JUDGMENT : Hari Swarup, J. This revision has been filed against an order of the first appellate court setting aside its earlier order by exercising powers u/s 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 2. One Kunj Behari filed a suit against Ramlal, Shyam Sunder and Ram Jiwan. The suit was decreed exparte on 6-4-1967. On 8-4-1967 an application was moved by the Defendants for setting aside the exparte decree. During the pendency of this application, Ramlal died on 9-7-1967. An application for substitution of his legal representatives was made that was allowed on 27-1-1968. Smt. Kesar, Daya Shanker, Ram Shanker and Shiv Kumar were brought on record as legal representatives of Ramlal. On 27-4-1968, the application to set aside the ex-parte decree was dismissed by the trial court. An appeal was filed against this order by Shyam Sunder and Ram Jiwan and also the name of Ramlal was shown as the Appellant. His legal representatives were neither the Appellants nor Respondents. The appellate court, by its order dated 22-7-1969, allowed the appeal and also the application to set aside the ex-parte decree, with the result that the decree passed ex-parte was ordered to be set aside. On 5-9-1970 the Plaintiff moved an application in the appellate court with a prayer that the order dated 22-7-1969 be recalled and the trial court be directed not to proceed with the case. The appellate court has allowed this application by purporting to exercise power u/s 151 CPC and has directed the appeal to be listed for rehearing. It is against this order that the present revision has been preferred. 3. The learned first temporary Civil Judge has belaboured under misapprehension of facts. He has stated in his judgment that the previous order was passed by him in ignorance of fact that Ramlal was dead. The present judgment shows further ignorance of fact. He appears to think that none representing the interest of Ramlal is on record. He has given his judgment on the premise that the previous order of his had been passed to give some benefits to a dead person. He has forgotten that after Randal's death his legal representatives had been brought on record and they were the Defendants in the case after Randal's death. The effect of substitution was that the name of Ramlal no longer existed but of his legal representatives came on the record. He has forgotten that after Randal's death his legal representatives had been brought on record and they were the Defendants in the case after Randal's death. The effect of substitution was that the name of Ramlal no longer existed but of his legal representatives came on the record. They were all alive. It is on this misapprehension of facts that the court below has applied the decisions of the Supreme Court, this Court and other Courts in setting aside the earlier order. In Rameshwar Prasad and Others Vs. Shyam Beharilal Jagannath and Others, AIR 1963 SC 1901 all the Plaintiffs whose suit had been dismissed had filed an appeal and thereafter one of them died and his heirs were not brought on record. Similarly in Baij Nath and Another Vs. Ram Bharose and Others, AIR 1953 All 565 out of the three Defendants one had died and his legal representatives had not been brought on record. There is no doubt that a decree cannot be altered in favour of persons who are dead or are not on record as parties. In the present case, however, the effect of the appellate order dated 22-7-1969 was to give benefit not to any dead person but to the Defendants who were alive and though parties in the suit were not parties in the appeal. To such a case Order 41 Rule 4 CPC was clearly applicable, which provides: Where there are more Plaintiffs or more Defendants than one in a suit, and the decree appealed from proceeds on any ground common to all the Plaintiffs or to all the Defendants, any one of the Plaintiffs or of the Defendants may appeal from the whole decree, and there upon the Appellate Court may reverse or vary the decree in favour of all the Plaintiffs or Defendants, as the case may be. 4. Interpreting this provision the Supreme Court in Mahabir Prasad v. Jaga Ram and Ors. 1971 SC 742 ruled : Power of the appellate court under Order 41 Rule 4 to vary or modify the decree by a Subordinate Court arises when one of the, persons out of many against whom a decree or an order had been made on a ground which was common to him and others has appealed. 1971 SC 742 ruled : Power of the appellate court under Order 41 Rule 4 to vary or modify the decree by a Subordinate Court arises when one of the, persons out of many against whom a decree or an order had been made on a ground which was common to him and others has appealed. That power may be exercised when other persons who were parties to the proceedings before the Subordinate Court and against whom a decree proceed on a ground which was common to the Appellant and to those other persons are either not impleaded as parties to the appeal or are impleaded as Respondents. In view of Rule 4 of Order 41 CPC the order passed by the Court at the time of allowing the appeal must be held to be a valid order. 5. As the final order passed in appeal was not against law, it could not be set aside by the court in exercise of the powers u/s 151 Code of Civil Procedure. Section 151, CPC provides : Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. By passing the present order the court below has not remedied any abuses of the process of court but has set aside a valid order on assumption of facts which do not exist and ignoring facts which did exist. He has ignored the fact that the legal representatives of Ramlal had been substituted and were on record. Section 151 CPC does not authorise a Court to set aside a valid earlier order on the basis of misunderstanding and ignorance of facts. Learned Civil Judge had thus exercised a jurisdiction not vested in him by law. 6. In the result the revision is allowed and the impugned order dated 10-9-1973 is set aside. Parties shall bear their own costs.