J. M. L. SINHA, J. This is a decree-holders second appeal aris ing out of execution proceedings. The material facts are as follows: Sri B. P. Tandon and Sri Brijeshwari Prasad Tandon, hereinafter to be called decree-holder-appellants, filed a suit for recovery of a sum of Rs. 2,592. 56 against Nawab Mehdi Ali Khan, now substituted by his heirs, and Mohammad Mehdi Ali Khan. A compromise was entered into between the parties during the pendency of the case in the trial court, and the suit was decreed in accordance with that compromise. It may be relevant to mention here some of the terms of that compromise which were as follows: (i) That the decretal amount shall be payable by the defendants in monthly instalments of Rs. 50/ -. The first instalment being payable on 1st June, 1969. (ii) That the defendants shall also pay Rs. 500/- from each of the commutations granted to them from time to time. (iii) That the interest of the interim period on the decretal amount from 1-11-68 to 31-5-1969 will be charged at the rate of 2% per month. (iv) That if the decretal amount is paid as per terms stated above, the plaintiff shall be entitled for decretal amount with interest at Rs. 1% per mensem and in the case of any of the defaults, the interest shall be chargeable at 2% per mensem on the decretal amount and the plaintiff shall be entitled to get the decree executed by attaching commutation granted to the defendants with up to date defaulted instalments of money monthly and also the defaulted amount of Rs. 500/-, if any, from the next commutation granted to him of the respective amount in future: (v) The defendants shall pay the decretal amount positively within three years failing which the plaintiff shall be entitled to attach the whole of the outstanding amount from any of the commutations granted to them and the defendants shall have no objection to such attachment. The aforesaid compromise decree was put into execution by the decree-holder appellants praying that commutation of Wasiqa or pen sion of the respondents be attached from the office of the Wasiqa Officer, Lucknow. The aforesaid compromise decree was put into execution by the decree-holder appellants praying that commutation of Wasiqa or pen sion of the respondents be attached from the office of the Wasiqa Officer, Lucknow. An attachment order was sent and in response thereto the Wasiqa Officer as well as the respondents raised objections stating that, despite the consent decree, the wasiqa or pension could not be attached in view of the provisions contained in section 11 of the Pension Act. It was also urged that the agreement contained in the compromise decree regarding the mode of payment was void, being in violation of section 12 of the Pensions Act. Both the objections found favour with the execution court, with the result that the attachment of the amount of commutation was vacated. Feeling aggrieved against it, the decree-holder went in appeal before the District Judge. The appeal was heard by the Second Additional Civil Judge, Kanpur, and was dismissed. A Second Appeal was then filed before this Court which came up for disposal before a learned Single Judge. One of the arguments advanced on behalf of the decree-holder before the learned Single Judge was that the commuted amount is not a pension and, consequently, section 11 of the Pensions Act cannot apply to it. Reliance for this argument was placed before the learned Single Judge on a decision of this Court in the case of Mela Ram v. Senior Superintendent of Post Offices, Agra. A. I. R. 1970 Alld. 234 The learned Single Judge, however, felt that, in view of the pronounce ment of the Supreme Court in the case of The State of Gujarat v. Dr. Raghunath Balkrishna Chandrachud A. I. R. 1971 S. C. 846 the decision of this Court in the case of Mela Ram v. Senior Superintendent of Post Offices (supra) no more appeared to be a good law. In view, however, of the fact that the decision of this Court in the aforesaid case was a Division Bench decision, the learned Single Judge directed that this case may be referred to a larger Bench for disposal. It is thus that the case has come up before us. We have heard learned counsel on either side. In view, however, of the fact that the decision of this Court in the aforesaid case was a Division Bench decision, the learned Single Judge directed that this case may be referred to a larger Bench for disposal. It is thus that the case has come up before us. We have heard learned counsel on either side. On the arguments raised on either side, we find that the limited question involved for con sideration is whether sections 11 and 12 of the Pensions Act would apply to the commuted value of pension. Section 11 of the Pensions Act reads as follows: "11. EXEMPTION OF PENSION FROM ATTACHMENT: No pension granted or continued by Government on political considerations, or on account of past services or present infirmities or as a compassionate allowance and no money due or to become due on account of any such pension or allowance, shall be liable to seizure, attachment or seqeustration by process of any Court at the instance of a oreditor, for any demand against the pensioner, or in satisfaction of a decree or order of any such Court. . . . . . " So far as the first part of section 11 is concerned, it merely speaks of pension. It has been held in a number of cases that the word pension means periodical payment, see Lachmi Narain and others v. Makund Singh and others A. L. J. 338; Wasiq Ali Mirza Nawab Bahadur of Murshidabad v. Karnani Industries) A. I. R. 1931 P. C. 160; Bankey Behari Lal v. Lala Babu A. I. R. 1955 Alld. 1 (F. B.); Shankat Husain Beg Mirza v. State of Uttar Pradesh A. I. R. 1959 Alld. 769 and Mela Ram v. Senior Superintendent of Post Offices, (supra ). Reference has been made in the order of the learned Single Judge to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Gujarat v. Dr. Raghunath Balkrishna Chandrachud (supra) for his tentative conclusion that the view expressed by this Court in the case of Mela Ram v. Senior Superintendent of Post Offices is not correct. Reference has been made in the order of the learned Single Judge to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Gujarat v. Dr. Raghunath Balkrishna Chandrachud (supra) for his tentative conclusion that the view expressed by this Court in the case of Mela Ram v. Senior Superintendent of Post Offices is not correct. We have carefully gone through the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court and we find that it cannot categorically be said on the basis of anything contained in the report of that case that the interpretation of the word pension, as given in the case of Mela Ram v. Senior Superintendent of Post Offices (supra) and in the other cases referred to above is incorrect. On the contrary the following observation contained in the decision of the Supreme Court at page 683 lends support to the view taken in the earlier cases: "the word "pension" in the Pensions Act, 1871, Section 60 (1) (g) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and section 6 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 implies periodical payments of money by Government to the pensioner". It is true that in the aforesaid case, the Supreme Court held that the allowance payable to the respondent in one lump sum was pension. It was, however, so held in the context of the order passed by the Maharaja of Baroda and clause 2 of Article VIII of the Baroda State Merger Agreement. Therefore, for the purposes of this appeal, we shall assume that the word pension used in section 11 means periodical payment and that the commuted value of the pension may not be covered by the word pension. What is, however, worthy of notice is that the second part of section 11 speaks of "money due or to become due on account of any such pension. . . . . . . . . "-The question is whether it can be said that the commuted value of the pension is money due or to become due on account of pension. If that is so, the commuted value of pension should be protected from attachment under second part of section 11 of the Pensions Act. The Pensions Act is divided in three parts. Part I is preliminary and contains three sections. If that is so, the commuted value of pension should be protected from attachment under second part of section 11 of the Pensions Act. The Pensions Act is divided in three parts. Part I is preliminary and contains three sections. Section 1 only defines the territorial scope of the act, section 2 mentions about the Acts repealed and section 3 interpretes the expression "grant of money or land revenue". Section 3-A defines the expression appropriate government. Thereafter comes Part II the head ing whereof is rights to Pensions. It consists of sections 4, 5, 6 and 7. It is not necessary to advert to those sections at any length. Part III relates to mode of payment, as is apparent from its heading. It consists of sections 8, 9 and 10. Section 8 states that payment of all pensions or grants etc. shall be made by the Collector or the other authorised officer. Section 9 states that nothing in sections 4 and 8 shall affect the right of a grantee of land revenue, whose claim to such grant is admitted by Government, to recover such revenue from the persons liable to pay the same. Section 10 refers to commutation of Pensions and reads as follows; "the appropriate Government may, with the consent of the holder, order the whole or any part of his pension or grant of money or land revenue to be commuted for a lump sum on such terms as may be seem fit. " A perusal of section 10, reproduced above, which falls in the chapter headed mode of Payment, to our mind leaves no room for doubt that commuted amount of pension is nothing but a payment on account of pension. But for the fact that a Government servant is entitled to pension within the meaning of that term used in section 11 of the Act, he cannot ask for any commuted amount thereof. In our opinion therefore the commuted amount of pension would clearly fall under the second part of section 11 of the Act. In taking this view we are fortified by a decision of the High Court of Madras in C. Gopalachariar v. Deepachand Sowcar A. I. R. 1941 Mad. 207. Reference may also be made in this connection to the case of Union of India v. Jyoti Chit Fund and Finance and others A. I. R. 1976 S. C. 1163. In taking this view we are fortified by a decision of the High Court of Madras in C. Gopalachariar v. Deepachand Sowcar A. I. R. 1941 Mad. 207. Reference may also be made in this connection to the case of Union of India v. Jyoti Chit Fund and Finance and others A. I. R. 1976 S. C. 1163. One of the questions formulated in that case for answer by the Supreme Court was: Is it permissible in law for amounts representing provident fund contributions and pensionary benefits to be attached having due regard to sections 3 and 4 of the Provident Funds Act, section 11 of the Pensions Act and section 60 (1), Provisos (g) and (k) of C. P. C. " (underlining is by us ). It is worthy of notice that the words used in the question formu lated were amounts representing pensionary benefits and not pensions. Together with the above question, two other questions were formulated which it is not relevant to reproduce here. It should suffice to say that the three questions were answered in the following words: "we are inclined to hold, without hesitation, that on all the points the appellant is bound to succeed. " It may not be out of place to mention here that so far as the earlier mentioned cases are concerned, they only intepreted the word pension occurring in section 11 of the Act. Part II of section 11 did not come in for interpretation in any of those cases. The view that we are taking about the scope of Part II of section 11 can, by no means, be said to be inconsistent or contradictory to the view expressed in those cases. Since the amount sought to be attached in the present case was the commuted amount of the pension that was protected by Part II of the Act the appeal should fail on that account alone. Since, however, a reference was also made to section 12, in his argument by the learned counsel, it would be expedient that we address ourselves that part of the argument as well. Section 12 of the Act reads as follows: "assignments, etc. Since, however, a reference was also made to section 12, in his argument by the learned counsel, it would be expedient that we address ourselves that part of the argument as well. Section 12 of the Act reads as follows: "assignments, etc. in anticipation of pension, to be void: All assignments, agreements, orders, sales and securities of every kind made by the person entitled to any pension, pay or allowance mentioned in section 11, in respect of any money not payable at or before the making thereof, on account of any such pension, pay or allowance, or for giving or assigning any future interest therein, are null and void," A perusal of the above would show that section 12 renders null and void all assignments and agreements etc. in respect of money not payable at or before the making of such assignment or agreement, on account of any pension to which the person making the assignment or agree ment may be entitled. We have already reproduced earlier the com promise that was entered into between the parties. The mode of payment of the decretal amount agreed upon in the compromise was that the defendant was to pay Rs. 50/- in monthly instalments and was also to pay Rs. 500/- from each of the commutations granted to them from time to time. It was further stipulated that, in the event of default, it will be open to the decree-holder appellants to get the decree executed by attaching the commutation granted to the defendants. A reading of the compromise indicates that the commutations referred to therein were commutations to be granted to the defendants subsequent to the date of the compromise. In view of the language contained in sec. 12 of the Act, however, no assignment or agreement can be made in regard to the amount which was not due on account of the pension on the date thereof. It will, therefore, follow that the agreement contained in the compromise relating to the execution of the decree was null and void as also concluded by the lower court of appeal. The decree- holder could not, therefore, ask for attachment of the commuted amount on the basis of that condition, contained in the compromise decree. Thus looked at from any angle, this appeal does not carry any force. The appeal accordingly fails and is hereby dismissed. The decree- holder could not, therefore, ask for attachment of the commuted amount on the basis of that condition, contained in the compromise decree. Thus looked at from any angle, this appeal does not carry any force. The appeal accordingly fails and is hereby dismissed. In view of particular circumstances of the case, however, the parties are directed to bear their own costs. .