Ramaprasada Rao, J. -Defendants in O.S. No. 33 of 1975 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nagercoil, are the appellants. The relevant facts which led the plaintiff’s to file the present suit for declaration that the 1st plaintiff is entitled to administer the plaint properties which are trust properties, being the eldest male member and consequently karnavan of the tarwad, is as follows: 2. Long time before and which time is not known, the plaint schedule properties are said to have been endowed by the ancestors of the plaintiffs in favour of keezhatheru Illangam Badrakali Amman Temple. Admittedly, both the plaintiffs and the defendants are members of a Marumakkathayam tarwad. The properties of the temple constituted according to the plaintiffs, a private family trust. It is alleged that it had been the custom for the karnavan for the time being of the tarwad to act as trustee and administer the trust properties. There is no deed of trust and there is no significant material to prove dedication either. But we shall refer to that salient fact and hypothesis which was brought to the notice of the trial Court and to us on which both the plaintiffs and the defendants find a case of dedication. Originally, the tarwad constituted of two main branches. One branch consisted of Padmanabha Pillai Bhoothalingam Pillai and others. In the year 1105 ME. 1929 A.D. one Padmanabha Pillai Narayana Pillai was the sole surviving member in that branch. The second branch consisted of two sub-branches. The plaint allegations make it clear that the branch of Padmanabha Pillai Narayana Pillai and the sub-branch of the second branch became extinct and according to the plaintiffs the branch of Ananthapadmanabha Pillai Nellayandar Pillai alone got the right to administer the temple. The branches set out in the plaint, which is not necessary for us to recite herein, is contained in a clear cut genealogical table appended to the proceedings. 3. On the death of Ananthapadmanabha Pillai Nellayandar Pillai in or about 1948, Ananthapadmanabha Pillai Bhoothalingam Pillai, who is the father of defendants 1 to 3, being the senior most member, got into the management of the trust properties. 3. On the death of Ananthapadmanabha Pillai Nellayandar Pillai in or about 1948, Ananthapadmanabha Pillai Bhoothalingam Pillai, who is the father of defendants 1 to 3, being the senior most member, got into the management of the trust properties. The plaintiff’s case is that Ananthapadmanabha Pillai Bhoothalingam Pillai died in 1974 and the right to manage the trust vested with the senior most male member of the tarwad and in that behalf and as sons of Nagammal, the sister of Ananthapadmanabha Pillai Bhoothalingam Pillai, the 1st plaintiff as the eldest male member of such tarwad is entitled as of right, according to the personal law, to be in charge of the property and in accordance with the prevailing custom to seek for a declaration that he is entitled to administer the plaint trust solely for himself but as representative of the tarwad and incidentally has sought for possession of the plaint schedule properties from defendants 1 to 3, who apparently continued to be in possession of the office and the properties attached thereto, after the death of Ananthapadamanabha Pillai Bhoothalingam Pillai in 1974. 4. The defendants while denying firmly the allegations made in the plaint would aver that it was true that successive karnavans were managing the trust till the death of the father of the defendants, when the devolution fell on the defendants by reason of the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act. Mainly, the defendant’s case is that the office of the trusteeship in the instant case is decipherable from Exhibit B-1, which is a photostat copy of an inscription in the precinct of the temple which gave out the sum and sub-stance of the origin of the temple and the manner and method by which the properties of the temple were dedicated and it has to devolve accordingly. It is said that the plaintiffs cannot claim any right, much less, the 1st plaintiff cannot claim the sole right to be in charge of the properties of the temple as the trustee and also proclaim that as such karnavan of the tarwad in question he is entitled to be the sole trustee for the management of the temple properties. The following issues were framed by the trial Court: 1. Whether it had been the custom and usage in the trust that the same should be administered by successive karnavans of the tarwad? 2. The following issues were framed by the trial Court: 1. Whether it had been the custom and usage in the trust that the same should be administered by successive karnavans of the tarwad? 2. Whether the founder of the trust also intends that successive karnavans be the trustees? 3. Whether the relationship and details as regards the two main branches of the tarwad contained in paras. 4 to 6 of the plaint are correct? 4. Whether on the death of A. Bhoothalingam Pillai, the right of managing the trust vests with P. Pavanasam Pillai, the next karnavan and whether on the latter’s death, the right to manage vests with the 1st plaintiff? 5. Whether the defendants 1 to 3 are entitled to claim the office of trusteeship? 6. Whether the defendants 1 to 3 are guilty of acts of breach of trust? 7. What is the quantum of mesne profits derivable from plaint properties? 8. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to get recovery of possession of plaint properties? 9. To what relief plaintiffs are entitled? The trial Court held that by reason of the prevailing custom which enabled the plaintiffs to enter upon the office of trustee as claimed by them and as according to the said practice it was the eldest male member of the family who would be entitled to administer the plainttrust-properties, he gave a decree as prayed for. It is as against this, the present appeal has been filed. 5. The learned counsel for the appellants mainly urged two contentions — firstly, there being no guideline or any deed either expressly stated or by necessary inference to be gathered for the dedication of the suit properties in favour of an approved trust by the temple in question, the two rules of succession to the office which are available and could be taken advantage of by the parties to this action are — (i) succession by reason , of an existing practice or approved custom; (it) succession under the Hindu Succession Act. Pursuing the first contention, it is said that the learned trial Judge did not have such abundance of material as would be usually called upon by a civil Court to establish custom. Pursuing the first contention, it is said that the learned trial Judge did not have such abundance of material as would be usually called upon by a civil Court to establish custom. Even assuming that on the faint evidence that was sought to be introduced into the case on the foot of an earlier judgment — (Exhibit A-2 dated 16th August, 1935 — not wholly inter parties between the members of the tarwad) the prevalence of practice for a long time could be assumed, the argument is, by reason of section 4 (1) (a) of the Hindu Succession Act, this custom should be deemed to have been overridden by the express provisions of the Act and therefore succession to the office of the trustee should be worked out on that basis. Secondly, it is said that the office of trusteeship in the instant case is not a bare office of honour or prestige but an office which carries with it such integrated rights which projects in the holder a right to enjoy such properties and administer the same for the benefit of the trust. The integration of such right to hold a bare office together with the right to enjoy the properties annexed to that office makes such an office, an office which is equitable to and understood as property in law and so understood such property after the passing of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, should devolve in accordance with the provisions therein. Our attention has been drawn to section 7 of the Hindu Succession Act which in its turn overrides the normal law prevailing in Malabar, namely, the Marumakkathayam Law and it is said that notwithstanding the personal law which was in force prior to the passing of the Hindu Succession Act succession to the properties in the instant case has to be worked out in accordance with the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, more fully with reference to section 7 read and understood fully and completely. 6. 6. The learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, would emphasise that such was the practice so far as the instant temple administration is concerned that it cannot be overlooked that for a long period of time the practice was that the eldest member of the tarwad was the person who was recognised and accepted as the trustee of the temple and was also considered as an entity who would be entitled not only to administer the property annexed to it but also to be in possession of it for the purpose of such administration. Such being the custom and such custom having been established in the instant case, no other matter need be considered for the purpose of ascertaining the mode of succession to the office. On the other question as to the nature of the office in the instant case, which is a bare trusteeship of a temple for the purpose of administering it and incidentally to be in possession of the properties owned by the temple, it is argued that it cannot by any stretch of imagination be said to be property. It is a bare incorporeal right to be in charge of the properties of the temple and the entitlement of the person, who, for the time being is recognised by the tarwad as the person entitled to be the trustee of the temple holds only an office of honour which is not heritable under any provision of law and much less under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Pursuing this contention, it is said that the Hindu Succession Act is inapplicable to the facts of this case and even if it is to be held that section 4 overrides any such custom yet, section 7 prescribes the mode by which such properties, assuming it is property, should devolve, and the devolution of the ‘property’ should be worked out not in the manner suggested by the appellants but in accordance with the text of section 7 read with the first Explanation thereto. 7. In order to appreciate the contentions, it is necessary for us to refer to the fundamental basis on which the arguments are raised. 7. In order to appreciate the contentions, it is necessary for us to refer to the fundamental basis on which the arguments are raised. It is common ground that there is no deed of dedication in the instant case in and by which the properties have been dedicated to the temple, nor is there any deed or document prescribing the mode of succession to the office of trusteeship created in connection with the temple. We are to therefore fall back upon an inscription in the temple which is admittedly of the year 1949 Kollam era, which may be 1774 AD. As there is no controversy about the acceptance of the recitals in Exhibit B-1 we have looked into the recitals therein. We are extracting below the same: The sum and substance of the above excerpt is that — until the sun and moon rule the world, the trustee for the time being should be in enjoyment of the properties attached to the temple and be answerable to the other members of his family. Read in the context of the other recitals in the inscription, one gains the impression that the dedication is full and complete and the subject of the dedication is that the trustee for the time being should enjoy properties and be domestically accountable to the other members and also perform the various obligations more fully referred to therein. Prima facie therefore it cannot be said that under this inscription there was no beneficial right which the trustee obtained in relation to the properties. The right to enjoy the stated properties specifically provided for in the deed is so wide and unlimited that excepting for the obligation to perform those kattalais and other obligations tinder the citation there is nothing which prevented the trustee in charge to materially benefit thereby from being a trustee in office and contemporaneously be in possession of the properties for his own enjoyment. This by itself would be sufficient for us to dispose of this appeal as in our view the inscription and the citation referred to under Exhibit B-1 not only created an office of honour but also created an office to which is annexed si certain material ‘benefits which form part of the dedication. 8. Mr. Padmanabhan, the learned counsel for the respondents relied upon K. A. Samajam v. Commissioner, H.R. & C.E.1. 8. Mr. Padmanabhan, the learned counsel for the respondents relied upon K. A. Samajam v. Commissioner, H.R. & C.E.1. as also a Full Bench decision of our Court in Manathunainatha v. Sundaralingam2, to contend that the office of trustee is only a bare right to manage and administer the secular estate of the institution or the endowment and it does not carry with it any proprietary or beneficial interest either in the corpus or in the usufruct of the estate. In K. A. Samajam v. Commissioner, H.R. & C.E.3, the Supreme Court indeed laid down the proposition that the position of a hereditary trustee does not appear to be in any way different from that of a Dharmakartha or a mere manager or custodian of an institution or endowment. There is one exception only. The hereditary trustee succeeds to the office as of right and in accordance” with the rules governing succession. But in all other respects his duties and obligations are the same as that of Dharmakartha. No one has ever suggested that a hereditary trustee can be equated to a Shebait of a religious institution or Madhathipathi or the Mahant. The ingredients of both office and property, of duties and personal interest are blended together in the rights of a Mahant as also a She bait and a Madhathipathi. The position of Dharmakartha, on the other hand, is not that of a She bait of a religious institution or of the head of a math. They followed the opinion expressed by the Court in an earlier case Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji v. State of Rajasthan4. 9. It is seen even from the ratio of the Supreme Court decision in the above case that in cases, where there is no blending of the office with ‘property’ and there is no integration of duties and personal interest of the trustee, then the office would be considered as a bare office of honour and not as property within the meaning of Article 19 of the Constitution of India. As a matter of fact, a poser was assumed by the Supreme Court itself in that case when they said: “We may add that even if it was held that the rights in question constituted ‘property’ their regulation by the relevant provisions of the Act would undoubtedly be protected by Article 19 (5)”. As a matter of fact, a poser was assumed by the Supreme Court itself in that case when they said: “We may add that even if it was held that the rights in question constituted ‘property’ their regulation by the relevant provisions of the Act would undoubtedly be protected by Article 19 (5)”. The emphasis therefore in that case was on the question whether the office of hereditary trustee or trusteeship of an endowment would be property for the purpose of Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. It was this probably which was responsible for the Supreme Court to take the view that the opinion expressed by the Court in Sambandamurthi Mudaliar v. Slate of Madras5, was rot necessary for a decision of that case. 10. Even our Full Bench in Manathunainatha v. Sundaralingam2., reiterated the same principle laying accent upon the difference between the position and functions of the Dharmakartha of a religious endowment in the south on one hand and poosaries, archakas, mahants, heads of Mutts and She baits of North India on the other. The Dharmakartha is a mere manager, his liabilitity will be that of a trustee, but he holds an office The learned Judges also observed: “It may be held individually, collectively or by a family or by a number of families.” Undoubtedly, therefore if it is proved beyond doubt, in the facts and circumstances of a particular case, that the office of Dharmakartha was merely an office of honour without there being any personal interest or material benefit attached to that office in relation to the endowment or the temple in question, then such office of Dharmakartha or a trustee is not ‘property’. In the above Full Bench case the learned Judges expressed the view that the office may be held by an individual or collectively by persons or by a family or by a number of families. Necessarily therefore, if a dispute arises as between one family and another family who are competing for the office or between individuals or between one group of persons or another group of persons, then a formula has necessarily to be found as to which group has to be preferred or which individual has to be preferred. Then again the question comes — what is the law of succession which should apply in that particular case ? 11. Then again the question comes — what is the law of succession which should apply in that particular case ? 11. We would have felt a real embarrassment in this case having regard to the pronouncements of the Supreme Court in K.A. Samajam v. Commissioner, H.R. and C.E.1. But we have two decisions of the Supreme Court which emphatically support the view that such rights of trusteeship are ‘property’. The first one is C. Sethurayar v. Arumanayagam2. There in interpreting a will, the Court observed that at one particular point of time the prescribed mode of trusteeship delineated in the will of the testator came to an end and thereafter the Court was of the view that the succession was regulated by the ordinary rule of Mitakshara Law as the parties were Hindus. Ex facie this Rule was made relying upon the observations of the Privy Council in Sethuramaswamiar v. Meruswamiar3,which stated: “Assuming without deciding that the expression ‘property’ used in Act IE of 1929 does not include a trusteeship-right still it is a well established proposition of law that succession to trusteeship similar to the one before us is governed by the ordinary rules, of inheritance under the Hindu Law”. 12. In that case, the question arose; whether Act II of 1929 which amended the general law of inheritance in certain respects should be given effect to in. regard to succession to trusteeship as well. Dealing with this, the Supreme Court observed as above. They also accepted another quotation though that was in relation to the shebaitship of a temple and observed as follows: “Assuming that the word ‘property’ in Act XVIII of 1937 is to be interpreted to mean property in its common and ordinarily accepted sense and is not to be extended to any special or peculiar type of property even then we think that the other contention of Mr. Tek Chand is perfectly sound Succession to Shebaitship, even though there is an ingredient of office in it follows succession to ordinary or secular property. It is the general law of succession that governs succession to shebaitship as well. While the general law has now been changed by reason of Act XVIII of 1937 there does not appear to be any cogent reason why the law as it stands at present should not be made applicable in the case of devolution of shebaitship.” 13. It is the general law of succession that governs succession to shebaitship as well. While the general law has now been changed by reason of Act XVIII of 1937 there does not appear to be any cogent reason why the law as it stands at present should not be made applicable in the case of devolution of shebaitship.” 13. Closely following this decision is one rendered by the Supreme Court again in Sambandamurthi Mudaliar v. State of Madras4. It is enough if we refer to the ratio therein which is to the effect that the phrase ‘succession to whose office is regulated by usage’ would only apply when the ordinary rules of succession under the Hindu Law are modified by usage, and succession has to be determined in accordance with the modified rules. The office of a hereditary trustee is in the nature of property. Succession in relation to property implies passing of an interest from one person to another. 14. Relying strongly upon the dicta in C. Sethurayar v. Arumanayagam1, and Sambandamurthi Mudaliar v. State of Madras2, Mr. Kesava Iyengar urges that trusteeship is ‘property’ and therefore heritable. To this extent there cannot be any controversy, having -regard to the pronouncements of the Supreme Court as above. 15. Then the question is as to what is meant by ‘succession’. There would be no difficulty at all if there was a deed or in the absence of a deed there was such acceptable data or hypothesis delineating the line of succession. But here in this case unfortunately there is no guideline. Therefore, the other two norms as to succession to the office, namely, by custom or by the invocation of the ordinary rule of succession have to be invoked for the purpose of finding out as to whether the plaintiff’s claim is correct or the defendants’ contention has to be upheld. 16. We have already referred to the insufficient material on which the Court below accepted the plaintiff’s contention that there was a usage which was long and immemorial. For this purpose the Court relied upon Exhibit A-2 which was a judgment rendered in a litigation between the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs and some other parties to the suit. There the question was whether the person in office of the trustee of the temple in question was to be removed for maladministration. For this purpose the Court relied upon Exhibit A-2 which was a judgment rendered in a litigation between the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs and some other parties to the suit. There the question was whether the person in office of the trustee of the temple in question was to be removed for maladministration. Certain observations were made by the trial Judge in that case which is to the following effect: “It is very clear from the above admissions of the 1st defendant that the plaintiffs and the defendant Nos. one and three are members of one and the same tarwad, though the 1st defendant belongs to a divided branch, that the plaint Bhadrakaly Amman belongs to the members of the tarwad in both the branches, that the management and trusteeship of the Ammankoil and its properties vest in the senior most member for the time being and that in accordance with this practice the plaintiff’s karnavan Subramonya Thevar was trustee and manager in 1056.” 17. Relying upon this observation, the Court below accepted that there was a custom which ought to prevail in this case under which the entitlement of the plaintiffs has to be recognised. We are unable to go into the question whether there has been enough proof of such custom as it is ordinarily required in a civil Court, as in our view the other argument of Mr. Kesava Iyengar that notwithstanding the existence of a custom section 4 of the Hindu Succession Act, has an over-riding effect and by invocation of this provision read with section 7 of the Act, the plaintiff’s claim is untenable. 18. We will assume for the purpose of argument that there is a custom in the instant case. Mr. Kesava Iyengar’s argument is that under the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, to wit, section 4, the custom, if any, is overridden by the express provisions of section 4(1)(a) of the Act and therefore the normal law of succession as provided for in the Act has to prevail. While this is accepted to a certain extent by Mr. Padmanabhan,. appearing for the respondents, he would invite our attention to section 7 of the Act which governs the situation. While this is accepted to a certain extent by Mr. Padmanabhan,. appearing for the respondents, he would invite our attention to section 7 of the Act which governs the situation. It is common ground that prior to the passing of the Act, the Marumakkathayam Law applied to the facts and circumstances of this case, but by reason of section 7 which practically abrogates the peculiar system of law prevailing in that part of our country and having regard to the Explanation to section 7, the learned counsel for the respondents says that the lower Court has to adjudicate hereafter the quantum of entitlement of each of the parties to this litigation and others, if any, and. find out as to what relief has to be given in the present action. 19. It is no doubt true that in their pleadings the defendants besides raising the question that the Hindu Succession Act and the principles enunciated. herein are to be applied after the death of Bhoothalingam Pillai, they have not pursued this argument, nor was the contention put before the trial Court in the manner and fashion done before us. In fact, even in the Madras case in Narayana Pillai v. Dharman1 , the learned Judge has laid down that in the absence of the founder himself prescribing a line of succession and no special custom to. the contrary pleaded or proved, it is the general law of intestate succession applicable to the last holder of the office, that would be applicable for succession to the office of trusteeship. The argument that section 4 would override a pre-existing custom and that the succession in such circumstances in relation to matters governed by Marumakkathayam law has to be interpreted with reference to section 7 of the Hindu Succession Act, was not made before the learned Judge. As a matter of fact, even before the Supreme Court in the case cited, such a contingency did not arise. Undoubtedly section 4 has an overriding effect. The statute law having made marked in roads upon the personal law of the parties, has provided that any custom or usage immediately before the commencement of the Act shall cease to have effect with respect to any matter for which provision is made under this Act. 20. A faint argument was addressed (before us by placing reliance upon section 4 (1) (b) of the Act. 20. A faint argument was addressed (before us by placing reliance upon section 4 (1) (b) of the Act. But as the special excludes the general and as section 4 (1) (a) specifically refers to the inapplicability of any pre-existing custom or usage after the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, no further discussion is necessary to hold that even if a custom has been established in the particular case under consideration, it has no effect. 21. Section 7 of the Hindu Succession Act is the section which deals with devolution of interest in the property of a tarwad, tavazhi or illom. We have already expressed the view that the office of trusteeship, having regard to the facts of this case and after fully reading the recitals in the inscription Exhibit B-l, cannot be said to be a bare office of honour, but it is an office coupled with certain entitlements and material benefits. Such being the case, it would be property which has to devolve in accordance with the provisions of section 7 of the Act. We have already noticed that the trial Court was not obligated to discuss the facts in the light of the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, as it upheld the contention about the pre-existence of a custom or practice, and basing its judgment on the ratio in Narayana Pillai v. Dharman1, it decreed the suit. But having regard to our view which we have expressed in the light of the fresh arguments addressed before us, this case has to be given a new and a fresh look in accordance with the provisions of section 7 of the Hindu Succession Act. Though no doubt the plaintiffs claim the right to be the trustees of the temple to the exclusion of the defendants who prima facie are the descendants of the immediate predecessor in charge of the trust, yet it has to be resolved in this case as to what was the content of authority of the notional tarwad which in the light of Exhibit B-l possessed such entitlements as we have described before to be in charge of the office of the trusteeship. It is therefore necessary to find out as to who are the members of the notional tarwad whom Bhoothalingam Pillai was representing when he passed away in 1974 and who are the surviving members of that notional tarwad who will be entitled to succeed and claim the office as well as the material benefits attached to it. Mr. Kesava Iyengar would say that once it is accepted that the office of trusteeship is “property”, in the instant case, having regard to the facts, no other investigation is necessary to find out who are the persons entitled to succeed excepting to look at the genealogical tree and find out the heirs of Bhoothalingam Pillai. We do not think that such a superficial investigation only is called for in the instant case. We are not inclined to express any opinion at this stage in view of the conclusion we intend arriving at. Prima facie the contention of Mr. Padmanabhan that the Explanation to section 7 has to be considered and applied to the facts of this case appears to be well-founded. Even here, we refrain from making any positive observation. As the question was not gone into by the trial Court and as it is normally the duty of the trial Court to find facts and adjudicate upon them after giving an opportunity to the parties and as it is hazardous for the appellate Court to undertake such a task without calling for further evidence, if necessary, we intend remanding the matter, though allowing the appeal in part. 22. In the result, therefore, the argument of the appellants’ counsel is accepted, and the subject-matter is still open in the sense that it is for the trial Court to find out as to who are the parties who would be entitled to succeed as trustees and manage the trust properties and enjoy the same as prescribed in Exhibit’ B-1, and after finding such group of persons which might include the parties who are not already on record, it can come to the conclusion whether the plaintiff’s claim to be the sole trustees is right or not. The subject-matter is therefore remanded for the above purpose? There will be no order as to costs in the appeal. The appellants will be entitled to a refund of the Court fee paid on the memorandum of appeal.