JUDGMENT K.C. Agrawal, J. - This Special Appeal is directed against the judgment of a learned Single Judge allowing the writ petition of Lat Bux Singh, respondent No.1 (briefly stated as `the respondent'). Lat Bux Singh was appointed a Constable in the Police Department of the State of U.P. He was, thereafter, promoted to the post of Head Constable in 1957 and was confirmed on that post in 1961. In the year 1970, the State of U.P. created a new rank of Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police in U.P. All those persons who were confirmed Head Constables could be considered for appointment as Assistant Sub-Inspectors. On July, 23, 1970, the respondent was given an officiating chance and was appointed an Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police. He continued to work on this post till 8th March, 1973, when he was reverted to the post of Head Constable by an order of the Deputy Inspector General of Police. During the period that the respondent worked as Assistant Sub-Inspector he was awarded two entries. These entries were as under : "A thoroughly unreliable and intriging type. A case under Section 409/ 201, I. P. C. P. S. Tilhar has been registered against him. Conduct and integrity under enquiry. He is under suspension." "Acquitted from the Court, hence reinstated. An undersign able type whose conduct and integrity are bad. Is unfit to be retained as ASI. However, due to lack of clinching evidence, integrity is certified." 2. The respondent challenged the aforesaid order of reversion by means of a writ petition, giving rise to this appeal, on the ground that the said order of reversion amounted to one of reduction in rank and was passed in violation of the provisions of Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution. The writ petition was contested by the appellants, and the allegations made by the respondent were denied as incorrect. The plea taken by the appellants was that as the work of the respondent was not found satisfactory, lie was reverted to his permanent post of Head Constable. It was also stated in the counter-affidavit that since the promotion of the respondent was officiating the authorities were entitled to watch his work and conduct and had authority to revert him in case his work and conduct were not found satisfactory. 3. It was also stated in the counter-affidavit that since the promotion of the respondent was officiating the authorities were entitled to watch his work and conduct and had authority to revert him in case his work and conduct were not found satisfactory. 3. The learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition holding that the reversion of the respondent was punitive in nature and amounted to reduction in rank. The order having been passed without complying with the requirements of Article 311(g) of the Constitution, was invalid. In the opinion of the learned Single Judge, as the Assistant Sub-Inspectors, who were junior to the respondent, were still being retained, the order of reversion was in breach of Article 16 of the Constitution. The learned Single Judge, further held that removal of the name of the respondent from the approved list of Head Constables amounted to reduction in rank and since the respondent was not given an opportunity of being heard, it violated Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution and was liable to be quashed. Aggrieved, the State of U.P. and the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Bareilly Range have come to this Court by means of the present appeal. 4. Let us now examine whether the impugned order dated March 8, 1973, was in violation of the protection contained in Article 311 of the Constitution. The said Order was as under: "The names of ASI Lat Bux Singh and Ali Mehdi be removed from the approved list and they be reverted to their original post of Head Constable, Civil Police." 5. This order does not cast any stigma on the respondent. It merely states that the respondent is reverted and that he was being sent to his substantive post of Head Constable. The real thing in all these cases is to find out whether the incumbent concerned has a right to the post from which he is reverted. If he has a right to the post then the reversion is a punishment and cannot be ordered, except in compliance with the provisions of Art. 311 of the Constitution. A person who is given an officiating chance in a higher post has no right to the same. It is, in fact, an implied term of such an appointment that in case his work is not found satisfactory, he would be liable to be reverted to his substantive post. A person who is given an officiating chance in a higher post has no right to the same. It is, in fact, an implied term of such an appointment that in case his work is not found satisfactory, he would be liable to be reverted to his substantive post. In Purshottam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 36 : 1958 A.L.J. 372 S. R. Das J. has formulated a number of propositions in this regard. 6. In Union of India v. Gajendra Singh, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1329. The Supreme Court sustained an order reverting an officiating Naib Tehsildar to his permanent post of Kanungo on the ground that he could not pass the departmental examination. In this case, the Supreme Court observed : "Appointment to a post on officiating basis is from the very nature of employment itself of a transitory character and in the absence of any contract or specific rule regulating the conditions of service to the contrary, the implied term of such an appointment is that it is terminable at any time. The Government servant so appointed acquires no right to the post." 7. It is, therefore, established beyond doubt that an order of reversion of a Government servant working on an officiating basis to his substantive post does not attract by itself Article 311 of the Constitution. But if it is demonstrated that the order of reversion though innocuous on its face, is in truth and reality one by way of punishment it will amount to an order of reduction in rank and will attract Art. 311(2). In the instant case, we have seen that the order of reversion of the respondent is innocuous and there is nothing in it which can be said to cast stigma on the respondent. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent, however, urged that as the order of reversion was the result of two adverse entries made against the respondent, the same was punitive in character. The submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent does not appeal to us. During the time that a person is officiating on a higher post, the authorities are entitled to watch his work and conduct and if they are not satisfied they would be within their rights to revert him to the substantive post. In the instant case, the respondent was promoted on officiating basis in July, 1970. During the time that a person is officiating on a higher post, the authorities are entitled to watch his work and conduct and if they are not satisfied they would be within their rights to revert him to the substantive post. In the instant case, the respondent was promoted on officiating basis in July, 1970. The authorities had an occasion to watch his work with effect from the aforesaid date till March 1973, when he was ultimately reverted. During this period, his work and conduct were not found satisfactory; the same is reflected in the entries which were given to him in respect of the years 1971 and 1972. These entries clearly demonstrate that the work and conduct of the respondent were which led the authorities to think that it was not in public interest to retain him as an Assistant Sub-Inspector. The order, therefore, being based on the consideration of the work and conduct of the respondent cannot be said to be arbitrary or illegal. Counsel for the respondent however, urged that since the respondent had been acquitted by the court of the charge of Sections 409/201 I. P. C. for which he had been prosecuted, the authorities were not justified in taking into account the entry of the year 1971 and in directing his reversion on its basis. It is true that one of the facts mentioned in the aforesaid entry relates to the prosecution of the respondent for the offence under Sections 209/201, I. P. C. He was subsequently found not guilty of the said offence. But the entry in the year 1971 does not only make mention of the fact of prosecution of the respondent but also mentions "thoroughly unreliatle and intriging type." These remarks are independent of the fact of prosecution mentioned in this entry. We also do not agree with the learned counsel for the respondent that these entries are vague and relate to the matters other than those relating to his work and conduct as an Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police. In our opinion, these entries are clear and were relevant for the purpose of deciding whether or not the respondent should be retained as an Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police. 8. In our opinion, these entries are clear and were relevant for the purpose of deciding whether or not the respondent should be retained as an Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police. 8. Counsel for the respondent, however, referred to the decision of the Supreme Court State of U.P. v. Sughar Singh, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 423 and urged that as in the said case the Supreme Court had found that no order or reversion could be based on an adverse entry, therefore, this Court should also, in accordance with the law laid down in that case, hold that the reversion order dated, March 8, 1973, was bad. We have given our consideration to the said submission of the learned counsel for the respondent, but find ourselves unable to accede to the same. The case relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent is distinguishable on facts. In the instant case, we find that there was sample material before the authorities to arrive at the conclusion that the work and conduct of the respondent was unsatisfactory for being retained in the post of Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police. The case of State of U.P. v. Sughar Singh, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 423 has been recently explained by the Supreme Court itself in Regional Manager v. Pawan Kumar Dubey, 1976 (3) S.C.C. 334 . In this case the Supreme Court, after considering the facts of Sughar Singh's case in detail, observed : "We think that the principles involved in applying Article 311(2) having been sufficiently explained in Shamsher Singh's case it should no longer be possible to urge that Sughar Singh's case could give rise to some misapprehension of the law. Indeed, we do not think that the principles of law declared and applied so often have really changed. But, the application of the same law to the differing circumstances and facts of various cases which have come up to this Court could create the impression sometimes that there is some conflict between decisions of this Court. Even where there appears to be some conflict, it would, we think, vanish when the ratio decidendi of each case is correctly understood, It is the rule deducible from the application of law to the facts and circumstances of a case which constitutes its ratio decidendi and not some conclusion based upon facts which may appear to be similar. Even where there appears to be some conflict, it would, we think, vanish when the ratio decidendi of each case is correctly understood, It is the rule deducible from the application of law to the facts and circumstances of a case which constitutes its ratio decidendi and not some conclusion based upon facts which may appear to be similar. One additional or different fact can make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases even when the same principles are applied in each case to similar facts." Dealing with this controversy, Beg, J., further observed : "We do not think that Sughar Singh's case3, in any way, conflicts with what has been laid down by this Court previously on Art. 311(2) of the Constitution or Article 16 of the Constitution." 9. The observations mentioned above establish two facts now beyond doubt. Firstly that law laid down in Sughar Singh's case3 was based on its peculiar facts and that the same cannot be universally applied to all the cases irrespective of the situation in which the question of the validity of an order of reversion might arise. Secondly that the decision given in Sughar Singh's case is not at variance with previous decisions of the Supreme Court. In the instant case the reversion order having been passed as a result of administrative exigencies and on relevant considerations, the same remains unaffected by Sughar Singh's case. The impugned order is not based after on an extraneous or a misconceived ground. 10. Another fact to which reference was made by the learned counsel for the respondent was that about 500 Asstt. Sub-Inspectors, who were junior to the respondent, were still being retained and, therefore, the impugned order was hit by Art. 16 of the Constitution. The submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent, were still being retained and, therefore, the impugned order was hit by Art. 16 of the Constitution. The submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent was no substance. It is true that some of the Head Constables who were junior to the respondent and had also been appointed on officiating basis, were not reverted on the date on which the respondent was reverted but that cannot be a circumstance showing that the action taken against the respondent was discriminatory. 11. In Regional Manager v. Pawan Kumar Dubey, 1976 (3) S.C.C. 334 . 11. In Regional Manager v. Pawan Kumar Dubey, 1976 (3) S.C.C. 334 . The Supreme Court has very clearly found that, "Orders of reversion passed as a result of administrative exigencies, without any suggestion of malice in law or in fact, are unaffected by Sughar Singh's3 case. They are not vitiated merely because some other Government servants, juniors in the substantive rank, have not been reverted." 12. This makes it clear that merely because some of the persons junior to the Government servant reverted have been retained in service cannot be a ground for holding that the reversion contravences Art. 16 of the Constitution. The requirement of law is that an order of reversion should not be arbitrary or capricious. Since, in the instant case, the order has been passed on consideration of relevant facts, therefore, the same cannot be held to be in valid merely on the ground that some persons junior to the respondent are still in service. 13. The only other question that remains to be examined is whether the learned Single Judge was right in holding that as the respondent was not given an opportunity of being heard against the removal of his name from the approved list, the impugned order dated 8th March, 1973, was liable to be quashed. In this regard, the sub-mission made by the learned State Counsel was that there was neither any Act nor any rule governing the maintenance of an approved list from which promotion tiadto be made to the posts of Assistant Sub-Inspectors from amongst the Head Constables and, therefore, the learned Single Judge, committed an error in holding that the impugned order was bad in account of the defect, mentioned above. Sri Markandey Katju, however, urged that as the removal of the name of the respondent from the approved list, jeopardises his future chances of promotion, therefore, the impugned order was punitive. Reliance, was placed by him on a case of the Supreme Court reported in Jagdish Prasad Shastri v. State of U.P., A.I.R. S.C. 1224. 14. In P.L. Dhingra v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 36 : 1958 A.L.J. 372 two tests have been laid down For determination whether a reversion amounts to reduction in rank (1) whether the servant had a right to the post or rank, and (2) whether he had been visited with evil consequences. 14. In P.L. Dhingra v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 36 : 1958 A.L.J. 372 two tests have been laid down For determination whether a reversion amounts to reduction in rank (1) whether the servant had a right to the post or rank, and (2) whether he had been visited with evil consequences. It was held that if the order entails or provides for the forfeiture of his pay or allowances or the loss of his seniority in a substantive rank or the stoppage or postponement of his future chances of promotion, the order would be one which visited the servant with evil consequences. 15. The question, therefore to be seen is whether the future chances of promotion of the respondent were marked or jeopardised. In the instant case, it is true that the impugned order dated 8th March, 1973, directed the removal of the name of the respondent from the approved list, but the learned counsel for the respondent could not bring to our notice any provision of law which requires the maintenance of an approved list. He also could not point out any Government Order laying down the requirement of maintenance of such a list. He, however, invited our attention to paragraph 3 of the writ petition and Annexure `1' to the same. Paragraph 3 only states the fact that the appointment of the respondent was made in the manner mentioned therein. It does not any where state the fact that removal of name from a list of selected candidates disentitles a person from consideration of his name for promotion in future. Annexure `1' to which our attention was drawn, is headed as "Result Sheet of H. Cs. C. P., whose character rolls have been scrutinised for the post of Assistant Sub-Inspector." Further there is nothing in this annexure which could show that it laid down the requirement of preparation of any list of the candidates approved for selection. It only mentions the method in which the recruitment was made in that particular year. C. P., whose character rolls have been scrutinised for the post of Assistant Sub-Inspector." Further there is nothing in this annexure which could show that it laid down the requirement of preparation of any list of the candidates approved for selection. It only mentions the method in which the recruitment was made in that particular year. In the absence of any allegation in the writ petition that as result of the removal of name, a head constable is not entitled to the consideration of his name again for the post of Assistant Sub-Inspector we are not satisfied that on account of the removal of his name from the approved list the respondent became disentitled to considered in future for the promotional post. It is true that by the impugned order the respondent has been deprived of the post of Assistant Sub-Inspector, and that it might take some-time before the respondent is against appointed on that post, but such a deprivation is the usual consequence of order of reversion from the official-post. The counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the appellant also states that case the respondent shows improve - his case could be considered for promotional post again. We can therefore, accept the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent that as a result of the removal of his name from the approved list future chances of promotion of the respondent are marred. Jagdish Prasad's cases relied upon by the respondent is clearly distinguishable as it appears from the facts of that case that the removal had resulted in the total deprivation of consideration of name of Jagdish Prasad for the post of secretaryship of the Panchayat once for all. 16. The next case relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent is S. P. Dharni v. State of U. P., S.A. No. 10 of 1975 D/d. 5.3.1976. In this case, the Division Bench (of which one of us was a member) dealing with this question observed as under : "Normally is a case of reversion the Government servant who has been the Government servant who has been considered for promotion again. Such a case will stand on a different footing. But, if in view of some service a rules after a person has been reverted' he loses even the right for being considered for promotion, it would amount to a penalty". Such a case will stand on a different footing. But, if in view of some service a rules after a person has been reverted' he loses even the right for being considered for promotion, it would amount to a penalty". As, in the instant case, we have found that the respondent does not lose his right of being considered for promotion again, the view taken by us in case is in accordance with the law laid down by the Division Bench in the aforesaid case. 17. Counsel for the respondent also attempted to urge that the action taken against the respondent is mala fide, but he could not bring any evidence to our notice establishing the allegation. The only circumstance relied upon by him was the immediate action which was taken against the respondent after the entry of the year 1972 was given. In our opinion, this of circumstance by itself cannot lead us to hold that the action taken is mala fides are more easily made then proved. 18. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and order of the learned Single Judge, is set aside and the writ petition is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case the parties shall bear their own costs.