JUDGMENT G. Viswanatha Iyer, J. 1. In this Original Petition the petitioner challenges the order of the Government Ext. P-16 dated 15th March 1974 setting aside an earlier order of the Government Ext. P-14 dated 22nd October 1973 rejecting the request of the 1st respondent, the Manager, M.A.S.M. High School, Venmanad, Pavaraty, Trichur, for the permanent absorption of the 2nd respondent as Headmaster of the above school. The petitioner is now a High School Assistant in the school managed by the 1st respondent. While he was earlier working as a High School Assistant in the J.D.T. Islam High School, Calicut, at the suggestion of the 1st respondent, the petitioner moved for inter-management transfer to M.A.S.M. High School managed by the 1st respondent. Then the first respondent had informed the District Educational Officer, Chawghat, of a permanent vacancy in the post of a Headmaster in the school which had been upgraded as a High School in the year 1968. He had also intimated that he is prepared to appoint the petitioner in the above vacancy if he is transferred to the school on an inter-management transfer basis. This transfer was allowed by the District Educational Officer, Chawghat, by his order dated 3rd June 1968 and the petitioner was appointed as a permanent teacher and was also posted as teacher-in-charge of the school. This appointment was approved by the District Educational Officer by his order dated 20th July 1968. Rule 44-A of Chapter XIV-A, Kerala Education Rules, requires that the Headmaster of a complete High School should have put in a minimum of 12 years continuous service as High School Assistant before he is appointed as such. This school was to become a full- fledged high school with effect from the reopening date of the schools in June, 1970. The petitioner would have put in only 11 years of service by that time and so in September 1969 he asked for exemption from the prescribed minimum service to be appointed as Headmaster. His request was rejected by the Government as premature as the school had not at the time of application become a full High School. When it became a full-fledged High School he renewed his application on 29th May 1970. His request was rejected by the Government as premature as the school had not at the time of application become a full High School. When it became a full-fledged High School he renewed his application on 29th May 1970. In the meanwhile, the 1st respondent applied to accord sanction for the deputation of the 2nd respondent who was a graduate teacher in the Government High School, Chawghat, for appointment as Headmaster of the M.A.S.M. High School for a period of three years from the date of relief from the Department. That was allowed by the Government by order dated 14th August 1970. In the order sanctioning deputation it was stated that the sanction is accorded subject to the terms and conditions of foreign service laid down in Chapter II, K.S.R., Part I. Accordingly the 2nd respondent was appointed as the Headmaster in the school. Being aggrieved by this deputation of the 2nd respondent to the school the petitioner moved the Government by an application dated 26th August 1971 to cancel the deputation of the 2nd respondent so that the petitioner can claim to be appointed Headmaster of the school. In May, 1972, he sent another representation to the Government by way of a reminder. In the meanwhile the 1st respondent wanted to absorb the 2nd respondent as the permanent Headmaster and applied to the Government for sanction. On coming to know of this request the petitioner moved the Government to reject the request of the 1st respondent to permanently absorb the 2nd respondent as Headmaster. Without notice to the petitioner the Government by order dated 19th August 1972 accorded sanction for the permanent absorption of the 2nd respondent as the Headmaster subject to the specific condition that he resigns his appointment under Government. This order was challenged by the petitioner in O.P. No. 4724 of 1972 in this Court. In that Original Petition he challenged the deputation of the 2nd respondent and also the order of the Government sanctioning the permanent absorption of the 2nd respondent as Headmaster of the school. This Court by judgment dated 7th August 1973, directed the Government to consider the representation of the petitioner against the request of the 1st respondent to accord sanction to permanently absorb the 2nd respondent as the Headmaster of the school. This Court by judgment dated 7th August 1973, directed the Government to consider the representation of the petitioner against the request of the 1st respondent to accord sanction to permanently absorb the 2nd respondent as the Headmaster of the school. It was also observed that the order of the Government dated 19th August 1972 according sanction has no statutory basis and in that sense it cannot adversely affect the rights, if any, available to the petitioner under law. Pursuant to this judgment the Government considered the matter over again. The petitioner, 2nd respondent and the 1st respondent were heard. On a review of the whole position and in supersession of the earlier order dated 19th August 1972 the Government decided that it may not be correct to absorb a teacher in Government service as the Headmaster of a private school on a permanent basis so long as he is in Government service. The Government further decided that it may not be proper for the Government to suggest to the management that the 2nd respondent can be appointed as the Headmaster if he resigns his post under Government service since that would be committing themselves to a position which would preclude them from considering impartially an appeal that may be filed by an aggrieved party against an order of appointment under rule 44 (2) of Chapter XIV-A, K.E.R. In the light of this conclusion the request of the Manager for permanent absorption of the 2nd respondent as Headmaster of the school was rejected. 2. The Manager did not implement this order of Government. He filed a petition stated to be an appeal petition to the Government and implementation of the earlier order was temporarily stayed. Coming to know of this stay order the petitioner by Ext. P-15 petition dated 8th November 1973, moved the Government to vacate that order. The whole matter was reviewed over again. The Minister in charge of Local Administration who was in charge of the Education Department heard the parties. Coming to know of this stay order the petitioner by Ext. P-15 petition dated 8th November 1973, moved the Government to vacate that order. The whole matter was reviewed over again. The Minister in charge of Local Administration who was in charge of the Education Department heard the parties. The 1st respondent contended before the Government that since he applied for getting recognition to the school, and he only sponsored for upgrading the school into a High School and since he is conceding that the school is an institution run by him for the benefit of the community, the school is an institution established and administered by a minority community and as such the Manager can claim protection under of the Constitution in appointing a qualified hand of his choice as Headmaster. This plea was accepted by the Government and it was also considered by the Government that there is no legal bar in appointing a qualified hand from the Education Department as Headmaster in an aided school and that the petitioners complaint against the deputation and absorption of the 2nd respondent in the school are unsustainable. In this view the earlier order of the Government was set aside and the Education authorities were directed to dispose of as per the rules the letter of resignation submitted by the 2nd respondent to enable the 1st respondent to appoint him in the school. The petitioner challenges this order Ext P-16 in this writ petition. 3. Three points are raised by the petitioner in support of his prayer to set aside the Government order in question. Firstly it is contended that the order Ext. P-14 dated 22nd October 1973 is an order passed by the Government on considering the whole matter in detail as directed by this Court in the judgment in O.P. No. 4724 of 1972, that that was an order not coming under any of the provisions of the Kerala Education Act or the Rules and therefore there is no scope for any appeal against that order or for the Government to consider it even as a review petition. The power of review being not inherent but only one which should be conferred by statute and as there is no statutory provision to review an order of this type, in the absence of any change of circumstances subsequent to the earlier order the Government went wrong in setting aside the earlier order. Secondly it is contended that the conclusion of the Government that M.A.S.M. High School managed by the 1st respondent is an institution established and administered by a minority community is a conclusion based on no material and therefore it was wrong on the part of the Government to accept the contention of the 1st respondent that he can appoint qualified Headmaster as per his choice. One other point which also is incidently raised is that the order in question has been passed mala fide. These contentions are considered in detail hereafter. 4. The request for deputation of a Government servant for appointment as a Headmaster in a High School is not based on any provision of the Kerala Education Act or the Rules. Appointment of a Government servant in an aided school can be treated only as an appointment in a foreign service governed only by Kerala Service Rules. Hence the request of the manager for permanent absorption of a Government servant as Headmaster in the aided school is equally not governed by any provision of the Kerala Education Act or the Rules. This Court considered in O.P. No. 4724 of 1972 the nature of this request and the power of the Government under the Kerala Education Rules to consider it. It was observed in that case thus: ”All sides are agreed that Ext. P-15 has no statutory sanction behind it, and in that sense it cannot be said that Ext. P-15 can adversely affect the rights, if any, available to the petitioner under law. (Ext. P-15 is the order of Government dated 19th August 1972 allowing the managers request) After so stating this Court directed the Government to consider the undisposed of representation of the petitioner untrammelled by the earlier order. This direction and the consequent consideration of the representation of the petitioner by the Government are not on the basis of any provision in the Kerala Education Rules. Therefore, the order dated 22nd October 1973 was not an order passed by the Government under the Kerala Education Rules. This direction and the consequent consideration of the representation of the petitioner by the Government are not on the basis of any provision in the Kerala Education Rules. Therefore, the order dated 22nd October 1973 was not an order passed by the Government under the Kerala Education Rules. In this view there is no scope for an appeal or a review under any provision of the Kerala Education Rules. 1st respondents appeal against the order dated 22nd October 1973 was therefore incompetent either as an appeal petition or as a review. 5. The respondents next contended that the order dated 22nd October 1973 is an original order passed by the Government and therefore under rule 95 of Chapter XIV-A, Kerala Education Rules, the Government can on application of the party review its order. The Kerala Education Rules empower the Government to pass original orders; for instance, rule 67, sub-rule 2 of Chapter XIV-A allows the Government to suspend a teacher of an aided school. Similar powers are provided for in other rules. Such an order will be an original order which can be reviewed under rule 93 of Chapter XIV-A, Kerala Education Rules, by the Government. The order dated 22nd October 1973 is not an order of that type. It is not based on any Education Rule. Consequently the submission made by the respondents counsel that what has been done by the Government was by way of review under rule 93 cannot stand. The order dated 22nd October 1973 is itself a Government order. No appeal lies to the Government against that order. In these circumstances the order Ext. P-16 has no statutory foundation and is therefore invalid. Further considering it as a purely executive order there was no change of circumstances after Ext. P14 order to warrant a reconsideration of the matter by the Government. Therefore, in any view of the matter the order Ext. P-16 passed by the Government cannot be sustained. 6. In the order challenged it is stated that the school managed by the 1st respondent is an institution established and administered by a minority community. There is no relevant material to sustain that conclusion. In the order under attack the Government stated thus:” It is not disputed that the Muslims in India form a religious minority community. The Manager of M.A.S.M.H.S., Venmanad, Sri Mohammed, is a muslim. There is no relevant material to sustain that conclusion. In the order under attack the Government stated thus:” It is not disputed that the Muslims in India form a religious minority community. The Manager of M.A.S.M.H.S., Venmanad, Sri Mohammed, is a muslim. He was the sponsor or the applicant of the Muhammed Abdul Rahiman Sahib Memorial U. P. School Venmanad and he was also the applicant or sponsor for upgrading the same U. P. School as a High School and this was sanctioned accordingly by the Government. It is therefore clear that the school is established and administered by Sri Mohammed the Manager, who is a member of the minority community. The Manager himself has stated that the school is an institution run by him for the benefit of the community.� In the counter-affidavit filed by the respondents and by the Government no other material is placed to show that the community as such had anything to do for the establishment of the school. The school is managed by an individual and in that management the community has no control. This Court had occasion to consider the factors which have to be established to make out that an institution is established and administered by a minority community. In Rajershi Memorial Basic Training School v. State of Kerala and another, I.L.R. 1972 (2) Kerala 542 it has been laid down, following the decisions of the Supreme Court, that the mere fact that the school was founded by a person belonging to a particular religious persuasion is not at all conclusive of the question whether the institution is really one entitled to the protection guaranteed under Article 30 (1) of the Constitution. It was stated that it must be shown that the institution is established and administered by or on behalf of the particular community. In Rt. Rev. Dr. Aldo Maria Patroni v. Assistant Educational Officer, Tellicherry, 1974 K.L.T. 78 one of us had occasion to consider the factors which would go to make out that an institution is established and administered by a minority community. There was absolutely no material for the Government to conclude that the institution managed by the 1st respondent is an institution established and administered by the minority community. Therefore, the conclusion of the Government regarding the character of the institution cannot be supported. On this ground also therefore, the order Ext. P-16 cannot be sustained. There was absolutely no material for the Government to conclude that the institution managed by the 1st respondent is an institution established and administered by the minority community. Therefore, the conclusion of the Government regarding the character of the institution cannot be supported. On this ground also therefore, the order Ext. P-16 cannot be sustained. From this it follows that the 1st respondent cannot rely on Article 30 (1) of the Constitution and claim to appoint a Headmaster of his choice ignoring the statutory rules under the Kerala Education Rules. 7. In the light of these conclusions it is not necessary to go into the nature of the other contention urged by the petitioners counsel that the order in question is vitiated by mala fides. The file was placed before us by the Government Pleader for our perusal. We need not comment on it in view of our conclusion that the order under attack cannot, even on other grounds, be sustained in law. 8. In the result the order of the Government under challenge is set aside. This original petition is thus allowed with costs.