come to court within the period of three years. But the question is, when the Legislature has fixed the outer limit and if the limit was in its mind when it laid down not only the text of S. 9(1)(b) but also S. 9(2), then, in my opinion, importance has to be given to the period so fixed and it cannot be extended on the invocation of the principles of equity. As I said, the person who claims equity should do enquity. Ignorantia Juris Non ex-cusat. The petitioner cannot plead ignorance of the law. He ought to have filed the application and paid the full amount within the period of three years from the date of the order made by the court under S. 9(1)(b) of the Act. As I said, the person who claims equity should do enquity. Ignorantia Juris Non ex-cusat. The petitioner cannot plead ignorance of the law. He ought to have filed the application and paid the full amount within the period of three years from the date of the order made by the court under S. 9(1)(b) of the Act. That has not been done in this case. The petitioner cannot complain, and the order of the court below is right. 4. The civil revision petitions are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.