JUDGMENT K.C. Aggarwal, J. - House No. 54, Hewett Road, Allahabad belongs to Chandramani Chaubey, father of respondent No. 1. The said premises was let at to the Municipal Board, Allahabad in the year 1943. The Municipal Board, Allahabad was runining a primary school in the said premises. Subsequently the status of the Municipal Board was raised to that of a Corporation or Nagar Mahapalika. Since then the primary school was being managed, administered and controlled by the Nagar Mahapalika. It appears that by U.P. Basic Education Act, 1972, the management and control of the Nagar Palikas of the local bodies over the primary schools were taken over by the U.P. Board of Basic Education. As a result of the enforcement of the aforesaid Act, the management and control of the primary school which was being run in the premises in question was also taken over by the U.P. Basic Eduction Board. 2. The respondent No. 1 filed application on September 23, 1970 under section 16 for the release of the said building on the ground that as the Nagar Mahapalika, which was his tenant, had unauthorisedly permitted the building to be occupied by the U.P. Board of Basic Education, the building would be deemed be vacant under section 12 of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 and was thus open for being proceeded with under section 16 of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972. 3. The application was resisted by the U.P. Basic Education Board on the ground that the application filed by the respondent No. 1 was mis-conceived inasmuch as section 12 did not apply to the present case. The Board alleged that by the enforcement of U. P. Basic Education Act, the Board had entered into the shoes of Nagar Mahapalika, therefore, the possession of the said Board for all intents and purposes was in place of the Nagar Mahapalika. On that grounds the Board alleged that the building could not be deemed to be vacant for the purposes of section 12. The contention raised on behalf of U.P. Basic Education Board was controverted by the respondent on the ground that the Nagar Mahapalika having itself admitted that it had ceased to be a tenants of the premises in question, there was no occasion for the Board to assert that it was occupying the premises in possession of the Nagar Mahapalika. 4. The contention raised on behalf of U.P. Basic Education Board was controverted by the respondent on the ground that the Nagar Mahapalika having itself admitted that it had ceased to be a tenants of the premises in question, there was no occasion for the Board to assert that it was occupying the premises in possession of the Nagar Mahapalika. 4. The application made by the respondent No. 1 was rejected by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on February 24, 1975. Against the said order the respondent No. 1 preferred an appeal before the District Judge. The appeal was allowed and the case was sent back to the Rent Control and Eviction Office for a fresh decision. On remand the application was again dismissed by the Real Control and Eviction Officer on October 28, 1975. Aggrieved, the respondent No. 1 preferred an appeal before the District Judge. The appeal was allowed by the impugned judgment on 6th of February 1976. The learned District Judge found that as the Nagar Mahapalika had given possession of the building or premises, belonging to the respondent No. 1, to the U.P. Board of Basic Education, therefore, the building would be deemed to be vacant within the meaning of clause (b) of sub section (1) of section 12. On this finding the view taken was that the possession of the Basic Board was illegal and, therefore, the premises should be deemed to be vacant for the purposes of being proceeded with under section 16. On this finding the District Judge directed for the release of the premises in favour of the said respondent. Feeling aggrieved, the Basic Education authorities have come to this court by means of the present writ petition. 5. Sri S.K. Taneja, counsel for the respondent No. 1, raised the preliminary objection to the maintainability of the present writ petition on the ground that the petitioners having been found to have no right in the premises as a tenant, or sub tenant did not have any right to challenge the validity of the order of the District Judge by means of the writ petition. He submitted that in any view of the matter as the writ jurisdiction is discretionary in its nature, this the court should refuse to grant any relief to the present petitioners. He submitted that in any view of the matter as the writ jurisdiction is discretionary in its nature, this the court should refuse to grant any relief to the present petitioners. After hearing counsel for the parties, I do not find any substance in the preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel. The impugned order of the District Judge directly hits the U.P. Education Board which is at present running the primary school. As a result of the impugned order the Board would be liable to be evicted and it would have therefore to shift the school some where else. Accordingly, in my opinion, if any body at present is aggrieved by the impugned order it is the said Board. An aggrieged person is only required to establish that he has been injured by the impugned order. As in the instant case such an injury is obvious the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 about the maintainability of the writ petition, must fail. 6. Coming to the merits, the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that on account of the smendment made in U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 by U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976, the provisions of the said Act do not apply to a public building. He made reference to the definition of the word 'public building' given in clause (o) of section 3 and urged that as the building was on lease, the Act did not apply and, therefore, no action is possible to be taken against the petitioners under the New Act now. The submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioners was controverted by Sri Taneja, counsel for respondent. He invited my attention to a letter of Nagar Mahapalika which its been filed along with the counter affidavit as Annexure C.A. I and urged that a the Nagar Mahapalika has surrendered its tanancy, the lease which was panted in its favour does not subsist. As the present writ petition is to succeed on another point submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners, I do not wish to go into this controversy at this stage of the case. The decision on this question would require going into the facts and the evidence. I, therefore, do not wish to express any concluded opinion on this controversy. 7. The decision on this question would require going into the facts and the evidence. I, therefore, do not wish to express any concluded opinion on this controversy. 7. The next point urged by learned Counsel for the petitioners was that an order of release in sub-section 16 of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 can be passed by a court or an authority only finding that the need of the landlord is bona fide. Any order of release without finding that the need of a landlord is genuine would be contrary to sub-section (2) of section 16 and cannot, therefore, be sustained. The submission made is well founded Section 16(2) lays down in clear terms that in an application for release the landlord is required to establish that purpose for which the building is required by him is bona fide. Since the recording of a finding on the question of bona fide requirement is a condition precedent for the exercise of powers conferred by sub-section (2) of section 16, the impugned order of the District Judge releasing the premises to the respondent No. 1 having been made without such finding is illegal and therefore cannot be upheld. 8. Sri S.K. Taneja, counsel for the respondents, however contended that action 18 read with section 10 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 does not indicate that a court exercising its appellate jurisdiction is also obliged to record a finding in terms of sub section (2) of section 16 and, therefore, the omission to record such a finding in the instant case cannot be treated as illegal. The submission made is devoid of substance. It is settled that an appellate court has the same powers trying an appeal as the original court has. The appellate court, therefore, was as much bound to exercise the power in accordance with sub-section (2) of section 16 as the Rent Control and Eviction Officer.To my mind sub section (2) of section 16 is mandatory. Accordingly, the judgment of the learned District Judge is liable to be quashed. The appellate court, therefore, was as much bound to exercise the power in accordance with sub-section (2) of section 16 as the Rent Control and Eviction Officer.To my mind sub section (2) of section 16 is mandatory. Accordingly, the judgment of the learned District Judge is liable to be quashed. As the decision on the first question which was urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners is to be given after taking evidence from the parties, appears appropriate to send back,the case to Rent Control and Eviction Officer instead of District Judge especially when the District Judge has no power of release or allotment after the enforcement of U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976. 9. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and judgment of the learned District Judge dated 6.2-1976 is quashed. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer is directed to decide application afresh. No order as to costs.