ORDER Hari Swarup, J. - This petition is directed against an order passed by the Labour Court under section 6-H (2) of the U. P, Industrial Disputes Act. The petitioner was an employer and was governed by the. U. P. Dookan Aur Vanijya Adhishtan Adhiniyam (hereinafter referred to as the Adhiniyam). Opposite parties nos. 2 to 5 were the workmen working with the petitioner. The petitioner gave to the work-men a notice on September 1, 1967 terminating their services. According to the workmen they were entitled to the benefit available to a retrenched workman under section 6-H of the U. P, Industrial Disputes Act. They accordingly moved an application under section 6.H (2) of the Act. The Labour Court has computed the benefit. It is that order which is challenged by the petitioner. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act was not applicable as the petitioners concern was a shop and was governed by the provisions of the Adhiniyam. There is no merit in the contention. The U. P. Industrial Disputes Act defines Industry to mean any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers and includes any calling, service, employment, handicraft, or industrial occupation or avocation of workman. `Commercial establishment' under section 2 of the Adhiniyam means `any premises wherein any trade, business manufacture etc. is carried on for profit. Under section 2 (16) of the Adhiniyam "shop" has been defined to mean any premises where "any wholesale or retail trade or business is carried on". The commercial establishment or shop will thus be an industry within the meaning of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. The workmen working in the industry will be workmen according to the U. P. Indus-trial Disputes Act. Learned counsel has not been able to show any provision of law which might exclude the applicability of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act to the workmen employed in a shop or commercial establishment governed by that Adhiniyam. The contention, therefore, must be overruled. 3. The next contention of the learned counsel is that the application under section 6.H (2) was not maintainable as the claim of the workmen was disputed by the employer. According to the learned counsel unless there is an award the I Labour Court has no jurisdiction to proceed to compute the benefit under section 6 H (2) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. According to the learned counsel unless there is an award the I Labour Court has no jurisdiction to proceed to compute the benefit under section 6 H (2) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. Section 6-H (2), however, does not make any reference to a prior award or adjudication. It provides: "Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money the amount at which such benefit should be computed may, subject to any rules that may on made under this Act, be determined by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the State Government, and the amount so determined may be recovered as provided for in sub-section (1)." The plain reading of the section makes a distinction between 6.H (1) and 6-H (2) of the Act for purposes of computation of benefits in terms of money. Under sub-section (2) there is no requirement of a prior award. All that it needed is that the workman should be entitled to seek from the employer a benefit which may be capable of being computed in terms of money. Where a workman claims the benefit by reason of a provision of law no award is required. The workmen claimed compensation on the basis of the conditions mentioned under section 6-H of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act which by its own force confers on the workmen a right and title to receive from the employer the amount. Such an application could not be deemed to be barred under section 6-H (2) of the Act, 4. Learned counsel also contended that as the matter was disputed the Labour Court could not go into the question of computation of benefit. Here too, the contention of the learned counsel has no merit because the Labour Court had the jurisdiction, as held by the Supreme Court in Central Bank of India v. Rajgopalan ( AIR 1964 S.C. 743 ), to decide, disputes regarding the claim of the (workmen to the benefit. Before the Labour Court it was not disputed that the applicants before it were workmen employed with the present petitioner and that their services had been terminated. There was thus really no dispute on essential points. Before the Labour Court it was not disputed that the applicants before it were workmen employed with the present petitioner and that their services had been terminated. There was thus really no dispute on essential points. Only the amount of benefit was to be computed in terms of money on the basis of the provisions of section 6-H of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. The Labour Court had full jurisdiction to compute such a benefit. 5. The last contention of the learned counsel was that the Labour Court should not have proceeded to compute the benefit without giving a fresh opportunity to the employer to lead evidence after having overruled the objection of the employer that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to proceed with the matter. There is, however, no allegation in the writ petition to the effect that the petitioner was prevented from leading evidence by any express or implied order of the court or that the petitioner did not lead evidence due to some misapprehension. The petitioner cannot, therefore, be deemed to have any valid grievance on this account. Moreover, when an application under section 6-H (2) is made there are no stages. A party may raise the objections and lead evidence on the points that may arise in the case. Section 6-H (2) does not contemplate piecemeal decision or decisions on controversies in stages. The order of the Labour Court cannot thus be deemed to suffer from any error of law even on this score. 6. In the result the petition fails and is dismissed with costs.