Judgment :- 1. This appeal is by the quondam land-holder of what is known as Singampatti Zamin, an ‘estate’ within the meaning of S. 3(2) of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, from an order of Ramaprasada Rao, J. dismissing his petition under Art. 226 of the constitution to quash the Estates Abolition Tribunals order. The lands once formed part of that estate, the extent of which was said to be about 66,826 acres. He claimed the forest as his private property. The Privy Council upheld his title to it in the Secretary of State for India in Council v. Nallamkutti Sivasubramania Thevar 15 Mad. 101. During the minority of the appellant, the Court of Wards under the Court of Wards Act was in management of the estate until it was notified and taken over by under the provisions of Madras Act 26 of 1948, which was in February, 1952. He became a major in September of that year. It appears that his father had left considerable debts. The Court of Wards was finding ways and means to clear them. It was said that about 900 acres of forest land was reclaimed between 1937 and 1952. The wattle trees were cut and the land reclaimed, so as to plant teak there, through the Forest department. The appellant applied for a ryotwari patta under S. 12 of Madras Act 26 of 1948 and that led to varying decisions at the hands of the Settlement Officer and the Tribunal and once the matter came to this court and the same stood remitted to the Settlement Officer and over again, it went to the Tribunal and eventually, Ramaprasada Rao, J. had to deal with it, with the result we mentioned. 2. The entire question turns on whether that portion of the land, whatever the extent be, which had been reclaimed after cutting the wattle trees there and planting teakwood trees can be regarded as private land and in any case as land to which he would be entitled to patta under S. 12(b)(iii) of Madras Act 26 of 1948. Ramaprasada Rao. J. was of opinion that the forest land so reclaimed could be regarded as having been cultivated by planting teakwood; but he considered that since such cultivation was done by Forest department, it would not satisfy the requirements of S. 12(b)(iii). Ramaprasada Rao. J. was of opinion that the forest land so reclaimed could be regarded as having been cultivated by planting teakwood; but he considered that since such cultivation was done by Forest department, it would not satisfy the requirements of S. 12(b)(iii). There was a controversy as to the extent of the land reclaimed. But on the view we are taking, it is unnecessary to go into that question. 3. We shall presently refer to the relative statutory provisions. It seems to us that it is doubtful whether forest land can be regarded as ‘private land’ within the meaning of S. 3(10) of the Estates Land Act as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Chidombara v. Santhanaramaswami A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1005 Private land’ as defined means domain or home-farm land of the land-holder, such as Kambattam, khas, sir or pannai land . The definition includes also land which is proved to have been cultivated as private land by the landholder himself, by his own servants or by hired labour, with his own or hired stock, for a continuous period of 12 years immediately before the commencement of the Act. 4. In the above decision of the Supreme Court, it was held that the first part of the dentition was meant to include and signify those lands which are in the ordinary sense of the word home-farm lands, that is to say, those lands which surround the manor and used as home-farm lands. But the user of those lands is not the essence of it, but the intention to retain them for cultivation by the landholder. The latter part of that definition, according to that judgment, covered those lands which would not necessarily be regarded as home-farm lands in the ordinary usage of the term, but lands cultivated by the landholder in the manner mentioned in the statute. The definition read as a whole, as was pointed out by the Supreme Court, indicates that the ordinary test for ‘private land’ is the test of retention by the landholder for his personal use and cultivation by him or under his personal supervision. 5. The definition read as a whole, as was pointed out by the Supreme Court, indicates that the ordinary test for ‘private land’ is the test of retention by the landholder for his personal use and cultivation by him or under his personal supervision. 5. Sec. 12(a) of Madras Act 26 of 1948 provides for grant of ryotwari patta for lands which immediately before the notified date, belonged to the quondam landholder as private-land within the meaning of Sec. 3(10)(a) of the Estates Land Act, or stood recorded as his private land in a record prepared under the provisions of Chapter XI or chapter XII of that Act, not having been subsequently converted into ryoti land. Clause (b) of S. 12 has three sub-clauses. The first two subclauses deal with ryoti lands, which in certain cases, for the purpose of grant of patta be regarded as private lands. We are here concerned with sub clause (iii) of clause (b) of S. 12. This sub clause excludes from its purview forest lands. It speaks of lands which have been abandoned or relinquished by a ryot, or which have never been in the occupation of a ryot. If such a land has been cultivated by the landholder by his own servant or hired labour etc., and he has been in direct and continuous possession of such and from 1st July 1939, it might qualify him to get a ryotwari patta there for. To our minds this sub-clause deals with ryoti land and not private land, which by reason of cultivation by the land-holder in the manner indicated becomes ryoti lands. In fact, we know of such a conversion. 6. What was claimed by the appellant was that since the Court of Wards as his (appellants) agent cleared the forest through the Forest department, reclaimed the forest land and cultivated it by planting teakwood trees, the land should be regarded as of the description in sub-clause (iii) of clause (b) of S. 12 of Madras Act 26 of 1948, so as to qualify him for ryotwari patta. In our opinion, apart from the question of agency, we cannot accept the contention in that form. In our opinion, apart from the question of agency, we cannot accept the contention in that form. A landholer may claim a land to be private land as defined, or with reference to a ryoti land may claim ryotwari patta if the land qualifies itself therefor under any of the sub clauses in clause (b) of S. 12 of Act 26 of 1948. In no case, is it contemplated either by the provisions of the Estates Land Act or by the provisions of the Abolition Act that a landholder cultivating a reclaimed forest land could convert it into a ryoti land without there being a ryot inducted into it. It is open to a landholder to convert a private land into a ryoti land by inducting a ryot into it, or a ryot cultivating private land can acquire occupancy right in the land, thereby treating the land as ryoti land. But in this case, the appellant claimed that merely by reclaiming the forest land and cultivating the same, he could treat it as ryoti land. There is no provision of law which enables him to do so. The test of cultivation by the landlord is always applied to see whether the land which he claimed to be private land bears that character, and not to see whether the land is ryoti in his hands. 7. Our attention was invited for the appellants to Kadirvelsami v. Sultan Ahmed Badruddin Rowther 1946-2-M.L.J. 371=59 L.W. 657 and Kamulammal v. Athikari Sangali Subba Pillai 1946-2-M.L.J. 371=59 L.W. 657. Neither of these cases had occasion to deal with this problem. The first one related to jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain a suit for land on the lease of what was a forest land cleared for cultivation. That was a case where a third party was inducted into forest land and it was assumed that the through cultivation by the lessee, the land became ryoti. That is not the case before us. Kamulammal v. Athikari Sangali Subba Pillai 35 M.L.J. 11 also was not concerned with the problem with which we have to do. On that view, we think that the appellant has not established his eligibility to a ryotwari patta for the lands in question either under S. 12 (a) or S. 12(b) (iii) of Act 26 of 1948. 8. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. No costs.