JUDGMENT KAMBLI J.- These petitions challenge the notices and orders made by the respondents, namely, the Assistant Custodian of Evacuee Properties and the Sub-Divisional Officer, Akola (hereinafter referred to as S. D. O. Akola), and Tahsildar, Akola, Taluq and District Akola. These respondents have directed the petitioners to hand over the possession of the fields in their possession to certain displaced persons on the ground that the fields have been allotted to the latter under the provisions of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabiliation) Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the Displaced Persons Act). 2. The lands in these special civil applications were originally owned by one Firm known as "Moula Dina Ayub Firm, Akola". A partner of this firm by name Mohammad Hasham Abdulla migrated to Pakistan in or about 1948. A declaration was made by Deputy Custodian Akola on 21-6.1951, in respect of 1/4th share of Mohammad Hasham in the firm properties under section 7 (1) of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Administration Act). The non-evacuee partners of the firm, it appears, had at one stage taken the plea that they were the purchasers of the share of the evacuee (Mohammad Hasham) and had applied to the Custodian for confirmation of the alleged purchase in their favour under section 40 of the Administration Act. Having failed in that proceeding they filed Special Civil Application No. 135 of 1959 in this Court. The same was dismissed on 20-1-1960. 3. It appears that the Competent Officer under the provisions of the Evacuee Interest (Separation) Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the Separation Act, 1951) separated the evacuee interest in the composite property under section 11 of the Act and by his order, dated 18-4-1969, assigned agricultural lands measuring about 689.28 acres comprising of 56 survey numbers situated in various villages of Taluq Balapur and Akola to the Custodian. It is claimed for the respondents that the properties which vested in the Custodian eventually stood acquired under section 12 of the Displaced Persons Act and the Managing Officer under that Act has allotted the properties to various displaced persons. Notices were, therefore, issued to the persons in possession of these fields like the petitioners to deliver vacant possession of the lands in question to the displaced persons. It is these notices and orders that have been challenged in these special civil applications. Notices were, therefore, issued to the persons in possession of these fields like the petitioners to deliver vacant possession of the lands in question to the displaced persons. It is these notices and orders that have been challenged in these special civil applications. As they raise common questions, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. 4. The petitioners claim that they were the tenants of the fields in dispute since before 1947 and under the provisions of The Berar Regulation of Leases Act, 1951, they acquired a status of protected lessees. They further claim that there was a partition between the members of the firm on 16-5-1956 and they continued to be the tenants of the non-evacuee partners to whom these fields were allotted in the said partition. The petitioners also claimed that they have become the statutory owners of the field concerned under the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958, (hereinafter referred to as the Tenancy Act). The learned Counsel for the petitioners raised the following points ;- 1. No notice was given to the petitioners by the Custodian before declaring the property as the evacuee property under section 7 (1) of the Administration Act. The Custodian, therefore, had no jurisdiction to declare the property as evacuee property. 2. The petitioners were the tenants of the fields in question and by virtue of the provisions of sections 41 and 46 of the Tenancy Act they had become the statutory owners of the fields from 1-4-1961. 3. As the petitioners had become the statutory owners of the fields in question by virtue of the provisions of the Tenancy Act, the orders directing them to deliver possession of the fields to the allottees under Displaced Persons Act are ineffective, void and without jurisdiction. We are inclined to hold that the contention that in the absence of a notice to the petitioners, a declaration if any made by the Custodian under section 7 (I) of the Administration Act as regards the property being the evacuee property would be invalid and that further proceedings on such a declaration would be ineffective and without jurisdiction, is unsustainable. 5. In Bhanwarlal v. Regional' Settlement Commissioner, Jaipur, Cum Custodian of Evacuee Property1 the Supreme Court observed that the Custodian is not expected to hold the general' enquiry of the persons interested in the alleged' evacuee property. 5. In Bhanwarlal v. Regional' Settlement Commissioner, Jaipur, Cum Custodian of Evacuee Property1 the Supreme Court observed that the Custodian is not expected to hold the general' enquiry of the persons interested in the alleged' evacuee property. In that case~ it appears that there were mortgages· on the property' and' t1fe village record's about the land' recorded- the names of thosemortgagees. The Assistant Custodian' had' no information whether those mortgages, who" resided at some other-place, were alive or not. No notices wereserved on them, The Supreme Court observed that the' interest of the evacuees in the property consisted' of the equity of redemption-in' the property. It is this interest of theirs which could be declared' evacuee property- and' the order of the Assistant Custodian declaring the property to· be evacuee property' really amounted to an order declaring the right of evacuee to the equity of redemption. The order could not affect the mortgagee rights as the evacuee had no interest ill' the mortgagee: rights. The Supreme Court therefore held that the non-issue of the notice to be appellants in the case before them was of noconsequence as the order passed- without the issue of the- notice to' them did not affect their interest. 6. Now, in the case- before us the petitioners claimed that they were the tenants in possession of the fields at the time the declaration was made by the Custodian under section 1 of the Administration Act. Assuming that the petitoners were in possession of the fielids, the Custodian did not want to disturb their possession, at that time. The orders made by the Custodian, therefore, declaring the fields to be an evacuee property really amounted- to· an order, declaring that the fields were of the ownership of the evacuees. After all the petitioners had no claim to the ownership of the property at that time. They only claimed to be the tenants- and, therefore, the non-service of the notices on the petitioners at the time and. property was· declared to be evacuee property is in our opinion, of no consequence. 7. The observations· of the supreme Court in another case Begum' Noorbanu v. Deputy Custodian General of Evacuee Property2 could also be relied-upon with advantage. They only claimed to be the tenants- and, therefore, the non-service of the notices on the petitioners at the time and. property was· declared to be evacuee property is in our opinion, of no consequence. 7. The observations· of the supreme Court in another case Begum' Noorbanu v. Deputy Custodian General of Evacuee Property2 could also be relied-upon with advantage. It was observed there : "The notice contemplated by section 7 of the A-ct is- in the' first place intended to provide an opportunity of the person whose property is theirs opinion of the Custodian an evacuee property to' satisfy the custodian that he is not an evacuee as defined in section 2 (d) of the Act. If he is not an evacuee his property cannot be declared evacuee property. Moreover, it is> to afford an opportunity to persons who- have not migrated to' Pakistan to' satisfy the Calstodian that the property which, in the opinion of the Custodian is evacuee property does not belong to a-a evacuee or that an evacuee has 110 interest therein." It was further observed, "The Only persons who could claim to be Interested in the property would therefore be those who have not migrated to Pakistan and who may possibly claim that the property is theirs and did not belong to the evacuee” 8. In Allauddin Allabux v. M. B. Meher3, the Division Bench of this court observed, "The notice referred to' in section 1 is a notice to "the l1ersans interested. Now it cannot be that at the stage of giving notice, the CU6tadian shall have finally detelmined who are the persons interested, or could have had any means of determining it; and therefore, if these wolds in the section have to be given a reasonable interpretation, they con only mean persons who either claim to be interested or whom the custodian consider to be interested, both being Separate categories of persons, thought not necessarily mutually exclusive, who would ~ entitled to notice. In the case of a person claiming to be interested even if the Custodian considers that he is not interested; the person would still ~ entitled to a notice under section 7 and the Custodian may, even in a case in which no person comes forward and claims to interested, give notice to a person whom he considers to be interested." 9. In the very nature of things, the Custodian is expected to give notices under section 7 of the Administration Act to those persons only who on the basis of the information available to him at the material time would have interest in the property. The Custodian is not expected to hold the general enquiry of the persons interested in the alleged evacuee property the petitioners obviously had no interest as owners in the evacuee property and the absence of notice to them is, in our opinion of no consequence. 10. The next contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is that the petitioners have, by virtue of the relevant provisions in the Tenancy Act, become the statutory owners. In order to appreciate this contention, it would be necessary to refer to the scheme and certain provisions of the Administration Act. The Office of the Custodian of Evacuee Property was created by the various enactments enacted in this country subsequent to the partition of this country on 15th August 1947. Under section 5 of the Administration Act, the Central Government is vested with the powers to appoint Custodians of Evacuee Property in different States. Section 7 of the Act provides that where the Custodian is of the opinion that any property is evacuee property within the meaning of the Act, he may after causing notice thereof to be given in such manner as may be prescribed to the persons interested· and after holding enquiry pass an order 4eclaring the property to be an evacuee property. By virtue of section 8 such property thereafter shall be deemed to have vested in the Custodian of the State in which the property is situated from the date on which evacuee leaves or left any place in the State for any place outside the territory now forming part of India. 11. The evacuee in this case left India in or about August 1948. Section 8 (4) provides that where after any evacuee property has vested in the Custodian any person is in possession thereof, he shall be deemed to be holding on behalf of the Custodian and shall on demand surrender possession of it to the Custodian or to any other person duly authorised by him in this behalf. Section 9 empowers the Custodian to use or cause to be used such force as may be necessary for taking possession of such property. Section 9 empowers the Custodian to use or cause to be used such force as may be necessary for taking possession of such property. Section 10 refers to the powers and duties of the Custodian generally. Those powers and duties include taking such measures as the Custodian considers necessary or expedient for the purposes of securing and preserving etc. any evacuee property. Section 12 of the Act empowers the Custodian to terminate any lease or mend amend the terms of any lease or agreement under Which any evacuee property held is held or occupied by persons whether such lease was granted or entered into before or after the commencement of the Act. The proviso' to 'this section, however provides that in the case of any lease granted before the 14th day of August 1947 the Custodian shall not exercise any of the powers conferred upon him under this section unless he is satisfied about certain defaults of the lessees referred to in this proviso. Sections 17 and 18 of the Act which find place in Chapter III are important. That Chapter is headed as "Certain consequences of property vesting in Custodian". Section 17 reads as follows. "17. Exemption of evacuee property from processes of court, etc.-(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, no evacuee property which has vested or is deemed to have vested in the Custodian under the provisions of this Act, shall so long as it remains ~ vested, be liable to be proceeded against in any manner whatsoever in execution of any decree or order of any Court or other authority, and any attachment or injunction or order for the appointment of a receiver in respect of any such property subsisting on the commencement of the Administration of Evacuee Property (Amendment) Act, 1951, shall cease to have effect on such commencement and shall be deemed to be void. (2) Where, after the 1st day of March, 1947, any evacuee property which has vested in the Custodian under the provisions of this Act has been sold in execution of any decree or order of any Court or other authority, the sale shall be set aside if an application in that behalf has . been made by the Custodian to such Court or authority on or before the 17th day of October, 1950." Section 18 of the Administration Act is important and it provides. "18. been made by the Custodian to such Court or authority on or before the 17th day of October, 1950." Section 18 of the Administration Act is important and it provides. "18. Occupancy or tenancy rights not to be extinguished (1) Where the rights of an evacuee in any land or in any house or other building consist or consisted of occupancy right nothing contained in any law for the time being in force or in any instrument having the force of law or in any decree or order of any Court, shall extinguish or be deemed to have extinguished any such rights either on the tenant becoming an evacuee within the 81eaning of this Act or at any time thereafter so as prevent such rights from vesting in the Custodian from exercising all or any of the powers conferred on him by this Act in respect of any such rights and, notwithstanding anything contained in any such law, contract, instrument, decree, or order, neither the evacuee nor the Custodian, whether as an occupancy tenant or as a tenant for a certain time, monthly or otherwise, of any land or house or other building shall be liable to be ejected or be deemed to have become so liable on any ground whatsoever for any default of- (a) the evacuee committed after he became an evacuee or within a period of one year immediately preceding the date of his becoming an evacuee; or (b) the Custodian. (2) Where. any person acquires or has acquired any rights under a Provincial Act or a State Act in respect of any property by reason of being in possession of that property, whether in pursuance of a grant, lease or allotment made by the Custodian or otherwise, the acquisition of such rights shall not in any way effect or be deemed to have affected the rights and powers conferred on the Custodian under the Act in respect of that property." It is obvious from the provisions in the Administration Act referred to above that even though the beneficial interest in the property declared as evacuee property does not vest in the Custodian and it continues to vest in the evacuee, after the property declared as evacuee property the leases in respect of such properties are controlled and governed by the over-riding and special provisions in the Administration Act. The provisions of the general law and even the ordinary tenancy laws are to that extent excluded Section 4 (1) of the Administration Act provides that the provisions of the Act and of the rules and orders made thereunder shall have shall effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent there with contained in any other lay for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue 0f any such law. That section further declares that nothing in any other law controlling the rent of or eviction from, any property shall apply, to the evacuee property. Under section 8 (4) after any evacuee property has vested in the Custodian any person in possession thereof shall be deemed to be holding on behalf of the Custodian, and shall on demand surrender possession of it to the Custodian or to any other person duly authorised by him in this behalf. If any person in possession of any evacuee property fails on demand to surrender possession thereof to the Custodian, the Custodian is empowered to use such force as may be necessary for taking possession of such property. Section 12 expressly refers to the power of the Custodian, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force to cancel or terminate an~ lease under which any evacuee property is held or occupied by a person whether such lease was granted or entered into before or after the commencement of the Act. Section 18 specifically provides that where any persons acquires or has acquired any rights under a Provincial Act or a State Act in respect of any property by reason of being in possession of that property, whether in pursuance of a grant, lease, or allotment made by the Custodian or otherwise, the acquisition of such rights shall not in any way affect the rights and powers conferred on the Custodian under the Act in respect of that property. All these provisions are in keeping with the anxiety of the Legislature, for keeping the evacuee property intact for it being ultimately utilised for certain purposes including a public purpose of rehabilitating the displaced persons. All these provisions are in keeping with the anxiety of the Legislature, for keeping the evacuee property intact for it being ultimately utilised for certain purposes including a public purpose of rehabilitating the displaced persons. For that purpose, section 17 of the Administration Act provides that no evacuee property which has vested or is deemed to have vested in the Custodian shall be liable to be proceeded against in any manner whatsoever in execution of any decree or order of any Court or other authority, and any attachment, injunction or order for the appointment of a receiver of any such property subsisting on the commencement of the Administration Act shall cease to have effect on such commencement and shall be deemed to be void. The section goes further and provides that where after 1st day of March 1947, any evacuee property which, has vested in the Custodian has been sold in execution of any decree or order of any Court or other authority, the sale shall be set aside on an application made in that behalf by the Custodian to such Court or authority on or before the prescribed date. In view of the scheme of the Act which is reflected in all these provisions we are of the view that inspite of the petitioners being continued in possession of the fields they will not become the statutory owners of the fields by virtue of the provisions of the Tenancy Act. The contention raised on be half of the petitioners in this behalf will, therefore, have to be negatived. 12. The contention raised on behalf of the respondents is that after the competent officer, Bombay vide his orders dated 18-4-1969 partitioned the properties and separated the interest of the evacuees and thereafter assigned the agricultural lands situated in various villages to the Custodian, these properties, namely, the' fields stood acquired: under section 12 of the Displaced Persons Act, 1954, by the Government of India -for the purpose$: of resettlement of displaced persons who had left their agricultural lands in West Pakistan. The further contention raised on behalf of the respondents is that the properties had vested in the Custodian free from all encumbrances under section 11 of the Separation Act and they were thereafter acquired under the said Act of 1954. The further contention raised on behalf of the respondents is that the properties had vested in the Custodian free from all encumbrances under section 11 of the Separation Act and they were thereafter acquired under the said Act of 1954. It is also contended that on the publication of a 11otification under subsection (1) of section 12 of the Displaced Persons Act, the, right, title and interest on any evacuee in the evacuee property in the notification shall on the date on which the notification was so published be extinguished and the property shall vest in the central Government free form all encumbrances. 13. Mr. Salve, the learned Assistant Government Pleader who appeared for the respondents places reliance upon the two judgments of this Court one in Tarmohammed v. The Union of India and others4 by the Nagpur Bench and the other in Baliram v. Union of Indiaandothers5 Mr. Manohar, the learned Counsel for the petitioners, on the other hand, relies on the decision of Gujarat High Court in Pirdhandas v. Hujrabai Mohammad6 and also on the decision of Madras High Court reported in M. Ratanchand and others v. Kasim Khaleeli7 in support of his submission that inspite of the property being acquired under section 12 of the Displaced Persons Act the right of the petitioners to continue in possession as lessees will not be affected. So far as the first decision relied upon for the respondent~ in the Special Civil Application decided by the Nagpur Bench (supra) it is difficult for us to rest our conclusion on the decision in that case. It appears that all he relevant points were not argued before the Division Bench. The view taken by the Division Bench was that after the declaration was made under section 7 (I) of the Administration Act, the lands stood vested in the Government and the Government alone would have created a lease. As the lands stood vested in the Government in view of the provisions of section 128 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958, the provision~ of the Tenancy Act were not applicable to these lands at all. In view of this position, the Division Bench took: the view that the leases created in favour of the petitioners were not lawful and therefore no rights were created in the petitioners even as lessees or otherwise. In view of this position, the Division Bench took: the view that the leases created in favour of the petitioners were not lawful and therefore no rights were created in the petitioners even as lessees or otherwise. Now, in this case it was strenuously urged before us on behalf of the petitioners that inspite of the. declaration having been made under section 7 (1) of the Administration Act, the beneficial interest in the property would continue to vest in the evacuee. That position appears to be correct and, therefore, on the admitted ground that the petitioners were the lessees of the suit fields, the provisions in section 128 of the Bombay Tenancy Act would not come to the help of the respondents. 14. Now, our attention is drawn to the notification dated 2nd July 1970 published in the Official Gazette of India, July 25, 1970, under section 12 (1) of the Displaced Persons Act Which shows that the Central Government decided to and in fact acquired these evacuees properties Section 12 (2) provides that on the publication of a notification under sub-section (1), the right, title and interest of any evacuee in the evacuee property specified in a notification shall. Oil and. from that date be extinguished and the property shall vest absolutely in the Central Government free from all encumbrances. As we have pointed out earlier the Competent Officer under the provisions of the Evacuee Interest (Separation) Act, 1951, separated the evacuee interest in the composite Property under section 11 of the Act and by his order, dated 18-4-1969, assigned the agricultural lands to the Custodian Section 11 of the Separation of 11 Interest Act, 1951, provides that, after such separation the property shall vest in the Custodian free from all encumbrances. The proviso to this section', however, indicates that the Custodian shall not disturb the possession of any person who was in lawful possession of the property at the commencement of the Act and has continued in such possession. We are referring to this provision to point out that after tile interest of the evacuee was separated from that of the claimants in the composite property, under section 11 of tae Separation Of Interest Act the properties so separated vested in the Custodian free from all encoumbrances, of course subject to the provision that persons in lawful possession shall not be disturbed. 15. 15. The question for consideration is whether the possession of the petitioners in view of all these provision s of law would be an encumbrance with in the meaning o the expression in section 12 the Central Government free form that encumbrance the word “encumbrance” has been defined in Chamber’ s 20th Century Dictionary as “to burden” etc. we have already referred to the various provision of the administration Act and we have tried to emphasize the anxiety of the legislature to preserve the evacuee property for its eventual utilization for certain purposes including a public purpose of rehabilitation of the Displaced persons, Section 12 (1) of the Displaced Persons Act should given a wide connotation, and if it is so interpreted,. In our view it would include even a lease which has controlled by the Custodian in respect of the properties which vested in him under section 8 of the administration Act and section 11 of the Separation of the Interest Act. 16. As we have pointed out above after the properties vested in the Custodian he Was empowered to terminate or cancel the leases notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force Of course section 12 (1) of the Administration Act provides that the Custodian shall not exercise this power in case of any lease granted before the day of. 14th August 1947 unless he was satisfied that the lessees committed any of the three defaults mentioned in the section. We have also ponted out that after, the, evacuee interest in the composite property after it was separated under the Separation of Interest Act vested in the Custodian free from all encumbrances However under proviso to section 1l of the Separation of Interest Act, the possession of the persons in lawful possession was not to be disturbed However inspite of the possession being continued With the persons concerned: the rights of the persons in possession were controlled by the overriding provisions of the Administration Act. The properties had vested in' the Custodian and were subject to his control till they were acquired under the provisions of the Displaced Persons Act. The properties had vested in' the Custodian and were subject to his control till they were acquired under the provisions of the Displaced Persons Act. In view of the Purpose and scheme of both the Acts namely the Administration ct, 1951, an the Displaced perso0ns Act, 1954, we are of the view that the occupation of the field of the petitioners as lessees coming on the land through evacuee would constitute an encumbrance as contemplated by section 12 (2) of the Displaced persons Act. 17. The Division Bench of this Court in Special Civil Application No. 1218 of 1971 referred to above has observed, "the phraseology otherwise regulating agricultural holdings" can have no reference to the Tenancy Acts under which several rights are created in favour of the tenants. It obviously has reference to the laws regulating, the holdings of agricultural plots or lands under the Ceiling Act or corresponding provisions dealing with the agricultural holdings. The Tenancy Act can have no application whatsoever to the lands in dispute, as, after the vesting of the lands by operation of law under section 12 of the Act, the land becomes the property of the Government and the Tenancy Act has no application to the land held by the Government in term of possession, once the lands are found to be evacuee property and further found to have been vested in Government under section 12 of the Act. The land vests in the Government absolutely free from all encumbrances, including the rights of the tenant therein. This decision supports our view that the occupation of the fields of the petitioners as lessees could constitute an encumbrance as contemplated by section 12 (2) of the Displaced Persons Act. 18. Mr. Manohar, the learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the decision of the Gujarat High Court in Pirdhandas Parsumal v. Hujrabai Mahomad and also the decision of the Madras High Court in M. Ratanchand Chordia v. Kasim Khaleeli in support of his submissio1'l that the word "encumbrance" in section 12 of the Displaced Persons Act does not include the leases of the petitioner. However, these decisions can be distinguished on facts. The Gujarat decision (supra) refers to a widow's right of residence in the family dwelling house. However, these decisions can be distinguished on facts. The Gujarat decision (supra) refers to a widow's right of residence in the family dwelling house. The Madras decision (supra) refers to the right of easement and rules that the vesting of the servient heritage in the Central Government does not result in the extinguishment of easementary right of the dominant owner. Both these decisions can be distinguished on the ground that the claimants in those cases claimed right, independently of the evacuees. In the instant case, the petitioners were introduced on the property as lessees by the evacuee or his family They thus came on the property through evacuee. Their occupation as lessees, in our view, therefore, would not constitute an encumbrance within the meaning of section 12 (2) of the Displaced Persons Act after the properties are acquired by the Central Government. 19. However, we have to notice the provisions in section 19 of the Displaced persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954. That section provides that, - "(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any contract or any other law for the time being in force but subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, the managing pfficer or managing corporation may cancel any allotment or terminate any lease or amend the terms of any lease or allotment under which any evacuee property acquired under this Act is held or occupied by a person, whether such allotment 01 lease was granted before or after the commencement of this Act. (2) Where any person-, (a) has ceased to be entitled by reason of any action taken under sub-section (1), or (b) is otherwise in unauthorise4 possession of any evacuee property or any other immovable property forming part of the compensation pool; he shal1, after he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against his eviction from such property, surrender possession of the property on demand being made in this behalf by the managing officer or managing corporation or by any other person duly authorised by such officer or corporation. (3) If any pelS0n fails to surrender possession of any property on demand made under sub-section (2) the managing officer or managing corporation may, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, eject such person and take possession of such property and may, for such purpose, use or cause to be used such force as may be necessary. (4) x x x (5) x x x " Now, in this case it has been stated in the Return filed on behalf of the respondents that the properties were allotted by the managing officer to certain displaced persons and notices were issued to the persons in possession like the petitioners to deliver the vacant possession of the land in question. However, it is not clear from the record whether such notices were issued after the properties were acquired. If such notices are issued in terms of section 19 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act and the other requirements of that section are followed the petitioners will not obviously be able to challenge the notices and the orders made by the authorities concerned to deliver possession of the fields to the allottees concerned. However, if no action is taken by the managing officer as contemplated by section 19, it will in our view be necessary for him to take such action, if it is not already taken, before the possession is demanded from the petitioners. Subject to these observations the rules in these petitions will have to be discharged. However, Rule in Special Civil Application No. 373 of 1970 will have to be made absolute in respect of field Survey No.5 /2 of Borgaon Manju. The learned Assistant Government Pleader has passed a purshis that that field is not an evacuee property and as such the allotment order in respect of that field could not be treated as a valid order. 20. In the result, the rules in all the special civil applications are discharged except that Rule in Special Civil Application No. 373 of 1970 is made absolute in respect of field Survey No.5 /2 of Borgaon Manju only. No order as to costs. Rule in Spl. C. A. 373/70 made absolute; Rule in other Spl. C. Applns. discharged.