JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THE petitioner, Laxminarayan Behre, was Principal of Bhartiya higher Secondary School, Panagar, on 1st October 1969 when the school was taken over by the State Government and merged with the Government Higher secondary School, Panagar. Previous to its taking over by the Government, the school was run by the Bhartiya Education Society, Panagar, which is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act. After the school was taken over, the petitioner was appointed by the State Government as Principal in the Government Higher Secondary School, Niwas (Mandla ). Thereafter, by order passed on 12th March 1973, the petitioner was absorbed as Upper division Teacher on the ground that he did not possess the necessary educational qualification. The petitioner then filed the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the order appointing him as Upper division Teacher and for issuing a writ of mandamus that the agreement between him and the Education Society under which he was serving as Principal should be enforced against the State Government, and that the service conditions mentioned in that agreement should not be disturbed. ( 2. ) THE petitioners agreement with the Education Society is Annexure VI. It provides that the petitioner "shall not be removable from his post of Principal ship before he attains the age of sixty years except on grounds of gross misconduct or permanent physical or mental unfitness. " It is this agreement which the petitioner wants to enforce against the State Government. ( 3. ) IT is settled law that a contract for personal service cannot be assigned by one party without the consent of the other. Therefore, when there is a change of masters, the employees of the old master do not become the employees of the new master and the agreements between the employees and the old master are of no avail against the new master unless the Dew master agrees with the employees to continue them in service on the same terms and conditions. This legal position was recognised in Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries ltd. This legal position was recognised in Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries ltd. , ( (1940) 3 All er 549 (H L), p. 551.) where Viscount Simon, L. C, in his speech observed as follows : "apart from statutory provision to the contrary, the benefit of a contract entered into by a to render personal service to x cannot be transferred by x to y without as consent, which is the same thing as saying that, in order to produce the desired result, the old contract between A and X would have to be terminated by notice or by mutual consent and a new contract of service entered into by agreement between A and Y. The rule is so strict that, if the contract is between individuals on both sides and x dies, the contract of service is immediately dissolved (Farrow v. Wilson, ( (1869) LR4cp 744 at p. 746.)), for a never promised to serve xs personal representative and x could only act as employer when alive. Where a firm consisting of 4 partners engaged the plaintiff as manager for a term of 2 years, the retirement of two partners from the firm within that period operated as a wrongful dismissal of the plaintiff; Brace v. Calder, ( (1895) 2 Q B 253. ). If as contract is to serve a limited company, x and Co. , and x and Co. goes into liquidation, the winding up order operates as a notice of discharge to the servants of the company; Re General Rolling Stock Co. , Chapmans case , ( (1866) L R 1 Eq. 346. ). " In Collier v. Sunday Referee Publishing Co. , ( (1940) 2 KB 647) the plaintiff was employed as chief sub-editor of a newspaper owned by the defendants. The defendants sold the newspaper. It was held that the sale of the newspaper amounted to wrongful dismissal of the plaintiff and he was entitled to damages. It will be seen that by transfer of the business of the master the employee did not become the servant of the new master and the result of the transfer was that his services came to an end. It was held that the sale of the newspaper amounted to wrongful dismissal of the plaintiff and he was entitled to damages. It will be seen that by transfer of the business of the master the employee did not become the servant of the new master and the result of the transfer was that his services came to an end. Similarly, in Re Foster Clark Indenture Trusts, ( (1966) 1 All E R 43.) it was held that "the transfer of business of a company to another company, although a subsidiary of the former, had the effect of determining the employment of all employees who were employed in the business". The principle recognised by the house of Lords in Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd. (supra) was approved by the Supreme Court in Amar Singh v. State of Rajasthan, ( AIR 1958 SC 228 . ). In that case it was held that when one State is absorbed in another, all contracts of service between the prior Government and its servants automatically terminate and thereafter those who elect to serve in the new State, and are taken on by it, serve on such terms and conditions as the new State may choose to impose. It further held that "this is nothing more, though on a more exalted scale, than an application of the principle that underlies the law of Master and Servant when there is a change of masters". In M. G. Sharma v. Govt. of M. P , ( AIR 1973 SC 2279 .) the employees in three undertakings o ( the State were transferred to the Madhya pradesh State Industries Corporation. Before the transfer, the Government offered to the employees that the transfer of their services will not be treated as an interruption in the service and the employees would be entitled to continue on the same terms and conditions. The employees accepted these terms, and it appears that the Corporation also accepted to take the employees on these terms. This was a case where the benefit of continuance in service on existing terms and conditions became available to the employees as there was an agreement to that effect between the old and new employers and the employee. The general principle was, however, accepted and it was observed that "ordinarily the change of employers would have the effect of interrupting service". The general principle was, however, accepted and it was observed that "ordinarily the change of employers would have the effect of interrupting service". Most of these cases were considered by us in the same context in Raj Kumar Tiwari v. State of M. P. and others, (M. P. No. 17 of 1973, decided on the 14th Aprir 1976.) where we observed as follows : "the basic principle is that when there is a change of masters, all contracts of service between the prior master and his servants automatically terminate and thereafter those who elect to serve the new master and are taken over by the latter, serve on such terms and conditions as the new master may choose to impose. " ( 4. ) ON the principles stated above, the petitioner cannot enforce the agreement which was entered into between him and the Education Society against the State Government, which is the new master, unless he can show that the Government has entered into an agreement with him to employ him on the terms and conditions on which he was employed by the society. The petitioners agreement with the society was determined when the school was taken over by the Government, as there was no school of the society where the petitioner could be employed as Principal. It may be possible to urge that the society committed a breach of the agreement in handing over the school to the Government as it had the effect of terminating the petitioners services. If that be so, the petitioner can sue the society for wrongful dismissal and claim damages. But the petitioner cannot enforce the said agreement against the Government, unless he can show that there was an agreement between him and the Government to employ him on the same terms and conditions on which he was employed by the society. No such agreement has been pleaded by the petitioner. The question of enforcing such an agreement, therefore, does not arise. ( 5. ) ALL that has been alleged and argued by the petitioner is that the state Government gave an assurance to the Education Society to continue to employ the entire staff in the school on the same terms and conditions, and it was on this assurance that the school was transferred by the society to the government. ( 5. ) ALL that has been alleged and argued by the petitioner is that the state Government gave an assurance to the Education Society to continue to employ the entire staff in the school on the same terms and conditions, and it was on this assurance that the school was transferred by the society to the government. It has also been argued that there was an agreement between the Government and the society to that effect From the documents filed by the parties in this case, we are unable to hold that there was any contract between the society and the Government in which the Government promised to continue to employ the staff of the school on the same terms and conditions. May be, the Education Minister and some officers of the Education Department had given that assurance as alleged by the petitioner. But we are unable to hold that there was any concluded contract to that effect. A contract cannot be enforced against the State unless it is executed in the manner required by article 299 of the Constitution. No such contract is alleged or proved by the petitioner. However, assuming that there was a contract between the Government and the society to continue the services of the staff of the school on the same terms and conditions, the further difficulty is that the petitioner not being a party to the contract cannot enforce it against the Government. It is settled law that a stranger to a contract cannot enforce it even if the contract confers benefits upon him. In M. C. Chacko v. State Bank, Travancore, (Alr197sc 504.) the Supreme court ruled that it must be taken as well settled that "except in the case of a beneficiary under a trust created by a contract or in the case of a family arrangement, no right may be enforced by a person who is not a party to the contract. " another important recent case on the same point is Kepong Prospecting Ltd. v. Schmidt, ( (1968) 2 W L R 55 PC.) where the Privy Council considered the provisions of the Malaysian contracts Ordinance, which are based on the Indian Contract Act, and approved the Indian authorities which hold that a person not party to a contract cannot enforce it. Therefore, even assuming that there was a contract between the society and the Government to continue the petitioner in service on the same terms and conditions, the petitioner not being a party to that contract cannot enforce it. Such a contract does not come within the recognised exceptions because no trust or family arrangement is created by it. ( 6. ) THE Government as a matter of policy decided to take over all non-Government schools, whether belonging to societies or local bodies. By an order passed on 21st December 1967 (Annexure R-I) the Government laid down the terms and conditions for absorption of the staff of such schools. This order, though not statutory, is expected to be followed uniformly in all cases. If a person is deprived of the benefit conferred by this order in the matter of his absorption in Government service without any reasonable ground, he may legitimately complain that there has been a denial of equality of opportunity in a matter relating to employment under the State guaranteed to him under article 16 of the Constitution. It has, therefore, to be seen whether the petitioners non-absorption as Principal or Lecturer and his absorption as Upper division Teacher is in conformity with this order. ( 7. ) CLAUSE 3 (b) of the Order (Annexure R-I) provides that for being absorbed as Principal, the person concerned should possess a post-graduate degree and should have worked on the post of Principal for a minimum period of seven years in the same institution and should have ten years teaching experience in any of the recognised institutions. The petitioner did not possess a post-graduate degree which is essential for being absorbed as a Principal. After the schools were taken over, the Government examined the cases of the employees of these schools and they were absorbed in Government service in accordance with their qualifications and the principles laid down in Annexure R-I. This naturally took some time. To avoid hardship, the employees were provisionally absorbed on the same posts which were held by them before taking over of the schools. Final order of absorption was passed in each case after it was scrutinised in the light of the principles laid down in Annexure R-I the petitioners appointment as Principal of the Government Higher Secondary school, Niwas, was, in the circumstances, provisional pending examination of his case. Final order of absorption was passed in each case after it was scrutinised in the light of the principles laid down in Annexure R-I the petitioners appointment as Principal of the Government Higher Secondary school, Niwas, was, in the circumstances, provisional pending examination of his case. The petitioner not being a post graduate could not be absorbed as principal. ( 8. ) AS regards absorption as a Lecturer, the principle laid down by the order (Annexure R-I) is to see whether the person concerned was qualified to be appointed as a Lecturer in Government service at the time when the school was taken over by the Government. Clause 2 of the Order provides that "qualifications of the members of the staff of non Government/local body schools to be absorbed in Government service shall be the same as prescribed by Government for these posts. " The qualifications for appointment of Lecturers in Government Higher Secondary Schools were previously regulated by an order dated 15th June 1959. Under this order persons who could be appointed as Lecturers were classified under six categories. Category (E) comprised of trained graduates with at least seven years of service in teaching line in M. P. Education Department. Therefore, till this order continued, trained graduates with seven years of service could be appointed as Lecturers, even though they did not possess any post-graduate degree. But by order dated 24th April 1965 the Government decided to delete Category (E), the result of which was that a person without any post-graduate degree could not be appointed as a Lecturer after this order. By another order dated 16th March 1964, the Government had directed that the qualifications required for recruitment of teachers and lecturers in non-Government schools shall be the same as for persons seeking service in Government educational institutions. As the petitioner did not possess a post-graduate degree, he could not even be absorbed as a Lecturer. On the principles of absorption settled by the Order Annexure R-I, the petitioner could only be absorbed as an Upper Division Teacher as was done by the Government. ( 9. ) IT was contended that the petitioner possessed the qualifications for the posts of Principal and Lecturer as prescribed by the Regulations made under the Madhya Pradesh Madhyamik Shiksha Adhiniyam, 1965 and, therefore, he should have been absorbed as Principal or Lecturer. This argument cannot be accepted. ( 9. ) IT was contended that the petitioner possessed the qualifications for the posts of Principal and Lecturer as prescribed by the Regulations made under the Madhya Pradesh Madhyamik Shiksha Adhiniyam, 1965 and, therefore, he should have been absorbed as Principal or Lecturer. This argument cannot be accepted. The Regulations on which reliance is placed applied only to non-Government institutions. It may be that the petitioner possesses the qualifications laid down in the Regulations, but this is irrelevant for purposes of absorption in Government service. The Order Annexure R-I requires that the person concerned, for being absorbed, should satisfy the conditions and qualifications laid down in this Order. As earlier seen, the petitioner was not qualified to be absorbed as Principal or Lecturer in accordance with the principles of absorption laid down in Annexure R-I. The petitioner, therefore, cannot be granted any relief. ( 10. ) BEFORE parting with the case, we may state that we were informed by the learned Government Advocate that absorption of a person on a lower post does not affect his salary which he was getting in the non Government institution at the time when the institution was taken over and if a person is absorbed on a post carrying less pay, the difference in salary is treated and paid as personal pay. ( 11. ) THE petition fails and is dismissed, but without any order as to costs. The amount of the security deposit shall be refunded to the petitioner. Petition dismissed.