Judgement SARMA, J.:- This is a Letters Patent Appeal against the judgment and decree of the learned Single Judge dated 8th August, 1974 passed in First Appeal No. 45 of 1965 modifying the decree of the trial court. 2. The plaintiffs brought the suit for declaration of his title to the suit land, for confirmation of possession thereon as well as for partition. The suit land originally appertained to cadestral patta No. 129 which stood in the names of two brothers, namely, Anchal Mea, predecessor of the plaintiff and Latu Mea, predecessor of the defendants. The patta covered an area of 74B. 19k. and 4Ch. The cadestral patta was resurveyed in five pattas during the first resettlement operation. The five resettlement pattas are first R.S. Patta Nos. 165, 179, 180, 181 and 182. These five R. S. Pattas were again resurveyed during the second resettlement operation in nine pattas, namely, second R. S. Patta Nos. 261, 248, 249, 250, 251, 231, 240, 253 and 254. The original pattadars, namely, Anchal Mea and Latu Mea died leaving several heirs, each. Although each of them left several heirs, there is no dispute now that the plaintiff Mosaid Mea who was the son of Anchal Mea came to be the owner of the entire land falling in the share of Anchal Mea by right of inheritance as well as by purchase from other co-sharers. Similarly, although there were various other heirs left by Latu Mea, there is no dispute that present defendants have become the owners of the entire share of Latu Mea by inheritance as well as by purchase from other co-shares. 3. According to the plaintiff his predecessor Anchal Mea had 46B. 4K. 6Ch. of land in Cadestral Patta No. 129 and his brother Latu Mea had only 28B. 14K. 14Ch. of land. Besides 46B. 4K. and 6Ch. of land left by Anchal Mea, the plaintiff claimed in the plaint another 4B. 14K. 3Ch. of land by purchase from some of the heirs of Latu Mea under three sale deeds. Thus the plaintiff claimed 50B. 18K. 19Ch, of land in the disputed pattas by right of inheritance and purchase. As 1B. 14K. 10Ch. and 16G. of land, out of the aforesaid area, was eroded by river, the plaintiff prayed for a declaration of his title to 49B. 3K. 14Ch. and 4G. Thus the plaintiff claimed 50B. 18K. 19Ch, of land in the disputed pattas by right of inheritance and purchase. As 1B. 14K. 10Ch. and 16G. of land, out of the aforesaid area, was eroded by river, the plaintiff prayed for a declaration of his title to 49B. 3K. 14Ch. and 4G. of land in the disputed pattas and also for confirmation of his possession and partition. 4. The defendants case is that the two brothers, Anchal Mea and Latu Mea were the owners of equal interest in the disputed cadestral patta No. 129. The defendants further case is that by his purchase under 3 sale deeds Exts. 10, 11 and 18 the plaintiff could not acquire any interest over 4B. 14K and 3Ch. of land as the defendants had earlier repurchased this land from Khurshed Ali to whom their predecessor Anju Mea had sold the same. 5. Both the parties adduced oral as well as documentary evidence in support of their respective cases and on a consideration of the same the learned Subordinate Judge decreed in full the plaintiffs suit, i.e. in respect of 49B. 3K. 14Ch. and 4G. of land in the disputed patta. Being aggrieved by the decree of the trial court the defendants filed an appeal before this Court, which was heard and disposed of by a single Judge, as indicated above, by his judgment dated 8-8-74. 6. On a consideration of the evidence on record, the learned single Judge held that the predecessors of both the parties, namely, Anchal Mea and Latu Mea held equal interest in the cadestral patta i.e. 37B. 9K. 10Ch. of land each. He also found that the plaintiff acquired his interest to an area of another 3B. 10K. by purchase under 3 sale deeds marked Exts. 10, 11 and 18. Thus the learned Judge found that the plaintiff had his interest over an area of 40B. 19K. and 10Ch. of land in the disputed pattas. But as an area of 1B. 14K. 10Ch. and 16G. had been eroded by river out of this area, he decreed the plaintiffs suit in respect of 39B. 4K. 15Ch. and 14G. only. 7. It may be mentioned here that during the pendency of the appeal the original plaintiff-respondent Mosad Mea having died, his legal representatives were substituted as respondents. 8. 14K. 10Ch. and 16G. had been eroded by river out of this area, he decreed the plaintiffs suit in respect of 39B. 4K. 15Ch. and 14G. only. 7. It may be mentioned here that during the pendency of the appeal the original plaintiff-respondent Mosad Mea having died, his legal representatives were substituted as respondents. 8. Being aggrieved by the decree of the learned single Judge, the plaintiff-respondents have filed this Letters Patent Appeal. The defendant-respondents have also filed a cross-objection in respect of 3B. 10K. of land to which the plaintiff was found to be entitled by right of purchase under sale deeds Exts. 10, 11 and 18. 9. The only point for determination in this appeal is whether the two brothers, namely, Anchal Mea and Latu Mea had equal shares in C. S. Patta No. 129, as alleged by the defendants or they had unequal shares in the said patta, as alleged by the plaintiff. 10. It is an admitted fact that Anchal Mea and Latu Mea in whose name C. S. Patta No. 129 was issued were brothers and they inherited the land of the patta from their father. That being so, the natural presumption would be that both the brothers had equal shares in the land of the patta. The defendants alleged that before C. S. Patta No. 129 was issued, the suit land appertained to Khasra patta No. 53/55 which also contained other lands and at that time Latu Mea disposed of some lands from his share in the said Khasra patta and that is why his share in C. S. Patta No. 129 came to be lesser than that of his brother Anchal Mea. The plaintiff, however, could not prove that Latu Mea disposed of lands from his share to the extent of 18B or so to bring down his interest in the cadestral patta to only 28B. and odd as against 46B. 4K and 6Ch. of his brother Anchal Mea. The plaintiff proved only one sale deed which was marked Ext. 56 by which Latu Mea sold 1 kedar of land i.e. 1B. 1K. 4Ch of land in favour of two persons, namely Abdul Rokman Mea Barbhuyan and Umed Raja Mea Barbhuyan. On the other hand the defendants have proved two sale deeds which were marked Exts. The plaintiff proved only one sale deed which was marked Ext. 56 by which Latu Mea sold 1 kedar of land i.e. 1B. 1K. 4Ch of land in favour of two persons, namely Abdul Rokman Mea Barbhuyan and Umed Raja Mea Barbhuyan. On the other hand the defendants have proved two sale deeds which were marked Exts. L and M by which Latu Mea purchased 5 kedars of land from one Chandan Jugini in Khasra patta No. 53/55. The contention of the plaintiff that the share of Latu Mea in the C. S. Patta No. 129 was reduced to 28 bighas and odd only, as against 46B, and odd of his brother Anchal Mea on account of the fact that he had disposed of his remaining lands, before the issue of the cadestral patta could not be substantiated. On the other hand the defendants proved the certified copy of a sale deed executed by Anchal Mea in favour of the plaintiff and his mother on 2-4-1906 before the single Judge at the time of hearing of the appeal by way of additional evidence under Order 41, Rule 27. By this sale deed Anchal Mea sold 37B. 9K. 10Ch. of land covered by C. S. Patta No. 129 i.e. the disputed patta. In this sale deed, the land sold has been described as below "the land described in the schedule of the sale deed measuring 37B. 9K. 10Ch. covered by patta No. 129 of village Mohanpur Part II of Sub-division Hailakandi, Disict Cachar, being the half share of the total land of the patta which was my originally settled land with revenue of Rs. 22/15/6 P., being the half of the total revenue of Rs. 45 and As. 15." The recitals in this sale deed make it clear that the two brothers had equal shares in C. S. Patta No. 129. 11. Mr. A.K. Laskar, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted before us that the aforementioned sale deed dated 2nd April, 1906 executed by Anchal Mea does not go to show that he had no other land in the patta except 37B 9K and 10Ch. of land which he had sold to his son Mosaid Ali Barbhuyan and his wife Mahat Bibi. A.K. Laskar, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted before us that the aforementioned sale deed dated 2nd April, 1906 executed by Anchal Mea does not go to show that he had no other land in the patta except 37B 9K and 10Ch. of land which he had sold to his son Mosaid Ali Barbhuyan and his wife Mahat Bibi. He further submitted that if his entire land in the patta was sold in favour of the plaintiff and his mother Mahat Bibi under the said sale deed, the plaintiff would have no occasion to purchase the interest of his two sisters, namely, Jarina Bibi and Rabejan Bibi under sale deeds Exts. 7 and 8 which were not challenged by the defendants. 12. In our opinion the recitals in the sale deed dated 2nd April, 1906 executed by Anchal Mea in favour of the plaintiff and his mother, are clear enough to indicate that he had only half share in the patta, i.e. to the extent of 37B. 9K. 10Ch. The other contention is also without any substance. By Ext. 7 Jarina Bibi, a sister of the plaintiff, sold 6B. 9K. 12Ch. to him (plaintiff) and similarly by Ext. 8 the heirs of Musst. Robejan, another sister of the plaintiff, sold to him 6B. 9K. 12Ch. of land. If Anchal Mea had 46B. 4K. 6Ch. of land in the C. S. Patta No. 129, as alleged by the plaintiff, after he had sold 37B. 9K. 10Ch. of land to the plaintiff and his mother by sale deed 2nd April, 1906, he would have been left with only 8B. 14K. 12Ch. of land to be inherited by his wife, one son i.e. the plaintiff and two daughters, namely, Jarina and Robejan. In that case Jarina and Robejan could not have inherited 6B. 9K. 12Ch. of land, each in C. S. Patta No. 129 from their father to be transferred to the plaintiff afterwards under Exts. 7 and 8. If these sale deeds are genuine, the heirs of Anchal Mea gave a go-by to the sale deed dated 2-4-1906 and treated the entire original interest of Anchal Mea in the patta as available for inheritance by all his heirs. Be that as it may, it has not been challenged on behalf of the appellants that Anchal Mea in fact executed the sale deed dated 2-4-1906. Be that as it may, it has not been challenged on behalf of the appellants that Anchal Mea in fact executed the sale deed dated 2-4-1906. In the plaint as well as in his evidence, the plaintiff referred to this sale but for obvious reasons he did not produce the sale deed in court. Thus, in any view of the case, we are unable to hold that the learned single Judge was wrong in coming to his finding that Anchal Mea and Latu Mea predecessors of the plaintiff and the defendants, respectively, had equal interest in the patta. The learned Single Judge was, therefore, perfectly justified in modifying the decree of the trial court on the basis of this finding. This brings us to the cross-objection filed by the defendant-respondents. 13. The appellants have taken a preliminary objection that in a Letters Patent Appeal, the provisions of Rule 22 of Order 41 of the C.P.C. are not applicable and, therefore, no cross-objection lies. This question is not free from difficulty and the High Courts are not unanimous on the point. Prior to the Privy Council decision in Sabitri Thakurani v. Savi, AIR 1921 PC 80, all the High Courts before which this question came up for consideration, held that no cross-objection lies, on the footing that the provisions of Order 41 of the C.P.C. were not applicable in a Letters Patent appeal. In the aforesaid decision the Privy Council held that Order 41 of the C.P.C. is applicable to Letters Patent appeal. The point for determination in that case was whether Rule 10 of Order 41 regarding Appellate Courts power to require appellant to furnish security for costs is applicable in Letters Patent Appeal and it was decided in the affirmative. After this decision, a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Venkateshan Chetty v. Motichand, AIR 1926 Mad 316, overruling its earlier decision in Bhimasena v. Venugopal, AIR 1925 Mad 725, held that a respondent in a Letters Patent Appeal from the original side, could file cross-objection. Similarly, the Calcutta High Court also has held in State of West Bengal v. Ruttonjee, AIR 1970 Cal 548 , departing from its earlier decision in Brojendra v. Prasunna, AIR 1920 Cal 776 held that O.41 Rule 22 of the C. P. C. was applicable to Letters Patent Appeal and therefore cross-objection lies. Similarly, the Calcutta High Court also has held in State of West Bengal v. Ruttonjee, AIR 1970 Cal 548 , departing from its earlier decision in Brojendra v. Prasunna, AIR 1920 Cal 776 held that O.41 Rule 22 of the C. P. C. was applicable to Letters Patent Appeal and therefore cross-objection lies. The Lahore High Court has also taken a similar view in Khazanchi v. Niaz Ali, AIR 1940 Lah 438. The Allahabad High Court has however taken a contrary view in Daropudi v. S.K. Dutta, AIR 1957 All 43 in spite of the Privy Council decision aforesaid. In taking this view the Court followed the principle laid down in its earlier Full Bench decision in Mt. Abhilakhi v. Sadanand, AIR 1931 All 244, where it was held that no application for review lies before a Bench hearing an appeal from the decision of a single Judge. The reason assigned by the Allahabad High Court in AIR 1931 All 244 for taking such view was that procedure is one thing and power is another thing. A Bench hearing a Letters Patent Appeal derives its jurisdiction to hear the appeal from the Letters Patent and not from the Code. As the Letters Patent has not provided for any review, the court cannot entertain any review petition in Letters Patent appeal. For the same reason, in AIR 1957 All 48 (supra), it was held that no cross-objection lies in a Letters Patent appeal as the Letters Patent has not provided for any such cross-objection. 14. We may also mention here that the Letters Patent Appeal dealt with by the Allahabad High Court in AIR 1957 All 48 (supra) was from the decision of a single Judge in a Second Appeal. As the Lahore High Court observed: "The matter might be different in the case of a second appeal, for, a Letters Patent Appeal in such a case is possible with the certificate of the Judge who heard the case in a single Bench. Therefore the question of cross-objection in such a case might raise a question of jurisdiction as distinct from a matter of procedure." 15. Therefore the question of cross-objection in such a case might raise a question of jurisdiction as distinct from a matter of procedure." 15. Adopting the reasoning given by the Privy Council in Sabitri Thakuranis case (AIR 1921 PC 80), though in a different context, we respectfully agree with the view taken by the Madras, Calcutta and Lahore High Courts in AIR 1926 Mad 316 (FB) AIR 1970 Cal 548 and AIR 1940 Lah 438, respectively, that cross-objection lies in Letters Patent Appeal from a decision of the single Bench Judge in the First Appeal. 16. Even if it is assumed that the respondent has no right to file any cross-objection in such an appeal, the power of the Court in dealing with an appeal, to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made, as justice of the case may require, is there as provided in Rule 33 of O.41 of the C.P.C. Having thus disposed of the preliminary objection of the appellants we now proceed to decide the cross-objection on merits. 17. As already pointed out, by the cross-objection the respondents have challenged the decree of the learned single Judge in respect of 3B 10K of land which was claimed by the plaintiff on the basis of three sale deeds, namely, Exts. 10, 11 and 18. At the time of hearing the learned counsel for the respondents challenged the decree of the learned single Judge in respect of 1B. 3K. 6Ch. of land. In this regard his contention was as below: One Khursed Ali purchased 5B 9K 6Ch. of land from late Arju Mea, predecessor of defendants by two sale deeds, namely, Exts. 53 dated 8-4-1920 and Ext. 54 dated 18-3-1926. Earlier he had purchased 2B. 8K. 8Ch. of land from Moirang Bibi, a daughter of late Latu Mea under sale deed Ext. E dated 16-10-1906. Thus Khursed purchased in all 7B 17K 14Ch. in the disputed patta. Out of this land he sold back to Arju Mea 4B 6K 0ch. of land under two sale deeds, namely, Ext. 1 dated 18-3-26 and Ext. J dated 27-2-29. He also sold 2B. 8K 8Ch. of land to his son Mayor on 3-4-38 vide sale deed Ext. K. Thus, after these three sales, Khursed was left with only 1B. 3K. 6Ch. of land alone in the patta. The plaintiff claimed to have purchased 2B. 14K. 1 dated 18-3-26 and Ext. J dated 27-2-29. He also sold 2B. 8K 8Ch. of land to his son Mayor on 3-4-38 vide sale deed Ext. K. Thus, after these three sales, Khursed was left with only 1B. 3K. 6Ch. of land alone in the patta. The plaintiff claimed to have purchased 2B. 14K. 9Ch. of land from Khursed under two sale deeds, Exts. 10 and 11 dated 1-5-42 and 15-3-45, respectively. As at that point of time Khursed was left with only 1B. 3K. 6Ch. of land, the plaintiff could not claim more than that area by his purchase. Having realised this position, the plaintiff prayed for a declaration that the sale deed Ext. K (it was also marked as Ext. 55) executed by Khursed in favour of Mayor Ali is void. The learned trial court granted this prayer, but the learned single Judge failed to consider this aspect altogether. 18. Mr. A.K. Laskar, the learned counsel for the respondents challenged the claim of the respondents, in their cross-objection only on the basis of the sale deed Ext. K. If this document is valid, the contention of the respondents must be upheld. 19. In its judgment the trial court held that this document is not genuine, simply on the ground that Khursed Alis name was written as executant under his `Nisan and it was not signed by himself and the man who wrote his name on his behalf was also not examined. We however find that in the sale deeds Exts. 10 and 11 which were relied on by the plaintiff Khursed Alis names were similarly written under his `Nisan and the persons who wrote his name in the sale deeds were not examined. It also appears that the plaintiff did not challenge the sale deed Ext. K at the time of hearing and he led no evidence on that point. The trial Judge himself has observed in his judgment at page 45 of the Paper Book that the plaintiff did not challenge this deed. In these circumstances we fail to understand how the sale deed Ext. K could be said to be not genuine. It appears the learned single Judge, while disposing of the appeal inadvertently lost sight of this aspect of the case. 20. From the foregoing discussion it is seen that the plaintiff can get only 1B. 3K. 6Ch. In these circumstances we fail to understand how the sale deed Ext. K could be said to be not genuine. It appears the learned single Judge, while disposing of the appeal inadvertently lost sight of this aspect of the case. 20. From the foregoing discussion it is seen that the plaintiff can get only 1B. 3K. 6Ch. of land by his purchase under sale deeds Exts. 10 and 11. His title to 15K 7Ch of land purchased under another sale deed Ext. 18 dated 2-7-30 from Arju Mea was not challenged by the defendant-respondents. Thus in all he is entitled to get 1B. 18K. 13Ch. of land under the sale deeds Exts. 10, 11 and 18 in addition to 37B. 9K. 10Ch. of land representing original half share in the patta, totalling 39B 8K 1Ch. Out of this area, admittedly 1B. 14K. 10Ch. 16 Gondas has been eroded by a river leaving only 37B 13K 6Ch 4 Gondas of land for the plaintiff. 21. In the result we modify the decree of the learned single Judge and decree the plaintiff suit for only 37B. 13K. 6Ch. and 4 Gondas. The appeal is dismissed and the cross-objection is partly allowed as indicated above. We however make no order as to costs. LAHIRI, J.:- I agree. Appeal dismissed. Cross objection partly allowed.