Judgment S.SARWAR ALI, J. 1. This is an application in revision directed against the order of the court below staying the preparation of the final decree in a mortgage suit till the receiver in insolvency is made a party to the present proceeding. 2. The petitioners claim to be the mortgagees in respect of a mortgage executed by the opposite party in the year 1952. By the order dated 4-6-1956, the opposite parties were adjudged insolvents. Mortgage Suit Ho. 86 of 1973 was filed by the petitioners in which a preliminary decree was passed on 23-7-1974. The receiver was not a party to the suit. The petitioners thereafter applied for preparation of final decree. On 4-4-1975, one of the judgment-debtors appeared and filed an application stating that since the opposite party-mortgagors had been adjudged insolvents and the property of the Insolvents vested in court and the receiver, there should be stay of proceeding for preparation of final decree until the receiver was made a party to the proceeding. This application was allowed. Hence this civil revision application. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the receiver was not a necessary party. At best he was a proper party. Since the petitioners, who are plaintiffs in the mortgage suit did not want the receiver to be impleaded, no order could be passed forcing them to implead the receiver. He relied on the decisions In Sant Prasad Singh V/s. Sheodut Singh, ILR 2 Pat 724 = (AIR 1924 Pat 259). Union Bank of Bijapur V/s. Bhimrao Shrinivasarao Jorapur, (AIR 1929 Bom 258) and Khazanchi Shah V/s. Nizam Din, (AIR 1930 Lah 791). He further contended that the decision of the Judicial Committee reported in Kala Chand Banerjee V/s. Jagannath Marwari, (AIR 1927 PC 108) is distinguishable as the decision aforesaid was given under the Insolvency Act. 1907 and not the present Insolvency Act which is of the year 1920. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners referred to Sec.28 of the Present Insolvency Act and contended that it was different from the corresponding provision in the earlier Act, being Sec.16 (clause 5). 1907 and not the present Insolvency Act which is of the year 1920. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners referred to Sec.28 of the Present Insolvency Act and contended that it was different from the corresponding provision in the earlier Act, being Sec.16 (clause 5). Sec.16 (clause 5) of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1907 was as follows:- "Nothing in this section shall affect the power of any secured creditor to deal with the security in the same manner as he would have been entitled to realise or deal with it if this section had not been passed." Sec.28 (clause 6) of the Present Act, being the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920, is as follows:- "Nothing in this section shall affect the power of any secured creditor to realise or otherwise deal with his security, in the same manner as he would have been entitled to realise or deal with it if this section had not been passed." The only difference between the two sub-sections is that while in the present sub-section the expression "to realise or otherwise" is present before the words "deal with his security" the same was not there in the corresponding provision in the earlier Act. But the introduction of these words, in my view, is only clarificatory in nature and does not bring about any sub-stantial difference in the provision as it stood before and as is enacted now. 5. Of the decisions cited by learned counsel for the petitioner, I find that the Patna and Bombay cases are distinguishable. They do not deal with the points which are in controversy in the present case. So far as the Lahore case is concerned, it relies on the case of Jagannath Marwari V/s. Kala Chand Banerjee, (AIR 1925 Cal 785) which has been specifically overruled by the Judicial Committee in AIR 1927 PC 108 (supra). In my view, therefore, the Privy Council decision is squarely applicable to the present case, despite the addition of certain words in Sec.28 (6) of the present Insolvency Act. In my view, therefore, the Privy Council decision is squarely applicable to the present case, despite the addition of certain words in Sec.28 (6) of the present Insolvency Act. In Kala Chand Banerjees case, Lord Salvesen observed as follows:- "That the rights of the secured creditor over a property are not affected by the fact that the mortgagor or his heir has been adjudicated an insolvent is of course, plain, but that does not in the least imply that an action against him may proceed in the absence of the person to whom the equity of redemption has been assigned by the operation of law. The latter alone is entitled to transact in regard to it, and he and not the insolvent, has the sole interest in the subject-matter of the suit. To him, therefore, must be given the opportunity of redeeming the property. The contrary view would encourage collusive arrangements between the secured creditor and the insolvent and might involve the sacrifice of valuable equities of redemption which ought to be made available for the benefit of the unsecured creditors of the insolvent with whose interests the Receiver is charged." In my view, therefore, in the circumstance of the present case, the receiver was a necessary party to the mortgage suit itself. 6 In the case of Indian Cotton Co. Ltd. V/s. Ramcharanlal Chunnilal, (AIR 1939 Nag 128), it was held that when a mortgagor is adjudged insolvent, his estate vests in the Court with effect from the presentation of the insolvency application. Where therefore in a suit brought by a mortgagee, a preliminary decree is obtained after the mortgagor has applied in insolvency but before he is adjudged an insolvent and that decree is made final and insolvents property is sold in execution, the proceedings are not binding on the receiver if he was not impleaded in those proceedings. The present case appears to be stronger than the case aforesaid. 7. The question, therefore, whether the order of the court directing the receiver to be impleaded as a party is, in view of the position of law as stated above, liable to be set aside. In my view, it is only after the receiver is impleaded, that he can protect the interest which devolves on him as a receiver in insolvency in respect of the right of redemption. In my view, it is only after the receiver is impleaded, that he can protect the interest which devolves on him as a receiver in insolvency in respect of the right of redemption. He can also in further proceeding before the court protect the interest of the insolvent and the unsecured creditor. It is, therefore, not a fit case where any interference is called for. 8. One other observation is, however, to be made. It may be possible that in certain circumstances, the receiver may feel that the preliminary decree itself should not have been passed. If that is the position, the receiver, if impleaded after the preliminary decree, would be entitled to take such other steps as may be necessary for getting rid of the effect of the preliminary decree by taking such steps as may be permissible in law. This application is, therefore, dismissed. But since there is no appearance for the Opposite party, there will be no order as to costs.