United Finance Syndicate represented by Ashok Kumar Metha v. Station House Officer, Gingee, and another
1976-10-05
S.NATARAJAN
body1976
DigiLaw.ai
Order.- As financier-cum-owner, the petitioner herein laid claim for the return of a motor-cycle bearing registration number T.N.J. 194 which was seized by the Police in connection with a prohibition case. The motor-cycle was seized, because two persons were caught carrying a large quantity of brandy bottles in the motor-cycle on 4th July, 1975. When those two persons were questioned, they stated that they were carrying the brandy bottles at the behest of one A.K. Sathar, the owner of the motor-cycle. All the three persons were prosecuted for contravention of the Prohibition Act. While the driver and the pillion-rider of the motor-cycle admitted the offence, A.K. Sathar denied the offence, but nevertheless, he was found guilty and convicted under the Prohibition Act. During the pendency of the case, the petitioner herein moved the trial Court for return of the motor cycle stating that he was the owner and Sathar was only the hirer, and as such, the vehicle did not belong to him. The trial Magistrate dismissed the application, and an appeal to the Sessions Judge did not meet with success. Hence, the present petition to this Court. 2. In support of his claim for the motor-cycle, the petitioner urged that the vehicle was subjected to a hire-purchase agreement. Exhibit C-2, dated 15th May, 1975, and as per the terms of the agreement, the hirer, viz., Sathar had to pay a sum of Rs. 300 per mensum for a period of twelve months, he was entitled to transfer of ownership of the vehicle only after payment of all the twelve instalments, and since the motor-cycle was seized by the authorities in about two months’ time after the hire-purchase agreement was entered into, the Courts below were not entitled to treat the vehicle as that of Sathar and order confiscation of the same. Johar and Company v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer1 and Instalment Supply Limited v. Sales Tax Officer2 were cited by the petitioner’s Counsel to contend that a hire-purchase agreement has two elements, viz., element of bailment and element of sale, and that the element of sale fructifies only when the option is exercised by the intending purchaser after fulfilling the terms of the agreement.
Placing reliance on the cases, the petitioner’s Counsel contended that since Sathar had not paid all the instalments due under the agreement and exercised his option to buy, the vehicle continued to be the property of the petitioner, and cannot, therefore, be treated as a confiscable item of property. 3. The contention of the petitioner cannot be accepted, for, the facts of the case clearly establish that the agreement between the parties was nothing more than a security for the return of the loan advanced to the customer and did not constitute a hire-purchase agreement in the real sense of the term. A hire purchase agreement, in the strict legal sense means an agreement to hire with an option to purchase. But, in common parlance, the term is frequently loosely used to describe contracts which are nothing more than agreement to purchase by instalments at the conclusion of the period of hire as well as those which merely give the hirer an option to purchase, whether by payment of a lump-sum or by completion of the instalments. In Sundaram Finance Limited v. State of Kerala1, the Supreme Court has succinctly pointed out the difference between the two types of agreements in the following words: “A hire-purchase agreement is normally one under which an owner hires goods to another party called the hirer and further agrees that the hirer shall have an option to purchase the chattel when he has paid a certain sum, or when the hire-rental payments have reached the hire purchase price stipulated in the agreement But, there are variations when a financier is interposed between the owner of the goods and the customer. The agreement, ignoring variations of detail, broadly takes one or the other of two forms: (1) when the owner is unwilling to look to the purchaser of goods to recover the balance of the price, and the financier, who pays the balance of the price, undertakes the recovery. In’ this form, goods are purchased by the financier from the dealer, and the financier obtains a hire-purchase agreement from the customer under which the latter becomes the owner of the goods on payment of all the instalments of the stipulated hire and exercising his option to purchase the goods on payment of a nominal price.
In’ this form, goods are purchased by the financier from the dealer, and the financier obtains a hire-purchase agreement from the customer under which the latter becomes the owner of the goods on payment of all the instalments of the stipulated hire and exercising his option to purchase the goods on payment of a nominal price. The decision of this Court in K.L. Johar and Company v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer2, dealt with a transaction of this character. (2) In the other form of the transactions goods are purchased by the customer, who, in consideration of executing a hire-purchase agreement and allied documents, remains in possession of the goods, subject to liability to pay the amount paid by the financier on his behalf to the owner or dealer, and the financier obtains a hire-purchase agreement which gives him a licence to seize the goods in the event of failure by the customer to abide by the conditions of the hire-purchase agreement.” 4. The cases cited by the petitioner’s Counsel relate to agreements of the first type, whereas the petitioner’s case will clearly fall under the second type. The following are the reasons for reaching this conclusion. The motor-cycle purchased by Sathar was not a new one. It had already been purchased by someone and from that person Sathar bought it second hand. Despite the hire-purchase agreement, Sathar continued to be the registered owner of the vehicle. No doubt the hire-purchase agreement of the petitioner was endorsed in the registration certificate, but the ownership was not transferred to the petitioner. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Sundaram Finance Limited v. State of Kerala1, if, there is a bona fide and completed sale of goods, evidenced by documents, anterior to and independent of a subsequent and distinct hiring to the vendor, the transaction may not be regarded as a loan transaction even though the reason, for which it was entered into, was to raise money. But, if the real transaction is a loan of money secured by a right of seizure of the goods, the property ostensibly passes under the documents embodying the transaction, but subject to the terms of the hiring agreement, which becomes part of the buyer’s title, and confers a licence to seize.
But, if the real transaction is a loan of money secured by a right of seizure of the goods, the property ostensibly passes under the documents embodying the transaction, but subject to the terms of the hiring agreement, which becomes part of the buyer’s title, and confers a licence to seize. When a person desiring to purchase goods and not having sufficient money on hand borrows the amount needed from a third person and pays it over to the vendor, the transaction between the customer and the lender will unquestionably be a loan transaction. The facts of the instant case clearly point out that the agreement Exhibit C-2, reflects only a transaction in which Sathar was the owner of the goods, and with a view to finance his purchase he entered into an agreement which is in the form of a hire-purchase agreement with the financier, but in substance, only a loan transaction, subject to a hiring agreement under which the vendor has licence to seize the goods. Hence, the petitioner’s contention that he was not a mere lender with a licence to seize the motor-cycle for non-payment of instalments but an owner under the agreement, Exhibit C-2, cannot be accepted. No doubt, the learned Sessions Judge’s opinion that Exhibit C-2 must be a fabrication, may not be correct. It may be, Exhibit C-2, genuinely entered into on 15th May, 1975 and the delay in the petitioner applying for the return of the motor-cycle was due to bona fide reasons. (The seizure of the motor cycle was on 4th July, 1975 but the petitioner filed his claim petition only on 7th February, 1976). Notwithstanding these facts, the petitioner cannot succeed without establishing that he was not only a lender, but also the owner of the motor-cycle on the date of its seizure. When the evidence discloses that he was only a lender with a licence to seize the goods given as security for the loan, the motor-cycle must be held to be the property of Sathar, and therefore liable to confiscation. 5. For the abovesaid reasons the petition fails and will stand dismissed.