JUDGMENT A.P. Sen, J. 1. This appeal by the defendant is directed against a judgment of the Addl. District Judge, Burhanpur dated 11th May 1973, affirming the judgment and decree of the Civil Judge, Class I, Burhanpur dated 24th October 1972 decreeing the plaintiff's suit under section 12(1) (a) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. 2. The facts leading to the appeal shortly stated, are these. The plaintiff Bhagwandas is the Karta of a joint Hindu family owning a non-residential accommodation, situate at Chowk Bazar, Burhanpur. The joint family had not the means to repair the accommodation and, therefore, the plaintiff had to take a loan. The defendant Navnit Das, the in tending tenant, who now runs his 'Apsara Hotel' from the accommodation, agreed to advance a sum of Rs. 2,000/- to the plaintiff for re-construction of the accommodation which was to be let out to him on a monthly rent of Rs. 80/- for a period of five years, by an agreement dated 9-7-1965, Ex-P-1. The agreement recites that out of the stipulated rent of Rs. 80/-, the defendant would pay Rs, 20/- per month as rent and the remaining amount of Rs. 60/- would be adjusted to wards the loan till, the loan remained unpaid. The counter-part executed by the plaintiff undertaking to renovate the accommodation on these terms was executed the same day and is Ex.-D-1. It, however, appears that the sum of Rs. 2,000/- advanced by the defendant and, therefore, he advanced a further sum of Rs. 2,038/- for completing the work of re-construction, i.e., in all Rs. 4,038/-. 3. The suit accommodation was made suitable for running the hotel by the end of September 1965, and the defendant entered into his tenancy w.e.f. 1-10-1965. On 21-12-1966 there was a settlement of account between the parties and Ex-P-2 is the document executed by the defendant on the s me day, while Ex-D-1 is the counter-part executed by the plaintiff. These documents mention that the plaintiff owed Rs. 3,938/- to the defendant for his having financed the work of repairs that the defendant had paid till date Rs. 100/- by way of rent, as against the total arrears of Rs. 1,200/- for the period from 1-10-1965 to 31-12-1966 at Rs. 80/- per month leaving a balance of Rs. 1,100/- towards the arrears of rent, which was adjusted towards the loan amount of Rs. 100/- by way of rent, as against the total arrears of Rs. 1,200/- for the period from 1-10-1965 to 31-12-1966 at Rs. 80/- per month leaving a balance of Rs. 1,100/- towards the arrears of rent, which was adjusted towards the loan amount of Rs. 4,038/-, which left a balance of Rs. 2,838/-. It is significant that the parties did not describe the aforesaid amount of Rs 3,938/- advanced towards the cost of re-construction as rent in advance but as a loan. 4. The defendant not having adhered to the terms of the agreement dated 9-7-1965, Ex-P-I, stipulating payment of Rs. 20/- per month as rent the plaintiff served him with a notice of demand dated 16-5-1969. Ex.P-3, requiring him to pay Rs. 560/- as arrears of rent at that rate from 1-1-1967 to 30-4-1969. The defendant having failed to comply with the notice of demand, the plaintiff brought the suit for his eviction u/s 12(1) (a) of the Act. In addition, he also claimed his eviction u/s 12 (1) (f) and (o). The Courts below negatived the plaintiff's claim under clauses (f) and (o), but decreed his claim under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act. 5. The question that falls for determination in the appeal is, whether a tenant who has advanced money to the landlord under an agreement for the purpose of financing the work of construction or re-construction of the whole or part of the accommodation taken on lease by him can, in law, be regarded to be in 'arrears of rent' within the meaning of section 12 (1) (a) of the Act. If that be so, then the defendant having failed to pay or tender the arrears of rent after service of the notice of demand within the stipulated time, i.e., within two months from the date of receipt of such notice, and having not complied with the requirements of section 13(1), is not entitled to get the protection u/s 12 (3) and a decree for his eviction must follow u/s 12(1) (a) of the Act. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant advanced two contentions namely, (1) the stipulation in the agreement dated 9-7-1965, Ex, P-1, for payment of Rs. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant advanced two contentions namely, (1) the stipulation in the agreement dated 9-7-1965, Ex, P-1, for payment of Rs. 20/- as rent was void by reason of section 23 of the Contract Act as construction loan under sub-section (4) of section 6 is deemed to be the 'payment of rent in advance' and as such enforcement of the said agreement, according to him, would produce the very result which the law seeks to guard against, and (ii) the entire amount of loan of Rs. 4.038/- advanced by the defendant under the terms of the agreement, Ex. P-1, and thereafter towards the re-construction of the demised premises must even otherwise be, having regard to the legal fiction contained in sub-section (5) of section 6 of the Act, treated, in law, to be the payment of rent in advance and therefore, the defendant could not be regarded as being in arrears of rent within the meaning of section 12 (1) (a) of the Act. It is urged that the effect of the legal fiction cannot be curtailed by any agreement between the parties In support of the contentions, reliance is placed on the decisions of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Waman Shriniwas Kini v. Ratilal Bhagwandas & Co. AIR 1959 SC 689 , and Boucher Pierre Andre v. Superintendent, Central Jail AIR 1975 SC 164 , I am afraid, the contentions cannot be accepted. 7. The submission does not take note of the scope and effect of section 6 of the Act and the limited purpose for which the legal fiction is created in sub-section (5) thereof. The section was enacted to prevent exploitation of needy tenants by unscrupulous landlords by taking advantage of the acute scarcity of accommodation. It provides protection to the tenants against exorbitant charges by the landlords. The object of section 6 is to prevent the landlord from making up, for what he loses due to the Legislature standardizing rents and controlling evictions of his tenants, by taking what is popularly known as 'pagree' (i.e.. premium or fine) from his tenants. 8. The provisions of section 6 of the Act consist of two distinct parts dealing with different subject-matters. The first is comprised of sub-5ections (1), (2) and (3), while the second is comprised of sub-sections (4) and (5). premium or fine) from his tenants. 8. The provisions of section 6 of the Act consist of two distinct parts dealing with different subject-matters. The first is comprised of sub-5ections (1), (2) and (3), while the second is comprised of sub-sections (4) and (5). Under sub-section (1) of section 6, no person shall claim or receive any rent in excess of the standard rent, notwithstanding any contract to the contrary. Under section 6(2) (a), no person shall, in consideration of the grant, renewal or continuance of a tenancy or sub-tenancy of any accommodation claim or receive the payment of any sum as premium or pagree or claim or receive any consideration whatsoever, in cash or in kind, in addition to the rent. The receipt of all such sums is made a penal offence u/s 43 (2) of the Act. This would also include the receipt of a sum of money by a person who enters into an executory agreement to grant a lease of a building under construction. 9. The provisions of sub-sections (4) and (5) of section 6 are as follows:- "(4) Nothing in this section shall apply to any payment made under an agreement by any person to a landlord for the purpose of financing the construction of the whole or part of any accommodation on the land belonging to, or taken on lease by, the landlord, if one of the conditions of the agreement is that the landlord is to let that person the whole or part of the accommodation when completed for the use of that person or any member of his family; Provided that such payment shall not exceed the amount of agreed rent for a period of five years of the whole or part of the accommodation to be let to such person. (5) Any payment made under sub-section (4) shall be deemed to be the payment of rent in advance for such period from the commencement of the tenancy to which it is relatable." 10. (5) Any payment made under sub-section (4) shall be deemed to be the payment of rent in advance for such period from the commencement of the tenancy to which it is relatable." 10. The words "shall be deemed to be the payment of rent in advance", appearing in sub-section (5) of section 6 of the Act cannot be read in isolation but they must be read in the context in which they appear, In that context it would be clear that the legal fiction created therein is for the limited purpose of taking out from the mischief of section 6 (2) (a) of the Act, the advance of a construction loan by an intending tenant to the Landlord for the purpose of financing the construction of an accommodation the whole or part of which, when completed, is to be let to such person, as otherwise, such payment would be a penal offence u/s 43 (2) of the Act. 11. In Tolaram Relumal & Anr. v. The State of Bombay AIR 1954 SC 196, their lordships while interpreting section 18 (1) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 which is analogous to section 6 (2) (a) of the Act, held that an executory contract to grant a lease of a building under construction does not fall within the mischief of section 18 (1), saying: "It is obvious that on the basis of an executory agreement the appellants would not be entitled to receive any rent. They would only be entitled to receive rent after the lease is executed and actual demise of the premises or their transfer is made." Their Lordships in teaching that conclusion, indicated that the language of the section envisaged the existence of a lease and the payment of an amount in respect of that lease or with reference to that lease They then dealt with section 18 (3) of that Act which is in pari materia with section 6 (4) of the Act, and stated that the provision was added to the section by reason of the fact that some Courts had taken the view that executory agreements to grant a lease to a would be tenant by an intending builder, or anyone, fell within the mischief of section 18 (1), and the Legislature by enacting sub-section (3) made it clear that agreements of this nature were never intended to be included therein. According to their Lordships, section 18 (3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 was, therefore, in the nature of an explanation to section 18 (1) thereof. 12. That is the limited purpose for which the legal fiction is created in sub-section (5) of section 6 of the Act. It is to take all financing agreements outside the mischief of section 6 (2) (a), the contravention of which is a penal offence u/s 43 (2) of the Act. It would, therefore, appear that u/s 6 (4) of the Act the landlord may lawfully receive any payment under an agreement from any person for the purpose of financing the construction of an accommodation, on the condition that the whole or part of the accommodation, when completed, shall be let to that person. The expression 'rent in advance' appearing in section 6 (5) must, in the context, mean moneys paid to the landlord on account of rent before the rent has accrued due in respect of the grant of a lease. Rent paid in advance is not strictly rent but an advance. It is in the nature of a loan. See, In re. Chief Controlling Revenue Authority 53 BLR 1006. 13. It is settled law that for the creation of a valid lease u/s 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, the immovable property in respect of which lease is sought to be created, must be in existence. It is in the nature of a loan. See, In re. Chief Controlling Revenue Authority 53 BLR 1006. 13. It is settled law that for the creation of a valid lease u/s 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, the immovable property in respect of which lease is sought to be created, must be in existence. Where the erection of a building is sought to be financed by a would be tenant, the tenement would not be in existence, and there cannot be the "grant" of a lease of any premises.' The agreement of advancing such a loan would, in no circumstances, amount to a present demise. Further, the liability to pay rent can only arise under the lease and at stated period or on specific occasions mentioned in the lease, till the stated period or specific occasion arrives, there is no liability on the part of the lessee to pay rent. Therefore, if the lessee pays an amount in respect of the rent prior to the liability arising, i.e., before the rent has accrued due that payment is nothing more than an advance made by the lessee to the lessor. The legal character of that payment is not rent, but moneys advanced by the lessee to the lessor. The liability only crystalises and takes the character of rent when the stated period or specific occasion arrives for the lease, and the lessee becomes liable to pay rent. 14. The decision of their Lordships in Sushila Kashinath Dhonde & Ors v. Harilal Govindji Bhogani & Ors AIR 1971 SC 1495 dealing with analogous provision in section 18 (3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 lends support to the view that the advance of a construction loan by the would be tenant to the landlord, is nothing but a loan, and the parties standing in the relation of debtor and creditor. 15. In interpreting a provision creating a legal fiction, the Court has to ascertain for what purpose the fiction is created, and after ascertaining this, it has to assume all those facts and consequences which are incidental or inevitable corollaries to the giving effect to the fiction. 15. In interpreting a provision creating a legal fiction, the Court has to ascertain for what purpose the fiction is created, and after ascertaining this, it has to assume all those facts and consequences which are incidental or inevitable corollaries to the giving effect to the fiction. In Boucher Tierre Andre v. Superintendent Central Jail (supra) their Lordships stated:- "It is now well settled law that where a legal fiction is created, full effect must be given to it and it should be carried to its logical conclusion, To quote the words of Lord Asquith in East End Dwellings Co, Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council 1952 AC 109 at P. 132 : 'If you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, you must surely, unless prohibited from doing so, also imagine as real the consequences and incidents which, if the putative state of affairs had in fact existed, must inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it. One of these in this case is emancipation from the 1939 level of rents. The statute says that you must imagine a certain state of affairs; it does not say that having done so, you must cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs.' True, that full effect must be given to a statutory fiction and it should be carried to its logical conclusion. It is equally true that a legal fiction is not to be extended beyond the purpose for which it is created, or beyond the language of the section by which it is created. See, Commissioner of Income-tax v. Maharaj Kumar Kamal Singh AIR 1973 SC 1056 . Thus, the legal fiction created by section 6 (5) of the Act cannot be extended beyond the purpose for which it was created. 16. The decision of the Supreme Court in Waman Shriniwas Kini v. Ratilal Bhagwandas & Co., (supra), cannot in my view, be pressed into service for the construction of sub-section (5) of section 6 of the Act. That decision of their Lords hips turned on the provisions of section 15 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act. 1947 which prohibits sub-letting, and makes it unlawful for a tenant to assign or to transfer his interest in the premises let to him. That decision of their Lords hips turned on the provisions of section 15 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act. 1947 which prohibits sub-letting, and makes it unlawful for a tenant to assign or to transfer his interest in the premises let to him. There is a non-obstante clause contained in the section which would render all contracts entered into after the Act had come into force, contrary to the provisions of section 15, to be unenforceable. In that context, their Lordships stated:- "It was contended that S: 13 (1) (e) had to be read separately and not in conjunction with S. 15 of the Act. The section itself makes it quite clear that it is subject to the provision of S. 15 and the two sections must, therefore, be read together. The appellant pleaded that under the agreement between him and the respondent he was entitled to sub-let the premises. Such an agreement, in our opinion is void because of the provisions of S. 15 of the Act and S. 23 of the Contract Act and enforcement of the agreement would produce the very result which the law seeks to guard against and to prevent and by sustaining the plea of the appellant the Court would be enforcing an agreement which is prohibited and made illegal," 17. In my judgment, the deeming clause in sub-section (5) of section 6 of the Act does not nuke it unlawful for the parties to curtail the effect of the legal fiction. It is for the parties to an agreement for advance of a construction loan to decide the mode in which the loan is to be re-paid. Nothing, therefore, prevents them the to enter into an agreement as to the manner of such re-payment. It is open to them to stipulate that the whole of the rent which accrues due after the accommodation is let should be adjusted towards the re-payment of the debt, or a part thereof should be so applied, In the latter event, the balance would still be payable as rent. That was the effect of the agreement dated 9-7-1965, Ex. P-1, the language of which is clear and unambiguous, and I fail to see why the stipulation for payment of Rs. 20/- per month as rent till the loan remained unpaid, should be hit by section 23 of the Contract Act. That was the effect of the agreement dated 9-7-1965, Ex. P-1, the language of which is clear and unambiguous, and I fail to see why the stipulation for payment of Rs. 20/- per month as rent till the loan remained unpaid, should be hit by section 23 of the Contract Act. It is not prohibited by law, nor is it against public policy. 18. The result, therefore, is that the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee, as per schedule or certificate, whichever is less.